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 Maurice Dobb (1900-1976) was a political economist at 
Cambridge University from 1924-1976.  Dobb made numerous 
contributions in the fields of economics, history, 
politics, sociology, and philosophy of science.  In spite 
of his impressive contributions and accomplishments there 
has been a relative neglect of his work, especially a 
comprehensive study of his work as a whole.  This 
dissertation is a contribution toward a more 
comprehensive understanding of the political economy of 
Maurice Dobb.  An institutional interpretation of Maurice 
Dobb is employed.  In the first chapter of the 
dissertation Dobb’s overarching contributions to social 
science are enunciated and his economic histories 
analyzed.  In Chapter 2 it is shown that Dobb’s economic 
histories initiated the emergence of a school of economic 
history which now constitutes a unique approach to 
history, or a separate tradition of historians.  Several 
of the contributing economic historians of this tradition 
are outlined and scrutinized.  Chapter 3 unfolds the 
political economy of Maurice Dobb.  Emphasis is placed
iv 
 
upon his institutional approach to political economy, his 
critique of mainstream neoclassical economic theory, and 
Dobb’s theory of capitalist economic crisis.  In Chapter 4 
Dobb’s methodology and philosophical underpinnings are 
examined and delineated.  Finally in Chapter 5 several 
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This dissertation will scrutinize the political 
economy of Maurice Dobb.  Dobb’s work has been relatively 
neglected, especially in comparison to his contemporary 
economic colleagues at Cambridge University.  Therefore, 
from a history of economic thought perspective alone, an 
analysis of Maurice Dobb’s contribution to political 
economy seems warranted.  However, several other reasons 
make a reconsideration of the historical economic work of 
Maurice Dobb both meaningful and timely.  First, Dobb’s 
political economy was heavily influenced by classical 
political economy, especially the economy of Karl Marx.  
Dobb successfully demonstrated that classical political 
economy and Marxian economics provided a basis for the 
development of economic theory and historical logic for the 
theoretical analysis of social being in the twentieth 
century (and beyond) which is often more “fruitful” (Dobb 
1946:8) than the mainstream alternative.  Second, Dobb 
developed an early theoretical critique of neoclassical 





informs.  With the worldwide return of neoliberal policies 
in the last three decades, Dobb’s critiques speak directly 
to the current generation of economists, politicians, and 
world citizens.  Third, Dobb emphasized an institutional 
approach to political economy.  The neoliberal policy that 
was implemented in the 1980s has led to many domestic and 
global failures and socioeconomic crises. There is now a 
significant body of literature advocating, either directly 
or tacitly, a more institutional approach to socioeconomic 
policy.  In fact, most recently, three of the most renowned 
neoliberals of the late 1980s and early 1990s have 
pronounced the importance of an institutionally informed 
approach toward economic theory and social policy (i.e., 
John Gray 1998, 2004; Francis Fukuyama 2005, 2006; Jeffrey 
Sachs 2005).  Dobb’s development of an institutionally 
enlightened political economy might be extremely 
informative for the development of contemporary 
institutional approaches to social being and the 
construction of open societies.  Especially important is 
Dobb’s accentuation upon a historically informed 
institutional political economy.  Finally, Dobb initiated 
the development of a specific approach toward historical 





Maurice Dobb potentially can advise both contemporary 
social theory and political policy. 
This dissertation will be divided into four main 
chapters, along with a fifth chapter outlining the 
conclusions of the study. In the first chapter, an 
institutional reading of Dobb’s political economy 
generally, and particularly his Studies in the Development 
of Capitalism (hereafter Studies), is developed.  Also, an 
analysis of the ensuing so-called “transition debate” from 
feudalism to capitalism, which emerged from Paul Sweezy’s 
reading and commentary of Dobb’s Studies, is constructed.  
Special focus is given to Dobb’s analysis of historical 
periods of change, or the moments of sociohistorical 
institutional transformation and the revolutionary forces 
or individual actions that cause the manifestation of 
socioeconomic change.   
In the second chapter, attention is turned to the 
influence of Studies upon the British Marxian Socioeconomic 
Historians tradition.  More specific focus will be given 
the work of four theorists (i.e., Rodney Hilton, 
Christopher Hill, Eric Hobsbawm, and E. P. Thompson) of 
this tradition.  Focus will extend from their explicit 
historical work to their philosophical and methodological 





use, interpretation, and development of Marxian historical 
materialism and its affinities and variance with that of 
Dobb. 
In the third chapter, Dobb’s theoretical work on the 
political economy of capitalism will be the agenda.  This 
aspect of Dobb’s work has been the most underappreciated.  
In this chapter, the general focus will be upon Dobb’s work 
concerning institutional change in human societies, or what 
Dobb dubbed “stages of development.”   In particular, 
Dobb’s analysis of the stages of development in capitalism 
during the late nineteenth and twentieth century will be 
analyzed.  Special emphasis will be upon Dobb’s historical 
dissection (e.g., Dobb 1925) of the rise of the capitalist 
undertakers (or entrepreneurs) and the institutional role 
this class must fulfill for the successful reproduction of 
the capitalistic stages of development.  Further focus will 
be upon Dobb’s attention to the institutional making of, 
and significance of, the wage-system as the predominant 
social relationship of the capitalist epoch (e.g., Dobb 
1928).  Third, Dobb’s stages of capitalist development in 
the twentieth century (e.g., Dobb 1946 chapters 7 and 8; 
1952; 1953; 1967), will be scrutinized, with special focus 
on his views of crisis (Dobb 1937 chapter 3; 1952), and the 





The fourth chapter will constitute the most innovative 
section of the dissertation. It is here that a Dobbian 
theoretical and applied methodology will be defined, as 
will the philosophical underpinnings of a Dobbian approach 
to social being.  Dobb’s ontological presuppositions will 
be underscored and the epistemology of the process of 
abstraction will be outlined. 
 If Dobb fails to offer a complete articulation of the 
philosophical underpinning (i.e., strong ontological theses 
and a bold epistemology), he certainly initiates the 
questions and the critique that would inspire the 
construction of an internally consistent philosophy of 
social science.  Moreover, he convincingly demonstrates the 
necessity for a self-conscious philosophy of science to 
ground and substantiate social knowledge.    
 A final comment can be made to the timeliness of 
Dobb’s analysis of the crisis-ridden tendencies of the 
capitalist mode of production and the antagonistic 
characteristics of the institutional forms that support it.  
There are a number of heterodox economists, and as 
mentioned above, even some orthodox economists who maintain 
that the neoliberal institutional forms that arose 
following the post-1970 crisis are deeply contradictory 





current global neoliberal inspired institutional system has 
been argued to be on the brink of socioeconomic breakdown, 
financial instability, and perhaps a deep global depression 
(see, for example, Aglietta 1998; Brenner 1998; Coats 1998; 
Crotty and Dymski 1999; Krugman 1999, 1997; O’Hara 2000; 
Palley 1998; R. Reich 2002; Soros 1998-9).   In short, many 
economists maintain that for most world citizens it is 
harder today to make a living, even harder to make a life, 
than it was forty years ago.  Americans in particular are 
working longer, at the neglect of both family and 
community, and often for less money (see, for example, 
Warren and Tyagi 2003; Folbre 2002; Wilkinson 2005; Kawachi 
and Kennedy 2002; Putnam 2000).     
The static analysis of mainstream microeconomic theory 
seems incapable, if not uninterested, in addressing such 
concerns.  Mainstream macroeconomic theory has also become 
less interested in a dynamic approach to social theory and 
seems to have become even less institutionally informed 
than the macroeconomics of three decades ago.  A study (or 
perhaps rereading) of the political economy of Maurice Dobb 
and the tradition that he inspired may help to both 
understand and address the current crisis in its current 
stage of economic development.  Many of the dilemmas and 





social theorists and community citizens alike are the types 
of dynamic issues and institutional problems that Dobb 
attempted to both underscore and answer.       
 
1.1. Maurice Herbert Dobb and  
Political Economy 
 
 Maurice Herbert Dobb was one of the most influential 
economists of his generation.  He was a member of the 
economic faculty at Cambridge University from 1924-1967, a 
time when, of course, J. M. Keynes, Joan Robinson, Michael 
Kalecki, Piero Sraffa, and Nicolas Kaldor were also members 
of the faculty (this is just to mention a few of the most 
well known of Dobb’s heterodox colleagues at Cambridge).  
It is astonishing that while there are volumes written on 
the economic ideas and works of his colleagues, Dobb’s work 
has been comparatively neglected.  This comparative neglect 
is all the more remarkable when the impact of his work is 
taken into account.  
Maurice Herbert Dobb was the most prominent Marxian 
political economist of his day.  He was one of only a 
handful of English-speaking economists1 strongly sympathetic 
to the writings of Marx, and the only one who was 
established at a leading University.  His Studies in the 
                                                 
1 Other prominent Marxian contemporaries of Dobb who were publishing in 





Development of Capitalism (1946) was perhaps Dobb’s most 
celebrated academic accomplishment.  This book not only 
influenced the interpretation of Marx for a generation of 
Marxists, but also changed the questions asked of history 
by mainstream historians, and generated unique (Dobbian) 
insights. 
Political Economy and Capitalism (1937) was Dobb’s 
most abstract and theoretical work.  He would underscore 
many forgotten, but essential classical political economy 
insights.2  Although he expressed a degree of 
dissatisfaction with the book’s final achievements,3 it was 
here that Dobb first insisted on the importance of the 
                                                 
2 Ronald Meek (1978) has commented that the publication of Political 
Economy and Capitalism will for “future historians of economic thought 
[…] probably date the emergence of Marxist economics as a really 
serious economic discipline.”  It would probably be more accurate to 
say that it will date the first serious critical scrutiny aimed toward 
the Jevonian Revolution, merged with a theoretical attempt to return to 
Classical Political Economy, with its firm roots in history and 
institutional analysis.  This is not to deny the importance of Marx to 
Dobb’s analysis, but to indicate that Dobb’s work has greater 
methodological importance than merely its Marxian sympathies.  This 
latter return to classical political economy is of special importance 
in that it initiated a revaluation of (social) scientific methodology 
and the construction of theory.  Of further importance chronologically, 
Dobb’s book appears at the same time that the Keynesian Revolution 
begins. It is significant to mention that (Cambridge) Keynesianism was 
inspired, in part, as a methodological and theoretical protest of the 
then dominant Marshallian/Jevonian tradition.  However, Keynes had 
erroneously implicated all of the classical tradition within the 
Marshallian/Jevonian paradigm.  In this sense Dobb’s Political Economy 
and Capitalism, along with his Theories of Value since Adam Smith 
(1973) can be seen as a defense against the Keynesian underestimation 
of the historical, institutional, and especially methodological  
insights of the Classical tradition. 
3 Dobb writes that Political Economy and Capitalism “was too hurriedly 
written and not based sufficiently deeply in theoretical thinking, so 
that much of it was superficial, too-little constructive or matured 





history of economic thought in the construction of 
contemporary economic theory.   In Dobb’s last major work 
Theories of Value and Distribution since Adam Smith (1973) 
many of the themes from Political Economy and Capitalism 
are revisited, further developed, and reinterpreted in 
light of Sraffa’s Production of Commodities by Means of 
Commodities (1960).  Maurice Dobb’s affiliation with 
Sraffian Political Economy predates the publication of 
Sraffa’s book in 1960.  They were not only long-standing 
colleagues at Trinity College but also had an extended 
association as collaborators in the editing of the Works 
and Correspondence of David Ricardo.  In all, eleven 
volumes of Ricardo’s works and correspondence were 
published between 1951 and 1973 (see Pollitt 1985). 
Dobb was also the foremost English-speaking economist 
studying the political economy of the twentieth-century 
Soviet Union.  His Soviet Economic Development Since 1917 
(1928), revised and updated in 1948, introduced several 
generations of English-speaking economists to the subject 
and history of the Soviet system.4  Dobb further 
participated in so-called calculation debate concerning the 
                                                 
4 “Professional studies of the Soviet economy were then virtually 
unknown and the information value of the book was widely appreciated, 
notably by economists such as J. M. Keynes and D. H. Robertson who had 






political economy of socialism, with Ludwig von Mises, 
Oskar Lange, Paul Sweezy, and others.5 
 Dobb’s contributions have a wide versatility, 
demonstrating substantial breadth of knowledge in an 
impressive number of areas. As indicated above, he was the 
foremost scholar of his generation in Marxian economic 
theory and Soviet studies.  As a radical political 
economist, Dobb’s depth of understanding of neoclassical 
economics and the Marginalist tradition was highly 
regarded.  Dobb held a deep passion, interest, and 
knowledge of economic history. He was a leading historian 
of thought of his generation and maintained a lifetime 
interest in the evolution of economic ideas.  His works in 
underdevelopment and the economics of development and 
planning are regarded among his most substantial 
contributions.    
                                                 
5 Some of Dobb’s positions on this issue first appeared in his Russian 
Economic Development (1928).  However, by the 1930s his position began 
to change.  He had seen no necessary role for markets prior to his 1930 
articles on the issue, but in the 1930s he came to the position that 
markets for consumer goods are relatively unproblematic.  However,  
markets for the factors of production are the culprit undermining the 
adjustment process of capitalist production.  Dobb certainly understood 
that all markets for factors of production were liable to maladjustment 
and crisis.  However, his own emphasis was on the entrepreneurial 
function, and the roles of the (socially) independent entrepreneur in 
capitalist production. To put it crudely, Dobb believed that investment 
was more efficient in the hands of a central, or semiautonomous body, 
rather than in the hands of the independent capitalist undertaking 
class.  Dobb’s 1930s articles are reprinted in Dobb (1955).  Some of 
Dobb’s position with respect to the relative inefficiency of 
independent entrepreneurship and the relative efficient of semi-





1.1.1. A Brief Biographical Sketch 
 
 Dobb was born on July 24, 1900, in London, to middle- 
class parents.  His father, Walter Herbert Dobb, was a 
retailer draper and his mother, Elsie Annie Moir, came from 
a financially “decayed” Scottish merchant family.  Dobb 
expressed his upbringing as politically “conservative” and 
religiously “non-conformist-Presbyterian,” otherwise 
“ordinary.”  He received a public English education and 
then went on to Pembroke College, Cambridge. He had 
originally intended to study history, but just before 
leaving London, he encountered several unorthodox writers, 
such as Karl Marx, J. A. Hobson, Bernard Shaw, and William 
Morris; these writers inspired him to study economics 
instead. 
 While at Cambridge, Dobb was a member of Keynes’s 
Political Economy Club, where he read a paper on Marx which 
Keynes approved.6  Dobb was involved with several student 
and political organizations as an undergraduate at 
Cambridge.  Following his graduation, he was able to obtain 
a (two-year) Studentship for Research at the London School 
of Economics.  In 1922, while in London, he became a member 
                                                 






of the British Communist Party and remained a member until 
his death on August 17, 1976. 
 
1.1.2. The Institutional and Methodological 
   Emphasis in the Political Economy of 
       Maurice Dobb 
 
 Dobb’s Ph.D. dissertation concerned the history and 
theory of the capitalist “undertaker” or entrepreneurship, 
which became the basis of his first published monograph, 
Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress (1925), hereafter 
CESP.  The historical section of CESP would provide Dobb 
the basis for his Studies in the Development of Capitalism 
(1946).  In addition, it was in CESP that Dobb first 
emphasized both the importance of methodology and the 
fruitfulness of, and necessity for, an institutional 
approach to the study of political economy.  The three 
themes, history, methodology, and institutional analysis, 
would be the paradigm pillars for Dobb’s studies in 
political economy.   
Dobb’s emphasis on the institutional physiology of 
society and the role of methodology in social science can 
be subdivided into five main academic themes present in 
CESP, which would be further developed and, in turn, would 





These themes were (1) an emphasis upon the 
institutional influences that determine (a) the (objective) 
historical circumstances and (b) the (subjective) beliefs 
and motivations of individuals;7 (2) an insistence upon the 
necessity of historical analysis prior to the construction 
of socioeconomic theory; (3) a critical assessment of 
mainstream or neoclassical (implicit) presuppositions; (4) 
the decisive role played by the monopolization of social 
resources (or factors of production) for the direction of 
socioeconomic development; and (5) the importance of 
historical processes of social differentiation and class-
advantage, for both the direction of history and for the 
forming of the institutional physiology of society. 
Although Dobb would later describe CESP as relatively 
“unsuccessful” (1978:117), the themes listed above, which 
were first introduced in this book, would recur in 
virtually every subsequent academic publication of Dobb.    
 
1.1.3. The Theoretical Themes of Dobb’s  
   Political Economy 
 
 Many of Dobb’s theoretical themes are quite familiar; 
other themes are relatively well known but remain under-
                                                 
7 This theme is of the utmost importance.  It constitutes for Dobb a 
particular interpretation of Marx’s theory of history.  Dobb’s 
interpretation was a direct challenge to the then Marxian orthodox and 
continues to be a theoretical challenge and alternative to the 
technological determinist interpretation of Gerry Cohen (1978) and the 





analyzed and at times misunderstood, while still other 
themes have all but escaped full critical appreciation and 
theoretical scrutiny.  Dobb’s theoretical themes can be 
divided into three categories, the exoteric, underanalyzed, 
and esoteric.    
A few of Dobb’s exoteric themes include his work on 
(1) the history of the development of capitalism; (2) the 
issues surrounding the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism; (3) the defense of classical political economy 
of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, J.S. Mill, and Karl Marx, 
along with an insistence on its relevance for contemporary 
analysis; (4) the strong Marxian sympathies which inform 
all his analysis; and (5) the sustained criticism of the 
“Jevonian Revolution” and neoclassical tradition. 
Other more-or-less exoteric themes, which have 
remained relatively underanalyzed, include the following: A 
(qualified) structuralism informs all of Dobb’s theoretical 
and historical analysis.  It is Dobb’s (qualified) 
structuralism that has him insist upon reconstructing the 
internal articulation of a mode of production to understand 
its “laws of motion.”  Dobbian structuralism offers 
economic history a degree of direction and broad 





sort of) structuralism drives Dobbian analysis in Studies, 
Dobb’s structuralism itself has escaped rigorous analysis.8  
Dobb’s explicit theoretical pronouncements on 
methodology emphasize the importance of the process of 
abstraction.  In spite of the importance and practical 
necessity of employing abstraction in scientific activity 
the theoretical process has not been rigorously 
scrutinized.  Ironically, although Dobb’s commentary has 
received some acclaim, theoretical analysis of the process 
of abstraction has barely proceeded beyond Dobb’s own 
explicit pronouncements.  Thus, Dobb’s theoretical 
methodology is appreciated but remains underanalyzed.  
Dobb begins Studies with a definition of capitalism as 
a mode of production, and similarly defines feudalism as a 
mode of production.  Moreover, a mode of production is said 
to determine and define the historical epoch.  It is well 
known that Marx first developed “mode of production” as a 
concept; Dobb borrows this concept from Marx.  However, 
there has been very little discussion concerning Dobb’s 
interpretation of Marx with respect specifically to the 
                                                 
8 The importance of Dobb’s structuralism is threefold: (1) it is a 
particular reading and interpretation of Marx, and differentiates from 
the two other main Marxian structuralist interpretations (see footnote 
9 below); (2) it is capable of reconciling the famous (methodological) 
debate between E.P. Thompson and Perry Anderson; and (3) it is the 
unifying paradigm of the Marxian economic historian tradition (see 





Marxian notion of “mode of production.”  For example, 
Dobb’s employment of the term seems quite different from 
that of other Marxian structuralists, such as Althusserians9 
or G. A. Cohen (1978).10 
In Studies and in several other writings Dobb presses 
the importance of class-struggle analysis. This is not 
merely an ideological bias but rather, Dobb suggests, 
class-struggle is an empirical manifestation that occurs in 
the unstable and contradictory movement of history.   
In more methodological terms, ‘class’ is a forced 
abstraction upon the theorist’s consciousness in an attempt 
to take account and make sense of social reality.  The 
physiocrats and classical economists constructed their 
economic theories around the new class relations that had 
emerged in the late eighteenth century.  However, the 
significance of these new relations, according to Dobb, was 
not adequately analyzed until Marx.  Dobb aimed to follow 
in the footsteps of Marx, to appropriate, understand, and 
                                                 
9 The Althusserians in mind here are especially Althusser and Balibar 
(1970:199ff) and Hindess and Hirst (1975).  In the case of the latter, 
they make the difference between their conception of mode of production 
and Dobb’s explicit (1975:263-6).  However, they misinterpret Dobb’s 
use of the term to such a gross degree that it makes their commentary 
not only useless but also obstructive.  
10 Although Cohen, Althusser, and Dobb are all structualists, it would 
be a gross error to conflate their differing branches of structuralism.  
In this sense, it can be argued that there are three main, otherwise 
separate and distinct, structuralist interpretations of Marx:  (1) 
Cohen’s technological determinism, (2) Althusserian overdetermination, 





explain the historical circumstance, events, and processes 
that generated particular class formations and various 
social alliances, and explain their significance in the 
particular stage of economic development11 and/or the 
historical economic epoch.   
In his 1937 article, “The Economic Basis of Class 
Conflict,” Dobb makes an explicit proclamation that class 
is something that happens in history and, as such, is both 
an elusive and malleable category.12  For Dobb, class is not 
a static category; rather class is a combination of 
historical circumstances (e.g., institutional physiology, 
stratification of opportunities etc.), political reactions, 
and consciousness or beliefs.13  Dobb’s notion of class 
underscores the necessity for studying history and the 
importance of being self-conscious of the particular 
                                                 
11 Stage of economic development and economic epoch are being employed 
in a technical Dobbian sense as defined in Studies (1946:45). 
12 “Amid the complex and changing constellation of social tendencies it 
would be a particularly vain task to look for a precise, logically 
neat, definition of class; and those who have thought that the notion 
must be so defined to be real have had small difficulty in 
demonstrating that it cannot exit” (Dobb 1955[1937]:94). 
13 Dobb’s conception of class was elaborated by E.P. Thompson 
(1965:295), “Class is a social and cultural formation (often finding 
institutional expression) which cannot be defined abstractly or in 
isolation, but only in terms of relationship with other classes; and 
ultimately the definition can only be made in the medium of time – that 
is, action and reaction, change and conflict.  When we speak of a class 
we are thinking of a very loosely defined body of people who share the 
same categories of interests, social experiences, traditions and value-
system, who have a disposition to behave as a class, to define 
themselves in their actions and in their consciousness in relations to 
other groups of people in class ways.  But class itself is not a thing 





process of abstraction or the methodology a theorist (often 
tacitly) employs.  
  
1.1.4. Esoteric Themes of Dobb’s Political 
   Economy 
 
Finally, there are four esoteric but otherwise 
cornerstone theoretical themes in Dobb’s work.  It is 
especially the esoteric themes below that will direct this 
dissertation.  Foremost is Dobb’s institutional analysis 
and emphasis upon the institutional physiology of society 
for understanding social reality.   
As mentioned above, this emphasis upon the 
institutional physiology was first initiated in CESP. In 
subsequent writings, Dobb would deepen and enrich his 
institutional analysis and his institutional methodology.  
The enrichment of his institutional analysis would (a) 
accentuate the role of history for theoretical analysis and 
(b) reveal the presence of the past in current historical 
circumstances, or the contemporary stage of economic 
development.  Moreover, his emphasis on institutional 
analysis would eventually develop into (c) an explicit 
methodological orientation14 and further provide him (d) the 
foundation for his interpretation of economic doctrines and 
                                                 
14 Dobb becomes more conscious and rigorous with respect to methodology 
beginning with explicit pronouncements in Political Economy and 






their tendency toward an ideological bias as apologetics 
for the particular political circumstances and for the 
historical stage of economic development, along with its 
mode of distribution.15  Dobb’s institutional emphasis was 
the basis of his theoretical work.   
More empirically, it would be the institutional 
emphasis of Dobbian analysis that informed his most 
insightful commentary on economic development and planning.  
Not only did Dobb himself employ and develop institutional  
analysis, but he urged other economic historians and 
theorists to take more seriously institutional analysis and 
the role of (human created) institutions in (a) shaping the 
beliefs, motives, and actions of individual human beings; 
(b) determining the historical objective conditions that 
confront them; and (c) understanding the evolution and 
direction of human history. 
 In Studies and during his ensuing discussion with Paul 
Sweezy and others, Dobb relentlessly expressed the urgency 
of reconstructing and understanding the internal 
articulation of a mode of production.  The internal 
articulation includes both the institutional physiology of 
                                                 
15 This theme is the basis of his initial assessment of modern economic 
doctrine and forms the basis of the arguments in Chapters 5 and 6 of 
Political Economy and Capitalism. In his last work, Theories of Value 
and Distribution since Adam Smith, this theme is the basis of the 





society and the actual (historical) actions taken by 
individuals.  To grasp the internal articulation of a 
society is to be able to explain episodes and events of 
history, hence to understand a society’s ‘laws of motion.’  
Dobb’s historical-institutionalism advocates that the 
understanding of a society’s ‘laws of motion’ is both a 
theoretical and empirical endeavor.  For Dobb there is no 
necessary separation between the work of historians and the 
work of social (or economic) theorists.  In this sense, a 
Dobbian analysis is properly understood as social history.16 
 The second esoteric theme is the notion of agency that 
Dobb employs throughout his (especially historical) studies 
of political economy.  This sense of agency grounds Dobb’s 
conception of both historical change and revolutionary 
action.  According to Dobb, the everyday actions of human 
beings tend to reproduce the historical conditions of their 
                                                 
16 The term social history is difficult to define precisely.  
Metaphorically, it is historical analysis that changes the emphasis 
from drums, trumpets, and swords to knives, forks, and hoes.  Less 
metaphorically, it is a change of focus from analysis of political 
leaders and their reaction to political events to the daily occurrences 
and acts of ‘ordinary people’ that lead to political manifestation.  It 
is to recognize that, more often than is acknowledged by mainstream 
academics, history is ‘made,’ not by political leaders but by the 
political action of ‘ordinary people.’  It is in this sense, to put it 
more negatively, that the practice of social history does not mean 
merely to add social content to the study of history.  Nor is it to say 
that social analysis must be rooted in history.  Rather, it is to 
deepen and modify the approach to the study of social-being as a whole.  
It insists (ontologically) that social theory and historical analysis 
are trying to explain the same (social) things, and ultimately employ 
(epistemologically) very similar, if not the same, modes of explanation 





lives.  If human beings were not to carry out these 
(everyday or tacit) actions, society would not be 
reproduced.  There is a revolutionary potential that is 
revealed with this Dobbian insight.  Latent in the everyday 
action of human beings is the usually unintended 
consequence of reproducing social institutions.  Historical 
change, along with transformations of society and its 
institutional physiology, may then occur when individuals 
(un)consciously change their everyday actions.  In brief, 
it is the everyday or tacit action of individuals within 
society that either reproduces or (potentially) transforms 
the institutional conditions and society itself.  In turn, 
the institutional physiology of society determines the 
conditions upon which human beings can act and form their 
subjective beliefs.  This could be termed the institutional 
dialectic within Dobbian political economy.   
It is the presence of and commitment to this 
institutional dialectic that allows a Dobbian analysis to 
avoid the ontological mistake and theoretical reduction of 
the lower classes to mere victims of the (political) power-
elite.  Moreover, the institutional dialectic theoretically 
engenders and empirically recognizes that all people have 
the power to change history and transform (or reproduce) 





against a second ontological mistake of viewing history as 
merely a function of the power-elite.   
Instead, Dobb is resolute upon the effective agency of 
the socially positioned lower classes.  In a Dobbian 
analysis, the proper understanding of history and social 
being requires that the beliefs, desires, and actions of 
all people must be historically accounted for in a 
relational form. However, the motor of historical 
transformations and the political impetus of social being 
have historically proven to be the beliefs, desires, and 
actions of the socially lower classes.  In Dobbian 
historical-institutionalism, the lower class, in their 
interactions with other classes, become the motor of 
history and the (usually unconscious) architects of the 
very institutional conditions upon which their actions (and 
lives) depend.    
 An application of this sense of (especially lower-
class) agency in Dobb’s work is his hypothesis in Studies 
that it was not the merchant class that formed the 
revolutionary force of sixteenth-century England, when the 
conditions for capitalist development were created.  
Rather, it was the will and political action of the 





farmers that brought about the epoch-breaking forces of 
history.17 
 The historical and ontological potency of this new 
sense of agency upon which Dobb insisted engendered a 
methodological shift in historical analysis.  In Dobbian 
analysis, the notion of human agency and intentional action 
becomes the paramount problematic.  For Dobb history is 
never merely a recording of events.  This is because the 
events themselves must be explained, and in turn the 
explanation requires an account of beliefs, motivation, and 
intention of the human agents involved.   
 To put it differently, from a Dobbian perspective, the 
notion of human agency (and the problem for both history 
and social theory) is to describe human historical 
experience while recognizing a historical dialectic.  The 
historical dialectic can be described as follows: the more 
or less intentional actions of individual human beings are 
ultimately what makes history and society; and the 
conditions for intentional actions of individuals are made 
by history and society.  The importance of this seemingly 
paradoxical historical dialectic is that Dobb resists any 
sort of (theoretical) reductionist collapse of both society 
                                                 
17 What Marx termed in volume III of Capital the “really revolutionary 





(e.g., neoclassical economics) and individuals (e.g., 
Keynesianism).  Rather, both individuals and society are 
given ontological status and an ontological hiatus between 
them is recognized.   
Dobb argued that the social ontology of the science of 
economics tends to be radically misconceived.   Dobb would 
insist that the science of economics is concerned with 
enduring relations between individuals (e.g., worker and 
capitalist, borrower and lender, producer and consumer, 
etc.) and with the relations between these relations (i.e., 
the institutional physiology).  In this sense, Dobb 
conceives social being as both radically relational and 
historically conditioned.18         
                                                 
18 In the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, numerous social 
philosophers argued for a corresponding relational social ontology.   
There is, however, a significant distinction between the foundational 
derivation of later social theorists and Dobb.  Several of these social 
theorists established the relational ontology of social being based 
upon the contradictions within the philosophy of social science (e.g., 
Bhaskar 1998, Lawson 1997, Archer 1995, A. Sayer 1984, Bourdieu 1990).   
Social theorists also approached this same position through an immanent 
reconciliation of the antinomies within social theory (e.g., Bhaskar 
1986, Bhaskar 1989, Giddens 1984, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, U. Beck 
1992.  Prior to these theorists, Dobb approached this position from the 
analysis of historical social forms and an immanent critique of 
mainstream conceptions of historical social revolutions and 
socioeconomic crises.  All of these foundational derivations should be 
viewed as mutually reinforcing and not necessarily antagonistic.  There 
has not been adequate recognition of the revolutionary potency and 
mutual supportive force between a Dobbian historical approach toward a 
relational social ontology and that of the more theoretical approaches.  
Part of the problem of recognition is that Dobb did not explicitly 
establish the theoretical import and philosophical foundation of his 
position.  E.P. Thompson attempts an articulation of a Dobbian 
analysis, but in the end, seems to abandon Dobb on theoretical and 





 Methodologically, the ever presence of the historical 
dialectic requires that the theorist, whether she or he be 
a historian or social theorist, account not only for 
events, but also for institutions, social relationships, 
individual beliefs, and culture.  This methodological shift 
further initiated the emergence of a tradition of economic 
historians.  The ontological and methodological commitment 
of this tradition is captured with their metaphor ‘history 
from the bottom up’ (this tradition will be addressed more 
fully in the following pages).       
 In short, with the ontological hint of the effective 
agency of the lower classes and the historical dialectic, 
this tradition of economic historians aims to articulate 
the institutions, culture, and beliefs that inform the 
epoch-making or epoch-breaking action that occurs from 
class struggle. 
 Dobb’s third esoteric theme is his periodization, or 
stages of historical development analysis for economic 
theory.  A stage of historical economic development can be 
contrasted with an economic epoch.  An epoch is defined by 
the predominant, relatively enduring, social relationship 
between the direct producers and their immediate rulers.  
This relationship can correspond to various institutional 





arrangement occur, while the predominant relationship 
between the direct producers and their immediate rulers 
remain intact, it is said that the economic epoch endures, 
while the stage of its historical development has been 
transformed (or modified).  Hence, a stage of historical 
economic development refers specifically to an enduring 
institutional physiology of society during a particular 
time of an economic epoch. 
 Dobbian theory of stages of development is, of course, 
inspired by (Dobb’s interpretation of) Marx and reminiscent 
of, but predates, the Uno School of Japan, the Social 
Structures of Accumulation of USA, and the Regulation 
School of France.  Dobbian stages of development theory is 
unique from these other traditions in that it is not merely 
a periodization theory of capitalist development but also 
applies such periodization analysis to feudal development, 
crisis, change, and transformation.       
The fourth esoteric theme of Dobb is his applied 
methodology.  If his methodological theorizing has been 
appreciated but underanalyzed, his methodological 
applications have been relatively ignored. One central aim 
of this dissertation is to articulate and model the 
methodology that Dobb applies to both historical and 





Dobb’s methodology is a self-conscious (although not 
explicitly articulated) process of abstraction.  It is 
suggested that Dobb’s process of abstraction pivots upon 
five basic theses.  One thesis is more methodological, and 
the other four more ontological.  First is the ‘theory 
thesis’: theory is necessary to both scientific activity 
and historical analysis alike.  More metaphorically, facts 
never speak for themselves.  Theory is compulsory for the 
interpretation of facts and indeed it is theory that gives 
facts their consequence and creates their very relevance. 
Second is the ‘material thesis’: Human beings’ ideas are 
conditioned by their practical or material experience.  
Third is the ‘internal articulation thesis’: Societies are 
structured and differentiated sets of social relations.  
Fourth is the ‘historical thesis’: Social relations are 
transitory.  Hence, theory too necessarily must change to 
as social relations are transformed.  Fifth is the ‘agency 
thesis’: All human action potentially has both stage-making 
and stage-breaking, along with epoch-making and epoch-
breaking effects. 
The process of abstraction Dobb applies is based on 
the above ontological theses, but the process itself is 
more epistemologically driven.  There are five moments to 





appropriate the (a) available data, (b) conventional 
wisdom, (c) analysis contradiction within current 
explanations, and (d) critique.19  The second moment is 
historical analysis proper and to historize categories, or 
the placing of events or categories in historical context.  
This moment attempts to understand the historical 
development and historical determination of a category, 
entity, or institutional form.  The third moment is 
institutional analysis.  It is in this step that the 
interconnectedness or disconnectedness of categories, 
entities, or institutional forms comes under scrutiny.  In 
this third moment, Dobb attempts to understand antagonisms 
or contradictions between institutional forms in order to 
determine which forms are “most influential in producing 
change” (1946:viii).  If potential for change, and/or the 
tendencies of an entity (or form), and/or the driving 
force(s) of a thing (or form) can be determined, a 
qualified prediction can be asserted or entertained.  The 
fourth moment is to offer an explanation of historical 
events, episodes, circumstances, or conditions.  It is here 
that a redescription may manifest or an explanatory 
                                                 
19 This first moment is a highly empirical and analytical step in the 
Dobbian process of abstraction.  Thus, although Dobb is highly critical 
of empiricism, he certainly does not reject empirical investigation as 
a first step.  Moreover, the first moment underscores the essential 





critique may be employed.  Finally, in the fifth moment, a 
policy recommendation can be offered, or political (and 
everyday) action informed.   
Dobb’s methodological themes are a central focus of 
this dissertation.  My interpretation of Dobb has been 
highly informed by Dobb’s emphasis on the process of 
abstraction and Dobbian methodological themes.  My 
contention is that focus upon Dobbian methodological themes 
leads to a deeper understanding of what drives Dobb’s 
intellectual flirtation and intentions with (economic) 
history. 
For Dobb (economic) history is a type of analogue to 
the laboratory scientific experiment conditions for the 
‘bouncer’ and ‘gate-keeper’ of social (economic) theory.  
However, at the same time Dobb is anxious that a commitment 
to any particular theory determines the facts that are 
‘discovered’ and how facts are interpreted.  Hence, for 
Dobb there is a peculiar dialectic between history and 
theory.  History conditions theory, but theory conditions 
our interpretation of history.  Historical facts are 
created in historical time, theory conditions historical 
facts and determined whether historical facts are either 
relevant or irrelevant.  Thus, for Dobb there is an urgency 





among social theorists.  This intellectual openness and 
nondogmatism becomes the foundational moment for the 
journal Past and Present, which Dobb helped found.  A 
chapter of this dissertation will be dedicated to more 
fully developing these Dobbian methodological themes.     
  
1.1.5. An Institutional Reading of Dobb:  
   From Static Analysis to Dynamic 
   Analysis 
 
In this dissertation special emphasis has been placed 
upon the esoteric themes of Dobb listed above.  Moreover, 
the interpretation of my reading of Dobb for this 
dissertation is institutionalist.  The institutionalist 
reading of Dobb is not employed arbitrarily; rather it 
manifests from Dobb’s own institutional approach to 
(historical) economic analysis, what can be termed his 
social history. 
As Tadeusz Kowalik (1978:145) has pointed out, Dobb’s 
institutional analysis is an attempt at a reorientation 
toward the study of economics from static analysis to a 
dynamic analysis.  When Dobb was writing, the primacy of 
static analysis not only was established in mainstream or 
neoclassical research, but it also characterized much of 
the research within Marxian theory.  Dobb intended to shift 





to a study of the institutional physiology of a society 
(Dobb 1946:32). By concentrating his analysis on 
institutional forms and the interaction between 
institutions, Dobb aimed to theorize social change.20   
To theorize social change is to be on a different 
level of abstraction from static analysis.  Essentially, 
                                                 
20 “Once the formal question of internal consistency is settled, the 
acceptance or rejection of a theory depends on one’s view of the 
appropriateness of the particular abstraction on which the theory is 
based.  This is necessarily a practical question, depending on the 
nature of the terrain and the character of the problem and the activity 
to which the theory is intended to relate” (Dobb 1937a:127).  When it 
comes to the questions of economic development and historical change, 
Dobb believed that confining the inquiry to the level of market 
equilibrium makes the inquiry “powerless to provide answers to certain 
questions.  By confining its examination of society to the level of the 
market, this type of inquiry also contributes to that mystification 
about the essential nature of capitalist society of which the history 
of economics, with its abstinence-theories and its wordplay about 
‘productivity’, is so prolific of examples” (Dobb 1946:32).  Dobb makes 
a similar point, but more specific to the neoclassical notion of 
equilibrium, in 1973:8-10.  Even when the analysis was to be ‘static,’ 
Dobb was often very suspicious of the notion of equilibrium.  With 
respect to the relationship between variables or entities, Dobb made a 
broad distinction between three levels of generalization.  “The most 
elementary form of generalisation consists of a statement, based on 
observation or on logical inference, that two variables are related in 
some manner, but without the relationship being defined.  Second in 
order comes the statement, in the form of a functional equation, which 
defines the movement of a particular quantity in terms of other 
variables to which it is related.  Third is a group of generalizations 
which together enable a certain equilibrium to be postulated” (Dobb 
1955[1929]:21).  Generally, economic enquiry aspired to the third type 
of generalization.  However, with respect to the markets for the 
factors of production the notion of equilibrium, according to Dobb, 
proves very difficult to postulate.  When equilibrium cannot be 
postulated, clearly knowledge is limited to the second rank 
generalization.  In fact, it can be argued that Keynes attempted to 
demonstrate that economics was of the second rank when considering the 
markets for capital and/or money.  Likewise, Dobb would attempt to 
demonstrate the same for labor markets (Dobb 1955[1929] and Dobb 1928) 
and for the entrepreneurial function (Dobb 1955[1924] and Dobb 1925).  
Or to put it differently, the historical circumstances often did not 
allow for any accurate prediction of equilibrium in markets for the 
factors of production.  Whereby the socioeconomic theorist can simply 
make adequate comment on the relational aspects involved in the 
tendencies of these markets, but not be able to postulate equilibrium, 





Dobb argued that the metaphors of equilibrium versus 
disequilibrium become inappropriate for the level of 
abstraction and analysis of social change.  More 
appropriate metaphors are reproduction versus 
transformation. 
Theorists who prioritize static problems tend to focus 
their analysis on the quantitative variation of some 
particular factor such as population, productivity, 
division labor, employment, GNP, etc.   In contrast, Dobb 
focuses first on the predominant relationship between the 
direct producers and their immediate ruler (which defines 
the economic epoch) and second on the institutional 
physiology of society (which defines the stage of economic 
development).   
  
1.1.6. Dobb’s “Methodological Primacy of the 
       Pathological” 
 
To understand the particular institutional physiology 
of society is to grasp the regular role and functioning of 
institutions for the (extended) reproduction of a 
(particular) social order.  In an attempt to grasp the 
regular or normal (extended) reproduction of society, a 
methodological motif is revealed in Dobbian historical 
analysis.  Namely, Dobb prioritizes the abnormal or 





society to be reproduced.  In other words, primacy is given 
to those moments of change, transition and transformation.  
That is to say that Dobb had a ‘chief interest’ in periods 
of socioeconomic crisis.   
To invoke Andrew Collier’s metaphor, Dobb’s focus on 
crisis constitutes his commitment to “the methodological 
primacy of the pathological” (Collier 1977:132; 1994:165).  
This “primacy of the pathological” in conjunction with the 
process of abstraction and Dobb’s insistence on the 
importance historical knowledge for the construction of 
social theory was intended to be a radical methodological 
break from the empiricism and deductivism that dominated 
and still characterizes much of the methodology of 
mainstream social sciences.  Furthermore, Dobb initiates a 
break with the deterministic interpretations of history of 
both mainstream and Marxian varieties.  In this context, 
Dobb often came in direct opposition to the (then) 
‘orthodox’ Marxists and deterministic interpretations of 
historical materialism.  
 The radical importance of Dobb’s methodological break 
in the history of social thought is all the more 
accentuated given that during the first half of the 
twentieth century, social scientists had generally 





emphasis on the historical element of analysis is a 
significant indication that Dobb was methodologically 
inspired by classical political economy (Dobb 1937:34ff).  
The work of Ferguson, Smith, J.S. Mill, and Marx did not 
suffer from the neglect of nor retreat from history. 
  
1.1.7. The Intellectual Retreat from History 
 
 The retreat from history in the social sciences begins 
in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and remains 
the methodological tendency during the first quarter of the 
twentieth century.  The tendency would deepen with the 
emergence of logical positivism as a philosophical approach 
to social theory and history, and by the 1940s, the retreat 
from history transforms into a virtual abandonment of 
history.  The retreat and virtual abandonment of history 
occur in all branches of social science, but the tendency 
is most pronounced in mainstream academic economics. 
Within psychology, there is a turn toward experimental 
methods in a laboratory setting and a turn away from 
historical context.  In effect, psychological ‘subjects’ 
become ahistorical.  This ahistorical approach in 
psychology comes to characterize the work of figures such 
as the child psychologist Jean Piaget and psychoanalyst S. 





‘fieldwork’, which is, once again, a turn away from 
historical accounts.  The paradigm representatives of the 
fieldwork approach are A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw 
Malinowski.21  In sociology, the contemporary society 
becomes the subject, constituting, as Norbert Elias (1987) 
would express it, “the retreat of sociology into the 
present.”  The interactionists of the University of Chicago 
sociology department are the paradigm representatives of 
the tendency within sociology.   
In economics, the retreat from history takes two 
distinct directions.  The first is a turn to statistical 
analysis to understand economic development and the 
business cycle.  This trend is represented in the work of 
the American Wesley Mitchell, the Austrian Joseph 
Schumpeter, and the Russian Nikolai Kondratieff and is 
characterized by a certain suspicion, and indeed contempt, 
for any other type of historical analysis besides 
quantifiable data.   Although this trend still has a use 
for history, it is mainly a history that could be 
                                                 
21 Malinowski’s work had a tremendous influence on the economic 
institutionalist history analysis of Karl Polanyi (see his The Great 
Transformation 1944:269ff).   With emphasis, ahistorical (static) 
analysis is by all means not completely empty.  Not only do theorists 
concerned with dynamic questions often utilize it, but ahistorical 
analysis (by itself) can produce substantial insights and knowledge.   
Thus, although it is not completely empty, ahistorical analysis is 
necessarily incomplete.  The ‘degree’ of incompleteness depends upon 
the level of abstraction, and the intention and questions posed by the 





quantified as statistical data.  This meant that many areas 
of the historical human experience would not be 
illuminated, hence would remain unknown.   
Methodologically, the second trend in economics 
constitutes a nearly complete abandonment of history.  The 
retreat from history that marked this second trend found 
refuge in the realm of ‘pure theory’, pure theory grounded 
and reducible to quantifiable generalizations of human 
behavior expressed philosophically as methodological 
individualism.   The second trend of retreat from history 
within economics found its greatest inspiration in the work 
of Stanley Jevons.   
The neoclassical tradition emerged during and came to 
exemplify this retreat and virtual abandonment of history.  
In this context, Dobb believed that the political 
economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century had a 
unique methodological advantage over the impoverished 
(deductivist) methodology of the twentieth century 
economists. 
Indeed, ahistorical and static analysis produced 
important bodies of knowledge.  Dobbian anxiety about the 
lack of history concerned the application of ahistorical 
knowledge and also the tendency for the reification of 





institutional) context.  In this sense, Dobb did not 
maintain that ahistorical analysis was necessarily vacuous, 
but incomplete.  In addition to the incompleteness, 
ahistorical analysis can be very misleading if the theorist 
is not conscious of the particular process of abstraction. 
 
1.1.8. A Pioneer Critique of Empiricist  
   Ontology 
 
Dobb spent his academic life in opposition to 
ahistorical analysis and its empiricist tendencies.  He 
maintained the main culprit in most of the methodological 
errors in social science was the underanalyzed, often 
unacknowledged, and otherwise tacitly taken-for-granted 
process of abstraction.  Many of Dobb’s protests against 
empiricist ontology had not been fully developed within the 
philosophy of science at the time.  Thus, Dobb could not 
draw from any sort of large body of philosophical work to 
substantiate his intuitive methodological anxieties.  Dobb 
could be described as an ‘armchair’ philosopher, and as 
such many of his methodological anxieties against an 
ahistorical epistemology and empiricist ontology are not 
expressed in contemporary terminology.  Therefore, Dobb’s 
methodological insights and criticism often are 





However, in the light of contemporary philosophy of 
science, much of Dobb’s methodological critique is more 
recognizable and immediately understood.  Further, it 
leaves little doubt that Dobb was an intellectual pioneer 
as a critic of ahistorical epistemology and empiricist 
ontology.     
Dobb’s rejection of the empiricist (a) monistic view 
of scientific development and its (b) deductivist structure 
grounded much of his criticism of neoclassical economics.  
Moreover, many of his methodological insights anticipate 
two strands of later critiques concerning the view of 
scientific development as monistic (see, for example, the 
work of M. Polanyi, T. Kuhn,22 K. Popper, I. Lakatos, P. 
Feyerbend, H. Putnam), and its structure as deductive(e.g., 
M. Scriven, M. Hesse, R. Harre, G. Myrdal,23 H. Putnam,24 R. 
Bhaskar25).   
                                                 
22 In Theories of Value since Adam Smith, Dobb would draw from the 
authority of Thomas Kuhn to express his own methodological position 
(see Dobb 1973:18, p. 20, 20n). 
23 On the affinities between Myrdal and Dobb see footnote 26. 
24 There are astonishing similarities between Dobbian methodology and 
history and the position of Hilary Putnam as expressed in his Reason, 
Truth and History (1981).  
25 In defending a position of Bhaskarian Realism, the Cambridge 
economist Tony Lawson (1997) has drawn on the methodological 
pronouncements of Dobb concerning the process of abstraction (see 
Chapter 16 of Lawson 1997).  In the end, however, Dobb’s methodological 
position is probably closer to the positions developed by Myrdal and 
Putnam.  Nonetheless, there do indeed exist some interesting 
similarities between the methodological positions of Dobb and 






Dobb further insisted that the boundary lines between 
social scientific disciplines such as history, economics, 
sociology, and psychology were arbitrary and that they 
obscured human problems and historical social conditions 
(see Dobb 1946:32; 1955[1951]:230).26 
 
1.1.9. Social Theory: A Convergence of  
   History and Theory 
 
Dobb’s work in this latter area has influenced and 
inspired many historical theorists to overcome these 
arbitrary barriers. Since the time of Dobb’s early 
methodological writings and the publication of Dobb’s 
Studies, it is much more common to encounter a convergence 
of history and social theory (see Callinicos 1988:1; Abrams 
1982:ix).  Besides the Marxian historical tradition (which 
Dobb had helped to inspire and is addressed more fully in 
subsequent sections), there are other historical social 
theorists, such as Barrington Moore, Jr., Reinhard Bendix, 
                                                 
26 This is a theme Dobb shared with the Swedish institutional economist 
Gunnar Myrdal.  Dobb and Myrdal shared several philosophical and 
methodological affinities.  Dobb in fact approvingly cites Myrdal 
several times in Theories of Value since Adam Smith.  Foremost among 
their affinities is their shared view that the demarcation between 
social scientific disciplines is both arbitrary and illusionary (Dobb 
1946:32.  They were both suspicious of purely abstract theorizing and 
advocated realism as the proper philosophical orientation for the 
practice of social science (see Dobb 1973:27n).  They also both 
insisted upon institutional analysis in an historical context and 
perspective.  As Myrdal (1979:106) wrote: “in reality there are no 
economic, sociological, psychological problems, but just problems and 
they are all mixed and composite.  In research, the only permissible 
demarcation is between relevant and irrelevant conditions.  The 
problems are regularly also political and have moreover to be seen in 





Alvin Gouldner, Daniel Bell, Fernand Braudel, Perry 
Anderson, Charles Tilly, and Immanuel Wallerstein, to 
mention only a few of the more prominent names.  In this 
sense, since the last quarter of the past century, there 
has certainly been a revival of uniting history and social 
theory.  Dobb should be recognized and appreciated for the 
role he played in this revival.   
In concurrence with the spirit of Dobb, Anthony 
Giddens asserts, “There simply are no logical or even 
methodological distinctions between social sciences and 
history – appropriately conceived” (1979:230).   Philip 
Abrams (1982:x) has put it even more strongly: “in terms of 
their fundamental preoccupations, history and sociology are 
and always have been the same thing.”  Abrams (1982:190) 
complains that the tendency in history was to claim only an 
interest in events and ‘facts,’ while there was a neglect 
of events and ‘facts’ in the overly theoretical 
sociological explanations of social reality.  Abrams (1982) 
claims: 
The really significant development of the past twenty 
 years has been the publication of a solid body of 
 theoretically self-conscious historical work which has 
 progressively made nonsense of earlier conceptions of 
 history as somehow, in principle, not engaged in the 
 theoretical world of the social sciences (p. 300). 





Dobb had been a pioneer in wedding historical analysis 
with the theoretical world of social sciences and 
philosophical realism.  Moreover, Dobb had a keen interest 
in the relationship between reproduction (and/or 
transformation) of social institutions and the motivations 
of individuals.  The latter is an important theme, not only 
in social theory (see Giddens 1984; Bhaskar 1979), but in 
social history (Skocpol 1984; Abrams 1982; Burke 1992).  In 
more contemporary terms, this concerns the dialectic of 
agency and structure, or the interaction between the 
duality of structure (Giddens 1976:121) and the duality of 
praxis (Bhaskar 1979).27  Once again in concert with the 
spirit of Dobbian analysis, Abrams (1982) maintained the 
problem of accounting sociologically for the 
individual in particular is really only a more precise 
version of the problem of accounting for individuals 
in general.  The solution in both cases lies in 
treating the problem historically – as a problem of 
understanding processes of becoming rather than states 
of being (p. 267).  
 
 It is in this sense that both history and sociology 
“seek to understand the puzzle of human agency and both 
                                                 
27 Duality of structure intends to underscore the observation that 
“society is both the ever-present condition (material cause) and the 
continually reproduced outcome of human agency” (Bhaskar 1989:34-5; 
also see Giddens 1976:121).  Duality of praxis intends to underscore 
the observation that “praxis is both work, that is, conscious 
production, and (normally unconscious) reproduction of the conditions 
of production, that is society” (Bhaskar 1989:35).  In other words, the 
duality of structure and praxis taken together inform social science 
that “social structure is a necessary condition for, and medium of, 
intentional agency, which is in turn a necessary condition for the 





seek to do so in terms of the process of social 
structuring” (Abrams 1982:267).  Thus, Abrams concludes: 
“Sociology must be concerned with eventuation, because that 
is how structuring happens.  History must be theoretical, 
because that is how structuring is apprehended.”  History 
and sociology share a “common explanatory project,” whereby 
the historian has no necessarily privileged access to 
empirical events, and the sociologist has no necessarily 
privileged position to the construction of theory (Abrams, 
1982:x-xi).  In short, history and sociology are mutually 
inclusive, or a unified explanatory project.28 
This unification of history and social science is not 
only recognized by historians (such as Abrams), but 
sociologists and social theorists also have come to the 
conclusion that “what distinguishes social science from 
history” is “nothing – nothing, that is, which is 
                                                 
28 There are now a multitude of historians demanding the mutual 
inclusiveness of history and social science.  The important traditions 
are the British Marxian tradition (which now includes a number of 
American historians), the historical sociology tradition, and the 
French annals school.  Certainly, not every sociologically conscious 
historian can be reduced to one these three traditions.  As John 
Mandalios (1996:279) has pointed out: “The presence of an acute sense 
of historical consciousness in modern as well as classical social 
theory can be evinced from the fact that what was described in 1980 as 
a ‘stream’ of historical sociology – as against the ‘trickle’ of the 
1950s [Burke, 1980:28] – has turned into a veritable torrent.”  
Mandalios further explains: “Historical sociology remained weak until 
the 1960s but not simply because fascism and Stalinism were ‘deeply 
hostile to its critical perspective’ [D. Smith, 1991:1].  Within the 
modern university, the human sciences had also become fragmented along 
numerous disciplinary boundaries and subdiscipline specialization, 
making historical sociology or cultural history look somewhat 





conceptually coherent or intellectually defensible” 
(Giddens 1984:357).  In Giddens’ view, “there are no 
distinctions between the methods of investigation open to 
historians and sociologists, or the forms of concepts which 
they can and should employ” (1987:224).  This is because 
the past is always present, and “the present is forever 
shading into the past.”  Although it cannot be made 
precise, there are specialization and intellectual 
divisions of labor, in that the historian specializes in  
tasks of retrieval which sociologists do not normally 
 have to master.  The sociologist is mainly concerned 
 with the pastness that lingers in the present and has 
 entered formatively into its character (Giddens 
 1987:39).   
 
Giddens insists that “sociologists have a great deal 
more to learn from the work of historians than most would 
currently admit [or realize]” (1984:362). In addition, 
Giddens insists that there are not “any logical or even 
major methodological differences between sociology and 
history” (1987:39).  Giddens’s work is merely an example of 
the convergence of the practice of history and social 
theory which would occur with vengeance in the late 
twentieth century.29  
 
                                                 
29 Other important sociologists insisting on the unification of history 
and social science include Pierre Bourdieu (1977), Norbert Elias 
(1939), Michel Foucault (1961, 1975), Ernest Gellner (1988), Michael 





1.1.10. The Role of Maurice Dobb in the  
    Convergence of History and  
    Social Theory  
 
 It is my contention that the work of Maurice Dobb 
anticipated, inspired, and facilitated the convergence of 
history and social theory that, since the midtwentieth 
century, continues to develop.  On these grounds alone, a 
reinvestigation of Dobb’s contribution seems warranted and 
long overdue. 
 Following the eclipse of history within social theory 
and the empiricist impulse of (especially) the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, Dobb must certainly be seen as 
an initiator for the convergence of history and social 
theory.  However, more than this, Dobb’s antiempiricism and 
mistrust of mathematics in social science were steadfast 
against the direction of academic currents.  Finally, Dobb 
further recognized that many of the classical (political 
economy) doctrines, which had been all but scrapped by the 
mainstream academic economists for lack of ‘scientific 
rigor,’ did not suffer from the same methodological 
deficiencies of the ahistorically conceived theoretical 
models of mainstream academic economics (e.g., neoclassical 
economics).  Rather, classical political economy beheld a 





had been absented by the Jevonian revolution and 
neoclassical developments. 
Dobb was very much aware of how intellectually 
“promiscuous”30 his attempt at unifying history and social 
science, especially history and economic theory, would 
appear to the (empiricist-minded mainstream) academic.  In 
the first paragraph of his 1946 Preface to Studies, Dobb 
(apologetically) expresses both his anticipation of 
skepticism and criticism from mainstream academics and his 
personal belief in the mutual inclusiveness of history and 
theory:      
A work of this kind, which is concerned with 
generalizing about historical development on the basis 
of material already collected and arranged by other 
hands, runs a grave danger of falling between two 
stools, and of displeasing both the economist, who 
often has little time for history, and the historian, 
who may dismiss it as insufficiently grounded in the 
first-hand knowledge that comes from actual field-
work.  To the economist the author may appear as an 
irrelevant wanderer from his proper territory, and to 
the historian as an intruding amateur.  Of this danger 
and of his own imperfect equipment for the task the 
author has, at least, not been unaware.  He has, 
nevertheless, been encouraged to persevere by the 
obstinate belief that economic analysis only makes 
sense and can only bear fruit if it is joined to a 
study of historical development, and that the 
economist concerned with present-day problems has 
certain questions of his own to put to historical 
data.  He has been fortified by the conviction that a 
study of Capitalism, in its origins and growth, so 
much neglected by economists (other than those of a 
                                                 





Marxist persuasion), is an essential foundation for 
any realistic system of economics (Dobb 1946:vii). 
 
In 1946 it may have seemed intellectually “promiscuous” and 
merely an “obstinate belief” to maintain that “any 
realistic system of economics” depends upon an appropriate 
convergence of history and theory as “an essential 
foundation.”  However, fifty-plus years after the 
publication of Studies, Dobb’s methodological ‘wanderings’ 
and philosophical stubbornness have now found substantial 
intellectual warrant within (sometimes much less 
fragmented) disciplines of history, social theory, and 
philosophy.    
For Dobb the warrant of his ‘intellectual promiscuity’ 
lies in the power of the particular sociohistorical 
analysis to illuminate the actual historical processes of 
human experience (Dobb 1951:235).  Many of the historical 
processes that had been dim behind the shadow cast by an 
empiricist methodology have now been illuminated by the 
British Marxist (socioeconomic) historians (such as Rodney 
Hilton, Christopher Hill, E.P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, 
Howard Zinn, David Kaye, George Rude, Herbert Gutman, 
Eugene Genovese, Robert Brenner, and Victor Kiernan) and 
other historians who employ the methodology of  “history 





1.1.11. The Marxian British Socioeconomic  
    Historians 
 
It had been Dobb’s Studies that had inspired this 
tradition of Marxian (socioeconomic) historians (see 
Hobsbawm 1978:23; Hill 1950:315; Hilton 1947:29-30; Kaye 
1984, 1992; Schwarz 1982).  Initially, the first generation 
of this group of historians came together in England in 
1945 to discuss a second edition of A.L. Morton’s A 
People’s History of England (original published in 1938). 
The group included some of the twentieth century’s most 
prominent names in Marxian social historiography.  Besides 
Maurice Dobb, regular attendees included Christopher Hill, 
Rodney Hilton, Eric Hobsbawm, Victor Kiernan, George Rude, 
Dorothy Thompson, E.P. Thompson, and Dona Torr.    
All of the members of the group were also members of 
the British Communist Party (CP), and the group came to be 
known as the Communist historians’ group.  Dobb’s Studies 
(1946), published within a year of the group’s formation, 
became of great intellectual interest to many of the 
group’s members (see, for example, Hilton 1947; Hill 1950; 
Hobsbawm 1978).   
Especially significant to the group members is Dobb’s 
stages of development analysis in Studies.  Chapters 2 





distinct stages of development analyzed by Dobb.  In each 
stage of development, Dobb’s analysis is driven 
methodologically by primacy given to the “pathological” or 
crisis moments of history.  The first stage is the “crisis 
of feudalism” in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth 
century.  The second stage is the bourgeois revolution of 
the seventeenth century.  The second stage is a reactionary 
response in an attempt to ‘save’ feudalism and, hence, 
remains part of the development of feudalism. The third 
stage is a movement away from feudalism. More specifically, 
the third stage is the aftermath of the English bourgeois 
revolution during relatively the same time period as the 
second stage.  The third stage initiated the rise of 
industrial capital and historically constitutes a prelude 
to capitalist development and a more rapid deterioration of 
the feudal mode of production.  The fourth stage is the 
social historical formation, or “making,” of a proletariat 
class dependent solely on wages for their livelihood. With 
the formation of a proletariat class, the conditions are 
set for the industrial revolution in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century, which is the fifth (Dobbian) 
stage of development. 
As mentioned above, each stage of economic development 





Further, each stage would become a research agenda for, in 
order of their respective stages, Rodney Hilton, 
Christopher Hill, E.P. Thompson, and Eric Hobsbawm.  Hilton 
would take up the research of crisis and class conflict in 
thirteenth and fourteenth century (English) feudalism 
(stage one).  Christopher Hill would focus his intellectual 
efforts on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England 
(stage two and three).  E.P. Thompson would write one of 
the most celebrated monographs in Marxian historiography 
concerning The Making of the English Working Class (to 
invoke the title of his book) (stage four).  Eric Hobsbawm 
would research the Industrial Revolution of England and the 
(more political) French Revolution during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (stage five). 
It was Dobb’s Studies that provided the basic 
framework for these historians (see Hobsbawm 1978:38).  
Dobb’s influence also inspired a methodology and specific 
interpretation of Marx and Engel’s historical materialism, 
an interpretation quite at odds with the orthodox 
deterministic versions of historical materialism that ruled 
the era (e.g., Plekhanov’s The Development of the Monist 
View of History, originally published in Russian 1894.  
Later defended by Gerry Cohen in his Marx’s Theory of 





A study of the writings of these Marxian historians 
will further enrich the methodological insights and 
ontological orientation of a Dobbian approach to social 
history.  Although the historical periods of research of 
these historians are distinct, and the methodological 
emphases and biases may vary, it is suggested that these 
historians constitute a theoretical tradition.31  Dobb’s 
influence on this tradition alone warrants a penetrating 
study of his work.  However, as explained above, there is a 
multitude of additional reasons for the study of Dobb’s 
work. 
 
1.2. Dobb’s Studies 
 
 Dobb’s constructive aim within chapters 2-6 of Studies 
is twofold: (a) begin a sketch of the internal articulation 
of feudalism and (b) model and explicate the Marxian 
conception of primitive accumulation.  The result of (a) 
                                                 
31 Harvey Kaye (1984, 1992) has argued most strongly for interpreting 
these social historians as a distinct, coherent, and continuous 
tradition.  Nonetheless, the philosophical underpinnings of these 
Marxian social historians’ work are by no means fully scrutinized by 
Kaye.  Kaye observes and comments rather superficially on the 
methodological and philosophical underpinnings of these socioeconomic 
historians.  The importance of Kaye’s superficiality is that it is 
perhaps the common methodological and philosophical orientation that 
most substantiates these historians as a tradition.  The reading of 
these socioeconomic historians that underlies this dissertation intends 
to ‘tease out’ the philosophical underpinnings that ground these 
theorists as a tradition.  Moreover, it seems that there may be two 
strands of this tradition, which Kaye necessarily attempts to deny.  
Nonetheless, these two strands are merely a shift of emphasis and not 
an epistemological break within the tradition, as Clarke (1979) has 





and (b) together is an original (Dobbian) general theory of 
transition from feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe.  
Briefly, Dobb argues that (a) and (b) are historically 
connected and complexly determined.  In what Dobb calls the 
‘traditional interpretation’ of the transition, the 
historical line of causal determination is understood to be 
from (b) to (a).  This ‘traditional interpretation’ 
portrays “a more or less stable [feudal] economy that was 
disintegrated by the impact of commerce acting as an 
external force and developing outside the system that it 
finally overwhelmed” (Dobb 1946:38).  In the ‘traditional 
interpretation’ of the agricultural-based feudal economy, 
producing for use-value and an exchange-based market 
economy “are two economic orders that cannot mix, and the 
presence of the latter, we are told, is sufficient to cause 
the former to go into dissolution” (Dobb 1946:38). 
 Metaphorically, Dobb declares (theoretical) war on 
this traditional interpretation.  The Dobbian line of 
historical causal determination reverses the traditional 
view, hence, runs from (a) to (b).  In the Dobbian view, 
the internal articulation of feudalism is at odds with the 
internal articulation associated with (or implied by) the 





According to Dobb, it was the contradictory internal 
articulation of feudalism that gave rise to periodic feudal 
crises.  During a major feudal crisis the conditions for 
capitalist development were (unintentionally) achieved. In 
the Dobbian view, the contradictory institutional 
arrangement and defects of feudalism in part explain, or at 
least provide the necessary conditions for, the birth of 
modern capitalism.  Thus, the study of the internal 
articulation of feudalism may be of interest to the 
underdeveloped countries and economic development theorists 
(Dobb 1967:2; also Hilton 1973:10; Aston and Philpin 1985).  
In the Dobbian view, economic development proceeds and 
can be analytically separated into particular stages of 
(economic) history.  Essential economic categories, such as 
labor productivity and total output, only can be 
comprehended in terms of the institutional limits and 
possibilities that are opened during a particular 
historical stage of development (Brenner 1978:121). 
  
1.2.1. Mode of Production as the Entry Point 
       to History 
 
An historical economic epoch will consist of several 
stages of development (Dobb 1946:17).  An epoch of economic 
history is, for Dobb, defined as a (Marxian) mode of 





and the central concept for the Dobbian theory of 
transition, as well as the basis for his definitions of 
both Feudalism and Capitalism, are the Marxian concept mode 
of production.  Dobb does not offer a rigorous analytical 
definition of this concept, as do Cohen (1978) and Balibar 
(with Althusser, 1970) decades later.  
Nonetheless, drawing heavily from his interpretation 
of Marx, Dobb’s intention with the mode of production 
concept is to underscore the transitory32 nature of any 
social formation.  The mode of production constitutes the 
“kernel of ‘civil society’” or a “society’s structural 
foundation” (Dobb 1955[1951]:234). 
The kernel of civil society, or the mode of 
production, embraces two categories of things (Dobb 
1955[1951]): (1) the forces of production, or stage of 
technique, and (2) the social relations of production, or 
the way in which the means of production are owned.  The 
social relations of production include the connections 
between human beings that arise from the process of 
                                                 
32 “Whenever we speak of production, then, what is meant is always 
production at a definite stage of social development – production by 
social individuals.  It might seem, therefore, that in order to talk 
about production at all we must either pursue the process of historic 
development through its different phases, or declare beforehand that we 
are dealing with a specific historic epoch such as modern bourgeois 





production (Dobb 1946:7), which in turn constitute the main 
element in the internal articulation of a social system. 
It is worthy of mention that there is a long 
traditional Marxist interpretation of historical 
materialism which insists that the two categories that 
compose the mode of production, i.e., the forces of 
production and the social relations of production are 
causally connected such that transformations in the forces 
of production cause changes in the social relations of 
production.  In historical materialism, this is known as 
the monistic line of causation (e.g., Plekhanov 1972; Shaw 
1978:149ff; Shaw 1992:234-9; Howard and King 1989:146ff).  
In the Dobbian interpretation of Marx, hence within the 
Dobbian view of transition from feudalism to capitalism, 
this monistic line of causation is rejected.   
Rather, in the Dobbian view, the contradictions that 
exist in the relations of production themselves cause 
internal transformations of these relations and then, and 
only then, allow for the forces for production to develop 
under new social relations of production.  In other words, 
social relations of production function as the boundary 
condition upon which (broadly) the mode of technology and 





 Capitalism as a mode of production is differentiated 
from other modes of production not simply in that it is 
commodity production, i.e., production for the market 
system.  Rather, capitalism is a system whereby human 
beings themselves have been transformed into commodities 
(Marx’s category of labor-power) and are “bought and sold 
on the market like any other object of exchange” (Dobb 
1946:7).  Once the wage-labor/capital nexus becomes the 
predominant social relation, the internal structure and 
macro dynamic of the system, i.e., the mode of production, 
necessarily have been transformed.   
  
1.2.2. Relational Social Theory and  
       Transitory History 
 
Capitalism, defined as such, cannot be granted a 
“natural” or “eternal” status33 (Dobb 1973:27, Dobb 
1937:128); rather capitalism is understood to be both (a) 
social, i.e., institutionally defined, whereby particular, 
                                                 
33 As Marx puts it, capitalism “is a mode of production of a particular 
kind and a specific historical determinacy; that like any other 
particular mode of production it assumes a given level of social 
productive forces and of their forms of development as its historical 
precondition, a condition that is itself the historical result and 
product of a previous process and from which the new mode of production 
proceeds as its given foundation; that the relations of production 
corresponding to this specific and historically determined mode of 
production – relations into which men enter in their social life-
process, in the production of their social like – have a specific, 
historical and  transitory character; and that finally the relations of 
distribution are essentially identical with these relations of 
production, the reverse side of the same coin, so that the two things 





significant modifications of institutions define a stage of 
historical development within a mode of production, and (b) 
transitory. 
The commoditification of human beings is the 
differentia specifica of capitalism as a mode of 
production; it was accomplished in a relatively gradual, 
centuries long historical process of transmutation of one 
matrix of human social relations to a new matrix of human 
social relations.  It is Dobb’s aim to capture and describe 
this historical process of transmutation.   
The result of this transmutation is what Marx 
(1976:1023-5) called the “real subsumption” of labor under 
capital. In short, with the commodification of human beings 
the connections, obligations, and commitments, i.e., the 
internal social relations of feudalism that bind human 
beings to one another, have been radically transformed.  
According to Dobb, this historical transmutation takes 
place in two analytically and ontologically separate 
phases.  The analytical separation constitutes for Dobb 
“two central problems” in the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, which in turn correspond to the two 
ontologically separate phases.  The first analytical 
question is what historical motive-force brought about the 





Ontologically, this means that the historian must study the 
‘internal articulation’ and dynamic of feudalism itself.  
The second analytical question is why did wage-labor 
replace serfdom?  Ontologically, the question becomes, 
‘what are the historical processes that lead to capitalist 
methods of production based on wage-labor?’  
Dobb, highly influenced by Marx, contends that the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism occurs not merely 
because of the extension of markets and expansion of 
trade.34  The transition cannot simply be explained by the 
augmentation of a merchant class and the theological 
acceptance of usury.35 According to Dobb (following Marx) 
the transition could not simply be caused by a change in 
commutation for services rendered from the peasant or serf 
                                                 
34 “The development of trade and commercial capital always gives 
production a growing orientation towards exchange-value, expands its 
scope, diversifies it and renders it cosmopolitan, developing money 
into world money.  Trade always has, to a greater or lesser degree, a 
solvent effect on the pre-existing organizations of production, which 
in all their various forms are principally oriented to use-value.  But 
how far it leads to the dissolution of the old mode of production 
depends first and foremost on the solidity and inner articulation of 
this mode of production itself.  And what comes out of this process of 
dissolution, i.e. what new mode of production arises in place of the 
old, does not depend on trade, but rather on the character of the old 
mode of production itself” (Marx 1981:449). 
35 “As long as […] the surplus production is consumed by the feudal lord 
and his retinue, the mode of production still remains the same even 
though […] feudal lord fall prey to usury; it simply becomes harsher 
for the workers.  The indebted […] feudal lord takes more out of them, 
since more is taken from him.  Ultimately, he may be completely 
replaced by the usurer, who himself becomes a landowner. […] In place 
of the old exploiter, whose exploitation was more or less patriarchal, 
since it was largely a means of political power, we have a hard, money-






to the lord or master.36  According to Dobb, each of these 
certainly can be argued to have facilitated the rise of 
capitalism, but none, nor the combination of these 
occurrences, caused the decline of feudal social relations 
of production.  Rather, Dobb maintains that the internal 
contradictions of feudalism as a mode of production led to 
its decline and to the disintegration of the internal 
relations that held the feudal system together and provided 
the necessary basis of its reproduction.  In short, a 
general crisis within the internal relations of feudalism 
was the source of its decline (at least in the case of 
England).   
 
1.2.3. Stages of Economic Development and 
       Themes of Studies 
 
With the entry point of mode of production in hand, 
and recalling that in the Dobbian view, economic 
                                                 
36 “Even though the direct producer still continues to produce at least 
the greater part of his means of subsistence himself, a portion of his 
product must now be transformed into a commodity and be produced as 
such.  The character of the entire mode of production is thus more or 
less changed. […] The transformation of rent in kind into money rent 
that takes place at first sporadically, then on a more or less national 
scale, presupposes an already more significant development of trade, 
urban industry, commodity production in general and therefore monetary 
circulation. […] In its pure form, this rent, just like labour rent and 
rent in kind, does not represent any excess over and above profit.  In 
its concept, it includes profit.  In as much as profit arises alongside 
it as a particular part of surplus labour, the money rent, like rent in 
its earlier forms, is still the normal limit to this embryonic profit, 
which can develop only in proportion to the possibility of exploiting 
that labour. […] If a profit really does arise alongside the rent, it 
is not the profit that sets a limit to rent, but inversely rent which 





development proceeds and can be analytically separated into 
stages of (economic) history, viewed from a historic-
ontological perspective, the first six chapters of Dobb’s 
Studies divide into four moments or stages of historical 
economic development: (1) thirteenth-fourteenth century 
feudal crisis, followed by fifteenth-sixteenth century 
recovery; (2) the bourgeois revolution of the seventeenth 
century; (3) the rise of industrial capital in seventeenth- 
eighteenth century as merely a prelude to capitalism; (4) 
the “making” of a disposed (fully) proletariat-class and 
the institutional rise of a wage-system.  
From a more analytical perspective, the main concerns 
of Chapters 2 through 6 of Dobb’s Studies have six main 
analytical themes.  These are (1) the definition of 
feudalism as a mode of production, (2) scrutiny of the 
‘traditional view’ of the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism (and Dobb’s dissatisfaction with it), (3) the 
internal articulation and (contradictory) dynamic of 
feudalism, (4) the primitive accumulation (as a prelude to 
the industrial revolution), (5) the rise of a fully 
proletariat class, and (6) the specific dynamics and 







1.2.4. Definition of Feudalism 
 
 Dobb’s definition of feudalism accentuates the 
socioeconomic aspects of feudal societies.  The aim of 
Dobb’s definition is to “characterize Feudalism primarily 
as a ‘mode of production’” (Dobb 1946:35).  Feudalism 
defined as a mode of production, Dobb intends to illuminate 
two sets of relationships that together will constitute the 
base of the socioeconomic system.  First is the 
relationship between the direct producers and their 
immediate (social) ruler (Dobb 1946).  In this regard, Dobb 
claims that feudalism is “virtually identical with what we 
generally mean by serfdom” (1946:35), where serfdom is 
understood to be an obligation of the direct producers to 
perform an economic service for the ruler or overlord.  The 
particular service is contingent upon various circumstances 
and is malleable. As such, the service can take the form of 
direct labor performed on the overlord’s demesne, or the 
provision of tribute in produce as a form of feudal rent.  
Moreover, this tribute can be paid in the form of money.   
The second relationship is between serfdom and 
technology.  It is this second relationship that will 
constitute the dynamic of the system.  The dynamic of the 
system can be analytically separated into (1) the 





change, and (3) internal limitations and contradictions of 
the feudal mode of production.  
 
1.2.5. Forms of Serfdom 
 
 It is important to point out that the obligation of 
the serf to the overlord was often paid in the form of 
direct labor service on the overlord’s demesne. However, 
payment was not always performed as direct labor.  
Depending on time and place (i.e., the particular 
historical regional form of feudalism), serf obligation to 
the overlord would take the form of payment in kind, or 
products produced on the serf’s commons and then 
transformed to the overlord’s possession.  Furthermore, it 
was not uncommon during the feudal era to have the serf 
obligation fulfilled by a money payment or rent.  In sum, 
there could be three broad forms of serf payment or 
obligation to an overlord, namely, (1) direct labor service 
(upon the lord’s demesne), (2) payment in kind or produce 
(from the serf’s own plot or commons), (3) payment of rent 
in money.  All three are well within Dobb’s use of the term 
serfdom and, hence, express a very similar form of 
exploitation that was characteristic of feudal production. 
Because feudal exploitation could be commuted in any 





understand feudal production as a “natural economy” or 
production merely for what Adam Smith called “use-values.” 
Feudal production could not be characterized as production 
merely of use-value.  Rather, production was often for 
exchange-value.  In turn these exchange-values could be 
sold in the market place, and the money obtained in the 
sale could be used to pay rent to the manor overlord.  In 
this sense, “‘natural economy’ and serfdom are far from 
being coterminous” (Dobb 1946:37).  
Moreover, feudal serfdom production was far more 
dynamic than merely production in a “natural economy.”  
According to Dobb, one main determinant in the dynamic of 
feudalism as a mode of production is the specific 
socioeconomic relationship between direct producers and 
their most immediate rulers.  In order to definitively 
distinguish a feudal from a “natural economy,” the dynamic 
nature and characteristics of feudalism must be understood 
and underscored.  To (re)construct in theory the dynamic of 
feudalism requires a deepening knowledge of the 
relationship between the serfs and their overlords, in 
particular, and the relationship between peasants and 
feudal nobility, more generally, i.e., the internal 





Dobb knew that it would be very difficult to fully 
formulate an explanatory revision of conventional wisdom 
concerning the internal articulation of feudalism.  The 
main problem was a lack of (alternative) theory and, 
consequently, a lack of historical evidence to support a 
full explanatory critique of the internal articulation of 
feudalism.  Thus, Dobb must use the historical evidence 
available and provide an immanent critique of the 
traditional view’s conception of the internal articulation 
of feudalism.   
Dobb observes, consistent with the “natural economy” 
definition of feudalism, that feudal production was 
characterized by a division of labor, which from a modern 
perspective would be viewed as “primitive” (far from the 
complexity and extensiveness of capitalist production); 
further feudalism was characterized by a low level of 
technique and the employment of simple and inexpensive 
instruments of production (Dobb 1946:36-7).   
Feudal production had these characteristics, not 
because it was merely production of use-values, or a 
“natural economy,” but because of the specific 
socioeconomic relations that constituted the base of 





of this base was that between the direct producers and 
their most immediate rulers.   
This relationship was maintained by “extra-economic 
compulsion.”   It was extra economic compulsion in that the 
compulsion tended to appear in various social and cultural 
forms (i.e., military, religious,37 sociotacit, etc.).  It 
was this “extra economic compulsion” that maintained the 
explicit economic exploitation of one class by another, 
i.e., serfdom.  In this context, Dobb was fond of 
approvingly quoting Marc Bloch: “whatever the source of the 
noble’s income, he always lived on the labour of other men” 
(Bloch quoted in Dobb 1967:3; 1967:252; 1973:145). 
 Dobb is at pains to define feudalism (as serfdom) in 
contradistinction to a “natural economy” in that he is 
opposed to the idea, characteristic of the work of Gustav 
                                                 
37An astonishing lack within Dobb’s historical analysis of feudalism is 
his almost complete neglect of any rigorous analysis of the role of 
religion as an institutional form necessary for the successful 
preservation and reproduction of feudal social relations.   In fact, 
according to one contemporary of Dobb’s, the ideological role of 
religious beliefs cannot be underestimated as a main determining factor 
for the enduring character of the European feudal system. “The power of 
the church in the medieval town was ever-present and all-pervasive.  It 
operated through the ritual of the sacraments, the jurisdiction of the 
ecclesiastical courts, the charitable foundations of the orders, 
through the pictorial teaching of church walls and windows, open-air 
sermons, public inflictions of penance, the celebration of saints’ 
festivals, and in many other ways.  There can be no reasonable doubt 
that the social teachings of the church, along with its other 
doctrines, were by one means or another impressed upon every townsman, 





Schmoller and Henri Pirenne,38 among others, that it was the 
growth of exchange relations, trade, and markets, along 
with the extensive use of money in these transactions, that 
first led to the commutation from labor-rent, to produce-
rent, and finally to money-rent; and second to dissolving 
feudalism as a “natural economy,” or production merely of 
use-values.  Robert Brenner terms such a view the 
“commercialization model” of economic change (1985:25-9). 
 
1.2.6. Feudalism as a “Natural Economy” and 
       the Commercialization Model  
 
 According to the commercialization model, the 
extension of long-distance trade, then the development of 
domestic exchange, and consequently, the rise of domestic 
markets are the primary dissolvents of feudal relations of 
production.  Moreover, trade and markets are seen as alien 
or external forces operating outside of the internal 
structure of both feudal production and feudal 
exploitation.  In turn, markets and money are seen as the 
catalyst for the emancipation of feudal peasantry from 
serf-labor.  The presence of markets and money, 
furthermore, are seen to have unleashed improvements in 
technology from the fetters of feudalism (Dobb 1946:37-8).   
                                                 
38 In his debate with Dobb, the American Marxian economist Paul Sweezy 
would draw heavily from the work of Pirenne (see below, also Hilton 





In that these forces are viewed as alien and external 
to the internal structure of feudalism, the internal social 
constitution of feudal production itself is viewed as (more 
or less) stable, save for the external pressures of markets 
and money.  Moreover, in that the commercialization model 
assumes that feudalism was characterized by its particular 
stability, this implicitly suggests that the feudal mode of 
production tended to be technologically stagnant. 
According to the commercialization model then, not 
only are markets and money exchange the ‘historical 
destroyers’ of feudal relations of production, but they 
also further engender the capitalist relations of 
production.  Monopoly merchants, or the mercantile element 
of feudalism, in this view, are crowned as the principal 
begetter of emancipation of human beings from the shackles 
of feudal institutions.   
 
1.2.7. Dobb’s Dissatisfaction with, or Immanent 
       Critique of, the Commercialization Model 
 
Dobb finds the commercialization model unsatisfactory 
on a number of accounts.  First, it seems to misunderstand 
the dynamism of feudalism, both on the grounds that the 
technological change that occurred during the feudal era 
has been underestimated, an underestimation that the 





triumphs and tribulation of feudalism have not been 
properly understood (that is, the social relations of 
feudalism have been underanalyzed, hence its internal 
articulation misunderstood).   
Second, the commercialization model is misleading on 
the specifics of the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism.  Upon the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, the commercialization model, according to Dobb, 
has three main difficulties.  First, the elongation of the 
transition is left unexplained.  Why did it take four or 
five centuries for the rise of trade and money exchange to 
transform feudalism, rather then two or three centuries? 
(Dobb 1967:6). 
The second issue of Dobb’s dissatisfaction with the 
commercialization model concerns the role of markets in 
feudalism and posits several layers of concern. The role of 
markets throughout the twelve centuries of feudalism tends 
to be underplayed.  Dobb, in fact, insists that “one must 
avoid the mistake of thinking of the feudal epoch as one in 
which trade disappeared entirely and to which the use of 
money was entirely alien” (Dobb 1946:79). Neither is the 
presence of markets an external force upon feudal 
societies.  In fact, it is difficult to imagine any mode of 





inconsistency between the presence of market exchange 
mediated by money and social production organized around 
the institution of serfdom.  Trade and market activity had, 
according to Dobb, become an element of the internal 
articulation of feudalism with the return of commercial 
activity.   
Another concern of Dobb’s is that serfdom had been on 
the retreat in various areas of Europe as early as the 
thirteenth-century.  In the ensuing two centuries, market 
activity and money mediation were increasing throughout 
Europe. Nonetheless, by the end of the fifteenth century a 
revival of serfdom was manifest in many parts of Europe.  
Fredrick Engels called this revival the “second serfdom” 
(Dobb 1946:39, p. 57).  In areas where serfdom had not gone 
into retreat, the increase of market exchange and money 
mediation often gave rise to an intensification of serfdom, 
not only in the monetary form but often in the form of 
rent-in-kind and actual labor services.  Servitude would 
take these nonmonetary forms not only in the countryside in 
agricultural production but also in the towns and cities 
(see Hilton 1978:17).    
Kosminsky reiterates that in areas where peasantry had 
gained some degree of freedom, there was an increase in 





turn, led to the imputation of money-rent, which is to say 
(in concert with Engels and Dobb), a return to a form of 
serfdom.  Where serfdom remained the characteristic social 
relation there was an intensification in labor services 
performed on the overlord’s demesne, or work to be 
performed in the lord’s mill or lord’s baking-oven, etc. 
(Dobb 1946:81).  Where commutation shifted from labor 
services to money tributes, this shift did not necessarily 
mean that serfdom would shed its compulsory character, nor 
can it “be assumed that commutation involved an actual 
lightening of feudal burdens” (Dobb 1946:63).  Rather, once 
again, it led to the “intensification” of feudal 
exploitation by raising rent in money-form.  It is in this 
sense that “the existence of trade and of production for 
the market were by no means inconsistent with serfdom as a 
labour-system” (Dobb 1967:6).       
Dobb further insists that it was often the more 
‘economically backward’ (nonmarket-based production) from 
which direct labor service disappeared the earliest, 
whereas in areas where market production was dominant, for 
example London, labor-service obligation stubbornly 
continued to structure society and production (Dobb 
1946:38-9).  On these accounts Dobb scolds Paul Sweezy 





not between nearness to markets and feudal disintegration, 
but between nearness to markets and strengthening of 
serfdom” (Dobb, in Hilton 1976:61). 
The third weakness of the commercialization model with 
respect to the transition from feudalism to capitalism is 
that it tends to misrepresent the conservative role played 
by the merchant class in the stubborn survival of feudal 
exploitation.  This misrepresentation has implications for 
the historic-political role played by merchant capital in 
the dynamic of feudal reproduction.  Merchant capital was 
far from being the progressive entity that is suggested in 
the commercialization model’s account.  Dobb claims that 
the larger merchant capital families of feudalism had far 
too much at stake in the feudal order to become a 
progressive force to sever the fetters of feudal relations 
of production (Dobb 1946:122).  “One feature of this new 
merchant bourgeoisie that is at first surprising as it is 
universal, is the readiness with which this class 
compromised with the feudal society once its privileges had 
been won” (Dobb 1946:120).   
Following the bourgeois revolution of the seventeenth 
century, the powerful mercantile element had retained their 
political and economic presence (as a class), even while 





by the mercantile element impeded the promise of the 
enlightenment and the emergence of a liberal market society 
well into the early nineteenth century.  Adam Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations is testament to the conservative and 
antiliberal force still being played by the mercantile 
element of feudalism into the late eighteenth century. 
The presence of a bourgeois element in society is 
completely consistent with the absence of capitalist 
production relations.  In fact, it is Dobb’s contention 
that the actual mode of production is incidental to 
merchant capital.  The merchant motive and element are 
quite at home in a slave, feudal, or capitalist mode of 
production.  In feudalism, the mercantile element becomes a 
type of parasite that preys on the existing relations.  The 
political consequence was the evolution of a monopolistic 
merchant class that came to identify with and serve the 
purposes “largely those of lords and princes and kings” 
(Dobb 1946:121).  The mercantile element was dependent on 
the feudal relations that organized the feudal economic 
epoch and were the source of their own income (Dobb 
1946:165).  Although a “merchant bourgeoisie had grown to 
wealth and to influence,” it “exercised little direct 
effect upon the mode of production.”  Rather, “having won a 





co-partner rather than antagonist to the [feudal] nobility” 
(Dobb 1946:20).  
The influence of the feudal mercantile element “and 
the influence of the institutions it had fostered, such as 
the chartered [trade] companies, were to retard rather than 
to accelerate the development of capitalism as a mode of 
production” (Dobb 1946:122).  In addition to retarding the 
development of capitalism, the mercantile element protected 
and sustained the reproduction of the feudal mode of 
production (Dobb 1946:157ff).  The mercantile element and 
many other members of the bourgeois nouveaux-riches tended 
to be a highly conservative political force that supported 
the continuation of feudal social relations of production 
as much as did the nobility, clergy, and monarch (Dobb 
1946:89, 122). 
In sum, Dobb’s dissatisfaction with the 
commercialization model is threefold: (1) the internal 
articulation is underanalyzed; hence the economic dynamism 
of feudalism remains obscure; (2) it is misleading on 
several accounts with respect to the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism; (3) it overestimates the 
revolutionary role of the feudal mercantile element on the 





conservative role of merchant capital in sustaining the 
social relations of feudal production. 
 
1.2.8. Internal Articulation: Trade and the 
       Merchants 
 
As I have shown in the Dobbian view, trade and market 
exchange are characteristic of all modes of production.  An 
entity that is necessary for market change is a merchant 
class.  From classical slave economies through medieval 
feudalism, market exchange and money mediation of exchange 
have always been present, and so, too, has a merchant 
class.  Market exchange generates merchants, which in turn 
constitute a social stratum of commercial bourgeoisie.  The 
difference between precapitalist production and capitalist 
societies is that, in the former, the bourgeois element is 
much more removed from the production process and is viewed 
as excrescencies upon the mode of production (Dobb 1967:7-
8).  Hence, as suggested above, the mercantile element in 
the Dobbian view becomes an aspect of feudalism’s internal 
articulation.  Subsequent research seems to strongly 
support this general Dobbian thesis. 
Commercial activity in Europe is well documented to 
have reached a high point during the Roman Empire in the 
first and second century.  Although there is considerable 





urban life during the early Middle Ages, there is general 
agreement that commercial activity and urban life were in 
decline from the third century (mainly due to Roman civil 
wars and later Germanic and Islamic invasions) through the 
twelfth century (Garnsey, et al. 1983).  It was the tenth 
century that was perhaps the low point of commercial 
activity in Western Europe (Lopez and Raymond 1955).  By 
the twelfth century, there was a revival of trade activity 
and commerce in Western feudal societies.   
With healthy commerce in antiquity (both in Greece and 
Rome) (see Polanyi, et al. 1957) and during the high point 
of the feudal system, it must have been true that the 
necessary conditions for commerce were present.  The basic 
conditions being (1) at least two groups of people produce 
a surplus of domestic product, (2) the products must be 
different and each desired by its non-producer, (3) 
sufficient transport routes and transport technology, (4) a 
medium of exchange,39 and (5) merchants and merchant 
activity.  Most certainly, the revival of commerce during 
the twelfth century affected the whole of social relations 
upon which feudalism was constituted; however, it was not 
the “disappearance of earlier conditions [i.e., serfdom as 
                                                 
39 George Dalton (1982:181-190) points out there is no historical 
evidence that any economy has ever been constituted by a system of 
barter as the primary organizing principle of internal economic 





the organizational principle of feudal production and 
distribution] but their modification” (Bloch 1961:71). The 
significant point is that trade activity may have waxed and 
waned during the (Western) feudal era, but recent scholarly 
work has securely established Dobb’s position that trade 
and commerce were a constitutive element of the internal 
articulation of Western feudalism for both its production 
process and its distribution process. 
In the Dobbian view, trade and market activity were 
constitutive of the internal articulation of the feudal 
mode of production. Therefore, it could not have been trade 
and market activity that dissolved the feudal system of 
production.  Moreover, with trade and market activity as a 
constitutive element, the macrodynamic of feudalism would 
have been quite contrary to the ‘stable and stagnate’ 
thesis of the ‘traditional view.’ 
Dobb acknowledges that the rise of commerce during the 
twelfth century had a “disruptive effect on the [European] 
feudal” order (Dobb 1946:37).  However, what Dobb 
tentatively rejected, which now seems well supported, is 
“whether the widening of the market can be held to have 
been a sufficient condition for the decline of Feudalism – 
whether an explanation is possible in terms of this as the 





It is also very important to understand that the 
acknowledgment of trade and market activity as constitutive 
elements also implies that merchants and merchant capital 
more generally are in themselves constitutive of, rather 
than contrary to, feudalism as a mode of production.  More 
strongly, in feudalism the ambitions of merchant capital 
were not necessarily out of phase with the feudal nobility.  
Although disputes emerged between merchants and landed 
aristocracy, with respect to the internal articulation of 
the feudal system and its socioeconomic reproduction, these 
disputes in particular, and these relations in general, 
were of secondary importance in the Dobbian view.  This is 
not to say that the relations between the mercantile 
element and nobility were unimportant to the stages of 
feudal historical development; however, they were 
relatively insignificant with respect to the transformation 
of the epoch. 
In the commercialization model, priority has tended to 
be given to the disputes of “secondary importance,” while 
relations of ‘primary importance’ had gone underanalyzed 
and neglected.  According to Dobb:  
What is clearly missing in the traditional 
 interpretation [or commercialization model] is an 
 analysis of the internal relationships of Feudalism as 





 in determining the system’s disintegration or survival 
 (1946:42). 
 
Dobb argued that to understand the internal 
articulation, institutional character and the ‘laws of 
motion’ of feudal society require a deep analytical grasp 
of the social relations of the direct producers and their 
most immediate rulers.  This, of course, merely follows the 
methodological and ontological hints of Marx, which are 
concisely summarized in the following statement from volume 
III of Capital. 
The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus 
labour is pumped out of the direct producers 
determines the relationship of domination and 
servitude, as this grows directly out of production 
itself and reacts back on it in turn as a determinant.   
On this is based the entire configuration of the 
economic community arising from the actual relations 
of production, and hence also its specific political 
form.  It is in each case the direct relationship of 
the owners of the conditions of production to the 
immediate producers – a relationship whose particular 
form naturally corresponds always to a certain level 
of development of the type and manner of labour, and 
hence to its social productive power – in which we 
find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the 
entire social edifice, and hence also the political 
form of the relationship of sovereignty and 
dependence, in short, the specific form of state in 
each case (Marx 1981:927). 
 
Although Dobb himself is not entirely successful in 
describing in any great detail the internal feudal 
relations, or rather, feudalism’s ‘internal articulation,’ 





“insufficiently grounded in the first-hand knowledge that 
comes from actual [historical] field-work” to adequately 
construct an accurate conception of these internal 
relations (Dobb 1946:vii).  Moreover, “unless the existing 
frontier between what it is fashionable to label as 
‘economic factors’ and as ‘social factors’ is abolished,” 
the leading questions that are to be evoked in such a study 
as Dobb’s will be left unanswered (Dobb 1946:32). 
Dobb, more humbly, will attempt merely to outline the 
internal relationships and antagonisms within the feudal 
class structure in an attempt to understand its internal 
social organization and its internal contradictions.  This 
is only a beginning because he is basing his analysis from 
second-hand accounts and not actual fieldwork.  In other 
words, he is posing questions that the first-hand accounts 
did not have in mind.  The results of such an attempt 
should be expected to be limited.  In this sense his 
attempt to construct an outline of the internal relations 
of feudalism should be understood more as an immanent 
critique of feudal historical literature, rather than a 
complete, new model.  Dobb finds cohesion and/or antagonism 
where they are often out of phase with traditional 
historical interpretations.  In turn, Dobb’s challenges 





of feudalism.  When the traditional interpretations of 
feudalism are challenged, necessarily there are 
implications for the origins of capitalist development, 
along with the current functioning of contemporary 
capitalism. 
 
1.2.9. The Petty Mode of Production 
 
For Dobb, the key characteristics of feudalism as a 
mode of production are fourfold: (1) the smallness of 
production units, (2) the direct ownership of means of 
production by the direct producers, (3) organization and 
control of the production process also in the hands of 
direct producers, and (4) ubiquitous social attachment of 
direct producer to the land (see Dobb in Hilton 1976:57; 
Dobb 1967:8ff). 
The structural production organization of feudalism 
was centered on the institution of serfdom.  The serf was 
socially and institutionally attached to the land.  
Individually, these land holdings were relatively small, 
usually less the 100 acres, and from them, the serfs 
derived personal and family subsistence.  The land rights 
often were held in commons, or in the form of common-field 
land.  As such, peasantry shared common grazing over common 





directly worked and maintained pastoral lands, but also 
“the occupancy of some cottages, inns, millhouses, 
farmhouses, and other buildings or sites of former 
buildings also brought pasture rights” (Neeson 1993:61). 
 Dobb maintained that the land rights of feudalism 
allowed for commoners, whether they were agricultural 
producers or town serfs, to derive their own subsistence 
from small plots of land, or from their rights to the 
commons.   The organization of production in conjunction 
with these rights gave rise to a system of production that 
can be characterized as “the petty mode of production.”  
For Dobb, this characterization is meant to capture the 
small size of the production units.  Individuals and 
families produced for themselves using primitive implements 
on small plots of land.  Even in the town workshop, 
organized by guild masters, production tended to assume a 
similar division of labor coordinated around small units of 
production.   
 As such feudalism struggled for its survival, not 
necessarily because of external pressures of markets and 
money mediation, but rather from the system’s internal 
contradictions and the logic of feudal production itself.  
Dobb suggested that over most of Western Europe the 





to A.D. 1300.   Dobb insisted that “after 1300 […] begun a 
sharp decline” in the population of Western Europe.  This 
is significant in that Dobb is proposing that the 
depopulation of Western Europe began well before the 
bubonic plague had reached the shores of Europe (i.e., 
before 1347).  Thus, the depopulation of Europe and the 
ensuing decline in productivity cannot be exclusively 
attributed to the devastation of wars and the plague (Dobb 
1946:48). 
 Since the depopulation and ensuing decline in 
productivity began decades before the devastation of the 
Black Death, Dobb proposed that the rapid decline may have 
had economic causes rooted in the internal limitations of 
the petty mode of production and the contradictions of pre-
fourteenth century feudalism. 
 
1.2.10. Feudal Crisis in the Thirteenth Century 
   
 Because the traditional interpretations have neglected 
the internal articulation of feudal productive relations, 
historical evidence of the economic causes of thirteenth 
century depopulation are far from plentiful.  Therefore, 
Dobb warns that his hypotheses are meant to be more 





 As explained above, Dobb attempted to begin a 
construction of the internal articulation as provided by 
the limited historical evidence available.  Dobb believed 
that the proper portrayal of the feudal ‘internal 
articulation’ must include a place for, and explain the 
roles played by, a bourgeois class and/or mercantile 
element, (petty) industrial production, extensive markets, 
and various forms of commutation.  In the Dobbian 
portrayal, none of these key elements of feudalism are 
necessarily antagonistic to its internal articulation, nor 
the structure of its class relations.  Rather, and contrary 
to the commercialization model, these elements tended to 
have a conservative force toward the feudal relations upon 
which they depended.  For Dobb, the antagonistic elements, 
or internal contradictions, are of three main sources: (1) 
the form of exploitation and limits thereof (e.g., Dobb 
1946:45-6; Dobb in Hilton 1976:57); (2) direct producers 
attempting to take to trade (often in an attempt to avoid 
an intensification of their already severe exploitation) 
(e.g., Dobb 1946:chp. 4; Dobb 1967:11); and (3) the absence 
of institutional forms to impede social class 
differentiation (Dobb 1946:13ff, 88ff, 124ff; Dobb 
1925:188ff; Dobb 1948:chp. 2; Dobb 1967:10). In short and 





possessed progressive and regressive elements.  These 
elements are institutionally fused in the feudal mode of 
production such that contradictions arise generating its 
characteristically unstable motion. 
 Related to the three internal contradictions above, 
Dobb proposed there were three important elements of pre-
fourteenth century (Western European) feudalism.  First is 
“the inefficiency of Feudalism as a system of production.”  
Second was “the growing needs of the ruling class for 
revenue” (Dobb 1946:42). The third element of crucial 
importance was the growth of urban areas or feudal burgs 
(Dobb 1946:70-83). Together, these three forces, in 
conjunction with the aforementioned contradictions, 
generated a number of social tensions and economic failures 
that were primary causes of feudalism’s decline in the 
thirteenth century and into the fourteenth century. 
 Dobb maintained that the methods used in feudal 
production were primitive and the incentives to increase 
productivity for the producer were minimal, sometimes 
nonexistent.  This is because the noble aristocracy often 
“discouraged [producer] initiative and dried up all energy 
at its source by taking from the villein an exorbitant part 
of the fruits of his work, so that labour was half sterile” 





1.2.11. Intensification of Feudal Exploitation 
 
 Greater exploitative pressures were placed upon the 
producing serf class from the feudal ruling class due to 
both the natural growth of the noble families and the need 
for greater military strength.   The need for greater 
military strength led to the multiplication of the number 
of vassals, by a process of “sub-infeudation.”  The 
increase in the ratio of noble class to producer class 
translated into an increase in the exploitative pressures 
facing the feudal serf. 
 The need for greater military strength arose from an 
increase in war.  The effects of war and brigandage, which 
Dobb suggests could be said to be integral to the feudal 
order, generated destruction of economic life and 
devastation of land and productive materials.  In short, 
“While exaction and pillage diminished productive powers, 
the demands that the producer was required to meet were 
augmented” (Dobb 1946:45). 
 Dobb further suggested that the Crusades of this 
period were both costly, adding to the exploitative 
pressures upon the serfs, and induced a desire for exotic 
wares from the European noble class, reinforcing yet 






 Finally, townships, or feudal burgs, played a pivotal 
role in both increasing production and diversity of product 
in feudal societies, often with an augmentation of work 
obligation of the rural or agriculture serf, in order to 
support the township population and their production.  On 
this last point, the origin of feudal townships becomes 
crucial (Dobb in Hilton 1976:60). 
 
1.2.12. Townships as Part of Feudal Internal 
        Articulation 
 
The origin of medieval urban centers is “far from 
clear, and has been the matter of some controversy” (Dobb 
1946:72).  Nonetheless, Dobb (1946:72-5) rehearses the four 
leading explanations of the origin of feudal township 
communities.  In brief, the first explanation suggests a 
respite and renewal of older Roman cities.  The second 
explanation suggests rural feudalism’s natural population 
growth to a village and then town community.  The third and 
most dominant explanation, which finds support from 
authorities such as Adam Smith, W. J. Ashely, and Henri 
Pirenne, maintains that, in the main, townships originated 
as (temporary shelters or) settlements of merchants’ 
caravans (Dobb 1946:74; see Pirenne 1925:95 & 105-7; and 
Adam Smith 1998:447ff).  The fourth explanation emphasizes 





settlements and more of an ordained extension of feudal 
societies, hence under the obligation of feudal authority 
and order.40   
Due to limited evidence and knowledge of townships, 
Dobb contents himself with an “eclectic explanation” for 
the origin and emergence of medieval burgs and townships.  
In this way, Dobb allows for “different weight to various 
influences in different cases.” 
 Although the differing explanations are not 
necessarily incompatible, there is a point of substance to 
be drawn between the third and fourth explanations.  
Namely, if burgs were not always spontaneous semi-
independent formations of merchants’ caravans, but 
sometimes were sanctioned extensions of feudal societies, 
then this lends support toward the idea that the mere 
presence of market exchange and money mediation does not 
necessarily contradict the feudal order.  Rather, the 
market exchange and money mediation may have strengthened 
feudal authority and served seigniorial interests. 
Moreover, the internal articulation and dynamic 
between rural and urban centers would have an altogether 
                                                 
40 Subsequent research has been shown to support the fourth explanation:  
“The earliest cities of medieval Europe [eleventh century] had been 
primarily residences of nobles, temporal princes or wealthy churchmen, 
with enough craftspeople and particularly merchants to supply them with 





different character if medieval towns originated as “free 
towns,” independent of feudal authority, versus feudal 
initiated “cooperate bodies.”  It would have implications 
for the historian interpreting the struggles between urban 
centers and rural areas.  Furthermore, it would have an 
enormous influence over the chartering of guilds and the 
ensuing relationship between guilds and the rest of 
society.  It would be the job of the more specialized 
historian to ascertain for any particular medieval urban 
development what explanation, or combination of 
explanations, would best capture the specific situation.  
In acknowledgment of the scanty evidence, Dobb does 
“venture a tentative judgment.”  It would seem “probable,” 
according to Dobb, that “a majority of towns originated on 
the initiative of some feudal institution, or in some way 
as an element of some feudal institution, rather than as 
entirely alien bodies” (Dobb 1946:78). 
In support of this “tentative judgment,” Dobb 
suggested that there “are fairly plentiful” examples of 
townspeople “themselves owing services to an overlord, like 
any feudal dependant” (Dobb 1946:81), perhaps suggesting 
the origin of such towns to be feudal initiated.  
Furthermore, the early eleventh-century town guilds were 





see Nicholas 1997:129).  This is especially significant in 
that it was these early aristocratic guilds that would 
develop into merchant guilds, suggesting, of course, that 
merchant guilds (at least sometimes) had an aristocratic 
lineage in their very origin and, hence, formation.  As 
such, the institutional structure and internal articulation 
of feudalism would incorporate townships. 
 It is indisputable that the survival of the feudal 
burgs and their inhabitants radically depended on the 
agricultural production of the countryside.  This 
dependence sometimes placed greater demands on the rural 
serfs and intensified the rural serfs’ feudal obligations. 
 
1.2.13. Hyper-Exploitation and Social  
        Differentiation of the Peasantry   
 
According to a number of sources, feudal obligations 
intensified for rural peasantry, whereby illegal emigration 
ensued.  Although there were formal agreements between the 
feudal aristocracy to return fugitive serfs, Dobb maintains 
it was common for the feudal aristocracy to entice or 
kidnap serfs away from one another (Dobb 1946:46). The 
smaller estates were the “most liable to suffer” from 
“enticements” or kidnappings of serfs, “hence were most 





fetter labour to the land and to restore fugitives” (Dobb 
1946:59).  
 The sum result of subinfeudation, war, crusades, the 
increased desire of extravaganza and exotic wares of the 
aristocracy support of urban life, illegal emigration to 
avoid the intensification of feudal exploitation, coupled 
with low levels of productivity and a (decreasing) lack of 
incentives toward individual productivity, put the feudal 
mode of production into crisis during the thirteenth and 
into the fourteenth century.  Dobb argued that the 
devastation from the plague would only add to the already 
manifest crisis.  Dobb (1946) wrote, the  
 destructive effect of the plague itself must have been 
 fanned by the malnutrition of the population [i.e., 
 hyper-exploitation] (mortality from the pestilence 
 apparently being proportionately greater among the 
 masses), and local famines have taken the toll they 
 did because of the absence of reserves (p. 50). 
 
The latter, in part, was a function of low technology and 
low productivity. 
 A number of factors would determine the intensity of 
the reassertion of serf-labor obligations during the 
fourteenth and fifteenth century.  Although geographic 
proximity to market activity and money mediation was indeed 
a factor, it was not decisive.  After the thirteenth-





Death in the fourteenth century, feudalism had more or less 
recovered by the late fifteenth century. 
 It was Dobb’s contention that there was a fundamental 
qualitative transformation following the feudal crisis of 
the thirteenth century.  Although significant, the 
qualitative transformation was not the amount of 
commutation that occurred during this period.  Even when 
commutation was invoked, it is not at all clear that this 
meant a lightening of feudal obligations, rather than an 
intensification of feudal burdens.  Although commutation 
would facilitate changes in a later century, through the 
fourteenth century it was merely an alternative, and 
sometimes a more burdensome and exploitative form, of 
feudal serfdom(Dobb 1946:63ff). Dobb uses his extensive 
knowledge of Russian history to sketch an example of the 
correlation between the increase in commutation and the 
stability of feudal relations of production.  Dobb’s sketch 
of Russian feudalism offers a brilliant illustration of the 
rise of commutation in correlation with the rise in feudal 
obligations of the servile class (Dobb 1946:67-70; Dobb 
1948:chps. 2 and 3). 
Hence, according to Dobb, it was not commutation that 
constituted a qualitative transformation in the feudal 





the number of well-to-do peasantry.  As already mentioned, 
feudal production lacked incentives for ambitious peasants.  
However, during the feudal crisis, ambitious peasant-
farmers were able to accumulate small amounts of capital 
and lease additional land in order to enlarge their 
holdings (Dobb 1946:242ff; Dobb 1948:63-4).  Moreover, Dobb 
suggested that “these farmers were probably capable of more 
efficient cultivation."  Although they did not possess, nor 
could they maintain, any claim that would provide them the 
proper status to invoke servile obligation from any serf.  
However, they were able to exploit the desperation during a 
crisis and employ their poorer and more desperate neighbors 
(Dobb 1946:60).  This was not a form of serfdom, but a 
radical attempt of individuals to maintain themselves 
during a feudal crisis.   
It was the rise of a kulak-like class during a feudal 
crisis that would become a new alien force upon the feudal 
order.  However, it was not until the seventeenth century 
that kulakism would become a revolution, or transformative 
force upon the feudal mode of production. 
Rather, at this stage of historical economic 
development there are two analytically distinct aspects of 
serfdom, one economic, the other political: first, “the 





“the degree of subordination in which the serf is placed 
relative to his lord and the consequential degree of 
exploitation to which he is subject” (Dobb 1946:66). 
The nature of the obligation may change form due to 
commutation of tribute, but the essential economic 
relationship between direct producers and the immediate 
rulers was relatively stable and would constitute the 
structure of feudal society well into the eighteenth 
century. 
It was the degree of subordination or “extra-economic 
compulsion” that would wax and wane, contingent upon the 
state of economic health or crisis state of the feudal 
system.  During a crisis, the degree of subordination may 
be temporarily weakened.  This was not necessarily a 
positive manifestation for either the overlord or the serf.  
Nonetheless, it was during such times that the kulak-like 
class of peasantry was able to take advantage and 
contribute positively to the weakened state of the economy 
by employing the more desperate peasantry.  
 
1.2.14. Class Differentiation Within the  
        Feudal Township 
 
 The class differentiation in the feudal countryside 
was paralleled by a class differentiation within the feudal 





similar pattern in feudal townships of Europe was the 
struggle over town governance and the rise of bourgeois 
elite, most often controlling all foreign merchant 
activity. 
 Although a mercantile element would typically secure 
hold of foreign trade, control of the production process 
itself usually was retained by the craft guild.  Some of 
the most violent struggles were over the rights, 
privileges, responsibilities, and autonomy of the craft 
guilds (Dobb 1946:81-2).  Dobb hypothesizes that, similar 
to the class differentiation in rural areas of a kulak-like 
class coming to rule over their once social-class equals, 
the township’s struggles, especially during a crisis, could 
manifest into a relatively sharp class differentiation 
between craft guild masters and their (once social-class 
equal) journeymen.   
The significance of the rise of a kulak-like class in 
particular and class differentiation in general was 
indisputable in the historical case of Russian feudalism.  
Nonetheless, for Dobb the significance of the class 
differentiation within townships could be judged only 
tentatively.  Likewise, the parallel class differentiation 
within the rural areas of Europe was tentative with respect 





the feudalism system. Dobb’s suspicion was that the class 
differentiation was of great significance with respect to 
the modification of the feudal order and the successful (or 
unsuccessful) reproduction of the system.  However, a 
definitive judgment of the significance would need to wait 
until further historical analysis could ascertain the 
phenomena of class differentiation in particular, 
specifically regional cases, along with its impact upon the 
reproduction, modification, or transformation of the social 
network in question. 
 
1.2.15. Some Concluding Comments 
 
At the beginning of this section, it was claimed that 
in Studies Dobb aimed to (a) begin a sketch of the internal 
articulation of feudalism and (b) model and explicate the 
Marxian conception of primitive accumulation.  Further, it 
was suggested that the “traditional view” held that the 
line of causation for the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism was from (b) to (a), and that Dobb more or less 
reverses the line of causation as defined by the 
“traditional view.”  One is now in a position to understand 
that although Dobb certainly rejects the line of causation 
of the “traditional view,” he does more than merely reverse 





First, Dobb claims that the “traditional view” held an 
interpretation of the internal articulation of feudalism 
that is theoretically impoverished, historically 
misleading, epistemologically underanalyzed, and 
consequently, ontologically inaccurate.  Hence, the 
“traditional view” of (a) the internal articulation of 
feudalism must be rejected. 
Second, the “traditional view” has “primitive 
accumulation” forming from an historical process of 
(personal) enrichment by means of (personal) thrift and 
abstinence of the bourgeois section and mercantile element 
of society.  This view is rooted in the work of Adam Smith 
(see Brenner 1977) and essentially maintains that 
“primitive accumulation” and the index of capitalist 
development are the extension of markets and the growth of 
commercial activity (Wood 2002:19).  
Dobb, closely following the lead of Marx (1976, 
section eight) maintains that enrichment alone was not 
enough (Dobb 1946:185).  Marx, in his critique of political 
economy’s “so-called primitive accumulation,” makes a sharp 
distinction between wealth (i.e., enrichment) and capital 
(i.e., a social relationship).  If there is no distinction 
between wealth and capital, there is no need to distinguish 





(Dobb 1946:178).  The “primitive accumulation” of classical 
political economy is “so-called” because the classical 
political economists tended not to recognize capital as a 
social relation and failed to distinguish it from, and 
rather would conflate it with, wealth (profit and 
enrichment). 
Wealth is a necessary condition for the manifestation 
and development of capitalism, but it is far from being a 
sufficient, or even a decisive condition.  Real primitive 
accumulation, according to Marx, was the transformation of 
wealth into capital.  In this sense, real primitive 
accumulation was not merely enrichment, but “had to be 
enrichment in ways which [at the same time] involved 
dispossession of persons several times more numerous than 
those enriched” (Dobb 1946:185).41  
This is an extremely important point from a Dobbian 
perspective.  Primitive accumulation is a dual process of 
both the enrichment of a small kulak-like class and an even 
greater dispossession of the masses.  It is via Dobb’s 
analysis of primitive accumulation that the revolutionary 
                                                 
41 “The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else 
than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of 
production.  It appears as ‘primitive’ because it forms the pre-history 
of capital, and of the mode of production corresponding to capital. […] 
The expropriation of the agricultural producer from the social is the 
basis of the whole process. […] And this history, the history of their 
expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letter of blood 





and transformative elements and conditions of feudalism are 
revealed.  
In brief, Dobb claims, contrary to the 
commercialization model, an increase in market activity and 
changes in the commutation (e.g., from kind to money) did 
not dissolve feudal production relations.  Markets were 
always a constitutive element of feudalism, and the mode of 
commutation was more or less incidental to the (Dobbian) 
definition and ontological structure of feudalism. 
Likewise, the rise and extension of townships were 
necessarily nonantagonistic to the feudal system.  More 
strongly, in at least as many cases townships were 
initiated, ruled, and controlled by feudal nobility.  
Consequent to these observations, Dobb is highly suspicious 
of townships playing a dissolving role in the feudal order.  
This is not to argue that markets, monetary commutation, 
and townships played no part in the dissolution of 
feudalism, but to argue that these elements were not the 
cause of the disintegration of the feudal mode of 
production. 
In the Dobbian model, the internal tendency toward 
feudal socioeconomic crisis is the main culprit behind the 
disintegration of feudalism as a mode of production.  It 





serfs from feudal obligations would manifest.  This was not 
necessarily a positive occurrence for the serf.  The 
“emancipation” of the serf from feudal obligation was often 
no more than a reactionary response to navigate or survive 
a socioeconomic disruption.  
At the same time, it was during a crisis that feudal 
exploitation would tend to intensify.  The intensification 
of feudal exploitation would augment the class antagonism 
between serfs/peasants and feudal nobility.  It is 
historically contingent whether a particular struggle from 
this augmented class antagonism would result in the 
emancipation of serfs/peasants from feudalism obligation.  
Nonetheless, such struggles would tend to weaken the feudal 
order and its ability to reproduce on the same scale.   
This latter point is of great importance to the 
Dobbian model.  To restate it in brief, Dobb proposed that 
crisis tended to increase class antagonism and weaken the 
feudal order regardless of the emancipatory result.  If the 
class struggle during such crisis moments resulted in a 
‘victory’ for serfs/peasants in the form of emancipation, 
the feudal order was disrupted by definition.  However, 
even if the class struggle during such crisis moments 
resulted in a ‘victory’ for the nobility, disruption of the 





in the latter case is because following ‘victory,’ feudal 
nobility most often intensified feudal exploitation, i.e., 
increased rents.  In this case, direct producers may become 
more dependent on markets to obtain the increase in their 
rent and attempt to minimize the exploitation confronting 
them.  If such cases can be historically verified, a degree 
of warrant would be given to Marx’s “really revolutionary-
way.”   
In Marx’s “really revolutionary-way” it was the 
(serf/peasant) direct producer that takes to trade.  This 
process is quite different from the (relatively non-
revolutionary) case whereby the merchant takes to 
production.  It will be recalled that the Dobbian 
hypothesis is that the merchant tended to be a conservative 
force and social agent in a way that the peasant 
necessarily was not. Thus, the idea is that when the 
relatively nonconservative free peasantry element augments 
quantitatively their control of the means of (feudal) 
production, at some crucial moment, a (transformative) 
qualitative change in the (feudal) social relations of 
production manifests. 
Of course, the “really revolutionary-way” is rooted in 
the work of Marx; what is uniquely Dobbian is that Dobb 





relations of feudalism that generated motivations toward 
direct producers taking to trade.  This point is important 
because Dobb has often been accused of remaining committed 
to the basic behavioral premises of the “commercialization 
model.”  For example, Wood (2002:42) charges Dobb with 
leaving his reader “with the overwhelming impression that, 
given the chance, the commodity-producing peasant (and 
artisan) will grow into a capitalist.”  However, as has 
been demonstrated earlier in this argument, the Dobbian 
thesis is much more complex and nuanced than Wood’s 
criticism suggests.   
According to Dobb, it was not that the peasant would 
become capitalist given the chance, but that the internal 
class-antagonisms created a structural dynamic that tended 
to undermine the feudal order.  The class-antagonism forced 
the peasant producers to become more dependent on the 
market to obtain the required rent.  In no way, according 
to Dobb, was this dependence on markets necessarily a 
choice freely sought by feudal producers.  Rather, it was 
structurally forced upon them. 
It is generally acknowledged that Dobb’s (immanent) 
critique of the “traditional view” is devastating to the 
commercialization model of transition.  Dobb was, however, 





Nonetheless, his methodological and ontological suggestions 
would prove to be decisive for the direction of future 
historical research.  The accomplishments of Dobb’s 
alternative model, although incomplete, include the 
following: First, Dobb insists on the importance of Marx 
and Marxian theory, more specifically a particular 
interpretation of historical materialism, for understanding 
both feudalism and capitalism as modes of production.  
Special emphasis was given to the relationship between the 
direct producers and their immediate rulers as constituting 
a prime-mover and an imperative element to the dynamic of 
the system.   
Second, Dobb implicitly insists on the importance of a 
“structuralist” approach to social being.  In some sense, 
Dobb’s insistence on a structuralist approach to feudalism 
is analogous to Keynes’s insistence that the proper 
dichotomy in economics is between “micro” and “macro.”  
Dobb, unlike Keynes, does not identify specific categories 
such as national product, unemployment, and price indices 
(these are specific to capitalism), but suggests the 
significance of the feudal boom/bust sequence, which is the 






Third, Dobb suggested that any dynamic theory of 
feudalism would remain incomplete, if not misleading, if 
the institutions of feudalism were not accounted for.  It 
will be recalled that Dobb placed great emphasis on the 
absence of “special social institutions” that impeded the 
social differentiation of individuals in the same 
occupation or class.  More than simply identifying the 
absence of such special social institutions as one culprit 
in the dissolution of feudalism, Dobb suggested that in 
regions that feudalism persisted such institutions must 
have had a relative presence.  Although he was not 
decisively able to ascertain from the available historical 
research the full truth or falsity of this hunch, it was 
accepted by many historians that institutions would have to 
be accounted for and theorized about.     
Finally, Dobb accentuates the importance of the 
motivation of human action or the notion of (institutional) 
agency.  From the Dobbian perspective, the motivation of 
human action is mediated by the institutions in existence.  
That is to say, motivation of human action is 
institutionally constituted and, therefore, cannot be 
reduced merely to the “self interest” postulate (Dobb 





In other words, the product of human will and action 
 depends both on the relation in which the individual 
 will stands to the wills of others […], and upon the 
 total character of the objective situation which human 
 action seeks to influence (p. 231). 
   
The notion of institutional agency underscores, 
ironically, Dobb’s commitment to (a form of) structuralism.  
Dobb’s notion of agency is institutionally mediated; hence 
agency is institutionally dependent.  For Dobb this 
translates as the proposition that “there is much greater 
uniformity in the response of human beings to various 
situations and to various stimuli” – at the level of group 
or class action – “than can be noticed when one is 
observing individuals” (Dobb 1955[1951]:231).  It is 
because of such group or class uniformity that structural 
causal analysis is an applicable and fruitful scientific 
endeavor for the study of social being and historical 
movements.   
Moreover, Dobb maintains that economic factors (i.e., 
social relations of production and sources of income) have 
a predominant influence in shaping the direction of 
institutional agency and the actions of social groups and 
classes.  According to Dobb (1955[1951]), economic factors 
have such a predominant influence  
because so much in the mode of life of man in society 
 – his nurture, his habits and conventions, his 





 opportunities and pursuits, and his relations with 
 other members of society – is dependent on the source 
 and nature of his income (p. 231).  
 
Dobb did more than leave his readers with 
methodological and ontological clues for future historical 
endeavors.  As explained, Dobb began a sketch of an 
alternative theory to the commercialization model.  In 
Dobb’s alternative theory, the methodological and 
ontological hints have, even if not explicit, a heavy 
presence.  That is to suggest that Dobb’s alternative 
theory to the commercialization model draws heavily from 
notions of structuralism, institutional analysis, and a 
(radical) reconceptualization of the notion of agency.  
This latter reconceptualization especially concerns the 
relationship between, and ontological hiatus (or 
irreducibility) of, agency and institutions on one hand and 
agency and structure on the other.  At this juncture, it 
will suffice to illustrate with brief examples the presence 
of structuralism, institutional analysis, and agency in 
Dobb’s alternative theory for the historical phenomena of 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism. 
It will be recalled that the commercialization model 
maintained that the dissolvent elements of feudalism were 
external to the system as a mode of production.  As a 





mercantile element, money, townships, and bubonic plague. 
According to Dobb, the so-called external dissolvent 
elements identified in the commercialization model were, in 
fact, internal to the feudal mode of production.   
Dobb’s argument does not suggest that these elements 
had nothing to do with the dissolution of the feudal mode 
of production.  Rather, his point is that the role played 
by these elements in the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism is not as simple as the external versus internal 
dualism would suggest.  For Dobb, this means that the 
historians and theorists of medieval societies must 
investigate more deeply into the internal articulation of 
feudalism to understand the contradictions that existed 
within it. 
Crucial to Dobb’s methodology is that to understand 
the basic mechanism necessary for a mode to production to 
be simply reproduced on the same scale or an extended 
scale, the theorist should focus on the moments the system 
fails to be reproduced. Such ‘pathological’ moments, or 
socioeconomic crisis, can be utilized as a contrastive to 
the nonpathological moments in which the system succeeds in 
being reproduced.  The methodological “primacy of the 
pathological” or the emphasis upon feudal socioeconomic 





shown above, what is required is a deeper analysis of the 
primary relationship between direct producers and their 
immediate rulers.  In short, it is Dobb’s hypothesis that 
the internal contradictions that tended to cause 
socioeconomic crisis would be, at least in part, the 
dissolvent elements of the system itself, or would lead the 
theorist closer to the dissolvent elements. 
Dobb’s institutional analysis is also underscored in a 
partial alternative theory to the commercialization model.  
Dobb proposed, in his sketch of an alternative theory, that 
one dissolvent aspect of feudalism was the absence of 
institutional forms that would impede social class 
differentiation (Dobb 1946:13ff, 88ff, 124ff; Dobb 
1925:188ff; Dobb 1948:chp. 2; Dobb 1967:10).  Implicit in 
this proposal is that institutions could be present or, 
alternatively, could have been constructed to stabilize and 
(macro) manage the system’s successful reproduction.    
Dobb does not provide evidence of the particular 
institutions that he believed must have been present in 
areas where capitalism failed to develop, nor does he 
suggest any specific institutions that could have been 
constructed to stabilize the system.  Nonetheless, Dobb’s 
analysis of social class differentiation in general, and 





emphasized the necessity of institutional analysis for 
understanding social being and historical movements. 
It should also be pointed out that Dobb’s insistence 
on an institutional analysis for understanding feudalism 
and his proposal that particular institutions could either 
impede or facilitate the dissolution of feudalism and the 
rise of capitalism are analogous to the Keynesian 
institutional proposal for achieving stabilization and 
crisis management in capitalism.  In 1927, Keynes proposed 
the construction of special institutions that he believed 
were capable of stabilizing the internal contradictions 
inherent in the capitalist mode of production.  Dobb is 
suggesting that the historical construction and existence 
of special specific institutions in feudalism may, to a 
significant degree, help explain the chronology of the 
dissolution of feudalism and the rise of capitalism in 
various parts of the world.  A theoretical analysis and 
practical understanding of (feudal) institutions may also 
suggest the type of institutions that could be constructed 
to facilitate a more stable and smoother development of 
market economies in contemporary underdeveloped nations 
wishing to marketize their economies. 
Finally, Dobb’s reconceptualization of agency is 





feudal society and upon his suggestion that it was the 
dynamic relationship between serf/peasants and their 
overlords that was the “prime-mover” of feudalism as a 
system.  Dobb’s analysis of the conservative force of 
merchants became generally accepted as definitive, at least 
in a broad sense.  Dobb’s theoretical interest in the 
feudal peasants initiated some of the first rigorous and 
most influential historical analyses of these highly under-
analyzed and misunderstood people.  Dobb’s work would 
inspire a tradition of (socioeconomic) historians that 
would come to describe their own methodological orientation 
in the metaphor history from the bottom, up. 
It was not, however, the subtle methodological 
orientation of Dobb’s Studies that first gained attention 
from its readers.42  Rather, it was Dobb’s rejection of the 
“external” element thesis of the commercialization model 
that gained the most prominent attention.43  It was the 
economic theorist Paul Sweezy who initiated the so-called 
                                                 
42 One exception to this is a six-paragraph review by Karl Polanyi, 
published in Journal of Economic History (1948).  Polanyi’s review was 
far too short and did not develop the many critical methodological 
insights that he mentions.  Nor does Polanyi mention Dobb’s 
structuralism, institutional analysis, or reconceptualization of 
agency.  Rather, Polanyi is highly suspicious of Dobb’s Marxian 
orientation and anxious that Dobb imports categories from contemporary 
capitalist society which are inappropriate for the analysis of 
feudalism. 
43 It has been pointed out by Rodney Hilton that Dobb’s Studies had been 
neglected by most economic historians (Hilton 1976:10).  The attention 
Studies received tended to be narrow in analysis and unappreciative of 





“transition debate” in Science and Society in the early 
1950s.  Sweezy was himself a heterodox economist with 
strong Marxian sympathies.  Ironically, Sweezy’s critical 
appreciation of Dobb’s work essentially defended the 
commercialization model against Dobb’s decisive critique.   
Before turning to the specifics of the debate it can 
be acknowledged that Dobb’s definitive (immanent) critique 
of the commercialization model was significantly weakened 
by his inability to develop a full explanatory critique or 
complete alternative theory.  Dobb and others who attempted 
to defend his general thesis lacked the historical research 
and evidence to support their theories and ideas. 
In short, Dobb had proposed the crisis-ridden nature 
of feudalism but was unable to provide a fully consistent 
theory of feudal crisis.  Sweezy, much like mainstream 
economic historians before him, had not denied the 
manifestation of medieval feudal crisis but had placed the 
cause external to the mode of production itself.  In this 
sense, Sweezy and mainstream historical theorists alike 
differed drastically from Dobb’s interpretation of the 
causes of such (feudal) crises.  Sweezy’s challenge is 
testament not to the lack of good ideas coming from Dobb 





questions being asked of history.  Adequate answers and 
complete theories had not yet been fully formulated.       
The “debate” does not fill, necessarily, the 
theoretical void, but it is testament to the absence of 
fully articulated explanations and theories of feudal 
crisis.  With this I now turn my attention to the specifics 
of the famous “transition debate.” 
 
1.3. The Transition Debate 
 
 Maurice Dobb’s Studies in the Development of 
Capitalism was primarily concerned with the 
reproduction/transformation of capitalist social relations 
of production.  Nonetheless, a primer to understanding 
capitalist social relations is knowledge of the origins of 
such relations.44  Therefore, nearly one third of Studies 
concentrates on the transition from the decline of 
feudalism to the rise of capitalism.  It is this third of 
Studies that received the vast bulk of critical commentary 
and sparked the celebrated debate on transition.   
 Paul Sweezy’s “Critique” of Studies published in 
Science & Society, 1952, initiated the transition debate.   
Although Sweezy’s original contribution was intended as 
                                                 
44 In his “Contribution” to the transition debate (see next footnote) 
Kohachiro Takahashi comments: “There is a deep inner relationship 
between the agrarian question and industrial capital, which determines 
the characteristic structures of capitalism in the various countries” 





critical commentary on Dobb’s account of the transition, 
Sweezy held Dobb’s contribution in high regard (Transition, 
p. 41).  In his second contribution to the debate, Sweezy 
acknowledges that his original contribution was more 
“supplementary suggestions and hypotheses” than 
“criticisms” of Dobb’s account of the transition 
(Transition, p. 102).  In this respect, the transition 
debate should be understood, as Dobb had hoped it would 
develop, as a collective effort for “further thought and 
study” (Transition p. 57).45 
 
1.3.1. Sweezy’s Interest in Dobb’s Studies 
 
 Sweezy’s interest in the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism was to investigate the possibility of drawing an 
analogy from feudal development to capitalist development.  
                                                 
45 The original essays of the debate were all published in Science & 
Society.  The contributions include Paul M. Sweezy, “A Critique” 
(Spring 1950);  Maurice Dobb, “A Reply” (Spring 1950); H. K. Takahashi, 
“A Contribution to the Discussion” (Fall 1952); Maurice Dobb, “A 
Further Comment” (Spring 1953); Paul M. Sweezy, ‘A Rejoinder’ (Spring 
1953); Rodney Hilton, “Comment” (Fall 1953); and Christopher Hill, 
“Comment” (Fall 1953).  These essays were collected and published as 
The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism: A Symposium (New York: 
Science and Society, 1954).  In 1976, the original essays were 
published once again with six supplement articles as The Transition 
from Feudalism to Capitalism, edited by Rodney Hilton (London: New Left 
Books, 1976).  The supplement articles include Georges Lefebvre, “Some 
Observations” (originally in La Pensée, February, 1956); Giuliano 
Procacci, “A Survey of the Debate” (originally in Società, XI, 1955); 
Rodney Hilton, “Capitalism – What’s in a Name?” (originally in Past and 
Present, February, 1952); Eric Hobsbawm, “From Feudalism to Capitalism” 
(originally in Marxism Today, August 1962); Maurice Dobb, “From 
Feudalism to Capitalism” (originally in Marxism Today, September, 
1962); John Merrington, “Town and Country in the Transition to 






More specifically, the analogy to be drawn was the 
historical process of feudal development, its general 
crisis, and transformation or transition to capitalism.  
Sweezy desired to contrast feudal development (crisis, 
collapse, and transition to capitalism) to the historical 
process of capitalist development (general crisis, 
collapse, and transition to socialism)46 (Transition p. 
102).  Sweezy claims to “have a pretty good idea about the 
nature of the prime mover” of capitalism, why crisis is 
immanent, and “why socialism is necessarily the successor 
form of society” (Transition p. 102).  However, Sweezy 
suggests that there was no necessity in the logic of 
feudalism that would necessarily give rise to capitalism as 
the successor form of society.  The irony of Sweezy’s 
argument is the transition from feudalism to capitalism had 
actually occurred, whereas the capitalism to socialism 
transition had not.  Nonetheless, Sweezy says he understand 
the logic of the latter, but not of the former. 
  
1.3.2. Sweezy’s “Critique” 
 
The issues that Sweezy addresses in his initial 
“Critique” include (1) Dobb’s “defective definition” of 
                                                 
46 The first sentence in his original contribution reads: “We live in 
the period of transition from capitalism to socialism; and this fact 
lends particular interest to studies of earlier transitions from one 





feudalism and the consequences of this defective 
definition; (2) the processes of reproduction of feudal 
social relations; (3) the mechanism(s) of feudalism’s 
disintegration; (4) how to characterize the “pre-capitalist 
interval” from the fifteenth to seventeenth century; and 
(5) the origin of (a) industrial capital, (b) primitive 
accumulation, and (c) the rise of capitalism.47    
 Sweezy maintains that Dobb’s definition of feudalism 
as “virtually identical with what we usually mean by 
serfdom” (Dobb 1946:35) is “defective” in that it does not 
identify a particular “system of production” and otherwise 
is “too general to be immediately applicable to the study 
                                                 
47 In short, Sweezy necessarily rejects (1) the immanence of crisis in 
feudalism and (2) the necessity of feudalism, due to its own internal 
contradictions, to give rise to capitalism.  Sweezy misunderstands (1) 
the immanence of feudal crisis because the social relations of feudal 
production had been underanalyzed.  It was one of Dobb’s main aims to 
suggest that historians need to study what had been a historically 
neglected area of investigation, i.e., the social relations of feudal 
production, and the reproduction (and potential transformation) of 
feudalism as a mode of production.   However, Dobb himself can hardly 
be said to have provided convincing arguments for the immanence of 
feudal crisis; hence he merely hypothesized an incomplete cause, 
namely, that of the overexploitation of serfs.  A more complete answer 
would have to await further research of the topic.  Turning to (2), 
Sweezy’s rejection of the necessity of feudalism, due to its own 
internal contradictions, to give rise to capitalism is actually in 
agreement with Dobb.  Sweezy’s attempt to invoke a debate between the 
internal causes versus external causes of the actual transition that 
took place is misleading and distracts from points of agreement.  
Dobb’s own conclusion is that there was no necessity for the 
dissolution of feudal social relations, nor for capitalist social 
relations to be the successor of that society.  Rather, it is Dobb’s 
contention that feudalism was characterized by unstable socioeconomic 
development, whereby crises periodically manifest.  It was during such 
crises that the sociopolitical regimes of the feudal mode of production 
became vulnerable and subject to resistance, protest, and potential 






of a particular region during a particular period” 
(Transition p. 33).  Sweezy proposes that feudalism was a 
system of “production for use,” where the crucial feature 
is that the “needs of the community are known and 
production is planned and organized with a view to 
satisfying these needs” (Transition p. 35).  Further, 
Sweezy acknowledges that serfdom is, in fact, the 
predominant social relation of production, and “production 
is organised in and around the manorial estate.”  Sweezy 
continues, “markets are for the most part local.”  Hence 
money transactions are present, and there is also a 
presence of long-distance trade.  However, neither the 
presence of money, nor long-distance trade played any 
“determining role in the purposes or methods of production” 
(Transition pp. 34-5). 
 Since the community needs are known and production is 
planned, there are no internal or structural pressures to 
improve methods of production, nor is there a boundless 
thirst for surplus-labor.  Sweezy insists that this is not 
to suggest that feudalism is a stable and static system of 
production.  Rather, two key elements that generate a 
degree of instability within the system are (1) uneven 
population growth (Transition pp. 35-6) and (2) competition 





prestige.  War destroys resources of production and creates 
personal insecurity but simultaneously reinforces the need 
for the particular feudal arrangement.  “Feudal warfare 
upsets, impoverishes, and exhausts society, but it has no 
tendency to transform it” (Transition p. 35).  The chronic 
instability of the feudal system generated by uneven 
population growth and war engenders “a very strong bias in 
favour of maintaining given methods and relations of 
production” (Transition p. 36).   
 Sweezy believes that Dobb neglected the inherently 
conservative and change-resisting character of the feudal 
system (at least characteristic of Western Europe).  This 
neglect, according to Sweezy, has significant consequences 
for Dobb’s account of the dissolution of the feudal system. 
 Sweezy interprets Dobb’s theory of the decline of 
feudalism as essentially caused by the inefficient methods 
of production coupled with the overexploitation of the 
labor force by the feudal aristocracy for their ever 
growing needs for revenue.  The overexploitation led to 
serfs deserting the manor estates en masse (Dobb 1946:46), 
whereby the manor estates could not reproduce the system of 
production.  For this theory to hold up, Sweezy claims that 
Dobb must show the “ruling class’s growing need for revenue 





explained in terms of forces operating inside the feudal 
system” (Transition p. 37). 
 Sweezy maintains that Dobb cannot show that such 
forces operated inside of the feudal system because such 
forces were outside of, or external, to feudalism.  More 
specifically, the external forces manifest (in part) from 
the rise of long-distance trade, which had brought in new, 
exotic wares and induced new desires, which would become 
the taste nouveau of the ruling aristocracy, and increased 
their need for revenue.  Likewise, serfs resisting a 
deepening of exploitation escaped to adjacent, but 
otherwise adjunct, townships.  Both of these forces, argues 
Sweezy, were appendages to the feudal system.  Therefore, 
according to Sweezy, the very forces Dobb identifies as the 
begetter of the dissolution of feudalism are “external” to 
that system of production. 
 Sweezy maintains that Dobb could still salvage his 
thesis of internal contradictions if he could show that 
townships arose “owing to the initiative of feudal 
institutions themselves” (Dobb 1946:77).  Dobb, however, 
takes an “eclectic explanation of the rise of mediæval 
towns” (Dobb 1946:75; 1925:181), whereby his internal 
contradictions thesis is significantly weakened.  The 





“that part of the commonly accepted theory which holds that 
the root cause of the decline of feudalism was the growth 
of trade” (Transition p. 41).  
 Thus, according to Sweezy, Dobb committed two key 
oversights, which were (1) Dobb’s failure to identify the 
“crucial feature of feudalism” as a system of “production 
for use” (Transition p. 35) and (2) Dobb’s neglect of 
taking “full account of [the] inherently conservative and 
change-resisting character of western European feudalism” 
(Transition p. 36).  Sweezy contends that had Dobb not 
overlooked these features, he would be obliged to change 
his theory of the decline of feudalism. 
 Despite Sweezy’s critique missing on many points, it 
must be recognized here that Dobb’s explanation for the 
cause of feudal crisis is, of course, incomplete.  Dobb 
himself identified his explanation as incomplete but, 
nonetheless, a beginning exploration of the crisis-ridden 
nature of the feudal mode of production.  Sweezy’s weak 
argument is that Dobb’s explanation is incomplete.  
Sweezy’s strong argument is that feudalism is inherently 
stable.   
Certainly, it can be recognized that Sweezy’s weak 
argument is more or less accurate.  However, his strong 





unaddressed.  It can be argued in concert with Sweezy that 
Dobb does not have a complete explanation for the culprit 
mechanisms and specific individual actions that give rise 
to feudal crisis.  However, Dobb’s thesis in Studies is 
that feudalism was in (at least a continent-wide) crisis 
prior to the fourteenth century and hence before the 
bubonic plague had reached the shores of Europe.  Thus, for 
Sweezy to theoretically deny the crisis-ridden nature of 
feudalism and adhere to the idea of an inherent stable 
system, he must explain, or deny, the (external) mechanisms 
of crisis.  However, Sweezy remains silent on these 
particular issues. 
Nonetheless, Sweezy must be appreciated for 
recognizing the incompleteness and indeed weakness of 
Dobb’s explanation for feudal crisis.48  A more complete and 
stronger explanation would only appear at a much later 
date, following from more historical research. 
 
1.3.3. Sweezy’s Alternative Explanation 
 
 Sweezy offers an alternative account of the decline of 
feudalism that he believes does not suffer from Dobb’s 
                                                 
48 Dobb’s explanation concerned the inefficient production methods of 
the feudal system and the pressures for greater revenues for the ruling 
class.  The problem with this explanation is more than incompleteness 
and simplicity; it actually tends to suggest that feudalism was out-
competed by bourgeois production, hence Sweezy’s thesis, or 





oversights of (1) not recognizing that feudalism was a 
system of “production for use” and (2) underestimating the 
change-resistant nature of feudalism as a system.  In 
Sweezy’s account, the decisive factor in the decline of 
feudalism is the dual rise (and growth) of townships and 
trade.  Recognizing that feudal production is for use, 
while production within townships was for the market 
(therefore production for exchange), Sweezy contends that 
two separate and distinct systems of production existed 
simultaneously.  These separate and distinct socioeconomic 
systems of production competed for politico-economic 
dominance. 
 Feudalism as a system of production is not conducive 
to commodity production due to its inefficiencies and the 
predominance of regulations by custom and tradition (as 
opposed to rational maximization).  The more efficient 
system of production for exchange within townships further 
induced a transformation in the psychology of human beings 
toward a “business-like attitude” that had effects 
throughout the entire (feudal) society.  The rise of long-
distance trade generated a change in tastes and preferences 
of especially the ruling aristocracy.  At the same time the 
rise of townships engendered the prospect and promise of “a 





the system of production for exchange within townships out-
produced and outcompeted the system of production for use.  
Until defeated the system of production for use coexisted 
with the more efficient system of production exchange. 
 Sweezy concludes, “feudalism and commodity production 
are [therefore] mutually exclusive concepts” (Transition p. 
50, n22).  Nonetheless, serfdom survived for an extended 
period of time because it is also not necessarily 
inconsistent with commodity production, although it is 
characteristic of production for use (Transition p. 44). 
 Sweezy further suggests that in regions where markets 
were far from the manorial estate, serfdom was intensified.  
Alternatively, in regions within proximity of trade centers 
and markets, any attempt to increase feudal exploitation on 
the part of manor lords led to the migration of serfs (en 
masse) to the townships and market centers.  It is in this 
sense that Sweezy claims that Dobb’s “over-exploitation” 
theory misses the mark.  It is “more accurate to say that 
the decline of western European feudalism was due to the 
inability of the ruling class to maintain control over,” 
and hence inability to overexploit, “society labor power” 
(Transition p. 46). 
 With the dual and competing system of production 





period between the dissolution of feudalism and rise of 
full-blown capitalism was neither feudal nor capitalist, 
but rather a “pre-capitalist commodity production” 
(Transition p. 49). 
 Finally, Sweezy addresses Dobb’s thesis on the rise of 
capitalism.  At issue is Marx’s idea that there are two 
roads to capitalism.  Marx writes in Chapter XX of Capital 
III: 
The transition from the feudal mode of production 
takes place in two different ways.  The producer may 
become a merchant and capitalist, in contrast to the 
agricultural natural economy and the guild-bound 
handicraft of medieval urban industry.  This is the 
really revolutionary way.  Alternatively, however, the 
merchant may take direct control of production 
himself.  But however frequently this occurs as a 
historical transition – for example the English 
clothier of the seventeenth century, who brought 
weavers who were formerly independent under his 
control, selling them their wool and buying up their 
cloth – it cannot bring about the overthrow of the old 
mode of production by itself, but rather preserves and 
retains it as its own precondition (p. 323). 
 
Sweezy contends that Dobb misinterprets the meaning of this 
passage to imply that the independent freemen rise up from 
the ranks of direct producers to become merchants and 
capitalists themselves.  However, Sweezy maintains that the 
actual meaning of this passage is simply “the producer, 
whatever his background, starts out as both a merchant and 
an employer of wage-labour” (Transition p. 54).  In other 





the putting-out system to the rapid development of full-
blown capitalist enterprise.  
 In this sense, Marx himself was not committed to the 
idea that the “real revolutionary way” was the rise of the 
direct producer to the rank of merchant and capitalist.   
According to Sweezy, this is to Marx’s credit and Dobb’s 
detriment in that even if there is any evidence of the 
rising of direct producer to the ranks of merchant and 
capitalist, it probably had no significance in the rise of 
industrial capitalism.49  
  Sweezy also finds Dobb’s historical analysis of 
primitive accumulation less than convincing.  At issue is 
Dobb’s separation of primitive accumulation into two 
separate phases: “a phase of acquisition and a phase of 
realization (or of transfer of bourgeois wealth into 
industrial investment)” (Dobb 1946:184).  This second phase 
is argued by Sweezy to be inessential to the process of 
                                                 
49 It should be recalled that Dobb suggested that the Russian case was 
unambiguous with respect to the so-called “real revolutionary way” and 
the rise of the Kulak class.  He suggested that a similar process in 
Western Europe was probably more significant than had been recognized 
by socioeconomic historians.  It is also important to point out that 
the significance of the “real revolutionary way” was not the number of 
direct producers that turned capitalist, as much as the de-stabilizing 
influence the process of class differentiation (via the “real 
revolutionary way”) had on dissolving feudal relations and allowing for 
the development of capitalistic relations.  In other words, it may be 
the case that merchants in some region were in the main the first true 
industrial capitalists; nonetheless, it may have been the case that the 
prior class differentiation was a necessary process, following which a 
merchant could take advantage of the disruption of social relations and 





primitive accumulation.  Moreover, it plays no significant 
role in Dobb’s own analysis of “the necessary pre-
conditions of industrial investment” (Transition p. 56).  
Rather, Dobb demonstrates that the sufficient pre-
conditions for industrial investment are the dissolution of 
the old mode of production, and the dispossession of the 
masses to form a “willing” class of laborers and a reserve 
pool of unemployed in order to keep wages and costs low 
(Dobb 1946, chap. 6). 
 
1.3.4. Dobb’s “Reply” 
 
 In Dobb’s “Reply” to Sweezy, Dobb finds points of 
agreement, differences in emphasis, and several points of 
disagreement.  The first point of contention concerns 
Dobb’s definition of feudalism as virtually identical with 
serfdom.  Dobb expresses that the significance of this 
definition is that it emphasizes “the relations of 
production characteristic of feudalism: namely the 
relations between the direct producer and his overlord” 
(Transition p. 58).  Further, it is also implicit in this 
definition that the relationship between the direct 
producer and his overlord is of much greater significance 
than is the relationship between the direct producer and 





 Sweezy’s definition places the emphasis on the 
relationship between the direct producers and their access 
to markets.  In this sense, Sweezy’s definition demotes the 
primacy of the direct-producer/immediate-ruler relationship 
to secondary importance.  Of primary importance is the 
vicinity and presence of market forces.  It may further 
suggest that the key class conflict is not between the 
direct-producers/immediate-rulers, but rather between the 
urban merchant (or bourgeois elements within towns) and 
feudal overlords.  
 The difference in Sweezy’s definition of feudalism as 
‘production for use’ and Dobb’s definition of feudalism as 
(virtually) identical to ‘serfdom’ is ontological with 
methodological import.50  It is merely a presupposition, in 
the case of Dobb’s definition, to give primacy to the 
relationship between the direct producers and their most 
immediate rulers.  “The justification of any definition 
must ultimately rest on its successful employment in 
illuminating the actual process of historical development” 
(Dobb 1946:8).  It was Dobb’s belief that his definition, 
in fact, illuminated both the historical development of 
                                                 
50 This is a point hinted at by Takahashi in his “Contribution” to the 
debate.  Takahashi maintains that the differences between Dobb’s and 
Sweezy’s definitions of feudalism “are not mere questions of 






capitalism and the dissolution of feudalism alike.  
Methodologically, this ontological presupposition requires 
that the attention of the historian must be focused on the 
struggle over modes of exploitation.  In this sense, the 
way that the overlord would succeed or fail to pump out the 
labor service of the serf becomes the most important 
relationship to understand about the economic development 
of the system and political struggle that would manifest 
from it. 
 Perhaps the most crucial element accentuated by Dobb’s 
definition, although not underscored explicitly by Dobb 
himself, is a sense of agency on the part of the ‘subject 
peasantry’51 and serfs in both the development, crisis, and 
dissolution of feudalism as a mode of production.  This 
notion of the agency of the ‘subject peasantry’ had gone 
all but ignored in traditional accounts of feudalism.  
 Dobb makes this sense of agency explicit in his third 
contribution to the transition debate: 
“The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus 
labour is pumped out of the direct producers 
determines the relation of rulers and ruled.” 
                                                 
51 Dobb became fond of using this term, borrowed from Marc Bloch.  It 
emphasizes the subjection of the peasant to the (politico-economic) 
control of an overlord.  As Bloch puts it: “whatever the source of the 
noble’s income he always lived on the labour of other men” (quoted in 
Dobb 1967:252, p. 3; also 1973:145).  “The characteristic feature” of 






It follows immediately from this that the basic 
conflict must have been between the direct producers 
and their feudal overlords who made exactions of their 
surplus labour-time or surplus product by dint of 
feudal right and feudal power.  This conflict when it 
broke into open antagonism expressed itself in peasant 
revolt (individual or collective, e.g. in flight from 
the land or organised illegal action and force) 
(Transition p. 166).52 
 
 The ‘subject peasantry’ thus had modes of resisting 
feudal exploitation.  More importantly, Dobb is suggesting 
these forms of resistance, or the lack thereof, determined 
the dynamic of this system itself.  In this sense, Dobb 
emphasizes that the direct-producer/immediate-rule 
relationship was the crucial class struggle under feudalism 
and not any direct clash of urban bourgeois elements 
(traders) with feudal lords.  The latter did, of course, 
occur (as witness the struggle of urban communities for 
political autonomy and control of local markets).  But 
bourgeois traders, so long as they were purely traders and 
intermediaries, were generally parasitic on feudalism and 
                                                 
52 Dobb does not develop this intuition with any great historical (nor 
necessarily theoretical) rigor.  However, the notion of agency is an 
important ontological motif in Dobb’s Studies.  The Dobbian notion of 
agency is embedded in his definition of feudalism, which highlights the 
relationship between serfs and overlord as the main impetus of the 
dynamic of feudal as a system.  Implicitly this suggests that serfs and 
their agency and actions were important elements in the dynamic of the 
feudal system.  Likewise, Dobb’s theoretical analysis of merchants also 
highlights a particular conception of feudal agency.  Dobb’s analysis 
of the mercantile element necessarily is an explicit demotion of the 
merchant as the historical emancipator; more or less consequently it 
suggests that the actors responsible for the emancipation must be 
sought elsewhere.  The Dobbian-interpreted Marxian “real revolutionary 
way” further suggests that the significant action leading to feudal 
emancipation came from the peasant class (that is to say, Kulak-like 





tended to compromise with it; in many cases, they were 
actual allies of the feudal aristocracy.  At any rate, 
their struggle, I believe, remained secondary, at least 
until a much later stage (Transition p. 166). 
 If this thesis is correct, the proper focus should be 
on the revolt of the petty producers (whom Christopher Hill 
dubs the industrious sorts of people) against the 
Royalists, which included the monarch, clergy, landed 
aristocracy and merchant elite.  The direct-
producer/immediate-ruler relationship thus also has primacy 
over “vague concepts” such as the ‘deepening of the 
division of labor’, ‘the widening of the market’, ‘rise of 
money economy’, and even the rise of ‘large capitalist 
manufactories’ (Transition p. 167).    
 Sweezy’s complaint of Dobb’s definition of feudalism 
as being too general to be of historical use thus seems to 
be off the mark and may underestimate the significance and 
utility of its employment.  Further as Takahashi points 
out, Sweezy’s ‘system of production for the market’ is what 
lacks any specificity, in that it “cannot define specific 
historical productive relations (nor, therefore, class 
relations)” (Transition p. 71).  It is not adequate to 
simply deny with a definition that “commodity production 





attempts (Transition p. 50, no 22, and p. 70).  Following 
the rejection of Sweezy’s definition, Takahashi insists 
that the key question that must be asked “as to a given 
social structure is not whether commodities and money are 
present, but rather how these commodities are produced, how 
that money serves as a medium in production” (Transition p. 
71). 
 
1.3.5. The Weakness of Dobb’s Definition of 
       Feudalism  
  
Although Sweezy’s complaints about Dobb’s definition 
of feudalism miss the mark, and Sweezy’s own definition has 
been shown to be “defective”, in Dobb’s original 
formulation, his definition of feudalism nonetheless seems 
to have a “defective” emphasis that is not mentioned by 
Sweezy or Takahashi. 
 In the original formulation of his definition of 
feudalism Dobb (1946) writes: 
the definition of Feudalism [here employed, will place 
the …] emphasis [on …] the relation between the direct 
producer (whether he be artisan in some workshop or 
peasant cultivator on the land) and his immediate 
superior or overlord and in the social-economic 
content of the obligation which connects them. […] As 
such it will be virtually identical with what we 
generally mean by serfdom: an obligation laid on the 
producer by force and independently of his own 
volition to fulfill certain economic demands of an 
overlord, whether these demands take the form of 
services to be performed or of dues to be paid in 





of military strength, possessed by the feudal 
superior, or of custom backed by some kind of 
juridical procedure, or the force of law (pp. 35-6).  
 
 The “defective” side of this definition seems to be 
one of emphasis upon coercion, that is, serfdom as “an 
obligation” of coercive “force” and independent of the 
producer’s “own volition.”  This emphasis upon coercion 
seems to strip the sense of agency of the direct producer, 
which is key to Dobb definition and historical intention.  
It is not to be denied that ultimately, coercive forces 
could be, and, of course, were, used to sustain these 
relationships.  Neither can it be denied that the direct 
producers were more or less conscious of the possible use 
of such coercive forces.  Nonetheless, it is another 
argument to say this relationship is maintained independent 
of the direct producer’s own volition. 
 First, it is the role of ideological forms, such as 
religion, to make particular social relations part of 
everyone’s own volition.  This is an important insight into 
the persistence and resilience of any mode of production.  
Second, no coercive force (neither military, nor simply 
customary) is powerful enough by itself to assure the 
reproduction of any mode or production.  There is always an 
element of voluntarism or personal volition present and 





a positive class-consciousness, ignorance of an 
alternative, or a more or less conscious identification 
with ideas of the ruling elite.  Finally, if Dobb denies 
personal volition, his denial weakens, if not contradicts, 
his accounts of (1) the thirteenth-century crisis of 
feudalism, (2) the revolutionary forces at work in 
seventeenth-century England, and (3) the causes for the 
dissolution of feudalism.  In all three cases, the agency 
of peasants in the form of political protest (i.e., 
‘peasant revolt’) and the class of independent freeman, 
craftsmen, and artisans play the central role.      
 
1.3.6. Agency and the Stability of Feudalism 
 
 This notion of agency is related to the second point 
of contention between Sweezy and Dobb regarding the 
“conservative and change-resisting character of western 
European feudalism.”  Dobb maintains that the “fundamental 
point” is that Sweezy goes too far in denying the role of 
class struggle in the reproduction/transformation of 
feudalism.  According to Dobb, it was class struggle (e.g., 
peasant revolts) that proved to “modify the dependence of 
the petty mode of production upon feudal overlordship and 
eventually to shake loose the small producer from feudal 





Seemingly in agreement with Sweezy, Dobb concedes that 
when compared to capitalistic economies, feudalism as a 
system tended to be extremely stable.   However, Dobb 
proposes that feudalism was much more dynamic than Sweezy 
suggests.  Citing Molly Gibbs’s Feudal Order (London 1949), 
Dobb maintains that “the feudal period witnessed 
considerable changes in technique”53 (Transition p. 59).  
The historical record now thoroughly demonstrates that 
throughout the centuries feudalism showed remarkable 
ability to change it appearance.  Takahashi warns both Dobb 
and Sweezy that to point out that feudalism was 
conservative compared to modern capitalism is all but 
meaningless.  More meaningful is to compare Western 
European feudalism with Eastern European feudalism and 
feudalism in the Orient.   
Takahashi argued that in contrast to both Eastern 
European feudalism and feudalism of the Orient, Western 
European feudalism tended to be much more unstable and 
crisis ridden.  Moreover, the fact that bourgeois society 
(and industrial capitalism) first develops (in its 
classical form) in Western Europe indicates a certain 
                                                 
53 This is a point that has gained further support following the 1962 
publication of Lynn White’s Medieval Technology and Social Change (New 






“fragility and instability” inherent in the form of 
feudalism in this region of the world (Transition p. 74). 
 It is in this context that Dobb rejects the sharp 
external/internal distinction in the forces and causes 
behind the dissolution of feudalism.  More than half of 
Sweezy’s first essay is devoted to the critique of Dobb on 
this point and the development of his thesis that feudalism 
collapsed only because of external forces (i.e., the growth 
of long-distance trade in concert with the rise of 
townships). Dobb maintains he is not refuting the presence 
of external forces at work upon the dissolution of 
feudalism.  His point is that there had been too much of an 
emphasis on external forces and a neglect of the internal 
articulation of feudalism as mode of production.  The 
social relations of feudalism had been underanalyzed and 
the economic dynamics of the mode of production 
misunderstood.54  As a consequence, the origins of 
capitalism had been misinterpreted and the emancipatory 
potential and progressive developmental force of markets 
overestimated.  
                                                 
54 In Studies Dobb writes: “What is clearly missing in the traditional 
interpretation is an analysis of the internal relationship of Feudalism 
as a mode of production and the part which these played in determining 
the system’s disintegration or survival.  And while the actual outcome 
has to be treated as result of a complex interaction between the 
external impact of the market and these internal relationships of the 
system, there is a sense in which it is the latter that can be said to 





 As a direct application of this overestimation of the 
emancipatory potential of markets, Dobb scolds Sweezy for 
his error in maintaining that there is necessarily a 
correlation between feudal disintegration and “nearness to 
centres of trade.”  Repeating, in summary form, passages 
from Studies (pp. 38-42), Dobb (re)informs Sweezy that in 
many parts of Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
century, for example, the northern and western regions of 
England where access to centers of trade and markets were 
more remote, serfdom disappeared earliest.  In areas of 
proximity to trade centers and markets, such as London, 
serfdom persisted longest.  Furthermore, the growth of 
trade and commercial expansion in Eastern Europe was 
associated with the intensification of serfdom where it had 
survived and a reinstitution of serfdom where it had 
diminished (the so-called ‘second serfdom’).   Thus, as 
Takahashi notes in his “Contribution,” “The essential cause 
[of the emancipation from serfdom] therefore is not trade 
or the market itself; the structure of the market is 
conditioned by the internal organisation of the productive 
system” (Transition p. 76).  Hence, as Kosminsky had 
pointed out in 1935,  
 The rise of money economy has not always been the 
 great emancipating force which nineteenth-century 





 of markets and the growth of production [are] as 
 likely to lead to the increase of labour services as 
 to their decline (quoted by Takahashi in Transition 
 p. 77, no. 26). 
 
 
1.3.7. Dobb’s Rejection of an Era of “Pre- 
  Capitalist Commodity Production” 
 
 Dobb completely rejects Sweezy’s attempt to 
characterize the period between the fourteenth and 
seventeenth century as “pre-capitalist commodity 
production.”55  The “crucial question” insists Dobb, “which 
Sweezy has apparently failed to ask is […] what was the 
ruling class of this period” (Transition p. 62).  Dobb 
maintains that the ruling class remained unambiguously 
feudal in its forms of exploitation (i.e., rent, taxes, 
tithes, and merchant monopoly power).  Besides, if the 
ruling class was not feudal, then what was the bourgeois 
revolution about?  
In his second contribution, titled “A Rejoinder,” 
Sweezy puts his comment regarding Dobb’s crucial question 
                                                 
55 H. K. Takahashi in his ‘Contribution’ adds, “The introduction of the 
category of ‘pre-capitalist commodity production’ in this connection is 
not only unnecessary, but obscures the fact that feudal society and 
modern capitalist were ruled by different historical laws” (Transition 
p. 86).  This is of special significance when it is accepted that 
feudalism is also a form of commodity production.  In Sweezy’s account 
the forces of supply and demand would rule ‘pre-capitalist commodity 
production’ the same way that they rule capitalist society.  
Takahashi’s point here is that in fact the same sorts of laws may not 
be at work in each society.  Dobb makes a similar point in Studies when 
he writes that with commutation toward money rent, if a serf had higher 
than expected price in the market, the production in the next period 
decreased.  The reason for this is the difference in the institutional 
arrangement, i.e., the serf had control of the means of production and 





in the form of a query:  Is it possible that “there was not 
one ruling class but several” (Transition p. 108)?  
Christopher Hill’s contribution directly refutes the 
logical possibility of answering this query in the 
affirmative.  Furthermore, Hill suggests that empirical 
evidence would support the position of one (feudalistic) 
ruling class during the period in question (Transition pp. 
118-21).  Dobb himself cites an earlier debate that the 
British Marxist economic historians had already engaged in 
the early 1940s (in Labour Monthly) concerning the nature 
of the seventeenth-century bourgeois revolution in England.  
The issue of this debate was whether the English Revolution 
was a struggle against feudal rule or was the bourgeoisie 
in power and the revolution was feudal aristocratic 
reaction, which in the end failed to overthrow the 
bourgeois rule? 
During this debate Dobb’s own intervention56 urged that 
an improper distinction had been drawn between merchant 
capital and feudal aristocracy.  Rather, merchant capital 
was already part of feudal ruling class and was itself 
separated from the process of production (which the guild 
master had control of).  That is not to suggest that there 
were no political disputes between landed feudal 
                                                 





aristocracy and feudal monopoly merchants, but when it came 
to the actual rule of society, their interests converged.  
Neither opposed serfdom.   
Although this aspect of Dobb’s argument did not 
clearly come forth in his debate with Sweezy, the politico-
economic conservatism of the merchant class is a central 
thesis in Studies (1946:122).   In Studies, Dobb further 
substantiated the claim of the political actions of the 
merchant elite as being highly conservative and most often 
on the side of the Crown and noble classes during the 
bourgeois revolution.  As Dobb asserts in his “Reply” to 
Sweezy: 
the ruling class was still feudal [during the period 
in question] and [the] state was still the political 
instrument of its rule.  And if this is so, then this 
ruling class must have depended for its income on 
surviving feudal methods of exploiting the petty mode 
of production.  True, since trade had come to occupy a 
leading place in the economy, this ruling class had 
itself an interest in trade […], and took certain 
sections of the merchant bourgeoisie (specially the 
export merchants) into economic partnership and into 
political alliance with itself […].  [A]s long as 
political constraint and the pressures of manorial 
custom still ruled economic relationships […], and a 
free market in land was absent (as well as free labour 
mobility), the [feudal] form of […] exploitation 
cannot be said to have [been] shed […], even if this 
was a degenerate and rapidly disintegrating form. 
(Transition p. 63) 
 
Thus in agreement with Takahashi, “Sweezy is right in 





product of the disintegrating action of trade on the system 
of production of use” (Transition p. 77).  However, this 
did not constitute the collapse or end of feudalism.  One 
of Dobb’s most substantial contributions is his assertion 
that feudalism, as a system, was able to incorporate 
commodity production and market activities into its 
impulse.  That is to suggest that even if trade and 
townships were initially external to feudalism, they 
became, in time, part of its internal articulation.  It is 
in this sense that it can be said that markets as an 
opportunity for exchange have existed in all forms of human 
civilizations.  What have not always existed are market 
imperatives, or the coercive (impersonal) forces of 
markets.  Although these are not exactly the terms Dobb 
uses, it is what he is groping for.  The point here is that 
market imperatives57 only become operative following a 
revolution in the social relations of production or a 
transformation in the internal articulation of feudalism 




                                                 
57 Wood makes this point in her assessment of the transition and 
analysis of markets in different modes of production (Wood 2002:6-7).  
Moreover, this distinction is the basis of Polanyi’s distinction 
between an “embedded” economy versus a “disembedded” economy; in the 
former, market imperatives are (more or less) not operative, whereas 





1.3.8. The Process of Social Differentiation 
       Restated 
 
 As Dobb pointed out in his “Reply” to Sweezy 
(Transition p. 60) and as he hypothesizes in his Studies 
(p. 58ff), although it is an error to correlate the rise of 
trade and townships with directly dissolving feudalism, 
these initially external; and then internal-absorbed 
manifestations indeed gave rise to a process of social 
differentiation. 58  On the one hand, “a sort of kulak class 
in the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century English village” 
emerges (Dobb 1946:60).   On the other hand, “a stratum of 
impoverished peasants with meagre holdings” was created 
(Dobb 1946:59).  Nevertheless, the rise of this fourteenth- 
century kulak-like class was “insufficiently matured” and 
incapable of constituting “any serious challenge to an 
older” mode of production (Dobb 1946:18). Therefore, the 
full significance of this social differentiation would not 
be felt until the feudal crisis of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century (Dobb 1946:252-3, p. 18). 
                                                 
58 The connection between, on the one hand, the growth of towns and the 
development of long-distance and, on the other hand, the dissolution of 
feudalism is not direct (and the indirect influence is institutionally 
contingent, see below).  In this context, Dobb writes: “it may well be 
that any connection that there was between growth of the market and the 
transition to leases or to hired labour operated via the effect of 
trade on this process of differentiation among the peasantry themselves 
rather than via its direct influence on the economic policy of the 






 It is contingent whether townships and trade give rise 
to the manifestation of social differentiation.  The 
stronger point being made by Dobb, in his “eclectic” 
explanation of townships, is that townships, regardless of 
origin, often became (more or less) consistent with the 
feudal system.    Thus, it is possible that a feudal system 
absorbs townships and trade (even if, initially, these are 
external manifestations) into its internal articulation, 
and no social differentiation of significance emerges.  The 
contingent factors are the social institutions in place and 
the political policy implemented with the rise of trade and 
townships.  In this light, social differentiation59 does not 
necessarily have to emerge from the impetus of long-
distance trade but could manifest from “differences that 
arise in the course of time in the quality or quantity of 
land-holding and differences in instruments of tillage and 
of draught animals; and the agency of eventual 
dispossession is debt” (Dobb 1946:242).  Thus, with 
                                                 
59 Takahashi maintained the process of social differentiation “had its 
origin within the structure of already existing English feudal society, 
and there is no reason to ascribe it to trade as such.  In taking up 
this point, Dobb’s reply to Sweezy is inadequate and makes unnecessary 
concessions” (Transition pp. 77-8). Takahashi contended that the form 
of commutation (i.e., institutional arrangement) is of utmost 
importance.  If feudal rent is paid in kind, then there may not be a 
disintegrative force from the rise of trade, as was the case for both 
“France and Japan” (Transition p. 77).  Takahashi believed Marx had 
made a similar point in Capital III when he wrote that the form of rent 
in kind “is quite suitable for becoming the basis of stationary 
conditions of society, such as we see in Asia” (Marx in Transition p. 





emphasis, the presence of particular social institutions 
and/or the implementation of certain political policies can 
potentially prevent certain (drastic) forms of social 
differentiation.  It is a historical fact that, at least in 
the case of Western European feudalism, there was an 
absence of such social institutions and a political failure 
to implement impeding legislation and political policy to 
prevent a large degree of social differentiation from 
manifesting.  This historical fact, in concert with the 
rise of trade and townships, simultaneously accelerated the 
process of social differentiation among petty producers, 
between petty producers and peasants, deepening the 
impoverishment of various peasants, and finally, the 
general impoverishment of the peasantry as a class (Dobb 
1946:61; Takahashi also gestures at this latter point; see 
Transition p. 77). 
 
1.3.9. Reasserting the Dual Road Thesis 
 
Dobb’s emphasis upon the accelerated process of social 
differentiation and his insistence of the presence of the 
kulak-like class leave him committed to the importance of 
the ‘dual roads’ thesis of capitalist development.  Dobb 
is, however, in agreement with Sweezy that the dual roads 





so-called “real revolutionary way,” need further historical 
investigation.  Nonetheless, Dobb still insists that 
manufactory production did not develop from the feudal 
guild-system but was a new creation.  Manufactory 
production was not developed by feudal monopoly merchants, 
but rather by new social strata.  In this sense, Dobb 
remains committed to the dual road thesis of Marx and 
further insists on the importance of the “real 
revolutionary way.”  
Dobb suggests, contrary to Sweezy, that evidence has 
been provided by both himself and R. Tawney for the 
importance of direct producers rising from the ranks and 
becoming merchants and capitalists.  In this sense, Dobb 
believes his interpretation of the crucial passage from 
volume III of Marx’s Capital (as quoted above) is correct.  
Sweezy passively concedes this point when he maintains, in 
his “Rejoinder,” that upon further reflection, there is 
more than one interpretation of this crucial passage of the 
“real revolutionary way” and Dobb’s is a viable inference 
(Transition p. 107). 
Dobb strengthened his argument for the “real 





supported the (Marxian/Dobbian) thesis.60   According to 
Dobb, a kulak-like class had arisen from the ranks of 
craftsman, constituting an important shift in the “centre 
of gravity” at the “opening of the seventeenth century” 
(Dobb 1946:134, p. 123, Transition p. 65).  By the mid-
seventeenth century, it was especially this kulak-like 
class that played a revolutionary role in the bourgeois 
revolution (Dobb 1946:171) and not the merchant class.  The 
latter, “far from always playing a progressive role, was 
often to be found allied with feudal reaction” (Transition 
p. 64, Dobb 1946:162, p. 193).  To repeat for emphasis:  
By the end of the sixteenth century this new 
 aristocracy [of monopoly merchants], jealous of its 
 new-found [Crown granted] prerogatives, had become a 
 conservative, rather than a revolutionary force; and 
 its influence and the influence of the institutions it 
 had fostered, such as the chartered companies, was to 
 retard rather than to accelerate the development of 




                                                 
60 “There is accumulating evidence that the significance of kulak 
enterprise in the village can hardly be over-estimated.  There are 
signs of him at a quite early date, hiring the labour of the poorer 
‘cotter’ and in the sixteenth century pioneering new and improved 
methods of enclosed farming on a fairly extensive scale.  Historians of 
this period have recently pointed out that a distinctive feature of 
English development in the Tudor age was the ease with which these 
kulak yeoman farmers rose to become minor gentry, purchasing manors and 
joining the ranks of the squirearchy.  It may well be (as Kosminsky has 
suggested) that they played a leading role even in the Peasants’ Revolt 
in 1381.  Undoubtedly, they prospered greatly (as employers of labour) 
from the falling real wages of Tudor Inflation; and smaller gentry and 
rising kulaks were organisers of the country cloth industry on an 
extensive scale.  Evidently they were a most important driving force in 
the bourgeois revolution of the seventeenth century, providing in 





1.3.10. Takahashi, Procacci and Lefebvre on 
        the Dual Road Thesis 
 
Takahashi points out that G. Unwin61 and Max Weber62 
had, forty years before, reached similar conclusions to 
Dobb’s concerning the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism and the revolutionary role of feudal merchant 
class (Transition p. 80, no. 38).  More importantly he 
contends that the historical analysis in Japan had, 
independently of Dobb, arrived at similar ideas about the 
revolutionary role of the craftsman turned merchant 
capitalist (Way No. I) and the conservative role of the 
                                                 
61 Dobb recognizes this in Studies (p. 134), and also acknowledges Unwin 
in his “Reply” to Sweezy (Transition pp. 64-5). 
62 Takahashi finds it “surprising” that Dobb “overlooks this remarkable 
insight of Weber’s.”   Although it is true that Weber stumbles onto a 
seemingly similar insight (for example, when he writes “we shall see 
that at the beginning of modern times it was by no means the 
capitalistic entrepreneurs of commercial aristocracy, who were either 
the sole or the predominant bearers of the attitude we have here called 
the spirit of capitalism.  It was much more the rising strata of the 
lower industrial middle classes” [Weber 1958:65]), his explanation for 
the emergence of the “spirit of capitalism” is quite different from 
Dobb’s explanation for the motivations of the kulak-like class.  Weber 
maintained that the “spirit of capitalism” arises when a person 
develops the “ability to free oneself from the common tradition, a sort 
of liberal enlightenment, seems likely to be the most suitable basis 
for such a business man’s success.  And today that is generally 
precisely the case.  Any relationship between religious beliefs and 
conduct is generally absent. […] The people filled with the spirit of 
capitalism today tend to be indifferent, if not hostile, to the Church” 
(Weber 1958:70).  For Dobb, that transformation in motivation is a 
transformation, not merely in (ethical) attitude but in the social 
relations of production.   Weber has paid all but no attention to the 
(transformation of the) relationship between the direct producer and 
his immediate ruler or overlord.  In this sense, Takahashi seems to be 
too generous to Weber when he says “Weber brings out clearly two 
clashing social systems in that heroic period of English history” 
(Transition p. 89, no. 56).  Rather, Weber does not see it as a clash 






monopoly merchant turned capitalist (Way No. II) 
(Transition p. 88).   
 The fundamental point of the “two ways” is not merely 
a formal transition of a merchant to industrialist 
(Transition p. 89).  Or in Procacci’s words, “the two ways 
are not (as Sweezy seems to think) two separate solutions 
to a single problem” (Transition p. 140).  Rather, as Marx 
states, Way No. I “is the revolutionary way,” while Way No. 
II “always stands in the way of the genuine capitalist mode 
of production and [declines] with its development” (Marx 
1981:452-3, Transition p. 89, pp. 52-53).  “Thus, [says 
Takahashi] the whole reference to the original text points 
not merely to the existence of the two ways but to their 
opposition and clash” (Transition p. 90).  The agents 
involved in Way No. I versus Way No. II are not only 
distinct, but further “correspond”, says Procacci, “to 
different problems, different interests and different 
social strata” (Transition p. 140). They are opponents, 
inevitably destined to collide and “clash.”   
Takahashi maintains that such a “clash” between a 
group of the middle-class (feudal) independent producers 
and haute bourgeoisie was indeed characteristic of Western 





The revolution was a strenuous struggle for the state 
power between a group of the middle class (the 
Independents in the English Revolution, the 
Montagnards in the French), and a group of the haute 
bourgeoisie originating in the feudal land 
aristocracy, the merchant and financial monopolists 
(in the English Revolution the Royalists and after 
them the Presbyterians, in the French Revolution the 
Monarchiens, then the Feuillants, finally the 
Girondins); in the process of both revolutions, the 
former routed the latter (Transition pp. 94-5). 
 
Takahashi claims that Dobb is “clearly” in 
“contradiction” when he suggests that some middle-class 
producers in England participated in the putting-out 
system.  If this is the case, the producer-turned-merchant 
would only have controlled production from the outside, 
hence maintaining traditional feudal conditions of 
production, whereby they would not be a revolutionary 
force.  Rather, if such cases existed, they should be 
understood to be within Way No. II and not within the 
(‘really revolutionary’) Way No. I (Transition p. 92).  In 
his “Survey,” Procacci also contends that Dobb had erred on 
this account (Transition p. 140). 
Dobb’s response is not very enlightening; he merely 
says that he regarded the putting-out system generically to 
capture “a complex phenomenon embracing several different 
types” (Transition p. 100).  Hence it is easy to agree with 





Although Dobb made concrete and substantial analysis 
 of the ‘two ways’ and was able to get insight into the 
 historical character of the ‘classical’ bourgeois 
 revolution, on an international scale his various 
 theses call for re-examination (Transition p. 94). 
 
Lefebvre’s contribution to the debate addresses the 
discussion of the “two ways” to capitalist production.  He 
makes the point that in Way No. I, commerce was made 
“subordinate to production,” thus generating its 
revolutionary character.  In Way No. II, via the putting-
out system, the merchant becomes industrialist; however, 
production remains subordinate to commerce and, hence, 
impedes the “capitalist spirit” from emerging (Transition 
p. 124).  Lefebvre accepts these “two ways” as 
characteristic of Western European feudalism.  Because this 
corresponds to the empirical situation in Western Europe, 
Lefebvre believes that Marx was unaware that “‘Way No. II’ 
could [have theoretically] lead to capitalism just as 
easily as ‘Way No. I’” (Transition p. 124).  This indeed 
occurred in the case of capitalist development in Italy and 
Flanders (Transition p. 125). 
Takahashi seems to have made a similar point in the 
case of Eastern Europe and Asia.  The emancipation from 
feudalism, in the case of Prussia and Japan, for example, 
the “classes of free and independent peasants and middle-





conditions for modern political “democracy were not 
present” (p. 96).  In short, internal forces were not 
present to transform these feudal societies.  Rather, the 
pressure to transform arose from external circumstances 
(presumably from competition with capitalist economies).  
In Eastern Europe and Japan, both monopolistic enterprises 
and oligarchic political regimes played crucial roles in 
the establishment of capitalist production.  Hence, “It can 
be said that in connection with varying world and 
historical conditions the phase of establishing capitalism 
takes different basic lines: in Western Europe, Way No. I 
(producer  merchant), in Eastern Europe and Asia, Way No. 
II (merchant  manufacturer)” (Transition p. 96).   
 
1.3.11. Institutional Arrangement and Internal 
        Articulation Revisited 
 
With emphasis, the difference in the roads taken 
depends on the respective institutional arrangement and the 
internal articulation of the particular society in 
question.  Furthermore, as Marx63 pointed out, the 
historical circumstances will, in part, determine the forms 
                                                 
63 “Alongside the modern evils, we are oppressed by a whole series of 
inherited evils, arising from the passive survival of archaic and 
outmoded modes of production, with their accompanying train of 
anachronistic social and political relations.  We suffer not only from 
the living, but from the dead.  Le mort saisit le vif!” [‘The dead man 
clutches onto the living!’] (Marx 1976:91, also quoted by Takahashi in 





of oppression that persist.  The idea that the 
institutional arrangement can make a decisive difference in 
the direction in which a society evolves is, as 
demonstrated above, a central thesis of Dobb’s Studies.  
Both Dobb’s and Rodney Hilton’s contributions to the debate 
provide profoundly important arguments that demonstrate 
feudalism’s institutional incapacity to incorporate 
markets, towns, and money into its internal articulation.  
Hilton pointed out the many empirical flaws of the 
Pirenne/Sweezy argument (Transition pp. 109-111).   
Hilton demonstrates further the ways in which trade, 
towns, and money were not only consistent with but part of 
the internal articulation of feudalism as a mode of 
production.  Most importantly, Hilton maintains, in both 
his contributions and his later introduction to the debate, 
that the relationship between the direct producers and 
their immediate rulers is what determines the different 
characteristics of these institutional forms (i.e., 
markets, towns, and money) in capitalistic mode versus 
feudalistic mode. 
In short, the feudal relationship between the direct 
producer and immediate ruler was between serf and landlord.  
In capitalism, the relationship is between wage-labor and 





economic motivation, whereas in the former, it is rent 
maximization (Transition pp. 113-4, 27, 156-7).  
Fundamentally, the feudal rulers “strove to increase feudal 
rent in order to maintain and improve their position as 
rulers (Transition p. 114).  It would be left to Hilton’s 
later historical studies to explain how this different 
motivation of action led to a particular dynamic and 
contradictions.  With respect to the debate, Hilton’s point 
is that, far from dissolving feudalism, markets, towns, and 
money, along with the so-called ‘commercial revolution’, 
were a vital part and function of the internal articulation 
of the system itself. 
In Studies, Dobb noted that favorable market 
circumstances in feudalism did not necessarily have the 
same impetus as they do in capitalism.  That is to say, a 
serf who is paying commutation in monetary form takes his 
product to markets in hopes of obtaining a favorable 
return.  If the return is more favorable than expected, 
then the serf may very well (pay rent and then) decrease 
production in the next period rather than increase it (as 
would be the case in capitalism via profit maximization).  
The point is, as Hilton had insisted, the feudal internal 





desperate historical (re)investigation (Transition pp. 157-
8).   
In this context, Robert Benner would later accuse 
Sweezy, along with several other historians, such as 
Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre Gunder Frank, of being ‘neo-
Smithian’ in their adherence to the assumption that similar 
institutional forms (e.g., markets, money, etc.) functioned 
exactly the same in feudalism as they do in capitalism.  
Brenner would make a powerfully persuasive argument that 
many historical theorists tended to reify concepts and 
treat the specifics of the dynamic of capitalism (i.e., 
profit maximization, increases in labor-productivity, 
etc.), as an inevitable result of the commercial revolution 
(Brenner 1977:25-92).  From a more Dobbian perspective, the 
commercial revolution could just as well have been fully 
incorporated within a feudal system.  In other words, the 
outcome is not inevitable but contingent on the 
institutional arrangement and the dissolutive internal 
dynamics.     
These observations hark back to Dobb’s main theme 
concerning feudalism and the transition to capitalism in 
Studies, namely, the need and desire to specify the 
internal articulation of the feudal mode of production.   





would be generated by his focus on the “physiology” of 
society would be left unanswered until further research and 
historical analysis were performed (Dobb 1946:8).   
In the end, Dobb’s criticism of the traditional or 
commercialization view is both powerful and devastating in 
its ability to retain historic-theoretical merit.  However, 
as Procacci pointed out in his “A Survey of the Debate” 
(hereafter “Survey”) when it has come to describing the 
details of the “internal articulation” of the feudal mode 
of production, both Dobb and Hilton are less convincing 
(Transition p. 130).  The inability for the British Marxian 
economic historians to convincingly pronounce the internal 
articulation of feudalism was due, in part, to the lack of 
available historical evidence.  More important, however, 
was the absence of alternative theories, and the tendency 
to reify capitalist structures as “suprahistorical,” or 
applicable to all societies regardless of time and place.  
The Dobbian dichotomy between external and internal forces, 
although itself more misleading than enlightening, 
underscores the fundamental problem at issue.  The main 
problem is the internal articulation, macroeconomic 
developmental or structural dynamic, and (in)adaptability 
of external forces of the feudal mode of production all 





The primary reason for this lack of clarity and 
incompleteness was that (mainstream) historical research 
was conducted with a different set of presuppositions; 
hence, the questions formulated and facts uncovered were 
inadequate for addressing the (Dobbian) questions posed and 
the hypotheses proposed by the British Marxist economic 
historians.  Therefore, even where the “logical defects of 
Sweezy’s treatment” of a particular “problem are obvious” 
(as Procacci accuses, Transition p. 129), his probing 
demand for further clarity is justified and important for 
the further development of a more adequate (Marxian) 
approach to historical analysis.          
Takahashi recognizes this importance when he writes: 
“The Sweezy-Dobb controversy, if participated in critically 
by historians with the same awareness of problems in every 
country, could lay the foundation for co-operative advances 
in these studies” (Transition p. 68).  Dobb himself echoes 
Takahashi’s sentiments (Transition p. 99, 101). 
As a historian, Dobb did not attempt to find new 
original sources.  Instead, he utilized the existing 
historical sources, or previous findings from historians 
(Transition p. 126, Dobb 1946:vii).  Nonetheless, Dobb was 





empirical deficiencies of both economic historians and 
theoretical economists alike.   
Even with this success, as Lefebvre pointed out, there 
is a certain futility and even a particular danger in 
pursuing the historical issues provoked by Dobb’s Studies 
in purely abstract form (Transition p. 127).  It was time 
for a “co-operative” effort, to which Takahashi referred, 
in an attempt to address the provocative questions Dobb’s 
Studies had evoked (Transition p. 68, 127, 100).64   
The debate demonstrated, in concert with Dobb, that 
defining feudalism as a mode of production (i.e., focusing 
upon the relationship between the direct producers and 
their immediate rulers) generated particular important 
historical insights, otherwise neglected. Analyzing 
feudalism as a mode of production reveals particular 
tendencies of internal development or laws of feudal 
motion, which are otherwise unnoticed.  Feudal development, 
which for Dobb includes the growth of towns and trade, has 
its own internal contradictions and conflicts that 
generated (sometimes continent-wide) crisis.  Feudal crisis 
was the main threat to the existing class relations, not 
                                                 
64 Procacci was encouraged along similar lines to address historical 
economic questions of his own country, Italy.  “It is evident […] that 
many of the elements that have emerged in the course of the discussion 
on the transition from feudalism to capitalism can be used to cultivate 
certain areas of research and to pose and answer certain problems in 





merely the growth of towns and trade.  Moreover, it was not 
the merchant class that had undermined feudal relations of 
production.  However, if it were direct producers that 
fought against the fetter of feudalism, it was not clear 
why they were opposed to, nor how they opposed, the feudal 
relations of production.  It was also unclear whether the 
intention and motivation of any political action taken by 
the direct producer matched the historical results 
achieved.  
It is here that the full force of a seeming benign 
observation can be heeded.  Both Lefebvre and Procacci 
observed that Dobb lacked the support of original and 
direct historical evidence to brace his provocative 
hypotheses.  Based on thin evidence, Dobb began to 
reconstruct a historical theory of change and socioeconomic 
development.  The strength of his position was his immanent 
critique of the commercialization model.  The weakness of 
his position was the lack of historical evidence.  
Nonetheless, Dobb began to sketch an explanatory critique. 
Dobb’s schema is (1) feudal development (or internal 
articulation), then (2) feudal crisis, to (3) transition to 
capitalism.  With respect to (1) feudal development, he 
(and Hilton) can only offer the broadest descriptions.   





feudal crisis and merely proposes evidence to suggest that 
the system was in crisis prior to the bubonic plague 
reaching the shores of Europe.  The causes of the crisis 
remain mysterious and the specifics of the role of any 
internal contradictions are left unresolved.  Finally, when 
theorizing about the actual transition from (3) feudalism 
to capitalism, he is forced to abandon an internal 
articulation explanation and rather resorts to a Sweezy-
like external causation explanation.  “He ends up by 
explaining not only the rise of capitalism but also the 
overthrow of feudalism by the emergence of a new class of 
industrial and agricultural capitalists alongside the still 
feudal order during the early modern period” (Benner 
1978:122).  Related to Brenner’s observation, Dobb cannot 
offer the reasons why capitalism first develops in England 
and not elsewhere.  That is to say, why Way No. I is the 
road to capitalism in Western Europe and why Way No. II is 
the road to capitalism in Eastern Europe and Asia are left 
unanalyzed.  
Of course, Dobb suggests at least one major direction 
historical research would have to take in order to answer 
this latter problem.  Namely, special attention and 
research efforts would have to investigate the 





was Dobb’s hypothesis that differences in the institutional 
arrangement were capable of generating differences in the 
stability of a feudal system and, consequently, the 
difference in the historical paths taken.  
New and original historical evidence to support Dobb’s 
internal articulation theories would be left to another 
generation of Marxian economic historians.  Dobb’s 
contribution was to demonstrate the inconsistencies of the 
traditional (or commercialization) view and the potential 
theoretical potency of posing the problem from a “mode of 
production” perspective.  In this respect, historians 
became conscious of the necessity to theorize and analyze 
from the “lower” levels of the social strata, ‘History from 
the Bottom, Up.’   A generation of economic historians 
emerged to carry forth the metaphor as a guiding thread to 
understanding human socioeconomic history and social being.  

















2. MAURICE DOBB REINTERPRETS ECONOMIC HISTORY 
 
 
2.1. Maurice Dobb and the Study of History 
 
 It is a curious omission in Maurice Dobb’s “Random 
Biographical Notes” written in 1965 (published in the 1978 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, volume 2, [2]) that there 
is no mention of the Communist Party historians’ group 
which met regularly from 1946 to 1956.  For Dobb, these 
years were his most productive; he published both of his 
major economic histories, namely, Studies in the 
Development of Capitalism and Soviet Economic Development 
since 1917 (1948).  He also published Some Aspects of 
Economic Development (1951) and On Economic Theory and 
Socialism (1955).  During this period Dobb and Paul Sweezy 
et al. had their famous transition debate.  Dobb also began 
his collaboration with Piero Sraffa toward the completing 
and editing of the highly celebrated ten-volume edition of 
the Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo.  In 1951, he 
was a visiting professor at the University of Delhi School 
of Economics and lectured extensively throughout India on 





this visit to India that Dobb developed a lifelong interest 
in the problems facing “underdeveloped” countries.65   In 
1952, he was invited to the International Economic 
Conference in Moscow, and in 1956, to Poland.  During the 
latter trip, Dobb would first realize the magnitude of 
social contradictions in socialist economies and, further, 
would develop an appreciation for a more decentralized 
pricing-policy and economic incentive programs; 
simultaneously, he would (attempt to) remain committed to 
the relevance of planning the more “macrorelations” within 
a “socialist” economy.66 
 In light of the incredibly full intellectual and 
academic slate that Dobb was maintaining during this ten-
year period, failure to mention either his involvement with 
the historians’ group, or his emphasis on the importance of 
the role of history to theory and practice seems strange.  
                                                 
65 This interest resulted in the publication of An Essay on Economic 
Growth and Planning (1960).  From his insights and particular 
interpretation of Western European capitalist development, Dobb always 
remained highly suspicious of promises of capitalist economic 
development.  In short, just as demonstrated above, the mere presence 
of merchants, markets, and exchange does not necessarily historically 
translate into capitalism.  The motivation of a merchant and bourgeois 
element in society is not necessarily emancipatory.  Free-trade 
agreements and (Ricardian) comparative advantage do not automatically 
transform social relations toward capitalist development.  
Additionally, there may very well be a political advantage for the 
bourgeois element to resist such a transformation.    
66 He would later realize the relevance of “socialist” planning to the 
welfare problems manifest within capitalist economies and present in a 
paradoxical fashion with mainstream neoclassical economics.  He would 






The omission is especially curious given Dobb was a vital 
member of the group.  Furthermore, his Studies would 
provide a foundational moment for the historians’ group’s 
discussions, research, and publications. 
 
2.1.1. Communist Historians’ Group 1946-1956 
 
 The group formed in 1946 to read and discuss a second 
edition (1945) of A. L. Morton’s A People’s History of 
England.  Morton’s book, first published in 1938, was 
important as an extremely accessible Marxian inspired 
history of England.67  The strength of A People’s History of 
England was its ability to synthesize a vast plane of 
historical events and articulate various structural 
organizations throughout English social history all within 
a Marxian theoretical framework.   
 The members of the historians’ group included some of 
the best-known British historians of the twentieth 
century:68 Maurice Dobb, Christopher Hill, Rodney Harrison, 
Rodney Hilton, Eric Hobsbawm, Victor Kiernan, John Morris, 
George Rude, Raphael Samuel, George Thomson, John Saville, 
                                                 
67 Recently, Harvey Kaye (1992) has recommended that to address the 
contemporary crisis of history and history education we should begin 
with a reconsideration of Morton’s classic.   
68 Harvey Kaye (1992, 1984) has written two books on these historians.  
Kaye believes that the collective effort and aims of these historians 
should constitute them as a historical tradition.  Much of the effort  






Dorothy Thompson, E. P. Thompson, and Dona Torr.  It is 
interesting that so many Western Marxists of this period 
turned their attention to history.  Indeed, there was a 
certain need to reclaim history.   
 The members of the group developed their theoretical 
concerns, and their political commitments had formed, 
during the Western depression of the 1930s, the 
industrialization and rapid growth of the USSR, World War 
II, and the rise and defeat of fascism.  These historians 
had just witnessed the theoretical and political collapse 
of laissez-faire capitalist ideology, the theoretical rise 
of Soviet Marxism, the hegemony of monopoly capitalism, and 
the political formation of Keynesian inspired state welfare 
policies, along with monetary and unemployment management. 
 As Hill, Hilton, and Hobsbawm (1983:3) broadly 
describe, the members of the historians’ group shared “the 
quadruple bond of a common past (most had known one another 
since the late 1930s), a common political commitment, a 
passion for history, and regular, indeed intensive contact 
at the meetings of the Historians’ Group.”   The Marxian 
commitments “isolated” the group.  However, this isolation 
“also created a sense of cohesion between us, riveting us 
together against the outside world” (Hobsbawm, quoted in 





ironically, the intellectual isolation itself would prove 
to provide the group with a particular strength. 
 Politically, the members of the group were all members 
of the British Communist Party (CP).  Hobsbawm has recalled 
that the “CP members then segregated themselves strictly 
from schismatics and heretics, the writings of living non-
Party Marxists made little impact” on the historians’ group 
(Hobsbawm 1978a:23).  Additionally, the group was initially 
rather dogmatic with respect to their agenda to develop and 
deepen a Marxian analysis of history and social theory.  
This agenda was carried forward not only to provide an 
alternative perspective to mainstream historical views and 
social analysis but also to pose new questions to history.  
In the process of answering these new questions, hidden 
experiences of historical individuals would be illuminated.    
 Hobsbawm describes the group during its early 
formation as more or less sectarian “and apt to fall into 
the stern and wooden style of the disciplined bolshevik 
cadres” (1978a:31), not because they felt “any sense of 
constraint [from the CP …] nor did [they] feel that the 
Party tried to interfere with or distort [their] work as 
communist historians” (1978a:30).  Rather, they regarded 
themselves as Bolshevik communist historians (1978a:31).  





confirm what they already ‘knew’ to be “necessarily 
‘correct,’” for example, their work on “Absolutism and the 
English Revolution” (1978a:31).  Hobsbawm describes the 
Group’s collective political attitude, “We were as loyal, 
active and committed a group of Communists as any, if only 
because we felt that Marxism implied membership of the 
Party.  To criticize Marxism was to criticize the Party, 
and the other way around” (1978a:26). 
 Nonetheless, their political attitude, far from 
circumscribing or distorting their understanding of 
history, widened their explanatory ability (1978a:31).  
Although their agenda to develop and deepen a Marxian 
analysis of history was more or less dogmatic, they avoided 
intellectual and political dogmatism through their efforts 
to be taken seriously as intellectual historians.  This 
effort required that they prove their “competence”; hence 
their discussions and debates were especially undogmatic to 
help nurture and develop such competence and expertise.   
This intellectual openness was necessitated by the 
presence of an “enormous prejudice against anything 
describing itself as Marxist history.”  Therefore, they 
“couldn’t get away with bullshit,” in that they “didn’t 
have a homemade public that expected to read and approve of 





The historian’s group was able to avoid political 
dogmatism in that “there was no ‘party line’ on most of 
British history, and what there was in the USSR was largely 
unknown” to the group (Hobsbawm 1978a:32).  Moreover, much 
of their aim was to criticize non-Marxist history and the 
reactionary implications of mainstream historical 
portrayals.  The latter point not only “widened rather than 
narrowed [their] horizons” (1978a:32) but offered the group 
a certain unity with the British CP.  The group’s “loyalty 
and militancy” was “not in any doubt prior to 1956,” so the 
British CP was “well disposed” toward them (1978a:33).   
The capacity for the group to deepen and develop 
Marxian theory was further facilitated by a “certain old-
fashioned realism” that characterized the British CP and 
allowed for certain criticisms and modifications of some 
orthodox Marxian doctrines (1978a:34).  It can be added 
that orthodox Marxian doctrines are often ambiguous and 
open to interpretation. The “theory of history,” for which 
Marx is notorious, appears not in any one place within 
Marx’s writings, but is a doctrine scattered throughout his 
(and Engels’) vast work.  This especially provided the 
group with the room to develop important theoretical 
inferences in their interpretations of history, and in the 





historical materialism.69  This is to suggest that the 
implications of the work of the Marxian historians outlined 
later in this dissertation are a direct challenge to the 
more Marxian orthodox interpretations of historical 
materialism. This is the point to which I will return.  
First, however, the group’s personal development, 
intellectual influences, and political involvement will be 
                                                 
69Worthy of mention, various historical orientations or (competing) 
versions of historical materialism exist.  The leading versions all 
find their paradigm in the writings of Marx and Engels. Analytically, 
or schematically, it is possible to identify separate approaches to the 
“Marxian” concept of history in the writing of Marx and Engels 
themselves.  This is exactly what Helmut Fleischer (1969) demonstrates 
with a triadic schematization of the founders of historical 
materialism.  Roughly, Fleischer argues that there are three “different 
approaches” in the work of Marx and Engels.  First, in Marx’s 
Philosophical and Economic Manuscripts and Engels’s Dialectics of 
Nature and Anti-Dühring an “anthropological” approach to history can be 
identified, where history is seen as a (Hegelian teleological) process 
of development and realization of humanity’s species being.  Second, in 
Marx and Engels’s German Ideology and Holy Family history is presented 
as a blindly guided force, as a (radically un-teleological) function of 
the actions of individuals and group activity in reaction to empirical, 
or perceived, social situations in which they find themselves.  
Fleischer dubs this the “pragmatological” approach.  Finally, the 
third, so-called “nomological” approach is mainly based on Marx’s 
Critique of Political Economy and Capital.  In this case history is 
understood as a function of changes in the structure of social 
relations that take place according to certain social laws.     
 In light of the ways that this schematically vulgarizes Marx(ian 
historical materialism), Fleischer (1969:13) writes that these 
“different approaches […] are not mutually exclusive, indeed they are 
legitimate only to the extent that they complement each other.”  
Nevertheless, each reveal particular element of historical materialism 
and impose a specific accent.  Moreover, although Fleischer does not 
make this point, the schema also helps to understand various 
interpretations of historical materialism.  For example, Gerry Cohen’s 
“technological interpretation” emphasizes the “nomological” approach at 
the expense, or neglect of both the “anthropogenetic” and 
“pragmatological” approaches, whereas Althusserian structuralism 
asymmetrically combines the “pragmatological” and “nomological” 
approaches but radically denies the “anthropogenetic” approach by 
inventing an “epistemological break” within Marx’s writings.  What is 
of special emphasis for my purposes is that the British Marxian 






outlined.  Second, the influence of Dobb’s Studies on the 
work of four of the most prominent Marxian historians, 
along with a brief sketch of each historian’s work, will be 
developed.      
 
2.1.2. Dialogue Between Marxist and non-Marxist: 
       Past and Present 
 
  Early in its formation, the historians’ group was 
especially anxious to open a dialogue between themselves 
and non-Marxists70 (Hobsbawm 1978a:39) and “consistently 
attempted to build bridges between Marxists and non-
Marxists with whom they shared some “common interests and 
sympathies” (Hobsbawm 1978a:33).   
The launch of the academic history journal Past & 
Present (in 1952), subtitled A Journal of Scientific 
History, would prove to be an extremely successful attempt 
to build such bridges.  The members of the group inspired 
the launching of Past & Present; however, the journal 
developed quasi-independent of the historians’ group 
itself.  The editorial board insisted that in no way should 
the journal fall under the authority, nor direct influence, 
                                                 
70 When asked in a 1978 interview “What about the dialogue between 
Marxists and anti-Marxists?” Hobsbawm (abridged) replied: “What is 
important is that there should be such a dialogue. […] My own instinct, 
on the basis of my experience, has always been to avoid isolating 
Marxist historians from other historians.  My own instinct has always 
been to say that the place of Marxist historians to publish is right 





of the (British) CP.  “In our dealings with [the Communist] 
Party or [the Historians’] Group we were quite explicit in 
establishing that the journal was independent, and would 
accept no policy instructions” (Hill et al. 1983:5; also 
see Hobsbawm 1978:33).  Individually, many of the editorial 
board members of Past & Present continued a regular 
involvement with the meetings of the historians’ group and 
thus maintained their personal friendships and their 
political alliances (with the BCP).  However, the intention 
of Past & Present was to deepen sociohistorical knowledge; 
hence politics had to be superseded for the success of 
fruitful dialogue between Marxists and non-Marxists.  This 
had already, more or less, become a tradition that 
characterized the group’s meetings and discussions.   
The journal was “a deliberately constructed common 
forum for Marxists and non-Marxists” (Hobsbawm 1978:33).  
Although the majority of the editorial board of Past & 
Present were openly Marxists (V. Gordon Childe, Maurice 
Dobb, Christopher Hill, and Rodney Hilton) along with both 
of its editors (John Morris and Eric Hobsbawm), there was 
enormous conscious effort towards instituting a journal for 
correspondence between Marxist and non-Marxist historians 
alike.  “From the start the journal aimed to cover all 





first issue the editors were at pains to express this, 
without necessarily proclaiming its board’s Marxist 
sympathies.  The editors write (1952):  
The Board, and contributors to PAST AND PRESENT study 
different periods and aspects of history, inherit 
different preconceptions, and hold differing views.  
The Editorial Board therefore takes no responsibility 
for the views of contributors, nor does it seek to 
impose its own on them, where it is united, nor to 
exclude contributions which are at odds with some or 
all its members (p. iv).  
 
 It was John Morris who spearheaded the effort to 
launch a new journal.  Initially, Morris proposed the title 
Bulletin of Marxist Historical Studies.  The historians’ 
group and others immediately rejected this title, on the 
grounds that this would mistakenly draw a line between 
Marxists and non-Marxists.  The historians’ group believed 
the political divide between Marxian and non-Marxian 
history was not necessarily intellectually discontinuous, 
and it would be the aim of the journal to demonstrate this 
concretely.  In this sense, their adversaries were not the 
totality of non-Marxists, but “a minority of committed 
historical (and political) conservatives, not to mention 
the anti-Communist crusaders” (Hill et al. 1983:4). 
 They more or less aimed for Mortonian accessibility in 
conjunction with a high level of scholarship, “a serious 





the French Annales)” (Snowman 1999:17).  As heterodox 
historians, they wanted to be sure the journal demonstrated 
intellectual competence,71 but more deliberately, they 
wanted the journal to produce knowledge, with a mind 
towards improving the world.  Within the pages of Past & 
Present, the editors intended to continue the historians’ 
group debates concerning the Marxist interpretation of 
history but otherwise broaden the historical context of the 
participant’s research.  In their writings, they 
demonstrate deep concern with the further theoretical 
development and improvement of Marxist history.  This could 
only be accomplished in an open, nondogmatic dialogue with 
Marxists and non-Marxists alike.  Moreover, it could not be 
accomplished by merely propounding theory but, instead, 
must produce histories.  In a dialectic of ideas, (Marxian) 
theory would help recover (hidden and alternative 
narrative) history, and in turn, the history produced would 
affect and (tend toward) develop(ing) theory.   
Inspired by the tradition of Marc Bloch and Lucien 
Febvre, the editors of Past & Present would demonstrate how 
their history is different from their adversaries (i.e., 
                                                 
71 Until 1962, Past & Present was only published twice a year, while 
before 1960 the number of pages per annum never amounted to more than 
200.  The reason “for this was largely because from the outset the 
Broad agreed unanimously that its size must depend on the number of 






radical historical and political conservatives), “‘not by 
means of methodological articles and theoretical 
dissertations but by example and fact’” (Editors Past & 
Present 1952:i). 
 Initially, no articles were submitted to the journal; 
all were commissioned.  In the first six years (1952-58), 
Marxists had written two-thirds of the journal’s content 
(Hill et al. 1983:11).  In these early years, the editorial 
board members often took it upon themselves to write an 
article, with the lone exception of “Dobb who remained 
loyal but silent throughout” (Hill et al. 1983:10). 
 
2.1.3. 1956 ‘Crisis’ and 1958 “Breakthrough” 
In 1958, Past & Present achieved something of a 
“breakthrough” in broadening the board to include five non-
Marxists, hence, ‘achieving’ a certain respectability and 
taking further steps to substantiate its nonsectarian 
intentions (Hill et al. 1983:12-14).  The 1958 
“breakthrough” had been preceded by the events of 1956:  
First was Khruschev’s speech to the Twentieth Congress of 
the CP of the Soviet Union, where he denounced Stalin.   
The second was the invasion of Hungary by the Soviets, 
which was believed by many to have crushed the anti-





These events broke the implicit unity between the 
historians’ group’s work as historians and their CP 
politics.   The first CP members to pronounce their 
dissatisfaction with the British CP’s reaction (or lack 
thereof) to Khruschev’s speech were the historians.  The 
historians’ group discussed this on April 8, 1956. The main 
section of the minutes taken during the meeting have been 
reproduced by Bill Schwarz (1982:83) and read as follows:   
Resolutions were passed expressing profound 
dissatisfaction with the 24th Congress of the British 
Party for its failure to discuss publicly the 
implications for the British Party of the 20th Congress 
of the CPSU (the Group were told in reply the Congress 
decided its own procedure); and with the failure of 
the Party leadership to make a public statement of 
regret for the British Party’s past uncritical 
endorsement of all Soviet policies and views, the 
meeting calling upon it to make one as soon as 
possible, as well as to initiate the widest possible 
public discussion of all the problems involved for the 
British Party in the present situation.  (This 
Resolution was passed to the E. C.) 
 
 Nearly all of the members of the historians’ “Group 
left or were expelled from the Party, though fortunately 
the personal relationships between those who went and those 
who stayed were not, on the whole, disrupted” (Hobsbawm 
1978b:26).  Both Dobb and Hobsbawm remained members of the 
CP.   
The historians’ group continued beyond the “crisis” of 





that year, there had been a qualitative effect on the 
Group. As such, “the year between its foundation and the 
crisis of 1956-7 form a self-contained period” (Hobsbawm 
1978b:22).   
 With respect to Past & Present, Hill, Hilton, and 
Hobsbawm (1983:12-3) claim that the new entrants following 
the broadening of the Editorial Broad in 1958 “did not want 
to change the character of the journal.” Presumably, it was 
the journal’s character for which they wanted to join the 
board in the first place.  Hill, Hilton and Hobsbawm claim 
(1983:13):   
 The enlarged Board operated as before, and in fact, if 
 anything, more consistent practical participation was 
 henceforth expected of its members.  Its discussions 
 continued as before.  No ideological or political 
 issues of substance have disturbed its work as a team, 
 or the relations between its members.   
 
Likewise, Jacques Le Goff (1983:14-5), editor of 
Annales, Past & Present’s French sister journal, has stated 
that the broadening of the editorial board of Past & 
Present “did not seem to mark a significant turning-point.”  
The only thing that made him “ponder the matter” was the 
“disappearance” of the journal’s “subtitle A Journal of 
Scientific History”; otherwise he “hardly noticed” any 
qualitative change of the journal’s “very positive 





approach to history and which was concerned to situate 
history along with the social sciences.”  What was striking 
to Le Goff (1983:15) “is the journal’s continuity,” a 
continuity that “has gone hand in hand with a strengthening 
of the journal” (1983:16).  Le Goff (1983:27) claims to 
have seen  
no important turn in the direction of the journal 
 since 1959; indeed that point [Hill’s et al. 
 “breakthrough”] even seems to mark the realization of 
 what Past and Present both was and strove to be, more 
 or less consciously since its foundation, that is a 
 journal free of dogmatism, even during its Marxist 
 period. 
 
 What exactly is this continuity to which Le Goff 
alludes?  Certainly, there has been a continuity in the 
journal’s objectives, as a note in the November 1961 issue 
(No. 20) has pointed out: to “widen the somewhat narrow 
horizon of traditional historical studies” and “to make 
serious communication and cooperation between historians of 
different ideological allegiances […] not only possible but 
fruitful.”  They restate that they “have always preferred 
‘example and fact’ to ‘methodological articles and 
theoretical discussions.’”   
 Beyond a continuity of objectives, Le Goff (1983:26-7) 
personally identifies five principal characteristics 
between the years 1959-1983: (1) an attempt “to exemplify a 





history, (2) an attempt to generate and facilitate debate 
within its pages and across issues, (3) the primacy of 
social history, heavily informed by sociology, (4) the 
practice of “history from below,” consequently forming an 
alliance with anthropology, (5) an interest and focus upon 
culture and education. 
 Do these “five principal characteristics of 1959-1983” 
constitute a continuity between the “Marxist years” (1952-
58) and post-1959?  What were the characteristics prior to 
the broadening of the editorial board?  Earlier, Hill et 
al. (1983) informed us that Marxists produced two-thirds of 
the articles between 1952 and 1958.  If there was a 
substantial degree of continuity, this would be to claim 
that the Marxists proved to have an enormous influence upon 
(at least) the non-Marxist contributors of Past & Present, 
thereby implying a certain degree of warrant in the early 
vision of the editorial board to demonstrate commonality 
between Marxist and non-Marxist historians.   
 The Past & Present historians had believed that 
fictitious barriers keep non-Marxist historians divided 
from Marxist historians.  As Hill et al. (1983) stated 
their adversaries had not been non-Marxist but radical 
conservatives.  Launching Past & Present was an attempt to 





the November 1961 issue (No. 20) triumphantly proclaimed: 
“We have, we believe, made a distinctive contribution to 
historical studies.  We have stimulated discussion.  We 
have broken down barriers” (emphasis added).   
What were these barriers?  In Studies, Dobb suggested 
(p. 32) that analysis which employs (1) suprahistorical 
categories (what Marx called pure abstractions) “in which 
realism is so ruthlessly sacrificed to generality” and (2) 
the false dichotomy between economic factors and social 
factors had to be abolished.72  They had to be abolished not 
only to enable the theorist to answer the types of 
questions Dobb (and the Historians’ Group) posed, but even 
to formulate the questions.   
                                                 
72The real issue concerns the conception of social reality and social 
being, in short, (social) ontology.  Contemporary philosophy of science 
has emphasized the importance of ontology, especially critical realism 
and its fountainhead philosopher Roy Bhaskar (1975, 1979).  The 
critical realist social theorist Margaret Archer captures the spirit of 
Dobb’s contention concerning the theoretical importance of social 
ontology when she maintains that social ontologies perform a regulatory 
role in the practice of (social) science in that “they govern those 
concepts which are deemed admissible” for both description of 
historical moments and scientific explanations (Archer 1995:20).  In 
short, “ontology […] acts as both gatekeeper and bouncer for 
methodology” (Archer 1995:22).  Dobb’s anxiety toward suprahistorical 
categories and the false dichotomy between social and economic factors 
is ultimately anxiety about an illusionary and indeed false, although 
implicit (social) ontology governing [mainstream?] economic theory and 
regulating the concepts utilized; consequently both the questions asked 
and the answers given, along with the empirical historical evidence 
uncovered.  A new social ontology would allow for new explanatory 
concepts and generate new questions and answers, and empirical 
historical evidence uncovered would further require retheorization.  In 
this sense, a methodological and philosophical revolution could 





The editors of Past & Present may have preferred 
‘facts’ and ‘example’ to “methodological articles” and 
“theoretical dissertations”; however their accomplishments, 
as those of Marx, pivot on methodological and theoretical, 
indeed, (bold) ontological commitments.  It was the aim of 
the previous section to outline the methodology of Dobb 
over fifty years after the publication of Studies.  In the 
following pages, the historical work of Rodney Hilton, 
Christopher Hill, Eric Hobsbawm, and E. P. Thompson will be 
outlined briefly (with an eye toward methodology, theory, 
and ontology), but first, I start with Maurice Dobb and the 
reception of his Studies in the Development of Capitalism 
(1946).  
 
2.2. Studies and the British Marxian Historians 
 
 Twenty-one years separated the publications of 
Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress (1925) and 
Studies in the Development of Capitalism (1946) (hereafter 
CESP) and Studies (1946).  However, CESP would provide the 
basis for many chapters of Studies.  Dobb felt CESP to be 
something of a failure.  In it, he attempts to show the 
dialectical necessity of both history and theory for 
economic explanations.  Even in the 1920s, he had come to 





construction of a theory that was often incapable of 
explaining, out of phase with, and in opposition to many 
historical occurrences and events.  In CESP, Dobb sharply 
separates (Marxian) history from the (Marshallian) 
analytical (or theory), seemingly in an attempt to 
demonstrate the impoverishment of the latter to adequately 
grasp the former, along with an attempted sort of 
synthesis.   
 In the 1940s when Dobb resurrects his historical 
studies from CESP, his intention is not to (directly) 
critique the analytics of Marshallian theory but to explain 
historical processes and events.  Within Studies is an 
esoteric methodological motif; namely, Dobb is concerned 
with the normal reproduction of routine social patterns of 
an epoch.  To understand these routine social patterns of 
normal reproduction, Dobb contrasts them with abnormal 
moments in history, i.e., social crisis and revolution.  A 
core methodological motif of Dobb’s (and other Marxian 
historians to be considered) is the “primacy of the 
pathological.”  The historical movement between normal 
reproduction and abnormal reproduction constitutes stages 
of social reproduction. 
Accordingly, it will be recalled that Dobb contended 





capitalism, much like its reproduction, “falls into a 
number of stages” and processes (1946:17).  First, the 
reproduction of feudalism must necessarily become impeded.  
That is to say, a severe “crisis of feudalism” must occur.  
Hence, the first stage is the “crisis of feudalism” in the 
late thirteenth and early fourteenth century.  The second 
stage is the “Cromwellian” or bourgeois revolution 
occurring in seventeenth century England.  The third stage, 
(still) merely a prelude to capitalism, is the rise of 
industrial capital.  Fourth is the social historical 
process of creating, or the “making” of, the proletariat.  
The tempo of this process rapidly increases during the 
seventeenth century and through the eighteenth century.  
The growth of the proletariat sets the scene for the fifth 
stage, the industrial revolution, occurring in England in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.   At all 
stages, political and cultural spheres play crucial roles.   
Not only does each of these stages roughly correspond 
to a chapter of Studies, but they would come to constitute, 
respectively, the research efforts of Hilton, Hill, 
Thompson, and Hobsbawm.  Hobsbawm (1978a:23) would recall 
that “the major historical work which was to influence us 
crucially was Maurices Dobb’s Studies in the Development of 





Hill wrote in 1950: “The most important single work on 
British history so far produced by an English Marxist 
appeared in 1946 - M.H. Dobb’s Studies in the Development 
of Capitalism” (1950:315).  In a review of Studies, Hilton 
(1947:29-30) writes  
Maurice Dobb has demonstrated in a most striking way 
 the superiority of the Marxist approach to historical 
 problems over the bourgeois eclecticism which nowadays 
 passes as a substitute for proper analysis. […] It is 
 to be hoped that both historians and economists learn 
 the appropriate lesson. 
 
Dobb’s Studies was highly praised by the historians’ 
group and would assist in setting a research agenda for 
Marxian historians. 
 
2.2.1. Primacy of the Pathological, Feudal  
   Crisis, Bourgeois Revolution,  
   Industrial Revolution, and  
  the Proletariat: Rodney  
   Hilton, Christopher   
   Hill, Eric Hobsbawm, 
   and E. P. Thompson  
 
Rodney Hilton’s historical research focused on class 
conflict and the crisis of feudalism.  For example, in the 
introduction to his Class Conflict and the Crisis of 
Feudalism, Hilton writes, “The title of this collection of 
articles reflects a theme in my historical research” 
(Hilton 1990:ix).  Christopher Hill would concentrate on 





century England.73  Finally, Eric Hobsbawm’s main area of 
focus was the industrial revolution of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century.74  E. P. Thompson would write 
the highly celebrated The Making of the English Working 
Class (1963), which quickly became a classic in Marxist 
historiography. 
Dobb’s Studies would provide the historical 
“framework” of these historians, not simply because it was 
Marxist but because Dobb had aptly demonstrated that a 
Marxian theoretical scaffolding was capable of bringing 
history alive, posing new questions and unique answers to 
the past, with the intention of understanding the present. 
As Hobsbawm (1978a:38) has explained: “Dobb’s Studies, 
which gave us our framework, were novel precisely because 
they did not just restate or reconstruct the views of ‘the 
Marxist classics’, but because they embodied the findings 
of post-Marx economic history in a Marxist analysis.”  
Dobb’s Studies (and work in general) helped to modernize, 
                                                 
73 Titles of some of Hill’s books include The English Revolution 1640 
(rev. ed. 1955); Puritanism and Revolution: Studies in Interpretation 
of the English Revolution of the 17th Century (1958); The Century of 
Revolution 1603-1714 (1961); Society and Puritanism in Pre-
Revolutionary England (1964); Intellectual Origins of the English 
Revolution (1965); Reformation to Industrial Revolution: A Social and 
Economic History of Britain, 1530-1780 (1967); God’s Englishman: Oliver 
Cromwell and the English Revolution (1970); Antichrist in Seventeenth-
Century England (1971); Change and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century 
England (1974); Some Intellectual Consequences of the English 
Revolution (1980). 
74 Hobsbawm’s titles include The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848; Industry 





and consequently resuscitated Marxian analysis for the 
twentieth century.  He did this in part by demonstrating 
the importance of history for theory and the importance of 
theory for history.  Not only is history a challenge to 
theory, but theory, in part, (re)shapes history.  Dobb’s 
mode of production definitions of feudalism and capitalism, 
emphasizing class-struggle, not only helped to rewrite 
history but facilitated the rejuvenescence of past 
struggles by ‘reliving’ the experiences of the past to 
understand, explain, and sometimes overcome dilemmas of 
present, with an aim toward shaping the future.75 
 
2.3. Rodney Hilton and Economic History 
 
Rodney Howard Hilton was born November 17, 1916, and 
died June 7, 2002.  Hilton was not only one of the most 
important Marxist historians, but he was the leading, and 
most outstanding, medieval historian working in the 
twentieth century.  Hilton’s most widely recognized 
accomplishments include the revelation of new dimensions of 
the lives of medieval peasants, the radical scrutiny of 
feudal townships and townspeople, the construction of a 
more fully sketched internal articulation of feudalism, and 
                                                 
75 “History has to be rewritten in every generation, because although 
the past does not change the present does; each generation asks new 
questions of the past, and finds new areas of sympathy as it re-lives 






an outline of the dynamic forces which account for 
socioeconomic change.76 
Hilton was born in Middleton, Lancashire, and brought 
up in a family with Unitarian religion and Independent 
Labor Party politics.  He would marry three separate times.  
With his first wife, Margaret, he had a son (Tim); with his 
second wife, Gwyn, he had two children (Owen and Ceinwen).  
Jean Birrell was his third wife; she was herself an 
accomplished writer on medieval social and economic 
history.  Hilton attended Balliol College, Oxford, where he 
encountered the great medieval historians V.H. Galbraith 
and Richard Southern and where he first met the (in)famous 
historian of the seventeenth century, and later lifelong 
colleague, Christopher Hill.  Hilton’s thesis, written in 
the late 1930s, focused on the rural economy of 
Leicestershire from the thirteenth to fifteenth century and 
its development into an agrarian economy.  His thesis would 
be the basis of his first published book, The Economic 
Development of Some Leicestershire Estates in the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (1947).   
                                                 
76 It should be noted that these accomplishments respectively articulate 
the Dobbian themes of (1) reconceptualization of the notion of agency, 
(2) institutional analysis, and (3) structural analysis.  It will be 
seen that Hilton radically applies the ‘primacy of the pathological’ in 
his analysis of feudalism, constituting (4) a stage-theory analysis of 






 Like Dobb, and all the historians to be introduced in 
subsequent pages, Hilton was a member of the Communist 
Party but would denounce his membership in 1956.  
Nonetheless, Hilton remained committed to leftist politics 
and supported the rise, development, and activity of the 
so-called New Left movement.  Moreover, throughout his 
intellectual life, Hilton would consider his practice and 
study of history as being within a Marxist theoretical 
rubric.  Following several years of British military 
service (1940-6), Hilton was appointed to a lectureship at 
Birmingham University where he remained until his 
retirement in 1982.  Hilton influenced many students and 
colleagues with his particular practice and study of 
history, wherefore, as a group, these historians are 
sometimes referred to as the “Birmingham School.” 
  Hilton began his career with an interest in peasant 
rebellions.  These interests would culminate in a 
controversial article, “Peasant Movements in England Before 
1381,” which was published in Economic History Review, 
1949.  Roughly a year after the publication of the 1949 
article, Hilton and his coauthor (H. Fagan) published their 
ground-breaking book, The Revolt of 1381 (1950).  At the 
core of the argument in both publications, feudalism was 





peasants and their immediate rulers was seen to constitute 
the “prime mover” of the structural dynamic of feudalism as 
a mode of production.  Enthused by the student rebellions 
in 1968, including “sit-ins” at Birmingham University, 
Hilton returned to the theme of peasant revolts and 
published the (in)famous and influential book, Bondmen Made 
Free: Medieval Peasant Movements and the English Rising of 
1381 (1973).   
It was also in 1973, further exploring these themes, 
that Hilton delivered his renowned Ford Lectures at Oxford, 
which were later published in monograph form, titled The 
English Peasantry in the Later Middle Ages (1975).  Our 
focus on Hilton’s work will be his historical analysis of 
the medieval peasantry.  Nonetheless, Hilton’s work cannot 
merely be reduced to this highly influential feature.  
Hilton’s published works also include writings on 
literature and popular mentalities, women, and the history 
of towns.  The latter is of special significance in that 
Hilton’s innovative studies on medieval towns, just before 
and after his retirement, established that towns were not 
the beginnings of modernity but predated the rise of 
modernity, hence were firmly within the internal 
articulation of feudal society (see especially Hilton 





2.3.1. Hilton on Feudalism and the Peasantry 
 
Rodney Hilton was one of only a handful of Marxists 
researching medieval feudalism.  Hilton spent most of his 
intellectual efforts studying the social relations of 
European feudalism.  Hobsbawm stated that “We need somebody 
who will reinforce the sort of lonely fight that Rodney 
Hilton has been fighting for a long time” (1978b:41).  In 
1940, when Hilton was just beginning his studies of 
medieval Europe, “the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
were something of a neglected age in English rural history. 
[…] This neglect has ceased, and for that, much of the 
credit and responsibility must go to Hilton” (Miller 
1983:xii).  Initially, Hilton found creative impulse from 
the work of Marc Bloch (Kaye 1984:75-6; Miller 1983:x) and 
was, of course, theoretically informed by Karl Marx and 
inspired by Maurice Dobb.  Hilton has been “one of an 
international group of scholars (including E. A. Kosmisky, 
M. M. Postan, Georges Duby, and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie) 
who have formulated the questions we now ask about medieval 
society” (Miller 1983:x). 
Hilton’s work on medieval Europe has contributed to a 
reconsideration of the social structure of medieval 






the relationship of men in society to each other.  
 Since no society consists simply of a collection of 
 individuals […] human relationships are defined 
 according to the group or class into which individuals 
 are born, or occasionally climb. 
 
Hilton helped to reconstruct the class structure of 
medieval life and demonstrated that the particular class 
structure of feudalism made feudal societies periodically 
unstable. 
 
2.3.2. The Myth of a Passive Peasantry 
 
Heavily influenced by Marx and Dobb, Hilton argues 
that the “prime-mover” of feudalism was the relationship 
between the peasantry as the direct producers and their 
most immediate overlords, or rulers.  Hilton maintains that 
there had been a relative neglect of this relationship in 
the writing of history.  Further, relatively little was 
known of the actual lives and actions of the peasantry.  
This relative neglect is especially remarkable in that the 
peasantry “probably constituted at least 90 per cent of the 
population in the early middle ages” (Hilton 1976:30).   
Hilton contends that many historians wrongly portrayed 
the peasantry as overly passive (including Marx) and 
deficiently political.  Against the “enduring historical 
myth of the passive peasantry” (Merrington 1976:179), 





nonconservative.  In effect, Hilton shifts the focus of the 
historian from the relationship between lords and vassals 
to the relationship between lords and peasantry, or 
‘history from the bottom up.’   Moreover, it is a shift 
from a more culturally and socially constituted 
relationship, to a more directly (politico-) economic 
relationship.   
The metaphor ‘history from the bottom up’ should be 
taken literally.  To understand any society, one class of 
people should not be analyzed at the neglect of other 
classes.  Rather, the relationship between classes 
constitutes the system dynamics, and the system itself 
exists as a totality of social relationships.  
Nonetheless, in that the peasantry constituted 90 
percent of the feudal population and due to the general 
historical neglect of their daily existence, Hilton places 
a certain degree of emphasis on the study of feudal 
peasantry.  To aid the historian, Hilton (1975) provides 
the main characteristic that gave the peasantry its 
uniqueness as a historical class: 
(1) They posses, even they do not own, the means of 
agricultural production by which they subsist.  (2) 
They work their holdings essentially as a family unit, 
primarily with family labour.  (3) They are normally 
associated in larger units than the family, that is 
villages or hamlets, with greater or lesser elements 





the character of the economy.  (4) Ancillary workers, 
such as agricultural labourers, artisans, building 
workers are derived from their own ranks and are 
therefore part of the peasantry.  (5) They support 
super-imposed classes and institutions such as 
landlord, church, state, towns by producing more than 
is necessary for their own subsistence and economic 
reproduction (p. 13). 
 
According to Hilton, the feudal peasantry was far from 
being politically passive.  Rather, historical evidence 
suggests feudal peasantry was not only motivated to direct 
political action but often became a potent political force 
in making history.   In Bond Men Made Free: Medieval 
Peasant Movements and the English Rising of 1381, Hilton 
heeds warning that due, in part, to poor record keeping and 
destroyed records, direct historical evidence of peasant 
political action is far from plentiful (1973a:63ff),  
wherefore, historians will tend to underestimate the 
frequency of peasant political action and undervalue the 
effectual existence of peasant protest and modes of 
political resistance exercised by feudal peasantry.   It 
should further be noted that the official clerical (i.e., 
scholastic theologians) record-keepers were often unaware 
of most peasant protests and would remain ignorant of local 
and regional struggles and disputes unless such actions 





On a related note, a main argument in Hilton’s 1949 
article “Peasant Movements in England Before 1381” 
(reprinted in Hilton 1990) was that the peasant revolt of 
1381 was not unique.  Hilton maintains that there is a long 
history of peasant uprisings in England prior to 1381.  
Hilton’s surveys of peasant uprisings offer documentation 
of the element of conflict present in medieval society, 
along with the political life of the peasantry (1973a:233-
4; 1990:58ff).  Characteristic of many pre- and post-1381, 
but otherwise very distinct, uprisings are not “class-
consciousness” per se, but what Hilton dubs a “negative 
class consciousness” (1973:130), or a (bitter) hatred of a 
common enemy, i.e., the nobility: “this bitter hatred of 
the land-owning nobility, sometimes [was extended towards 
…] all the rich or well-to-do” (1973:220).  A more positive 
class consciousness of “the mutual interests of peasants 
and other basic producers” (1973:220) did not make itself 
felt until perhaps the 1381 peasants’ revolt, contributing 
to its relative success (1973:231). 
Although peasants’ revolts most often failed to 
achieve their progressive-intended objectives,77 Hilton 
suggests that “it might be said that the concept of the 
freeman, owing no obligation, not even deference, to an 
                                                 





overlord, is one of the most important if intangible 
legacies of medieval peasants to the modern world” 
(1973a:235 emphasis added).  Hence, the “assertion of 
freedom against feudal subordination was not, as is often 
supposed, a specific contribution of the bourgeoisie,” but 
a contribution of the peasantry as a result of their 
conflict with their overlords.  Besides the legacy of 
freedom and the desire for self-determination, peasant 
political action, according to Hilton, constituted, to a 
great degree, the dynamic of feudal politico-economic 
reproduction or transformation.    
 
2.3.3. “Prime-Mover”: Modes of Exploitation 
       and Resistance 
 
Thus, as Hilton had argued during the transition 
debate (reprinted in Hilton 1976), the “principal feature 
of the mode of production in feudal society is that owners 
of the means of production, the landed proprietors, are 
constantly striving to appropriate for their own use the 
whole of the surplus produced by the direct producers” 
(Hilton 1976:112).  The landlords did this by controlling, 
and attempting to increase, or “maximize” rents.  
 “Fundamentally they strove to increase feudal rent in 
order to maintain and improve their position as rulers, 





exploited underlings” (1976:114).  Thus, Hilton maintains 
that the “prime mover” of feudalism was the struggle over 
the rate of rent, the landlords attempting to get the rents 
of land as high has they could, and peasants trying to 
minimize feudal exploitation.78 
Rent, whether it was paid in money or kind, consisted 
of the surplus product the peasant household produced over 
and above that necessary for its reproduction.  Hence 
Hilton’s definition of rent, or forms of feudal 
exploitation, includes tithes levied by the church, taxes 
imposed by the state, and various local and monarchical 
juridical fines (Hilton 1990:50-51).   
Nobility’s desire to maximize rents and the 
peasantry’s desire to minimize feudal exploitation meant 
that resistance, struggle, and conflict constituted and 
characterized medieval society.  Thus the key form of 
struggle within feudal society was between the feudal 
elite’s attempt to maximize rents (including tithes, taxes, 
and fines) and the peasants’ attempt to resist increases in 
feudal exploitation.  The peasantry often demanded 
reductions and reforms of rents, fines, and tolls.  The 
peasantry could resist reductions in their household 
                                                 
78 “The demand for rent in its widest sense was clearly the important 






consumption by two means: first, by political protest, 
i.e., revolt, or second, by increasing their productivity.  
Hilton maintains feudal peasantry did both.  In this sense, 
Hilton’s medieval society is much more dynamic and complex 
than most previous conceptions.   That is to say, the 
struggle over rent and feudal exploitation led to (1) 
political struggle between lords and peasants, but it also 
tended to (2) increase the productivity of peasant labor.   
 
2.3.4. Feudal Production and Market Exchange 
 
In the following pages, I will outline two separate 
tendencies of resistance that manifested from the struggle 
over the maximization of feudal rents, which were internal 
to the dynamics of feudalism itself.  However, first it is 
important to point out that there is a necessary condition 
for one of these tendencies to manifest.  Namely, the very 
possibility of the peasantry turning to an increase in 
productivity as a mechanism to diminish pressures of feudal 
exploitation necessarily depends on the presence of a well-
developed domestic market system of exchange. 
This last point is important, for it emphasizes that, 
contrary to (for example) Pirenne and Sweezy’s claims, 
market exchange and commodity production (i.e., production 





internal to, feudal society.  Commodity production and 
market exchange are not of themselves enough to disturb the 
“solidity and internal articulation” of the feudal mode of 
production (see Hilton 1976:111ff).  This is not to say 
that commodity production did not have important effects on 
the social structure of feudalism.  Market exchange, and 
especially market fluctuations, gave rise to a tendency to 
deepen the income stratification between the peasantry 
themselves.  Paradoxically, this effect would, at times, 
dampen and, at other times, intensify peasant revolts.  In 
other words, the presence of a well-developed market system 
of exchange affected the relative success or failure of 
peasant resistance to feudal exploitation via political 
protest. 
 
2.3.5. Resistance to Feudal Exploitation  
       via Political Action 
 
The stratification of wealth among peasantry would 
tend to intensify political protest on two grounds.  First, 
the rise of a well-to-do class of peasants, or what Dobb 
called a kulak-like class, made it possible for individuals 
to have a successful nonserf existence within feudal 
society.  On the one hand, the kulak-like class itself 
could financially prosper in its freedom from manor 





kulak-like class necessarily depended on the presence of a 
laboring class that could be hired to work by nonnoble, 
otherwise well-to-do peasant farmers.  This situation could 
potentially give rise to an intensified struggle: first, 
between nobility and serf for the freedom of the serf to 
hire out his own labor beyond his serf obligations, and 
second, between peasant farmers and manor for either 
freedom from manor obligations or the right to hireout serf 
labor or both. 
The second case for a potential intensification of 
peasant protest manifests within the peasantry itself.  
There could emerge a certain resentment of the relatively 
poorer peasantry toward the well-to-do peasantry, 
especially if the former felt themselves overly exploited 
or otherwise taken economic advantage of by the kulak-like 
class.  The rise of a kulak-like class of peasantry 
simultaneously and necessarily produces a disjunction in 
common class interests.  
It was the disjunction or fracture of a common class 
interest that would potentially dampen peasant protest, or 
at least, tend to diminish the possibility of success for 
peasant protest and political action.  Thus, the presence 
of a kulak-like class could actually stabilize the feudal 





sense, Hilton actually suggests a type of feudal politico-
economic cycle theory.   For example, initially, the rise 
of the kulak-like class would destabilize the manor during 
a time of crisis by reducing the burdens of manor 
production, while reducing serf obligation.  However, as 
the stratification between the kulak-like class and 
laboring peasants and serfs widened, the fracture in the 
interests of the lower-order peasants and serfs alike would 
make both more susceptible to increases in exploitation due 
to their relative inability to resist.  Hilton focuses on 
one episodic feudal crisis of the thirteenth century.  This 
particular crisis had effects which deepened during the 
fourteenth century, thereby diminishing the feudal 
obligations.  By the late fourteenth century, this same 
crisis tended to deepen feudal exploitation and obligations 
of serfdom.  This intensified serfdom and feudal 
exploitation continued into, and throughout, the fifteenth 
century. 
 
2.3.6. Twelfth-Century Forms of Feudal 
       Emancipation  
 
The emancipation of the rural or agricultural feudal 
classes begins in the West during the twelfth century 
(Hilton 1969, 1978; Bloch 1961:275; Boissonnade 1964:240).  





attempt of peasant usurpation of seigniorial property 
became frequent (Hilton 1969; Bloch 1961:255ff; 
Boissonnade:246ff). Furthermore, throughout “practically 
the whole of Europe, a great movement of land clearance was 
proceeding.  He who wished to attract pioneers to his 
estate was obliged to promise them favourable conditions” 
(Bloch 1961:276).   Favorable conditions often included the 
abolition of serf obligations (see Hilton 1978; Boissonnade 
1964:245).  Nonetheless, liberty, whether chartered or 
usurped, did not mean the end of serfdom (Hilton 1983; 
Boisonnade 1964:258).79  Rather, the significance of the 
presence of a “free” class of peasants meant the emergence 
of a disjunction between and within the lives and motives 
of feudal peasantry.  
This disjunction within the feudal peasantry is of 
special significance for Hilton in that the “prime-mover” 
of feudalism was the relationship between the peasantry and 
noble lords (Hilton 1974:209-17).  The peasantry’s main 
mode of resistance was its sheer numbers.  On this account, 
Hilton quotes the Italian medieval writer Tamassia: “United 
they [the peasants] could confound Charlemagne. When they 
                                                 
79 In A Medieval Society, Hilton maintains that although serfdom 
continued in the West Midlands of England the peasant and serfs of 
these “communities still doubted the legality of the absolute disposal 
by the lord of the commons, still doubted whether any man except slaves 
could be treated as unfree, still doubted whether lords had the right 





are by themselves, they aren’t worth so many chickens” 
(Hilton 1985:125).80  Thus, the disjunction in the interests 
and motives of the peasantry gave a particular political 
and militaristic advantage to the noble classes. However, 
the politico-economic effects of this disjunction would 
take time to manifest.   
The economic significance of this disjunction would 
manifest during the thirteenth century.  It was during this 
period that landowners were successful in their ability to 
increase rent, for local authorities and monarchs to 
increase jurisdictional fines, for church hierarchy to 
increase pressures for tithing, and for the state to 
increase taxation and purveyance.  These forms of increased 
feudal exploitation “removed all cash surpluses” from the 
direct producers “and prevented even the most elementary 
investment” (Hilton 1985:128). 
Thus it seems that Hilton vindicates the tentative 
explanation of the fourteenth century crisis of feudalism 
put forward first by Maurice Dobb (1946:44-50) and later by 
                                                 
80The ability of peasants to overpower the nobility militaristically was 
a striking contradiction within feudalism.  “Wace, the twelfth-century 
Anglo-Norman writer of a verse history of the dukes of Normandy, puts 
into the mouths of peasants in revolt the following words: ‘Let us take 
an oath to defend ourselves and our goods and to stick together.  If 
they [the lords] were to wage war on us, we are thirty or forty 





E. A. Kosminsky.81 This explanation contends that there had 
been a linear escalation of feudal exploitation from the 
eleventh century forward which provoked various peasant 
revolts, until the system is unable to reproduce itself, 
whereby a general crisis emerges in the fourteenth 
century.82  Hilton accepts this view only in part.  Hilton 
offers a more structurally robust explanation, avoiding the 
political reductionism of Dobb’s and Kosminsky’s 
explanations.   
According to Hilton, it was the strength of the 
peasant classes which allowed for the continent-wide 
emancipation from feudal serfdom, which led to the 
expansion of feudal production and, through haste and 
misuse, the deterioration of the soil.  Further, the 
delicate balance between cereal acreage and grazing ground 
had become disrupted.  That is to say, animal husbandry 
tended to lag behind the advances in cereal acreage.  As 
animal husbandry declined, there followed a shortage of 
manure for cereal acreage itself. 
                                                 
81 See Kosminsky 1955:12-36, “The Evolution of Feudal Rent in England 
from the 11th  to the 15th Centuries.” 
82 In the pages of Science and Society, Hilton himself tends to the 
linear escalation of feudal exploitation but qualifies his view with 
the observation that there had been a qualitative shift in social 







 It is in this sense that one can argue that the very 
success of the political actions of the peasantry first 
augments production and leads to economic expansion, but 
then met internal limitations, or objective barriers of 
production between the social relations and forces of 
production.  The crisis of the late thirteenth and 
fourteenth century was especially acute in that the 
emancipation from serfdom from the eleventh and thirteenth 
century led to a growth in the ratio of nonfood producers 
to food producers.  Urban populations, including merchants, 
retailers, and artisans, were growing, but also growing in 
numbers was the mass of unskilled hirelings, day laborers, 
or “freemen.”  Further, the increasing complexity of the 
state and church administration meant an increase in 
lawyers and bureaucrats (Hilton 1985:130-1).  Still 
further, both royal and seigneurial households spent large 
sums of money on large displays, largess and retinues – a 




                                                 
83 For example, J. S. Mill (1987[1848]:52) writes: “consumption of 
pleasures or luxuries, whether by the idle or by the industrious, since 
production is neither its object nor is any way advanced by it, must be 
reckoned unproductive. […] That alone is productive consumption, which 
goes to maintain and increase the productive powers of the community; 
either those residing in its soil, in its materials, in the number and 





2.3.7. Feudal Investment and Technology 
 
 Not only was the ratio between nonfood producers and 
food producers rising, but as mentioned above, there was a 
lack of “any significant feedback in the form of investment 
which would increase production” (Hilton 1985:131).  
Aristocratic rents, church tithing, even state taxes were 
rarely, if ever, spent or invested to improve agricultural 
production.   
 Thus, according to Hilton, the central element of the 
feudal crisis that manifests in the fourteenth century 
actually begins well before the bubonic plague and late 
fourteenth century famines.  The crisis begins in the 
thirteenth century, from within the continuously 
contentious relationship between the direct producing 
peasantry and their aristocratic overlords.  In the 
thirteenth century, the peasantry’s forms of resistance 
were relatively strong and potent.  First, direct political 
action had relative success in reducing feudal obligations.  
Second, once free, yeomen and independent producers could 
resist feudal exploitation even further by means of 
increasing productivity.   
The increases in feudal peasant productivity resulted 
in significant improvements in agricultural production. 





significant.  Although Hilton did not rigorously document 
the specifics of medieval technology, his intuition of the 
matter is vindicated with a vengeance with the 1962 
publication of Lynn White’s Medieval Technology and Social 
Change.  In agriculture, significant technological 
improvement includes the eight-ox wheeled plough, the 
discovery of horse-power (development of the harness and 
nailed horseshoe), and the three-field rotation system, all 
of which resulted in the improved nutrition of medieval 
Europeans.  In urban production, there were significant 
changes in sources of power (water mill technology, 
windmills, and flirtations with steam-power), and 
consequently, the design of numerous machines. 
Although these developments in medieval technology 
were extremely significant, Hilton claims that the social 
relations of production that constituted feudal society 
otherwise limited the potential for technological advance.  
Limited here means that the social structure of feudalism 
only allowed for circumscribed technological improvement.  
For example, although agriculture improvement extended 
cultivation and the cultivated area, it was extended at the 
expense of the woodlands and natural pasture.  
“Agricultural productivity was limited by the shortage of 





winter fodder” (Hilton 1990:169).  Hence, Hilton suggests 
that by the end of the thirteenth century, the delicate 
balance between agricultural production and maintenance of 
the stock animal had been broken.   The deeper 
contradiction in the feudal mode of production was, 
however, an insufficient reinvestment motive within 
agriculture for both the landlord and peasant producer. 
The idea of reinvesting profit for the purpose of 
 increasing production seems to have been present in 
 few [medieval] minds if any.  In practice the minimum 
 rather than the maximum seems to have been spent on 
 those goods which go towards capital formation 
 (Hilton 1973b:213).   
 
As for the peasants, capital formation or re-
investment was not likely for two reasons. First, high 
rents severely restricted capital formation.  Second, even 
when rents did not absorb the entire surplus product, as 
Dobb was fond of pointing out, favorable market prices for 
peasants tended to decrease production during the next 
harvest rather than increase it.   This is because 
competition between producers was not the main driving 
force (or prime mover) of feudalism as it would become for 
capitalism.  Rather, with the direct producer in control of 
the means of production, the driving force of feudalism was 
the struggle over rent; competition as a motive force was 





In this way, the social relations of feudalism 
fettered possible technological improvements.  By the 
thirteenth century, these fetters on technology, and 
perhaps, because of achieved technological improvements in 
agriculture, feudalism stumbled into a severe crisis. 
To sum up: the stagnation of productivity during the 
last centuries of the middle ages, its inability to 
support the increasing cost of the non-productive 
expenditure of the ruling classes, were the 
fundamental reasons for the crisis of feudal society.  
This stagnation was the consequence of the inability 
of the feudal economy to generate investment for 
technical improvement.  In the first place, production 
for the market and the stimulus of competition only 
affected a very narrow sector of the economy.  
Secondly, agricultural and industrial production were 
based on the household unit and the profits of small 
peasant and small artisan enterprise were taken by 
landowners and usurers.  Thirdly, the social structure 
and the habits of the landed nobility did not permit 
accumulation for investment for the extension of 
production (Hilton 1990:171). 
 
 Feudalism would eventually recover from this crisis, 
in part by means of an intensification of serfdom.  
Moreover, on the heels of the feudal crisis, and a 
deepening of its effects, was the devastation of the 
bubonic plague.  Ironically, the intensification of serfdom 
and the labor shortage resulted in changes in land use and 
lower rents which “made possible a build-up of peasant 







2.4. Christopher Hill and Economic History 
 
Christopher Hill is considered one of the greatest 
English historians of the twentieth century.  “Few British 
historians have a reputation so truly world wide, and none 
has had a greater influence upon the study of his chosen 
period” (Pennington and Thomas 1978b:vii).  Christopher 
Hill was born February 6, 1912, and died February 23, 2003.  
Hill was born in York, England, where his father was 
employed as a solicitor.  His family was middle class, and 
both parents were Methodists.  Hill described his 
upbringing as Nonconformist (Kaye 1984:101) and 
secularized; however, the moral realism that underlies much 
of his academic historical work may very well have been 
rooted in his radical Protestant upbringing.   He attended 
St. Peter’s School in York and then entered Balliol 
College, Oxford, in 1931 to read history.  At Oxford, Hill 
was an accomplished rugby player and won many academic 
awards.  Upon graduation he was awarded a fellowship with 
All Souls College, Oxford (1934-8), and lectured in the 
history department.   
Hill spent a year in the Soviet Union studying Soviet 
historians. After this trip, Hill joined the Communist 
Party, although the details of his conversion to communism 





ended in divorce and produced four children.  Hill was a 
highly accomplished historical writer, whose success 
continued into his retirement and throughout the 1990s.  
Throughout his academic career, Hill’s central focus 
was writing and teaching about the Cromwellian or bourgeois 
revolution of England.  The bourgeois revolution has been 
Hill’s focus for nearly sixty years.  Although he has 
ventured outside of the seventeenth century, the great bulk 
of his intellectual efforts focused on the transitional 
seventeenth century period in England.  Hill can be said to 
have shaped the way that (Western) people of the twentieth 
century understood the history of seventeenth century 
England.  There is no other historian as synonymous with 
the history of the seventeenth century as Hill.    
It may seem that Hill’s focus on such a narrow time 
frame, so specific to one region of the world, would be 
overly confining.  However, it should be pointed out that 
the English revolution would prove to have enormous social 
consequences for the fate of feudalism, along with colossal 
effects on the direction taken by world history and world 
political-socioeconomic development.  In this sense, it can 
be said that Christopher Hill’s focus on the English 
Revolution of the seventeenth century is far from narrow.  





Hill’s work will assure that his studies and writings will 
continue to be celebrated and scrutinized for a long time 
to come. 
 
2.4.1. The Decisive Seventeenth Century 
 
For England, the seventeenth century certainly is most 
decisive for the transformation towards and formation of 
modern capitalism84 in England.  It can be argued that the 
seventeenth century is the time in England when the Middle 
Ages come to an end and the Modern Age begins (Hill 1961:1, 
p. 124, 1970:13; Dobb 1946:18-9).  On this account, Hill is 
in agreement with Karl Marx (1981:440-55) and Maurice Dobb 
(1946:123-76), who both argued that it was the politico-
historical events of seventeenth century England, processes 
of which began in the late sixteenth century, that bring 
forth the necessary conditions for the possibility of the 
emergence of the capitalist era in the nineteenth century 
(Dobb 1946:19). As Marx writes, “Although we come across 
the first sporadic traces of capitalist production as early 
as the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries in certain towns 
                                                 
84 Hill follows Marx and Dobb (1946:17ff) closely with regard to the 
fact that commodity production develops in a number of contingent 
stages.  Capitalism is a later stage of commodity production whereby 
human labor itself has taken the commodity form (Marx’s notion of 
labor-power, see Chapter 6 of Capital volume I), or there has been a 





of the Mediterranean,85 the capitalist era dates from the 
sixteenth century” (Marx 1976:876).  The development of 
commodity production and the emergence of “Capitalism 
fall[…] into a number of stages” (Dobb 1946:17), and in 
each stage, forms of politico-economic expropriation are 
always the result.   
The history of this expropriation assumes different 
 aspects in different countries, and runs through its 
 various phases in different orders of succession, and 
 at different historical epochs.  Only in England, 
 which we therefore take as our example, has it the 
 classic form (Marx 1976:876). 
 
The crucial or really revolutionary decades in England 
are from 1640-60.  However, the impetus toward revolution 
had been ushered in by the breakdown of the old society 
beginning in the sixteenth century (Hill 1986:95).  The 
social breakdown was not specific to England.  Rather, all 
of Europe was experiencing a socioeconomic crisis, which 
manifests in a series of political turmoil, revolts, and 
various civil wars (Hobsbawm 1967 in Aston 1967).  The 
reactions of various countries to the socioeconomic crisis 
took diverse forms depending on the particular social 
relations and institutional forms peculiar to each country 
and contingent upon differing national circumstances.   
                                                 
85 Dobb (1946:123) suggests that Marx should have concluded “Flanders 






From this continent-wide crisis, there was certainly a 
“dissolvent” effect upon the  
pre-existing organizations of production. […] But how 
 far it leads to the dissolution of the old mode of 
 production depends first and foremost on the solidity 
 and inner articulation of this mode of production 
 itself.  And what comes out of this process of 
 dissolution, i.e. the new mode of production arises in 
 place of the old [… pivots upon] the character of the 
 old mode of production itself (Marx 1981:449). 
 
The outcome of the crisis in the Netherlands and 
England was significantly different from the outcome in 
other European countries.  In the Netherlands and England, 
the political revolutions resulted in drastically different 
social and economic arrangements from the preexisting 
organizations of production (Hill 1967:3).   
These different historical and politico-economic paths 
that formed after the seventeenth century offer the 
historian the possibility of a fruitful contrastive 
analysis.  This contrastive method is the historian’s 
analogue to a controlled laboratory experiment in the 
natural sciences.  Not only is the historian able to 
contrast historical development in various regions and 
countries of Europe, but the historian also is able to 
better understand individual action and human agency in 





With the newly established trade routes to the Far 
East, the European settlement, and the plunder of North and 
South America, along with new found bullion and consequent 
monetary inflation, the stakes were high in regard to how a 
country would (politically) react and (economically) 
resolve itself from the crisis.   
It was especially true in England where there was 
success in establishing a national government committed 
specifically to commercial considerations. “Parliament now 
determined foreign policy, and used newly-mobilized 
financial resources of the country, through an aggressive 
use of sea power, to protect and expand the trade of a 
unified empire” (Hill 1970:256).  The revolutionary 
undercurrents, articulated throughout Europe, and the 
particular English institutional forms, or sociostructural 
constitution, along with its fractures and pressures of 
society, “dictated the outbreak of revolution and shaped 
the state which emerged from it,” as opposed to the 
intentions and wishes of its leaders (Hill 1985:95-6).  
What was peculiar to England was the particular social 
fractures and opposed political interests that split the 
ruling classes more so than elsewhere in Europe.  





confidence of an important section of the ruling class” 
(Hill 1961:88).      
 
2.4.2. The Undercurrent of Potential Unrest: 
       Reform and Revolution 
 
Hill’s basic theme has been the revolutionary 
character of seventeenth-century England.  Hill maintains 
that the revolutionary character was first initiated by a 
drive for political reform and economic liberty.  The 
outcome, however, was both a ‘political revolution’ and a 
‘socioeconomic revolution’.  He has insisted that the 
political revolution that occurred in seventeenth century 
England was initiated by means of deep democratic motives.  
Although a desire for establishing a democratic England86 
had instigated the drive for, first, political reformation 
and then revolution, the democratic aspirations of the 
revolution were ultimately defeated.  Although in early 
seventeenth-century England, there was no organized body of 
discontent (Hill 1961:21), the drive for a democratic 
                                                 
86  Hill argues that democracy had been an English political tradition 
prior to William’s conquests in 1066, which had never faded from the 
consciousness of the English mind.  “Before 1066 the Anglo-Saxon 
inhabitants of this country lived as free and equal citizens, governing 
themselves through representative institutions.  The Norman Conquest 
deprived them of this liberty, and established the tyranny of an alien 
King and landlords.  But the people did not forget the rights they had 
lost.  They fought continuously to recover them, with varying success.  
Concessions (Magna Carta, for instance) were from time to time extorted 
from their rulers, and always the tradition of lost Anglo-Saxon freedom 
was a stimulus to ever more insistent demands upon the successors of 





reformation of English politics had been part of English 
culture for over five hundred years (Hill in Saville 
1954:57).  The political discontent had become “a permanent 
background of potential unrest throughout” the early 
decades of the seventeenth century (Hill 1961:21). 
The unrest remained only a potential in that the 
democratic motives that had become a characteristic part of 
English culture were not immediately manifest from an 
element within the ruling class, but from only the English 
commoners and “middling sort.”    Thus, until the English 
governing body had “lost the confidence of an important 
section of the ruling class” (Hill 1961:88), revolution 
would remain only a potential.   
 
2.4.3. The Industrious Sorts of People Versus 
       The ‘Monopolies’ of Bishops and Crown 
 
It was the complexity of English society that would 
split the ruling class on a number of grounds, including 
economic, political, and religious.  Moreover, Hill heeds 
warning in making any simple division between economics, 
politics, and religious ideas in seventeenth century 
England; rather the significant split in the ruling class 
was between court and country (Hill 1961:86-7).  Court 
refers to the crown government, which was closely aligned 





nobility.87  Country refers “those of the free,” who did not 
have government office, including “the main body of the 
gentry” (Hill 1961:59), but also including “the middling 
sort” of small merchants, artisans, and yeomen88 (Hill 
1980:6). 
By the late fifteenth century, the country could also 
be identified as Puritan as long as it is recognized “that 
for contemporaries” of the period, when the term ‘Puritan’ 
was employed it had “no narrowly religious connotation” 
(Hill 1964:24).  The overtones of the term included 
religious, economic, social, and political elements.  In 
general, contemporaries employed the term Puritan in an 
effort to designate persons opposed to the policy of either 
church hierarchy or court, or both.             
Court government of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century was in the practice of granting special privileges 
and monopoly power to some merchants and perquisites to 
many members of the landed class (Hill 1961:86-7).   
Although in 1601, Queen Elizabeth abolished many 
monopolies, James I was to revive them (Hill 1970:22).   
The granting of special privileges and monopoly power did 
not merely split between class lines but also within 
                                                 
87 Quoting King James’s famous epigram, Hill (1961:65) writes “‘No 
Bishop, no King, no nobility.’ […]  The three stood or fell together.” 
88 ‘The middling sort’ “formed the backbone of Parliament’s support in 





classes.  That is to say, the ruling class itself was split 
on whether special privileges were just, whether they were 
‘deserved’ by particular individuals, etc.  In early 
seventeenth-century England, it is hard to exaggerate the 
extent of monopolies.  Virtually every product consumed in 
England had been produced and/or traded by a monopolist.89 
On the other hand, some of “richest and go-ahead 
members” of the landed class and many merchants were 
                                                 
89 “In 1601 a member of Parliament asked, when a list of monopolies was 
read out, ‘Is not bread there?’  His irony exaggerated only slightly.  
It is difficult for us to picture the life of a man living in a house 
built with monopoly bricks, with windows (if any) of monopoly glass; 
heated by monopoly coal (in Ireland monopoly timber), burning in a 
grate made of monopoly iron.  His walls were lined with monopoly 
tapestries.  He slept on monopoly feathers, did his hair with monopoly 
brushes and monopoly combs.  He washed himself with monopoly soap, his 
clothes in monopoly starch.  He dressed in monopoly lace, monopoly 
linen, monopoly leather, monopoly gold thread.  His hat was of monopoly 
beaver, with a monopoly band.  His clothes were held up by monopoly 
belts, monopoly buttons, monopoly pins.  They were dyed with monopoly 
dyes.  He ate monopoly butter, monopoly currants, monopoly red 
herrings, monopoly salmon, and monopoly lobsters.  His food was 
seasoned with monopoly salt, monopoly pepper, monopoly vinegar.  Out of 
monopoly glasses he drank monopoly wines and monopoly spirits; out of 
pewter mugs made from monopoly tin he drank monopoly beer made from 
monopoly hops, kept in monopoly barrels or monopoly bottles, sold in 
monopoly-licensed alehouses.  He smoked monopoly tobacco in monopoly 
pipes, played with monopoly dice or monopoly cards, or on monopoly 
lute-strings.  He wrote with monopoly pens, on monopoly writing-paper; 
read (through monopoly spectacles, by the light of monopoly candles) 
monopoly printed books, including monopoly Bibles and monopoly Latin 
grammars, printed on paper made from monopoly-collected rags, bound in 
sheepskin dressed in monopoly alum. He shot with monopoly gunpowder 
made from monopoly saltpetre.   He exercised himself with monopoly golf 
balls and in monopoly-licensed bowling alleys.  A monopolist collected 
the fines which he paid for swearing.  He traveled in monopoly sedan 
chairs or monopoly hackney coaches, drawn by horses fed on monopoly 
hay.  He tipped with monopoly farthings.  At sea he was lighted by 
monopoly lighthouses.  When he made his will, he went to a monopolist.  
(In Ireland one could not be born, married, or die without 6d. to a 
monopolist.)  Pedlars were licensed by a monopolist.  Mice were caught 
in monopoly mousetraps.  Not all these patents existed at once, but all 
come from the first decades of the seventeenth century.  In 1621 there 





excluded from special economic privilege and monopoly power 
(Hill 1961:87).  These groups looked to Parliament to help 
establish economic inclusion, justice, and greater freedom.  
These middling sorts and the otherwise economic 
underprivileged groups were further able to exploit the 
dormant democratic political desires of the masses by which 
to find support from the laboring classes, especially those 
dependent upon wages, for their cause against the court.   
Further, the church hierarchy forbade work on Saint’s 
days (Hill 1964:156), which numbered more than one hundred 
days in a year (Hill 1964:146).  This meant that those 
(Christians) who were “free” to sell their labor were at 
the same time forbidden to sell it on holy days. This was 
especially burdensome to those “free” from serfdom and 
feudal obligations.  That is to say, holy days meant that 
those dependent upon wages for their livelihood and 
survival experienced the forbidden days of labor as a 
statute against their ability to earn a livelihood.  Of 
course, prohibition of work on holy days also meant that 
independent artisans and yeomen must cease production for 
the day due to the absence of labor.  Capital must then sit 
wastefully idle and is thus reduced to merely an idle cost.  
“Machinery that is not regularly used is wasted: mines that 





The small independent merchant also suffered from the holy 
days’ restriction on labor.  The independent artisans, 
yeomen, and small middling merchants were the up and rising 
“industrious sort of people” who no longer relied on the 
old rhythms of feudal production, but rather a new atomized 
(pre)industrial rhythm. 
Puritanism came to represent this new rhythm in its 
articulation of the basic “dignity” and honor of labor 
(Hill 1964:138), its commitment to personal and labor 
discipline (Hill 1964:145ff), and its drive to establish 
Sabbatarianism90 (Hill 1964:219ff) in place of the 
‘economically wasteful’ holy days.91  It was especially the 
industrious sorts of people that believed in, and pushed 
for Puritanism on political, economic, and religious 
grounds.     
                                                 
90 Sabbatarianism not only aimed to replace the practice of holy days, 
but further forbid Sunday sports and insisted upon church service 
attendance.  Hill points out that Puritans in favor of Sabbatarianism 
should not simply be understood as “killjoys”; rather they were 
socioeconomically progressive.  “Had there been no administrative 
action by J.P.s and municipal authorities and no legislation against 
Sunday work, the competitive pressure on some employers and some of the 
self-employed poor to work a seven-day week for some of the time would 
have been irresistible” (Hill 1964:165).  In this sense, the 
industrious sort of people had to be “protected from themselves: by the 
total prohibition of Sunday work, and of travel to and from markets; 
and by the strict enforcement of this prohibition, in the interests of 
the class who would try to evade it.  This could not be left to private 
decision or to guild regulation.  It must be done either by the 
ecclesiastical disciplinary apparatus, or by national legislation 
enforced by M.P.s (Hill 1964:152).  
91 “A late seventeenth century economist estimated that every holiday 
lost £50,000 to the nation.  That was the new attitude with a 





The independent laboring class, although not always 
very religious, tended to support the political and 
economic aims represented by the industrious sort of people 
and Puritanism.  However, these independent hirelings often 
had political aims and social grievances of their own.  
Many of these independent hirelings pushed further for 
their democratic aspirations of England92 (Hill 1961:109-13, 
p. 131-2, 1970:94ff).  For the most part, however, the 
grievances of the independent hirelings were over local 
concerns, e.g., unemployment, poor relief, and enclosures.  
“So, although it would be wrong to think of any body of 
organized discontent” of independent hirelings, 
nonetheless, during the decades of 1600-40 there is a 
constant presence of “potential unrest” that determined 
political thought and action93 (Hill 1961:21). 
                                                 
92 The Levellers were radical democrats who pushed for drastic political 
and legal reforms, along with a push for a Parliament more 
representative of common English people.  This included a proposal that 
the poor should elect their own trustees to manage poor relief (Hill 
1964:295).  The Diggers made more economically conscious demands.  
Namely, the Diggers “demanded heaven for the poor on earth now” (Hill 
1970:213), and “that all crown lands and forests, all commons and 
wastes, should be cultivated by the poor in communal ownership, and the 
buying and selling of land should be forbidden by law” (Hill 1970:18).  
Quakers had more of a socioreligious doctrine, beginning with the 
recognition that each human being had divine potential, thus “rejected 
outward forms of social subordination in the name of Christian 
equality” (Hill 1970:213).  The political consequence was the belief 
that all human beings (both women and men) are created equal (Hill 
1961:144, 1965:275). 
93 Hill (1961:21) warns: “We shall often misinterpret men’s thoughts and 
actions if we do not continually remind ourselves of this background of 





One of the key issues following the Lutheran-inspired 
Reformation of the sixteenth century was that church 
charity no longer provided adequate amounts of poor relief, 
and the English monarchy was reluctant to take on the 
burden of growing poverty.  Therefore “relief of poverty 
was left mainly to private initiative.  The charitable, in 
this period, were overwhelmingly merchants (especially of 
London) and the Puritan section of the gentry” (Hill 
1961:20).  The Justices of the Peace, who usually were 
members of the privileged class, had been by default put in 
control of both poor relief and wage controls (Hill 
1961:87-8).  Thus, the industrious sort of people and 
feudally free classes were eager to exploit the inadequacy 
of poor relief to their advantage and sociopolitical 
aspirations.  They achieved the dissemination of their 
ideas mainly through means of (Puritan) preaching.  Pulpit 
preaching had a certain monopoly, not only on religious 
ideas but also on political information, education, and 
sociopolitical and economic morality.    The pulpit was 
used to denounce monopolies, excessive fees, low wages, and 
inadequate poor relief (Hill 1964 chapter 2).   
Greed of monopolies and government corruption were 
often explained as the culprit causing social maladies and 





reform was the cure.  The words of the pulpit “parson, even 
when they were not accepted as gospel, necessarily formed 
the starting-point for discussion” (Hill 1964:33). 
There emerged “a new body” of free-lance clergy or 
lecturers, the medieval analogue of the Sophists of 
antiquity.  Various types of lecturers emerge.  A 
lectureship might be a type of stipend to a minister 
already established in a parish, who would then be expected 
to deliver lectures on so many days during the week.  A 
lecturer may be “superinducted” in care of another pastor, 
or a combination of regional pastors, whereby the lecturer 
would be expected to preach in neighboring towns on various 
market days.  Finally there was the “running lecturer” who 
traveled from village to village to deliver lectures for 
anyone willing to pay. 
The middling and industrious sorts of people had a 
number of motives and reasons to invest money in the 
endowment of lectureships.   First, they enjoyed the 
theology themselves.  Second, there was a certain anxiety 
over the lower classes not being religious; thus a lecture 
could be used as a means of indoctrination.  Third were 
political motives to sway public opinion in favor of the 
industrious sorts of people concerning their struggle 





pulpit then becomes an institution of political social 
struggle in that “control of the pulpit was an essential 
political weapon” of country against crown (Hill 1964:43). 
The result of these struggles was the bourgeois 
revolution of mid-seventeenth century England.  The 
revolutionary result was not “made by or consciously willed 
by the bourgeoisie” (Hill 1986:95.  Genovese (1984:16) 
claims Hill suggests that “the bourgeoisie has not so much 
made the bourgeois revolutions as it has been made by 
them.”  According to Hill (1986:95): 
[t]he English Revolution, like all revolutions, was 
 caused by the breakdown of the old society; it was 
 brought about neither by the wishes of the 
 bourgeoisie, nor by the leaders of the Long 
 Parliament.  But its outcome was the establishment of 
 conditions far more favourable to the development of 
 capitalism than those which prevailed before 1640. 
 
  
2.4.4. Economic Conditions of Seventeenth 
   Century England 
 
According to Hill, the economic conditions were of 
special significance to the particular manifestations of 
the seventeenth century political struggles.  Prior to and 
following the death of Queen Elizabeth on March 24, 1603, 
inflation, in part due to the inflow of silver from the 
Americas, was chronic.  The revenue of King James I was 
more or less fixed by custom.  This meant that James I 





return for the control of policy, or he might attempt to 
squeeze out extra funds by more traditional feudal means 
(i.e., increase various fines, taxes, or tolls).  The 
latter procedure was seen as unfair and tyrannical by many, 
both of the privileged classes and the economically 
underprivileged classes (i.e., the industrious sorts of 
people). Enclosures and land were a further source of 
tension, and land reform constituted an important political 
drive.  So, too, were the economic privileges of the 
monopoly merchants a source of social tension and a 
rallying issue for politico-economic reform.  Increasing 
poverty and pauperism further heightened social tensions.  
Finally, the many disputes over religion only sharpened the 
potential for social unrest.  In short, Hill insists that 
the causes of the English revolution cannot be reduced to 
merely a religious or a political or an economic cause 
(Hill 1961:86).  Rather Hill (1956:31) maintains:  
we must widen our view so as to embrace the total 
 activity of society.  Any event so complex as a 
 revolution must be seen as a whole.  Large numbers of 
 men and women were drawn into political activity by 
 religious and  political ideals as well as by economic 
 necessities. 
 
Nevertheless, in Society & Puritanism in Pre-
Revolutionary England, Hill seems to confirm that 





overcoming the fetters of feudalism and in the relation to 
the development of capitalism.  A surface reading of this 
particular book may seem to vindicate Weber at the expense 
of Marx.  However, we must heed Hill’s point that 
Puritanism cannot be reduced to mere religious beliefs and 
practices.94  Rather as argued above, Puritanism in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth century designated those 
opposed to both bishops and crown.  Puritanism “was a 
philosophy of life, an attitude to the universe, which by 
no means excluded secular interests” (Hill 1965:293).  
Puritanism came to politically embody the struggle of a new 
social rhythm and attitude being ushered forth by the 
industrious sorts of people.  It was an attitude that 
resonated pragmatically, in a secular sense, not only with 
small merchants, artisans, and craftsmen but also with 
independent hirelings.    
In The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During 
the English Revolution and also in Intellectual Origins of 
the English Revolution, Hill focuses on “the fascinating 
flood of radical ideas,” or subrevolt, during the 
revolutionary period of England.  Understanding how these 
radicals gradually changed old ways of thinking, “we can, 
                                                 
94 Hill writes, “It is important, in discussing Puritanism, to remember 






perhaps, extend a little gratitude to all those nameless 
radicals who foresaw and worked for – not our modern world, 
but something far nobler, something yet to be achieved – 
upside-down world” (Hill 1975:384).  The (sub)revolts 
within the revolution included many diverse groups and 
beliefs, all with the aim of change and democracy as their 
objective (Hill 1975:128ff, pp. 67ff).  Hill (1975:14) 
claims:  
Groups like Levellers, Diggers, and Fifth Monarchists 
offered new political solutions (and in the case of 
the Diggers, new economic solutions too).  The various 
sects – Baptists, Quakers, Muggletonians – offered new 
religious solutions.  Other groups asked sceptical 
questions about all the institutions and beliefs of 
their society – Seekers, Ranters, the Diggers too.  
Indeed it is perhaps misleading to differentiate too 
sharply between politics, religion and general 
scepticism.  We know, as a result of hindsight, that 
some groups – Baptists, Quakers – will survive as 
religious sects and that most of the others will 
disappear.  In consequence we unconsciously tend to 
impose too clear outlines on the early history of 
English sects, to read back late beliefs into the 
1640s and 50s.  One of the aims of this book will be 
to suggest that in this period things were much more 
blurred.  From, say, 1645 to 1653, there was a great 
overturning, questioning, revaluing, of everything in 
England.  Old institutions, old beliefs, old values 
came in question.  Men moved easily from one critical 
group to another. 
 
These various political, economic, and religious sects 
and factions were constituted by two classes of people.  
First, the “common people” or what Hill called the “middle 





countryside), wage-labor (in the urban areas), and/or 
charity (Hill 1967:40ff).  Second, were the “industrious 
sorts of people,” which for Hill (1967:39) include “most 
merchants, richer artisans, the independent peasantry 
(yeomanry) and well-to-do tenant farmers.”  The most 
politically endowed were the landed ruling class or 
aristocracy, but the “numbers of those who called 
themselves gentlemen seems to have expanded very rapidly in 
this period” (Hill 1967:35).  The upper class thus included 
the gentry and the wealthiest of merchants, both having 
gained political influence.   
The “common” and “industrious” classes would join 
forces, organizing around political, religious, and 
ideological grounds, to challenge the institutions that 
supported the special privileges of the aristocracy, 
gentry, and wealthiest of merchants.  The “radical” (and 
“lunatic”)95 fringes played a pivotal role in bringing the 
protestors together.  The cry for greater political and 
economic democracy was the key unifying ideological 
motivation.   Although the middle sorts and industrious 
                                                 
95 “Historians, in fact, would be well-advised to avoid the loaded 
phrase, ‘lunatic fringe’.  Lunacy, like beauty, may be in the eye of 
the beholder.  There were lunatics in the seventeenth century, but 
modern psychiatry is helping us to understand that madness itself may 
be a form of protest against social norms, and that the ‘lunatic’ may 






sorts would successfully overcome the aristocracy and 
wealthiest merchants, the struggle for democracy would meet 
only limited success.   
The essentially feudal “police” state of pre-1640 
England, headed by the landed aristocracy and wealthiest 
merchants “was violently overthrown, power passed to a new 
class,” the bourgeoisie, and “the freer development of 
capitalism was made possible” (Hill 1955:6, 1990:2).  
Although the war was fought between and by the monarch 
(i.e., Charles I, and backed by the established church and 
conservative landlords) and parliament, Hill has always 
maintained that the English Civil War was a class war: 
“Parliament beat the King because it could appeal to the 
enthusiastic support of the trading and industrial classes 
in town and country-side, to yeoman and progressive gentry, 
and to wider masses of the population” (1955:6). 
Hill acknowledges that the ultimate victory of the 
bourgeoisie was at the same time a defeat for the radical 
fringe.  The new bourgeois “rulers of England organized a 
highly successful commercial empire and a system of class 
rule which proved to have unusual staying power” (Hill 
1975:384).  Although under bourgeois rule, England was now 
freer than France and Spain, “but we must always ask, 





historians (and social scientists) have been too quick to 
assume the bourgeois world to be “right way up.”  “Upside 
down is after all a relative concept.  The assumption that 
it means the wrong way up is itself an expression of the 
view from the top” (Hill 1975:385). 
Initially, the bourgeois had alliances with diverse 
sects.  However, following the successful political 
revolutions of 1640-1660 many factions remained suspicious 
of the bourgeois rule.  The radical revolts within the 
bourgeois revolution believed that England had remained 
upside down and undemocratic after the bourgeois had 
assumed political power, but by 1688, the radical fringe 
had been adequately suppressed. The political revolution 
had ultimately denied democracy for all and, according to 
Hill (1990:23):  
produced governments able to concentrate single-
 mindedly on economic growth.  Their policies led to 
 England becoming the country of the first Industrial 
 Revolution, and the first world empire.  The three 
 processes are […] indissolubly connected.  England’s 
 seventeenth-century Revolution is a decisive event not 
 only in English but in world history.  
 
Hill (1990:1) further insists that the English 
revolution of the seventeenth century was “comparable in 
world significance with the French and Russian Revolutions.    
Hill’s sixty years of studying the bourgeois 





which is not meant to deny: “No historian and no type of 
history have a monopoly of truth: the writing of history is 
co-operative, cumulative task, to which we all have to 
contribute to the best of our ability” (Hill 1976:3).  
Although he has narrowly focused the bulk of his 
intellectual efforts upon one era, Hill’s contribution is 
far broader and more progressive.  He has established, as 
did Dobb, that a Marxian class-struggle analysis offers 
important and unique historical perspectives on 
seventeenth-century England.  He has convincingly 
demonstrated that the social relations prior to 1640, and 
those after 1688, had been radically transformed, not 
simply politically but socially and culturally.  By 
demonstrating that the English revolution was not merely a 
political, religious, or economic revolution but ‘embraced 
the whole of life’ (Kaye 1984:129), Hill has radically 
challenged the deterministic interpretations of the 
historical materialism and technological primacy 
interpretation of the base/superstructure metaphor.  He 
has, in effect, demonstrated that contingency is a feature 
of history and a feature of the future, underscoring the 
importance of political action and personal agency.  
Further, Hill (with his insistence upon the idea that the 





established feudal order, nor had the bourgeois consciously 
willed the 1640 revolution, but nonetheless the effects of 
events of 1640-1688 promoted bourgeois interests) stresses 
the role of unintended consequences.  
 
2.5. Eric Hobsbawm and Economic History 
 
 Eric Hobsbawm has been hailed as the premier Marxist 
historian working today (Cronin 1978-9:88; Genovese and 
Warren 1978:9).  He remains a member of the British 
Communist Party and was an active member of the Historians’ 
group in London throughout his life.  He is on the 
editorial broad of Marxism Today, and vice president of the 
Past and Present Society. 
He was born in Egypt, but raised in Vienna (1919-
1931).  His family moved to Berlin in 1931 but left when 
Hitler rose to power, settling in London (1933).  He read 
history at King’s College, Cambridge, and became a Marxist, 
“or tried to be,” as a schoolboy.  He had read Maurice 
Dobb’s popular book On Marxism Today and was actively 
involved with the Communist Party.  However, the 
“university establishment was generally hostile to Marxism 
in those days.” Nonetheless the students, as Hobsbawm 





He served in the education corps during the war, 
“nothing interesting” (Hobsbawm, in Snowman 1999:17), and 
he returned to Cambridge and completed his studies with a 
thesis on the Fabians.  The “subject wasn’t interesting,” 
but the subject did help him to get “into trade union and 
working-class history” (Hobsbawm 1978:31).  He took a 
position at the University of London where he spent his 
entire academic career until his retirement in 1982. After 
his retirement he taught at the New School in New York 
City. 
Hobsbawm’s intellectual career covered a vast area of 
interest and has “achievements on a breathtaking array of 
subjects” (Genovese 1984:13).  Harvey Kaye (1984) has 
divided Hobsbawm’s work into three broad historical 
subjects: labor history, peasants and primitive rebels, and 
world history. (Hobsbawm was also an active author and 
critic of jazz.) 
His work on labor history, mainly published prior to 
1970, has mostly been published as articles, with the 
exception of Captain Swing (1969), written with George 
Rude.  Harvey Kaye claims that Hobsbawm’s work on labor 
history has significantly transformed the subject.  






have clearly contributed to the transformation of the 
 study of labour history.  Not only has his work added 
 to our knowledge of the British labour movement and 
 working-class, it has also shaped the way we study it.  
 
Hobsbawm’s contributions and achievement within labor 
history can be attributed to the likelihood, as Genovese 
(1984:19) suggested, that  
no historian of labour overmatches his respect and 
 sympathy for workers, his vast knowledge of their 
 living and working conditions, and his disdain, itself 
 born of respect for the people he is writing about for 
 all attempts to romanticize their dissent or to 
 pretend that it may be substituted for engaged 
 politics. 
 
His labor history takes a “sociological approach,” and 
treats such issues as formation of class-consciousness, 
machine-breaking, and national customs, labor aristocracy, 
trade unions, etc.  His approach to labor history has been 
dubbed “social history,” which Hobsbawm informs his readers 
refers to histories that combine manners, customs, and 
activity of everyday life with the more traditional 
economic analysis (1972:2).  His social history is an 
“impressive integration of art, science, religion, 
technology, and so much else, especially in his great work 
on the nineteenth century” (Genovese 1984:16).  Moreover, 
in Hobsbawm’s actual work, this impressive integration of 
social realms is further concerned with socioeconomic 





society becomes revolutionized, but remains within or as a 
constitutive aspect of later societies.   In this sense, it 
has an institutional(ist) emphasis. “Social history,” as 
such, “can never be another specialization like economic or 
other hyphenated histories because its subject matter 
cannot be isolated” (Hobsbawm 1972:5). 
Although Hobsbawm’s labor history may seem rather 
parochial today, as Kaye (1984:144) has observed, it helped 
to instigate (along with work by E. P. Thompson) the 
development of “new labor history.”96  This new labor 
history would emphasize the role of culture, and the 
importance of individual agency in changing the direction 
of history. 
Hobsbawm’s world histories, declared his “magnum opus” 
(Snowman 1999:17), could be argued to be more narrowly 
concerned with a study of the social history of Britain in 
a global context.   His world history begins in the 1780s 
when world “prosperity came from the countryside” and the 
“agrarian problem was therefore the fundamental one in the 
world of 1789” (Hobsbawm 1962:13).  The agrarian economies 
of the world are disrupted by “dual revolutions,” a 
political revolution in France (i.e., the French 
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revolution), and a socioeconomic revolution in England 
(i.e., the industrial revolution).  
Hobsbawm’s world history is now a quartet 
periodization: The Age of Revolution  (1789-1848), The Age 
of Capital (1848-75), The Age of Empire (1875-1914), and 
the Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century (1914-91).  
Although chronologically a four-volume set, “It certainly 
wasn’t planned that way.  That’s not my style.  They 
started as separate projects, but I think I realised 
somewhere between volumes two and three that it might 
eventually amount to a series” (Hobsbawm, quoted in Snowman 
1999:17). 
In Industry and Empire (1969), Hobsbawm covers 
Britain’s rise to world (industrial) dominance, from 1750 
Britain and through the 1960s.  Hobsbawm (1969:20) warns 
that the “history of British industrial society is a 
particular case” of capitalist industrialization.    
British industrialization made old forms of protest 
obsolete; from Luddism to Chartism, eighteenth century 
social movements “died away.”  It would be the mid-
nineteenth century until “the British working class evolved 
new ways of struggle and living” (Hobsbawm 1969:91).  
Countries industrializing in the twentieth century 





different political environments; further, the problems and 
contradictions that are internal to capitalist production 
and development are better understood.  “The history of 
Britain is therefore not a model for economic development 
of the [rest of the] world today” (Hobsbawm 1969:21). 
Hobsbawm concludes that British global hegemony was 
but a moment in her economic history.  The economic 
advantages Britain experienced during the nineteenth 
century based on the  
foundations of laissez-faire crumbled in the 1860s and 
 1870s.  As other countries industrialized, it became 
 evident that Free Trade was not enough to maintain 
 Britain as the only, or even the chief, workshop of 
 the world; and if she was so no longer, the basis of 
 her international economic policy needed to be 
 revised (Hobsbawm 1969:237). 
 
Hobsbawm (1969:226) adds laissez-faire policy is an 
illusion, because  
[t]otal government laissez-faire is of course a 
 contradiction in terms.  No modern government can not 
 influence economic life […], the ‘public sector,’ 
 however modest, is nearly always a very large 
 ‘industry’ in terms of sheer employment, and public 
 revenue and expenditure form a significant proportion 
 of the national total. 
 
For the survival of British capitalism and in the 
context of the great failure of laissez-faire policy and 
the threat of Bolshevism, Britain’s politicians have since 





(Keynesian) institutions to help manage economic 
development with more political and social consciousness 
(Hobsbawm 1969:245).  With these new politico-economic 
institutions in place, Britain experienced a “Long Boom” 
following the Second World War.  Even so, “the rise in the 
British standard of life after the Second World War was 
probably less rapid and less striking than in several other 
socialist and non-socialist European countries” (Hobsbawm 
1969:316). 
Just as Britain’s global hegemony has a life cycle, so 
too does each capitalist “upswing.”  In this context, 
Hobsbawm acknowledges the possibility of Kondratiev long-
waves and offers the following prophecy: “If there are 
Kondratiev periodicities, whatever their nature we might 
very well expect this era to end very soon, and the 1970s 
to have different and probably less pleasing 
characteristics” (Hobsbawm:314).   
What is striking about Hobsbawm’s The Age of 
Revolution is his assessment of the “dual revolutions” of 
the late eighteenth century versus the socialist-inspired 
revolution of 1848.  The late eighteenth century ushered in 
political revolution, “of which the French was only one, 





1962:54).97   Following this revolutionary era, the 
victorious regimes faced the “difficult and dangerous” task 
of instituting and preserving “peace” (Hobsbawm 1962:99ff).  
A number of institutional arrangements aided in securing 
international “peace” from 1815 forward, including the 
“concert of Europe” and “Holy Alliance,” both institutions 
to facilitate and secure international trade.   
Hobsbawm claims there is a type of double movement in 
capitalist development, as the industrial capitalists 
became wealthier the poor became more impoverished.  
Speenhamland systems (1832) were the last anti-laissiz-
faire measures (in Britain) to socially protect the 
laboring poor. By 1848 it seemed that a new revolutionary 
era was upon the world.  Hobsbawm (1962:314) insists that   
[t]his was the ‘spectre of communism’ which haunted 
 Europe, the fear of ‘the proletariat’ which affected 
 not merely factory-owners in Lancashire or […] France, 
 but [also …] Germany, […] Rome and professors 
 everywhere. 
 
Hobsbawm (1962:212) further argues this “spectre of 
communism” would awaken the British labor movement: 
Once [the British laboring poor] had acquired even 
 flickering of political consciousness, their 
 demonstrations were not the mere occasional eruptions 
 of an exasperated ‘mob’, which easily relapsed into 
 apathy.  They were the stirrings of an army.  
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According to Hobsbawm, at no time had a revolution 
been awaited and predicted by so many, working-class people 
“[t]ogether […] prepared for and awaited the European 
revolution which came – and failed – in 1848” (Hobsbawm 
1962:131).  Defeat was the fate of the 1848 revolution, The 
Age of Revolution (1789-1848) had been tamed in 1848.  The 
Age of Capital would emerge, following the imperialist 
phase of Industry and Empire. 
In Industry and Empire, Hobsbawm considers the 
development of British industrial capitalism, but in a more 
global and historical context.  The essence of Hobsbawm’s 
argument is directly inspired by Dobb.  More specifically, 
in contrast to mainstream economic historians (e.g., 
Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth, 1960), Hobsbawm 
(1968:21) warns that England is not a model for developing 
and industrializing countries.  According to Hobsbawm “The 
history of British industrial society is a particular 
case.”  The study of this particular historical case may 
offer many lessons “in principle, but rather little in 
actual practice” (Hobsbawm 1968:20).  Hobsbawm (1968:4) 
maintains that the highly celebrated assumption that “an 
economy of private enterprise has an automatic bias towards 
innovation” is mistaken.  The bias is toward the pursuit of 





manifests into innovation is contingent on historical 
factors, particular social (trans)formations and the 
existence of specific sociopolitical institutions.  
Hobsbawm’s aim in Industry and Empire is to begin to sketch 
the historical circumstances that favored capital 
development in England, and the social transformations, 
along with the sociopolitical institutions which made 
industrial development possible.   
Hobsbawm argues that there were specific social 
structural shifts that occurred in England during the 1750 
– 1825 period which would prove to make England ‘the first 
workshop of the world.’  Hobsbawm synthesizes the two main 
schools of thought theorizing the industrial revolution.  
The first school of thought emphasized the growth of the 
English domestic market as the chief institution behind the 
industrial revolution.  The second school of thought 
stressed the expansion of foreign or English export 
markets.  Hobsbawm warrants both domestic and export 
markets as essential for an explanation of the industrial 
take-off at the end of the eighteenth century.  In 
addition, however, Hobsbawm (1968:42) underscores the 
importance of an aggressive English government as a third, 





Hobsbawm’s explanation of the industrial take-off is 
the dialectic between the emergence of a domestic market 
for industrial goods, the expansion of the British export 
markets, the role the British government played in 
facilitating the development of both markets, and 
willingness for violent intervention.  Metaphorically, 
Hobsbawm (1968:48) explains that the rise of a domestic 
market provided the “fuel,” and the export markets provided 
the “spark.”  Finally, the British government maintained 
and stoked the fire:  “Government provided systematic 
support for merchant and manufacturer, and some by no means 
negligible incentives for technical innovation and the 
development of good industries” (Hobsbawm 1968:51).  The 
British government was also the main element behind the 
“concentration on the colonial and ‘underdeveloped’ markets 
overseas, and the battle to deny them to anyone else” 
(Hobsbawm 1968:54).  It was the British government that 
allowed for the slave trade to flourish and for the 
creation of the colonial empire. 
The structural social shifts drove farmers from their 
land and journeyman from the workshops.  The unemployed and 
the laboring poor had three options: aspire to the 
bourgeois ideals, accept the proletarian historical 





not merely possible, but virtually compulsory” (Hobsbawm 
1962:204).  It was the impetus of personal rebellion toward 
social transformations that gave “inevitable” rise to the 
labor movement and a socialist consciousness.  The 
bourgeoisie combined forces with these movements which 
helped to overthrow noble political power and church rule 
(Hobsbawm 1962:59).   
 
2.6. E. P. Thompson and Working-Class History 
 
 Of the British Marxian Historians, E. P. Thompson’s 
work is both the most widely known and the most 
controversial.  His most influential work is The Making of 
the English Working Class, published in 1963. In all of his 
historical work, but especially in The Making of the 
English Working Class, Thompson emphasized that the 
oppressed and exploited were (and are) the makers of 
history.  Thompson’s work ignited academic and pubic 
interest in issues of class, poverty, and exploitation.  
For Thompson, the practice of history was not merely 
scholarship but a political commitment toward better 
understanding the conditions necessary for participatory 
democracy and self-determination of all people.  
 Edward Palmer Thompson was born in Oxford in 1924 and 





Thompson and Theodosia Jessup Thompson, taught him to be 
suspicious of government (M. Merrill, “Interview with E. P. 
Thompson, in H. Abelove, et al. 1976:11).  Thompson, along 
with his brother Frank, joined the Communist Party.  While 
studying history at Cambridge, Thompson became the 
president of the University’s Socialist Club (1942).  
Thompson enlisted in the British Army and served from 1942-
45.  After World War II, Thompson returned to Cambridge to 
complete his studies in history, earning his degree in 
1946.  While at Cambridge, Thompson met Dorothy Towers and 
married her in 1948. 
Thompson and Dorothy were regular participants in the 
Historians’ group. Thompson had expressed that his 
experience with the Historians’ group, even more than his 
years as a student at Cambridge, helped to make him “into a 
historian” and would prove to have significant influence on 
his future historical studies.  Thompson would recall that 
it was especially his friends Christopher Hill, Christopher 
Cauldwell, and the work of Karl Marx that inspired his work 
in history.  His experience with the Historians’ group 
would further help to shape a practical model of socialist 
intellectual cooperation and in turn help to develop his 
‘socialist humanist’ politics.  According to Thompson, the 





formal and informal exchange with fellow socialists 
helped me more than anything I had found at Cambridge 
University.  This is not to say that one can’t, 
fortunately, sometimes find something in a university, 
but it is to emphasize that socialist intellectuals 
ought to help each other.  We should never be wholly 
dependent upon institutions, however benevolent, but 
should maintain groups in which theory is discussed 
and history is discussed and in which people criticize 
each other.  This principle of being able to give and 
receive sharp criticism is very important (Thompson 
1976b:14). 
 
 According to Thompson, socialists must participate in 
a division of intellectual labor.  Thompson (1976b:22), in 
other words, maintained that socialists should become  
 part of a[n intellectual] collective, in which someone 
 is writing about the welfare service, someone is 
 writing about education, someone is writing about 
 imperialism, one tends to assume this work goes on 
 along one’s own, and one concentrates on what one can 
 do best. 
 
Thompson (1976b:22-3) continued, socialists should  
get back to a collective converse again. […] What 
socialists must never do is allow themselves to become 
wholly dependent upon established institutions – 
publishing houses, commercial media, universities, 
foundations.  I don’t mean that these institutions are 
all repressive – certainly, much that is affirmative 
can be done within them.  But socialist intellectuals 
must occupy some territory that is, without 
qualification, their own journals, their own 
theoretical and practical centers – places where no 
one works for grades or for tenure but for the 
transformation of society; places where criticism and 
self-criticism are fierce, but also mutual help and 
the exchange of theoretical and practical knowledge; 







 It was not merely Thompson’s experience with the 
Historians’ Group that shaped his political and 
intellectual commitments.  As stated, the events of 1956 
gave a particular urgency to the (theoretical and 
historical) work and (practical and political) efforts to 
the members of the Historians’ group in general.  This is 
especially true of Thompson.  Following Khrushchev’s speech 
denouncing Stalin in 1956, but before the Soviet invasion 
of Hungary, Thompson and John Saville began to publish The 
Reasoner.  The purpose of The Reasoner was to initiate 
discussion as a journal independent of the British 
Communist Party.  Additional intentions were to stimulate 
debate and criticism of Stalinism and bring the British 
Communist Party out of its silence on the matter.  As party 
members, the British Communist Party demanded they cease 
publication, whereby both Thompson and Saville renounced 
their party membership (see Saville 1976:1-23).  Thompson’s 
departure from the party was not rejection of his socialist 
politics but rather symbolized a deepening of his political 
and theoretical commitment to human freedom and the 
development of his ‘Socialist Humanism.’  Thompson and 
Saville intended to free Marxism from both theoretical and 





aim would be to free Marxism from the political atrocities 
of Stalinism.     
 By 1957, Thompson and Saville begin publication of The 
New Reasoner with an editorial board of ex-party members.  
In the first issue Thompson (quoted in Soper:208) describes 
what he means by ‘socialist humanism’: 
It is humanist because it places once again real men 
and women at the centre of socialist theory and 
aspiration, instead of the resounding abstractions – 
the Party, Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, the Two Camps, 
the Vanguard of the Working-Class – so dear to 
Stalinism.  It is socialist because it reaffirms the 
revolutionary perspectives of Communism, faith in the 
revolutionary potentialities not only of the Human 
Race or of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat but of 
real men and women.  
 
 Thompson contended that Stalinism had violated the 
(implicit) codes of socialist humanism.  In addition, the 
British Communist Party’s lack of leadership during the 
events of 1956 demonstrated a divorce of moral principle 
from its political judgment.  In a 1965 article “Through 
the Smoke of Budapest,” published in the New Reasoner, 
Thompson expressed his condemnation of Stalinism and, by 
implication, the BCP.  Thompson (1965:3) wrote: 
the subordination of the moral and imaginative 
faculties to political and administrative authority is 
wrong: the elimination of moral criteria from 
political judgment is wrong: the fear of independent 
thought, the deliberate encouragement of anti-
intellectual trends amongst the people is wrong: the 
mechanical personification of unconscious class 





intellectual and spiritual conflict, all this is 
wrong.  
   
 Thompson desired to reassert ‘socialist humanism’ as 
both the moral criteria of socialist politics and to 
underscore the role of human agency in the historical and 
political process.  As Thompson pointed out, ‘socialist 
humanism’ has an ambiguous history (Thompson 1978:326).  It 
includes a broad body of European thought, from the 
philosophical historians Lukács, Gramsci, and Korsch; to 
the Existentialist Marxists such as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, 
and de Beauvior; to the Frankfurt school theorists; and the 
Yugoslavian Praxis school.  Certainly, the shared themes of 
these traditions have been (negatively) their critique of 
positivistic metaphysics and rejection of (technological) 
determinism as the correct interpretation of historical 
materialism.  More positively, they have emphasized the 
role of purposeful human action or praxis in shaping human 
history; the role of human creativity; and especially human 
agency in the historical construction of social 
institutions and the unfolding of historical processes, 
historical institutional development, and the direction of 
history itself. 
 Stalinism had all but eliminated a moral consciousness 





deterministic version of political beliefs and, 
consequently, a deterministic vision of the historical 
process had replaced moral consciousness.98  In a 1957 New 
Reasoner article titled “Socialist Humanism: an Epistle to 
the Philistines,” Thompson expressed his condemnation of a 
Stalinist deterministic politic and history.  Thompson 
wrote that, true to determinism, “The Stalinist is fixated 
by Pavlov’s Dogs: if a bell was rung, they salivated.  If 
an economic crisis comes, the people will salivate good 
‘Marxist-Leninist’ belief.”  Economic crisis simply would 
generate revolutionary politics.  Thompson emphasized that 
                                                 
98 Stalinism needed to justify a tyrannical politic.  Dobb described the 
brutality of Stalinism in his studies of the Russian economic system.  
Specifically significant to Dobb was the economic and political 
developments of post-1917 Russia.  In the early 1920s, Russia was 
experiencing a severe economic and political crisis.  In response, 
Bolshevik Russia politically implemented a centralized production and 
distribution (e.g., rations enforced) system.  This so-called “War 
Communism” would rupture the alliance between industrial working class 
and the peasantry upon which the Soviet Revolution had been based (Dobb 
1948:97ff).  The system would tend to become more decentralized during 
the mid-1920s until the grain crisis that began in 1927.  The political 
reaction to the grain crisis was to usher in political instruments of 
economic management resembling the earlier (and “temporary”) War 
Communism economy.  With centralized control of agriculture, further 
policy aimed to accelerate the pace of industrialization and restrict 
the actions, and eventually eliminate the existence of a kulak class 
(Dobb 1948:203).  These events would be followed by a series of “five-
year plans” as the basic guide to the planning of Soviet production 
(Dobb 1948:230ff). 
 During the successful centralized-planned industrialization of 
the Soviet Union, or “revolution from above,” political repression 
became a Stalinist institution, accompanied by ‘blood purges’ of over 
11,000,000 peasants, the arrest of over 5,000,000, of whom 3,000,000 
were executed or died in prison.  The mobility of peasants was highly 
restricted by means of an internal passport system.  They were able to 
subsist from the produce of their individual plots of land, reminiscent 







this misplaced prediction would lead to an apathetic 
politic and was a gross misunderstanding of the processes 
of history and the role of human agency in shaping the 
direction of history.   To expect human beings to behave as 
Pavlov’s dogs is not only to misunderstand human beings but 
also to miscomprehend and misinterpret history itself.  
Thompson (1957:122) argued that the historical agents such 
as the 
Roundhead, Leveller, and Cavalier, Chartist, and Anti-
Corn Law Leaguer, were not dogs; they did not salivate 
their creeds in response to economic stimuli; they 
loved and hated, argued, thought, and made moral 
choices.  Economic changes impel changes in social 
relationships, in relations between real men and 
women; and these are apprehended, felt, reveal 
themselves in feelings of injustice, frustration, 
aspirations for social changes; all is fought out in 
the human consciousness, including the moral 
consciousness.  If this were not so, men would be – 
not dogs – but ants, adjusting their society to 
upheavals in the terrain.  But men make their own 
history: they are part agents, part victims; it is 
precisely the element of agency which distinguishes 
them from the beasts, which is the human part of man, 
and which it is the business of or consciousness to 
increase. 
   
In this context it is essential to recognize, and it is 
important to underscore, that an impoverished theory can 
sustain a corrupt and tyrannical politic.  To misunderstand 
the real processes of history is to potentially engender a 
bankrupt political body.  According to Thompson, this is 





Communist Parties more generally.  In Thompson’s view, 
there had been a general abandonment of ‘socialist 
humanism’ in favor of deterministic Marxism.  
 To be sure, ‘socialist humanism’ was alive in the work 
and aspirations of various social thinkers and political 
factions.  However, whereas most of the ‘socialist 
humanism’ thinkers have begun with a reappraisal of the 
‘Young Marx,’ and/or Hegel, and the relationship between 
Marx and Hegel, that is to suggest a reappraisal of theory, 
Thompson begins with an historical analysis of the actual 
historical experience of human beings.  In this sense, 
Thompson’s ‘socialist humanism’ has affinity with the 
Existentialist emphasis upon “lived experience” and the 
irreducibility of conscious experience.  However, 
Thompson’s strategy has not been so much to theorize 
conscious experience and agency, as it has been to 
demonstrate the role of conscious experience and (working-
class) agency in the construction of social institutions 
and historical processes. 
 Thompson insists that the base/superstructure metaphor 
is an inadequate and as a theoretical tool highly dangerous 
for understanding complex historical processes.  It is a 
metaphor, claimed Thompson, which tends to reduce a complex 





social being to a clumsy, static, deterministic model.  It 
tends to elevate the economic sphere to supremacy over the 
passive ideological, political, cultural, etc. spheres.  In 
the Stalinist dogma, the technical forces of production 
operate in accordance with natural laws of technological 
progress, whereby human history tends to be reduced to a 
mechanical process of technological development.  
Furthermore, the base/superstructure model also affected 
the Marxian conception of class.  
 Class tended to be treated as a static category.  In 
turn this static conception of class supported a conception 
of the industrial working class as mere victims of history, 
rather than as participating architects of history.  In an 
attempt to reassert the agency of all people in the making 
of history, Thompson wrote his most famous book.  The book 
attempted to demonstrate the active role of the English 
working-classes in designing and reacting to industrial 
English society.  In The Making of the English Working 
Class (1963), Thompson demonstrated how so many English men 
and women become politically united as a group between the 
decades of 1790 – 1830.   
The book is more than eight hundred pages and is 
divided into three major parts.  In Part I Thompson aimed 





English working-class would come to rely on and had 
inherited from preindustrial institutions of England.   
First was the political tradition of “dissent.”  It 
was English dissent that helped manifest the seventeenth- 
century English revolution.  By 1790 Methodism had modified 
and tempered English dissent.  However, Thompson argues 
that Methodism was at the same time “indirectly responsible 
for a growth in self-confidence and capacity for 
organization of working people” (Thompson 1963:42). 
The second was the English tradition of “popular 
justice” and mob rule, expressed as a paradigm in the 
action of riot.  English popular justice was dominated by 
the “less articulate majority” in their “sub-political 
consciousness” (Thompson 1963:55).  Ubiquitous riots in 
English history “indicate an extraordinarily deep-rooted 
pattern of behaviour and belief” (Thompson 1963:66). 
Third, the “Englishman’s birthright” as a tradition 
internalized the English sense of individual liberty.  The 
Englishman’s birthright included legislative assurances and 
rights and the freedom of individual consciousness and 
forms of personal expression.  The English birthright 






In Part II, these preindustrial traditions collide 
with the advent of industrial society.  As industrial 
production emerges, there is a decline in working 
conditions and degradation to the lives of English working 
people.  Thompson demonstrated that as industrial society 
grows, there is a simultaneous belief on the part of 
working people that there emerges a distinct repression 
with respect to economic, political, social, and religious 
action. 
In Part III of the book, Thompson offers an historical 
sketch of the reactions and responses of the English 
working people to the structural shifts of industrial 
society.  Importantly, the English working-class relies 
heavily on the traditions of the past, especially the 
traditions of dissent as modified by Methodism, popular 
justice, and the Englishman’s birthright.  In other words, 
Thompson necessarily denied the simple formula that “steam 
power and the cotton mill = new working class” (Thompson 
1963:191).  Rather, class is an event in history that 
“happens” when events create common motives and interests 
for one group of individuals and against another group 
whose motives and “interests are different from (and 





 The Making of the English Working Class (hereafter 
MEWC) was written in the “hope [that] this book will be 
seen as a contribution to the understanding of class” 
(Thompson 1963:10).  In historical writings, it tends to be 
the case that “Only the successful (in the sense of those 
whose aspirations anticipated subsequent evolution) are 
remembered.  The blind alleys, the lost causes, and the 
losers themselves are forgotten” (Thompson 1963:12).  
Thompson aimed to demonstrate the potency and affective 
agency of the “lost causes” and the “forgotten” in the 
processes of history and in the construction of social 
institutions.  All too often, it is the “lost cause” that 
has most affected the actual evolution of historical 
development.  
 Analogous to the motivation sparking the publication 
of The Reasoner, namely, the silence of British Communist 
Party to the 1956 speech of Khrushchev, Thompson’s work has 
been motivated by the “silences” he finds in Marxian 
theoretical work. Thompson (1976:20) claims: 
there is a silence as to cultural and moral 
mediations; as to the ways in which the human being is 
imbricated in particular, determined productive 
relations; the way these material experiences are 
handled by them culturally; the way in which there are 
certain value systems that consonant with certain 
modes of production, and certain modes of production 
and productive relations that are inconceivable 





that is dependent upon the other.  There is not a 
moral ideology that belongs to a ‘superstructure’; 
there are these two things that are different sides of 
the same coin. 
 
 The theoretical problem for Thompson, then, was to 
rehabilitate “lost categories” and the “lost vocabulary” 
and give voice to the then “silence” of the Morrisian-
Marxian tradition.  This process of reclaiming lost 
categories, vocabulary, and voices of the past is what 
Thompson attempted in MEWC (Thompson 1976:21).  Against 
structural, functionalist, and otherwise deterministic 
interpretations of Marx, Thompson wanted to reinsert 
categories of moral consciousness and agency in the 
theoretical apparatus of Marxism. 
 In the preface of MEWC, Thompson further declares his 
analysis to be in opposition to certain (and more 
mainstream) theoretical and historical traditions.  First, 
he is in opposition to the older, “Fabian” historians 
(e.g., the Hammonds and Webbs), “in which the great 
majority of working people are seen as passive victims of 
laissez faire” (Thompson 1963:12).  Second, he is in 
opposition to more recent economic historians (e.g., Ashton 
and Clapham) who reify working people into a theoretical 
category, such as the “labor force” or reduce them to 





to rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, 
the ‘obsolete’ hand-loom weaver, the ‘utopian’ 
artisan, and even the deluded follower of Joanna 
Southcott, from the enormous condescension of 
posterity.  Their crafts and traditions may have been 
dying.  Their hostility to the new industrialism may 
have been backward-looking.  Their communitarian 
ideals may have been fantasies.  Their insurrectionary 
conspiracies may have been foolhardy.  But they lived 
through these times of acute social disturbance, and 
we did not.  Their aspirations were valid in terms of 
their own experience; and, if they were casualties of 
history, they remain, condemned in their own lives, as 
casualties. 
 
Thompson believed that the theoretical and historical 
traditions above tended to obscure the agency and sense of 
moral consciousness of the individuals.  In particular, the 
agency, or historical role, and moral consciousness of such 
groups as the English Jacobins, Luddites, and Chartists had 
been underappreciated.  Consequently, the extent to which 
their conscious efforts aided in the unfolding of history 
and construction of social institutions had been misplaced, 
if not “forgotten.”  Within the Marxian tradition, Thompson 
has maintained that the structural/deterministic (and to 
some extent functionalist) interpretations of historical 
materialism have undertheorized the ways in which cultural 
spheres have shaped social transformation and institutional 
formation. 
 The narrative “biography” of the English working-class 





being explicitly stated, these methodological historical 
themes.  In Part I of MEWC Thompson illuminates the 
political and religious culture that the English people 
historically inherited from the past and drew upon during 
the industrial revolution (1790-1832) to help inform their 
political demands and shape the institutional evolution of 
the future.  In short, it was this culture of the past that 
would inform their reaction and sense of moral 
consciousness to rapidly changing social relations.   
In Part II, Thompson turns his attention to actual 
political and economic changes that occurred during the 
industrial revolution.  However, his focus is not merely 
the actual changes but the feelings and moral reactions of 
the working-class to these changes.  If the seventeenth-
century English revolution had accomplished the formal 
subsumption of the English working-class to capital, it was 
the transformation of the social relations of production 
during the industrial revolution that established the real 
subsumption of the English working-class to capital.  
Importantly, the agency of the working-class and the poor 
to resistance and protest inspired significant social 
change to protect both community and individuals from the 
overly exploitative activities of the English aristocrats 





formally dubbed legal following the seventeenth century 
revolution.  Lower-class resistance and protest helped 
shape the political reaction to technological change and 
the rapid increases in population.  In this sense, Thompson 
(1963:198) claims: “The working class made itself as much 
as it was made.” 
 In Part III, Thompson chronicles the formation of an 
industrial working-class-consciousness that follows the 
forty-year historical process of real subsumption.  
Thompson (1963:194) argues:   
 By 1832 there were strongly-based and self-conscious 
 working class institutions – such as trade unions, 
 friendly societies, educational and religious 
 movements, political organizations, periodicals – 
 working class intellectual traditions, working class 
 community patterns, and working class structure of 
 feeling. 
 
 In brief, Part I of MEWC is an analysis of the 
inherited culture of the late eighteenth century English 
worker and common English citizen.  Beyond culture, 
Thompson has attempted to substantiate the moral 
consciousness of various religious and political factions 
in England during the eighteenth century and into the early 
nineteenth century.   
 Although the overarching concern of MEWC is the 
structure of English society, i.e., the social relations of 





production.  Thompson offers historical data on 
productivity, technology, population patterns, and labor 
relations; however, he does not analyze these data in 
traditional Marxian terms of capital accumulation.  Rather, 
his interest is in how the English worker experienced the 
events of the period, how the English worker felt about the 
changing patterns in technology, productivity, population, 
and political policy.   
 In Part III, Thompson’s concern was the emergence of 
both class and class-consciousness that followed from five 
key factors: (1) productivity and technological factors, 
(2) population patterns, (3) political ideology and policy, 
(4) the potency and modes of working-class agency, and (5) 
inherited culture from which the working-class were drew to 
interpret and navigate the changing social patterns. 
 In Part II, Thompson explained how during the years of 
real subsumption, economic exploitation had become both 
more intensive and more transparent: “[m]ore intensive in 
agriculture and in the old domestic industries: more 
transparent in the new factories and perhaps in mining” 
(Thompson 1963:198).  The increase in population, the 
change in industrial organization, the years (1760 - 1820) 
of wholesale enclosures, the employment of women and 





upper-class often within one generation, and the inadequate 
political response made exploitation highly transparent. 
 The working-class was not only subjected to 
(transparent) exploitation but also to political 
oppression.  Not only do the Combination Acts of 1799 and 
1800 give testament to the political oppression, but so too 
do the infiltration of “spies” within various politically 
motivated organizations and movements (Thompson 
1963:485ff).  “Indeed, a convincing history of English 
Jacobinism and popular Radicalism could be written solely 
in terms of the impact of espionage upon the movement” 
(Thompson 1963:493).  Jacobin-inspired protest “suffered” 
“a most serious defeat” in 1803 following the trial 
conviction of Colonel Despard for “preparing an imminent 
coup d’ état” (Thompson 1963:481). 
  The intensified exploitation and political oppression 
manifest in relationships “between employer and labourer” 
were “both harsher and less personal” (Thompson 1963:199).  
The depersonalization of exploitation tended to allow for 
the harsher conditions of treatment.  The rising antagonism 
between employer and laborer was accepted as “intrinsic” to 
all relations of producing.  This naturalization of the 
emerging antagonism offered a certain justification for the 





entry among other items of costs” (Thompson 1963:203).  The 
result for “most working people” was that they experienced 
and felt the industrial revolution “in terms of changes in 
the nature and intensity of exploitation” (Thompson 
1963:199). 
 The attempts of the working-class to confront and 
change these experiences of intensified exploitation 
politically were met with forms of oppression.  The 
intensification of exploitation and political oppression 
was not unique to England.  What was unique to England in 
1790 was its (inherited) culture.  The culture had 
instilled in individuals’ consciousness a sense to “regard 
themselves as ‘free-born’ Englishmen” as a “birthright” 
(Thompson 1963:78).  Yet, according to Thompson (1963:79) 
this sense of freedom was somewhat paradoxical: 
at this very time, freedom of the press, of public 
meeting, of trade union organisation, of political 
organisation and of election, were either severely 
limited or in abeyance.  What, then, did the common 
Englishman’s ‘birthright’ consist in?  ‘Security of 
property!’ answered Mary Wollstonecraft: ‘Behold … the 
definition of English liberty.’  And yet the rhetoric 
of liberty meant much more – first of all, of course, 
freedom from foreign domination. […] Freedom from 
absolutism (the constitutional monarchy), freedom from 
arbitrary arrest, trial by jury, equality before the 
law, the freedom of the home from arbitrary entrance 
and search, some limited liberty of thought, of 
speech, and of conscience, the vicarious participation 
in liberty (or in its semblance) afforded by the right 
of parliamentary opposition and by elections and 





had the right to parade, huzza and jeer on the 
hustings), as well as freedom to travel, trade, and 
sell one’s own labour. Nor were any of these freedoms 
insignificant; taken together, they both embody and 
reflect a moral consensus in which authority at times 
shared, and of which at all times it was bound to take 
account. 
 
 Here Thompson’s concern was to demonstrate the role 
played by the laboring classes in the real constitution of 
the industrial revolution or eighteenth and nineteenth 
century “take-off” (Rostow’s term for the industrial 
revolution quoted in Thompson 1963:195).  Far from being 
passive victims of capital accumulation and laissez-faire, 
to a significant extent, they were its engineers and policy 
authors. 
 Thompson’s historical work was aimed at reasserting a 
sense of agency and moral consciousness in the historical 
analysis of working-class groups and individuals of 
England.  Thompson believed that reassertion of the sense 
of agency and moral consciousness in the processes of 
history would tend to reestablish ‘social humanism’ as the 
moral fiber of socialist politics against Stalinistic 
tendencies.  Thompson believed that the French philosopher 
Louis Althusser’s “theoretical anti-humanism” was 
undermining his notion of social humanism and the proper 





 In The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays, Thompson 
(1976:284) declared “unrelenting intellectual war” against 
Althusserian structuralism.  Thompson argued that Althusser 
and his students had theoretically sanctioned the 
inhumanity and immorality of Stalinism.  Thompson’s 
(1976:84) chief complaint is that Althusserian 
structuralism, like its sociological counterpart, Parsonian 
functionalism, evicts human agency from history.  Thompson 
(1976:174) further rejects the Althusserian notion that all 
forms of ethical protest are merely ideology.  However, 
without agency and moral consciousness, not only are there 
no grounds for political action, but there is no history.       
 
2.7. Broad Lessons from a Study of the British 
Marxian Economic Historians 
 
The British Marxist historians were visionaries in 
that they recognized that (via [mainly] Marx) there is a 
theoretical necessity to historize or contextualize the 
categories in which historical questions are posed.  This 
is a theoretical necessity that is often neglected by non-
Marxist historians.99  Therefore, this is a direct challenge 
to the mainstream practice of historical analysis.  They 
were often unable to adequately answer their (historically) 
                                                 
99 Ontologically, empiricism dominated philosophy of science, whereas 





contextual questions in that the proper historical data and 
knowledge did not yet exist, because so few had formulated 
the question in such a way.    
There was a neglect of historical economic focus on 
social relations of production, relations distinct in each 
epoch, and a fixation upon the “suprahistorical approach,” 
whereby the focus is upon what is universal or common 
between each epoch.  According to Dobb, suprahistorical 
inquiry is not only “powerless to provide answers to 
certain questions” but it also mystifies “the essential 
nature of capitalist society” (Dobb 1946:32).  According to 
Dobb (1946:32): 
To shift the focus of economic enquiry from a study of 
 exchange societies in general [a form of supra-
 historicism] to a study of the physiology and growth 
 of a specifically capitalist economy – a study which 
 must necessarily be associated with a comparative 
 study of different forms of economy – is a change of 
 emphasis which seems, in this country at least, to be 
 long overdue.  
  
What Dobb is here complaining of is unfolded fully 
within the pages of Studies.  In short, it was demonstrated 
in Chapter 1 that Dobb believed exchange relations were 
characteristic of (nearly) all modes of production.  As 
shown in the current chapter, Rodney Hilton and Christopher 
Hill share this position.  As such, an emphasis on exchange 





insight into the ways in which any particular society is 
reproduced (although it must be recognized that exchange is 
a necessary moment for reproduction).  Before it can be 
understood how capitalism tends to be reproduced, it must 
first be understood how capitalism differs from other modes 
of production.  For Dobb, as for Marx, the “physiology” of 
capitalism begins with the relationship between the most 
direct producers and their most immediate rulers. 
 A study of the histories of the British Marxian 
economic historians not only proves to be a direct 
challenge to the practice of mainstream history but further 
forces important theoretical implications upon a Marxian 
theory of history.  First, their approach suggests a 
particular orientation towards a Marxian theory of history.  
In the broadest of terms, it is an orientation that rejects 
the linear, progressive development of the forces of 
production.  Rather, productive forces and technology can 
potentially progress, stagnate, or even regress.  Second, 
the main determinant of the forces of production pivot on 
two related elements: the social relations of production 
and the particular class struggle between the immediate 
producers and their most direct rulers.  The particular 





the class struggle will in turn radically establish the 
direction new technology takes.   
 This orientation toward historical materialism  
highlights four main lessons from the British Marxian 
economic historians: (1a) the historical specificity of 
social relations of production in the study of history, but 
further (1b) the historically specific nature of economic 
and social theory itself, (2) the role played by the forces 
of production in determining historical development is 
demoted (compared to the role they have in to technological 
determinist interpretations of historical materialism), in 
that changes in the forces of production are most often the 
effect and not the cause of historical change.  Rather, 
what the British Marxian economic historians tend to 
emphasize is that the historical and theoretical 
specificity of capitalism necessitates (3a) the central 
role of class and political struggle in capitalist 
historical development, necessitating (3b) a class-analysis 
approach to the study of history.  The British Marxian 
economic historians also emphasized in capitalist 
development (4a) resistance and unrest toward the social 
powers are always present within a society; and (4b) labor 
and the working-class have historically been the architects 





development of history itself and their own fate within it.  
The emancipatory role of the working class is a potent 











3. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MAURICE DOBB 
   
 
3.1. The Rise and Making of a Proletariat Class 
 When Dobb’s focus turned toward the historical 
circumstances that gave rise to the formation and 
development of an (English) proletariat class, his emphasis 
was upon the institutional complex that either (more or 
less) facilitates or (more or less) impedes the formation 
of such a class.  In other words, Dobbian methodological 
analysis of the formation (or “making”) of the (English) 
working class is institutionalist.  Dobb conceded that it 
is “commonplace” to recognize that a necessary condition 
for the proper functioning of a capitalist mode of 
production is the existence of such a class of proletariat.  
However, the details of the historical circumstances and 
institutional forms that gave rise to the formation of such 
a class have suffered from analytical and historical 
neglect.   
 Ultimately, the neglect of the historical 





and) methodological.100 The neglect of the historical 
circumstances arises from the tendency of economic 
historians to abstract away from the peculiar institutional 
complex in their historical analysis.101  A particular 
methodological violence is evoked when categories are 
employed which are too general for the historical 
circumstances.  Dobb believed that the ‘traditional’ 
process of abstraction of economic historians has left the 
institutional complexes of feudal history underanalyzed and 
                                                 
100 Marx had recognized this neglect.  The formation and existence of 
this class as the source of value are central to Marxian political 
economy.  Marx contended that for capitalism to reproduce there must 
exist, for the capitalist, a commodity that producing more value then 
it requires for its reproduction.  In other words the capitalist must 
be able to find “a special commodity on the market” that has the 
property of being the source of value.  The capitalist does find such a 
commodity on the market: “the capacity for labour, in other words 
labour-power” (Marx 1976:270).  The possessor of labor-power, i.e., the 
wage-labor, must be free in a “double sense:  Free to dispose his 
labor-power as his own commodity, and free of any other possessions for 
the realization of his labor-power.  Marx (1976:273) then adds: “Why 
this free worker confronts him in the sphere of circulation is a 
question which does not interest the owner of money, for he finds the 
labour-market in existence as a particular branch of the commodity-
market.  And for the present it interests us just as little.  We 
confine ourselves to the fact theoretically, as he does practically.  
One thing, however, is clear: nature does not produce on the one hand 
owners of money or commodities, and on the other hand men possessing 
nothing but their own labour-power.  This relation has no basis in 
natural history, nor does it have a social basis common to all periods 
of human history.  It is clearly the result of a past historical 
development, the product of many economic revolutions, of the 
extinction of a whole series of older formations of social production.”  
Marx finally concerns himself with these “past historical developments” 
in the final chapters of Capital volume I.  It is here Dobb’s intention 
to focus upon the “past historical developments.” 
101 Thus, the neglect is a direct function of the methodology employed.  
Within the mainstream “suprahistorical” categories are of the greatest 
methodological virtue. Suprahistorical categories are concepts believed 
to be true of all societies and historical circumstances.  In this 
sense commonality and universality characterize the process of 
abstraction of economic theorists and economic historians alike, at the 
expense of (institutional) uniqueness and particularity.  For a more 





misunderstood.  This lack of analysis and the misunderstood 
internal articulation of the mode of production are 
especially acute with respect to the institutional forms 
evolved from, and the historical processes that occurred 
in, the formation of the (English) proletariat class. 
 
3.1.1. The Historical Process of Social 
       Differentiation 
 
Dobb would contend that particular institutional 
arrangements allow for a very significant historical 
process of class differentiation (Dobb 1946:224ff, pp. 253-
4).  The historical processes of class differentiation 
ultimately, according to Dobb, prepared the way for the 
transition to the wage-labor system (Dobb 1946:253, also 
see Chapter 18 of CESP). 
 Dobb outlines several historical processes of class 
differentiation.  Most broadly, Dobb suggests that the 
institutional arrangement of English feudalism allowed for 
the accumulation of social productive resources.  This 
accumulation has a dual result; first, the actual 
accumulation of social productive resources is achieved by 
the few, while simultaneously, this same accumulation 
translates into the disposition of social productive 






3.1.2. The Inadequacy of (mere) Demographic 
       Explanations   
 
 Dobb suggested that mainstream historians had placed 
too much emphasis on demographic historical phenomena.  The 
assumption of many historians was that demographic trends 
fully explain the rise of a proletariat class.  This over-
emphasis on the demographic phenomena may have caused, 
according to Dobb, the neglect of the role played by the 
institutional complex and class differentiation.  Simply 
put, in a reductionist sense, population growth was seen as 
the sole culprit of the disposition of so many within the 
peasantry during the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
(Dobb 1946:223).   
 If the demographic explanation were true, the 
formation of the proletariat could be viewed as a “natural 
creation,” with the further caveat that the process of 
accumulation and the formation of the proletariat class are 
two “autonomous” and “independent” historical processes 
(Dobb 1946:223).  Dobb maintained that the demographic 
story is incapable of anything close to an exhaustive 
explanation of the historical formation of the proletariat 
class.  As suggestive evidence, Dobb pointed to the 
historical fact that the proletariat class grew the fastest 





(Dobb 1946:223).  Thus, economic historians can no longer 
accept the neglect of institutional factors in the 
formation of a proletariat class.  It was Dobb’s intention 
to suggest the direction that historians must take to 
overcome this neglect.  Dobb attempted, by way of 
historical demonstration, to illuminate the various 
institutional forms that have played a role in the 
formation of a proletariat class.  Dobb’s illustrations are 
not meant to be exhaustive; rather, they are merely 
examples to indicate that institutional forms were much 
more responsible for the formation of the proletariat class 
than was (and is) commonly acknowledged. 
 
3.1.3. The Importance of Institutional Factors 
 
Furthermore, it must be recognized, as Dobb himself 
did as early as 1925, that the historical circumstances and 
institutional factors involved in the formation of a wage-
system will become significant “determining elements in any 
distribution of income which is raised upon this base” 
(Dobb 1925:270).  The importance of this insight is 
twofold.  First, the institutional elements must be 
accounted for in any explanation of the formation of a 
proletariat class.  Second, the institutional elements that 





the basis of the institutional forms that are created.  
That is to suggest that the institutional forms of the past 
become the basis for the institutional forms of the future.  
Past institutional forms will be the genesis of the 
structural dynamic of the future.  This insight places 
history at the center of theory.  In this sense, the 
historical circumstances are not merely academic questions 
but have both a present and practical significance. 
 
3.1.4. The Fairly Familiar Institutional Factors  
 
 In spite of the general historical neglect, several 
institutional factors “are fairly familiar.  The disbanding 
of feudal retainers, the dissolution of the monasteries, 
the enclosures of land for sheep farming and changes in 
methods of tillage each played its part” in the dual 
process of primitive accumulation (namely, on the one hand, 
the concentration of wealth of one class of a few, and on 
the other, the disposition of wealth of another class of 
many) (Dobb 1946:224).  In time, these institutional 
factors, along with a growing population, gave rise to a 
general tendency during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century of “a substantial, if still minor [in quantity], 





direction of supplanting many small holdings by a few much 
larger ones” (Dobb 1946:226). 
Although a “semiproletariat” class existed during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, their presence did not 
constitute any significant change in the function of the 
feudal mode of production.  As I have shown, the 
“semiproletariat,” or “freemen,” were very much an element 
of the feudal internal articulation.  During this period, 
the numbers of the semiproletariat “remained small” and, as 
documented by various pieces of political legislation, such 
as the 1563 Statue of Artificers, the vast majority of the 
semiproletariat “retained” at least a precarious 
“attachment to the land.”   Thus, both legislatively and 
institutionally, the semiproletariat was recognized in the 
implicit constitution of feudal society.  
The (institutionally) precarious “attachment to the 
land” meant that the mobility of the semiproletariat “was 
restricted” (Dobb 1946:230). Thus, although there had 
emerged a quantitative augmentation of both yeomen (or 
independent, richer farmers) and semiproletariat, Dobb 
would contend that it was not large enough to summon a 
qualitative change in the feudal mode of production itself 





 Dobb does not offer penetrating details of the 
historical processes involved from the “fairly familiar” 
institutional causes of class differentiation during this 
period.  Seemingly, the details and effects of the 
enclosures, the dissolution of the monasteries, and the 
disbanding of feudal retainers can be found elsewhere.102  
The lack of details offered on these institutional causes 
is not meant to minimize the effect each had upon the 
feudal order and in the creation of an English proletariat 
class.  Rather, it was Dobb’s intention to note several 
other institutional factors that had significant influence 
on the formation of a disposed proletariat class, which 
were less “fairly familiar.” 
 
3.1.5. Less Familiar Institutional Factors  
   Giving Rise to the Formation of an  
   Industrial Working Class 
 
 Coinciding with the occurrence of the “fairly 
familiar” institutional modifications was a rise in the 
restrictive-entrance requirements, hence, exclusiveness, of 
the craft guilds, whereby the chances of a man without 
means rising beyond the status of “journeyman” became more 
remote (Dobb 1946:229).  Although as I have shown, this 
                                                 
102 Dobb cites several sources for such institutional causes throughout 
Chapter 6 of Studies.  However, it is worthy of mention that he does 
not specifically note any source for the “changes in methods of 
tillage.”  This would become significant during the transition debate 





semimonopolization of the craft-guilds would impede the 
growth of capital industry, it had the effect of “swelling 
the ranks of those whose condition made them pliable to a 
master’s will” (Dobb 1946:229).  If lucky, a member of this 
semiproletariat would find employment “as a hired servant,” 
under the will of a master and, if not, would be “haunted 
by the cruelties of the Tudor Poor Laws” (Dobb 1946:125).   
Tudor legislation made work compulsory, along with 
providing the compulsory employment, fixed maximum wages, 
“as well as making unemployment an offence punishable with 
characteristic brutality” (Dobb 1946:233).  In sum, the 
semimonopolization of the craft guilds and the political 
legislation of the Tudor period played a significant 
(although unintended) part in the creation of (an English) 
proletariat class. 
 Dobb further argued that the emphasis placed on the 
Tudor monetary factors103 (i.e., price-inflation), although 
significant, has been overestimated. Dobb indeed provided 
historical evidence that throughout Europe “the effects of 
monetary inflation were far from uniform” (Dobb 1946:237).  
Consequently, Dobb maintained that the diversity of the 
influence of price-inflation suggested that the 
                                                 
103 The contemporary authorities which Dobb cites are Earl J. Hamilton 
and J. M. Keynes, and the main historical authority cited on the matter 





institutional forms must have been decisive for the impact 
and outcome of monetary inflation.   In short, where 
institutional modifications had generated a 
semiproletariat, vagabonds, paupers, and criminal types 
(such as was the case in England), the price-inflation had 
a more devastating social impact than in areas (such as 
Spain) where the feudal establishment or institutions had 
not undergone such modifications.  The devastating social 
impact is with respect to feudalism; otherwise, the effects 
in England were to aid in the formation of the conditions 
necessary for the rise of capitalist industrial 
production.104 
 Dobb (1946:23, no. 1) summarizes his position on the 
monetary factors in a footnote: 
Monetary inflation per se no doubt had an effect in 
facilitating a fall in real wages, which might of 
otherwise have been tardier and smaller.  What we are 
claiming here is simply that (a) such effect as 
monetary change had was principally via its effect on 
real wages, which depended on the condition of the 
labour market, and (b) that probably most of the fall 
in real wages which took place would have occurred in 
the absence of monetary inflation.  
 
It should be added that the “condition of the labour 
market” itself depended on (1) the modifications of the 
                                                 
104 Although he says it “seems an overstatement” Dobb cites the authority 
of Schumpeter as supporting the thesis that the industrial achievements 
of England could have been accomplished without any price-inflation and 
that the price-inflation in Spain was to actually impede the transition 





feudal institutions (that had taken place prior to monetary 
inflation) and (2) the policies of the state, which were 
the real culprits of the social devastation on the 
peasantry and the downward movement in the real-wage. 
 Nevertheless, Dobb contended that monetary inflation 
indeed had social significance.  However, “what gave the 
Tudor price-inflation its special significance was the 
influence it had either upon the relative incomes of 
different classes or upon the value of property” (Dobb 
1946:236).  These two effects quickened the social class 
differentiation that was already taking place in the 
processes of English history due to various institutional 
modifications.   
However, with the restrictions on the mobility of 
labor, in conjunction with the “precarious” attachment of 
the semiproletariat to the land and despite the monetary 
inflation, capitalist industry would not reach full 
maturity until the eighteenth century.  It would be in the 
eighteenth century that further institutional modification 
would take place to finally uproot and completely alienate 
the semiproletariat from even a  “precarious” attachment to 
land; thus would be removed “the obstacles to labour 





It is in the eighteenth century that the pace of both 
accumulation and dispossession quickens and becomes even 
more institutionally significant.  The simultaneous rise of 
both well-to-do peasants, or kulak-like people, 
accumulating wealth, and the growing numbers of the poorest 
of small peasant landholders meant that “the ‘middle 
peasantry’ had become relatively insignificant” by the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century (Dobb 1946:228, 
no. 3).    
Rising from within the dissolution of the middle 
peasantry was a class of semiproletariat, along with a 
class fully dependent on wage employment.  The rising 
English industrial undertakers enriched themselves from 
this newly instituted wage-dependent class. 
 Besides the methods of social class differentiation 
mentioned above, Dobb outlines a further historical process 
that also tended to widen the differentiation of social 
class during the feudal period.  “The chief factors in this 
differentiation are differences that arise in the course of 
time in the quality or quantity of land-holding and 
differences in instruments of tillage and of draught 
animals” (Dobb 1946:242), in short, the access to social 





 Dobb attempted to attack the reductionism of 
demographic explanations for the rise of a proletariat 
class.  Most broadly, Dobb maintained that institutional 
factors had not been adequately accounted for and analyzed 
by social-economic historians in the process of historical 
proletariatization. In spite of highly limited historical 
evidence, Dobb gestured toward several institutional 
factors that demanded more rigorous historical scrutiny.  
First were the various institutional forms and historical 
processes that manifest significant social differentiation.  
Second were the institutional forms and historical 
processes of monopolization105 of social resources, or means 
of production.  Third were the institutional forms and 
historical processes that limited access to social 
resources. 
 Dobb outlines two separate historical examples to 
illustrate the historical method by which “a proletariat 
may come into being.”  He discusses (1) various English 
free-mining communities (Dobb 1946:243ff) and (2) Russian106 
agrarian peasant communities (Dobb 1946:251-3, also see 
Dobb 1948:34-60, 208-10).   
                                                 
105 Dobb dedicated a full chapter of Studies (i.e., Chapter 5) to the 
monopolization of social resources. 
106 Dobb suggests that a parallel historical process is “likely”  to  
have occurred in English peasant communities, although currently (i.e., 






3.1.6. English Mining Communities as an 
       Illustration 
 
 The charters of several of the English mining 
districts allowed for “free-mining,” whereby anyone was 
“free to engage in operations, provided that room for new 
claims remained unoccupied” (Dobb 1946:244).  Moreover, 
several egalitarian regulations (such as the small size of 
claims) were in place to assure “the maximum stability to 
such communities of small producers and to preserve the 
rights of the small man” (Dobb 1946:242).  Nevertheless, 
there was a tendency for inequalities and a certain degree 
of social differentiation to emerge between members of the 
mining communities, for example, (a) first comer’s 
advantage (to stake the more promising claims), (b) luck, 
and (c) personal initiative, etc.  However, as long as 
digging remained free, these “differential advantages,” 
“could hardly have formed the basis for class 
differentiation.” Even though a “small kulak” class 
emerged, it hardly would have changed the “homogenous” 
character of these communities had it not been for the 
implementation of the “external” “disrupting influence” of 
the “‘cost agreement’ system.”  
Under the “cost agreement system,” an associate of the 





return for monetary payment” (Dobb 1946:244).  In time, it 
seems this system gave way to a system of tribute and 
finally to “tut-work,” where the mine owner would simply 
auction the working of his claim to the lowest wage-bidder. 
 There were two further heavy burdens on the backs of 
the miners: (1) monopoly merchants and (2) usury.  The 
presence of monopoly merchants was for the sale of metal.  
Such monopolies might initially be chartered to protect the 
price the miner received; however, this was not always the 
outcome.  Struggles between monopoly merchants and miners 
would eventually end in the complete subordination of 
producer-miner to capital by the seventeenth century (Dobb 
1946:247). 
 The usurer proved to be yet another burden on the 
backs of the miners.  This subordination of the producer-
miner to the usurer was twofold.  First, the monopoly 
merchant would advance credit to a tin-master, dealers, or 
smelter, siphoning off something like 60 percent profit, 
and then the tin-master, and others would advance money to 
the tributer or tut-worker and commonly enjoy a profit-
margin of 80 or 90 percent (Dobb 1946:247).  With the heavy 
presence of usury, something very close to a wage-system 





“free” (and democratic) mining communities107 (Dobb 
1925:280, Dobb 1946:248).  
 
3.1.7. Russian Agrarian Peasant Communities 
       as an Illustration 
 
 In the historical process of the creation of a 
proletariat class in the Russian agrarian communes (or 
mir), the story begins with the “lowness” in the average 
standard of life in Tsarist Russia, due to the low 
productivity of its agriculture, upon which four fifths of 
Russian livelihoods depended (Dobb 1948:39).  The low 
productivity was a function of both climate and lack of 
capital and technique (Dobb 1948:34-37).  In spite of the 
egalitarian distribution of land, and periodic 
“redistribution”108 of land to avoid large differentials in 
yields, class differentiation would tend to manifest (Dobb 
1948:43ff, Dobb 1946:252).  “In this development,” 
                                                 
107 A comparative study of Dobb’s illustrative example and the peasant 
histories of Hilton have not yet been performed.  However, the 
influence of Dobb must have been decisive, in that Hilton often 
emphasizes the historical processes of social differentiation of 
peasants, monopolization of social resources, and the limited access 
manifest to the social resources.  These historical processes 
drastically affected both the economic constitution and politics of 
these communities. 
108 The redistribution was in the main based on two key factors: (a) 
family size and (b) ability to work the land.  Thus, during the 
redistribution, land allotments were often given to those with capital 
implements and draught animals to work them.  A third key factor was 
(c) the political influence that a kulak peasant may have in his 





according to Dobb (1946:251), “usury […] appears to have 
played a leading rôle” in various forms.109 
 A relatively small number of peasants by means of luck 
of distribution (or redistribution), personal initiative, 
or good management rose into a kulak class.  Nonetheless, 
the differences were far from substantial, save for the 
kulak class’s ability to practice various forms of usury on 
their relatively poorer neighbors.  Indeed, it was the 
kulak’s practice of usury that gave rise to substantial 
class differentiation. 
Their relatively higher yields and capital advantages 
could allow them to loan land, capital, or cash to their 
poorer neighbors (Dobb 1948:43-4, Dobb 1946:251).  The most 
usurious practice, however, was the loaning of seed-corn.   
Most of the poor peasants, being in urgent need for 
cash after the [fall] harvest, were apt to glut the 
market with their grain during the post-harvest 
months; with the result that the peasant with capital 
to spare could buy up the grain at low prices and hold 
it until the spring when prices were higher, and when 
the very peasants who had parted with it the previous 
autumn were often forced into the market again as 
buyers to tide them over the period of sowing and 
harvesting; taking back produce at a higher price (in 
money or in their own labour or on some kind of loan 
contract secured on their future labour time) than the 
price at which they had sold grain six months before.  
This fluctuation of prices on local markets between 
autumn and spring was frequently as much as 30-50 per 
cent (Dobb 1948:44).    
                                                 
109 “Among the Russian peasants, as in most other such communities, it is 






Thus, even though (in 1914) 50 percent of Russian 
exports were cereals and other foodstuffs (Dobb 1948:37), 
only 30-40 percent of this amount was from the rural 
agrarian communities, and “by far the greater part of this 
came from the upper layer of well-to-do kulak farms” (Dobb 
1948:42).110  It was the usurious practices of the kulaks 
that forced the “hunger renting” of capital and land by 
their poorer neighbors (Dobb 1946:251, Dobb 1948:53).  As 
such, it was the kulaks who were able to market produce, 
“while the middling and poorer peasantry were primarily 
subsistence farmers” (Dobb 1948:42).  Of these “middle 
peasants” or “subsistence” farmers, “the majority,” due to 
heavy taxation and the usurious practices of the kulaks, 
were unable to maintain their “family above the subsistence 
level” (Dobb 1948:45).  “Middle” peasantry would tend to 
“seek additional earnings, either by working for wages or 
by undertaking domestic handicraft industry” (Dobb 
1948:44).  In this way, the “middle” peasantry, burdened by 
taxation and usury, “tended to sink progressively into 
dependence” (Dobb 1946:253).  Their dependence was 
especially on the (ruthlessly usurious) kulak class.  “This 
relationship of dependence held a cumulative tendency, the 
                                                 
110 With respect to grain products, “while the estates accounted for 
barely one eighth of total production, they supplied nearly one half of 





end of which was apt to be the final alienation of the 
peasant holding in favour of the [kulak] creditor” (Dobb 
1946:252).   
 Whole families were turned into semiproletariat, or 
became fully dependent on wage-employment.  “For rising 
industry and a kulak class to feed upon [it], this rural 
semi-proletariat represented a rich potential reserve” 
(Dobb 1948:45). 
 The Russian peasant emancipation of 1861 proved only 
to quicken the class differentiation of previous decades in 
many regions and village communes (mir) of the country.  
The ability for the village commune to equalize land 
allotments weakened considerably during the last three 
decades of the century (1948:54).  The Narodnics, or 
agrarian socialists, had looked to the mir for peasant 
protection.  The Narodnics advocated loans to the mir to 
protect the peasant farmers.  The state provided the 
Narodnic-advocated loans.  Instead of protecting the 
peasant farmers, the loans proved only to further enrich 
the kulak class and “actually deepened the class cleavage” 
(Dobb 1925:285, Dobb 1948:61ff).   
At the same time, the sale of land by peasant 
landlords had increased considerably.  It was the richer 





sales, “and it is clear that this transfer of ownership was 
a factor in accelerating the development of a kulak class” 
and further deepening the social class differentiation 
(Dobb 1948:53).   
 Of course, centralization of land ownership in fewer 
hands also meant the disposition of land of the many and 
characteristically “middle” peasants.  The amount of 
peasant land per family decreased during the last three 
decades of the century by roughly one fifth.  
Simultaneously, there was an increase in the number of 
peasant families unable to eke out a subsistence living 
from the land (Dobb 1948:54), thus augmenting the numbers 
recruited to the ranks of the semiproletariat and also 
those fully dependent upon wage-employment.  It was the 
resistance of the rural peasantry toward these tendencies 
and social conditions that constituted the rise of the 
movement toward revolutionary action in 1905. 
 
3.1.8. Lessons from Dobb’s Illustrations 
 
From these (Dobbian) illustrations of potential and 
actual transitional historical processes to a system of 
wage-dependence of the masses, seven important lessons can 
be drawn.  Lesson (1) is that the monopolization of land in 





one of several ways by which a dependent wage-earning class 
is created and maintained.  As the English mining 
communities and Russian mir examples illustrate, 
monopolization of livestock or means of production, along 
with an aggressive system of usury, are just as effective 
for the disposition of the masses.  The particular 
historical means of disposition is contingent, but 
legislation and institutional forms that allow for 
significant social differentiation are necessary for the 
emergence (and perhaps the reproduction) of capitalist 
social relations. 
In lesson (2), Dobb demonstrates the Ricardian 
differential advantage of fertility and position of land, 
generating ever-increasing rents in favor of a nonproducing 
class and against a producing class, is brilliantly 
exemplified by the history of the Russian mir.  Further, 
Dobb demonstrates similarities between Russian history and 
the English mining towns as historical processes of class 
differentiation and income inequality, leading potentially 
to the creation of political power delineation (Dobb 
1925:286).   
The existence of such differential advantages in these 
cases may have “as much influence in the rise of the 





labor, on which Professor Usher [and Adam Smith] lays 
emphasis” (Dobb 1955:9).   
Given these differential advantages, along with 
production for a distant market, the result can be highly 
destabilizing to a community of small producers (or 
agrarian farmers) unless special institutional and 
legislative measures “are taken to give [the community] 
protection and in particular, to give protection to its 
poorer and weaker members” (Dobb 1946:253-4).  For example, 
the “middle” classes may need protection from aggressive 
and impoverishing usury.  In absence of such protective 
measures, Dobb (1955:9) claims these differential 
advantages  
placed one [small] class of the community in a 
 position where the assumption of risk and the 
 organisation of commerce were relatively easy; while 
 another [large] class, lacking those advantages, was 
 placed in a position of relative dependence. 
 
Lesson (3) Dobb demonstrates economic inequalities 
manifest from the aforementioned differential advantages do 
not necessarily create any substantial class 
differentiation. Hence, economic inequality by itself 
cannot account for the emergence of an enriched employing 
master class of kulak on the one hand and a class who is 
dependent upon wage-employment on the other.  Rather, the 





disposition of a wage-dependent class, requires that 
“access to the means of production” is significantly 
restricted, such that “a substantial section of the 
community” is barred from (any social) ownership. 
In this sense, it is not enough that accumulation of 
capital takes place for the emergence of capitalism; two 
other factors also must exist.  First, the disposition of 
the social resources from the hands of the masses must take 
place.  Second, special and specific institutional forms 
must be erected to limit access to the social resources 
from the producing class. 
 Lesson(4) suggest that the origins and historical 
brutality of monopoly profits and usury interest/rent are 
demonstrated to enrich one class of a few at the expense of 
the disposition of the many.   
In the epoch of primitive accumulation usury always 
has two faces: the one turned towards the old ruling 
class […] whose financial embarrassments drive him in 
search of cash at any cost; and the other face turned 
towards the defenceless victim of the two, the needy 
small producer (Dobb 1946:254).   
 
Whether the old aristocratic rulers or small producers, 
usurers enriched themselves by feeding on those who 
exhibited the characteristics of being poor, weak, and/or 





There is a significant point of (historical) 
difference between the “two faces” of usury.  The first 
face of usury was merely a transfer of wealth and 
productive resources from the old landed aristocracy toward 
the usurious bourgeoisie and perhaps its main source of 
personal enrichment.  The second face, although perhaps not 
as personally lucrative for individual usurers, serves 
toward the formation of a semiproletariat and then fully 
dependent wage-earning class upon which rising industry can 
feed (Dobb 1948:45).   
This class, once it is begotten, has a very convenient 
quality which gives it an important advantage, as a 
permanent object of investment, over others.  The 
endowments of Nature are limited; mineral resources 
are exhaustible; usury, like leeches, is apt to bleed 
the source on which it feeds; even slave populations 
appear to have a tendency to die out.  But a 
proletariat has the valuable quality, not merely of 
reproducing itself each generation, but (unless the 
present age prove an exception) of reproducing itself 
on an ever-expanding scale (Dobb 1946:254). 
 
 For lesson (5), Dobb heeds warning that in light of 
the evidence of the historical brutality, the historian 
must reinterpret the scorn of usury expressed by the 
contemporaries of the Medieval period, for example, by the 
Scholastics and other social thinkers. 
With the triumph of classical economy the opinion of 
usury which was held by Church and feudal writers of 
the Middle Ages was rejected and scorned.  It has 
mainly become the habit to treat such theories as the 





affairs, and sentimentally condemned as immoral what 
was merely an economic price for a much-needed factor 
of production.  This very largely they no doubt were: 
but at the same time it would be wise not to miss a 
certain truth which underlay those opinions of the 
Schoolmen (Dobb 1925:287). 
 
Usury suffered scorn both because it lacked ideological 
justification and the institutional arrangement was such 
that the usurer preyed on the desperate, poor, and weak.  
Speculative production for the market was not in any sense 
well developed, nor could it be further developed until a 
class was created by the processes of history and the 
development of particular institutional forms, which could 
exploit in different ways than feudal exploitation. 
 In lesson (6) the historical picture drawn by Dobb 
“bears little resemblance” to the historical view 
represented by “liberalism” (Dobb 1946:25, also see Dobb 
1925:334, 394-5). The liberal view (for example, Milton 
Friedman111 1962 and more recently Francis Fukuyama 1992) 
holds that “capitalism” is “constantly striving towards 
economic freedom,” and that only in the absence of 
regulation and state control can the best conditions 
favorable to economic expansion be achieved.  In the 
liberal view, capitalism is seen as “the historical enemy 
of legal restraint and monopoly,” whereby the manifestation 
                                                 
111 Friedman states: “Political freedom […] clearly came along with the 






of monopoly is believed to be “the product of illegitimate 
intrusion of the State into the economic domain, in pursuit 
of power instead of plenty or of social stability at the 
cost of commercial prosperity” (Dobb 1946:25). 
The Dobbian view not only challenges the liberal view 
on the specifics and accuracy of the actual historical 
development of a wage-dependency system in particular and 
capitalism more generally, but it also has relevance for 
theories of economic development, and hence contemporary 
developing countries.  The relevance of the Dobbian view 
has special significance for the developing countries whose 
production is based on a “peasantry class.”   
The Dobbian historical view questions in which ways 
capitalist development has been emancipatory and a begetter 
of freedom and in which ways capitalist development has 
tended to exploit and alienate human beings, waste 
resources, and destabilize societies.     
Finally, in lesson (7) the cases of transition to a 
wage-system give evidence to the influence and effect that 
social institutions and political legislation have “on 
economic development and the distribution of income” (Dobb 
1925:286-7).  Social institutions can either facilitate or 
impede class differentiation, likewise (non)egalitarian 





dialectic of unintended consequences of political 
legislation is revealed.  Historically, laws and social 
programs meant to protect the weaker, poorer constituency 
often have proven to enrich the stronger and wealthier 
members of the community and further impoverish the weaker 
and poorer.    
With respect to the influence of social institutions 
more generally, Dobb concludes that “suprahistorical” 
economic principles cannot be formulated independent from 
“particular institutional conditions” (Dobb 1946:27).  To 
do so is to perform a particular theoretical violence which 
is likely to create historical distortions.112 To avoid such 
distortions, the study of economics generally, and economic 
history specifically, should be “reintegrated with those 
factors (for so long dismissed as extra-economic, 
‘sociological’ factors) which constitute the material basis 
of society: its property institutions, its production 
relations and productive forces” i.e. a society’s 
institutional forms (Dobb 1955:116). 
 
                                                 
112 The specifics here have to do with methodology and the process of 
abstraction.  In brief, for Dobb, to understand the dynamic movement 
and internal articulation of a system, the “qualities peculiar to a 
system [i.e., particular social institutions] are more important than 
the qualities it may have in common with other systems” (Dobb 1946:27).   
To focus on commonalties characteristic of all systems is universalism, 
or the process of abstraction by generalization.  When these 
generalizations are applied to historical analysis, the generalizations 





3.1.9. The Dobbian Notion of Agency 
 
A paradox here confronts the economic historian 
sympathetic to Dobb’s argument. It is one of Dobb’s main 
strengths in both his historical analysis and theoretical 
analysis that a robust sense of human agency is defended.  
In short, for Dobb, individuals have the power to create 
the circumstances of their own existence.  However, they do 
not create those circumstances from historical conditions 
of their own choosing;113 it is nevertheless the actions and 
beliefs of especially the “middle” and “lower” classes that 
ultimately determine the direction of politico-historical 
economic development. 
Although Dobb rarely speaks of the agency of any 
particular individual, the role of class conflict is 
paramount in his approach to both historical and 
theoretical analysis.  The essential ingredient to manifest 
class conflict, according to Dobb, is inequality of 
opportunity.114  In his illustrations of the English “free 
mining” communities and Russian mir, the reader clearly is 
confronted with the historical manifestation of “inequality 
of opportunity.”  However, after presenting the historical 
                                                 
113 Dobb writes: “conditions of life exercised a strongly selective and 
formative influence over the ideas which were dominant at a particular 
period” (Dobb 1955:228). 
114 In an article written in 1937 Dobb writes: “inequality of opportunity 
is an essential ingredient of the situation from which class conflict 





manifestation of situations involving “inequality of 
opportunity,” Dobb does not mention class conflict, nor any 
resistance on behalf of those at a disadvantage.  Rather, 
the reader is left with the portrayal of the “middle” and 
“lower” classes as mere “victims” of the actions of their 
financial and political superiors. 
This is not characteristic of a Dobbian analysis.  For 
the historians Dobb influenced this notion of agency 
returns with a vengeance.  From Hilton’s peasants, to 
Hill’s “middling sorts,” onto Hobsbawm’s “rebels,” and 
Thompson’s working class, forms of resistance from all of 
these “lower” economic classes have shaped the 
institutional evolution of social being.  In Dobb’s 
writings from 1937 forward, class struggle analysis and 
“lower” economic class agency are central to his historical 
investigations and constitute his chief methodological 
orientation.  As such, agency of the ‘middle’ and ‘lower’ 
classes becomes the Dobbian paradigm.  In Studies, his 
analysis of feudalism exemplifies this sense of lower-class 
agency.   
Throughout Chapters 2-6, Dobb emphasized the 
democratic spirit and temper of the ‘middle’ and ‘lower’ 
English classes (e.g., Dobb 1946:174).  In pre-fourteenth 





emancipated themselves, at least in some degree, from 
servitude.   
In the fifteenth century with “a revival of the old 
system” of servitude (Dobb 1946:39), ‘would-be’ serfs were 
shown to have significant forms of resistance toward their 
rulers (Dobb 1946:51ff).  This peasant/serf resistance was 
demonstrated to have achieved relative success in regions 
where there was a return to serfdom (following decades of 
emancipation) and in regions where serfdom intensified.  
The peasants’ and serfs’ forms of resistance included the 
ability to increase their productivity, take to political 
protest (Dobb 1946:82), or escape to townships (Dobb 
1946:46). 
Citizens of townships were shown to have carried out 
significant struggles against the feudal aristocracy (Dobb 
1946:81).  Guilds fought battles against monopoly merchants 
and were shown to have won a political “reassertion” of 
their “privileges” (Dobb 1946:155).  Small producers not 
only won battles against the ruling aristocracy (Dobb 
1946:109) but were further argued to be the very 
revolutionary begetters of capitalist production relations 








3.1.10. Methodological Considerations of Dobb’s 
    Notion of Agency 
 
It also should be pointed out in the context of this 
chapter that Dobbian agency is necessarily nonantagonistic 
toward structuralism, institutionalism, and stage theory 
analysis.  In fact, the four methodological moments 
constitute his approach to social theory and social being.  
As illustrated in his two examples above, institutional 
factors provide the boundary conditions for individual 
action. The methodological motifs of a Dobbian analysis 
will be outlined in the final section of this dissertation. 
Before modeling Dobb’s implicit methodological (and 
ontological) insights, the following sections attempt to 
illustrate that in his historical and theoretical work, 
Dobb saw no antagonism between his radical notion of 
agency, institutional analysis and structuralist approaches 
to the dynamics of political economy and, more generally, 
social theory and history.  More emphatically, for Dobb, it 
was both a methodological and ontological necessity that 
his radical notion of agency (which especially influenced 
E. P. Thompson and his students) was simultaneously 
employed with a rigorous (historical) institutional 
analysis (which especially influenced Eric Hobsbawm, Eugene 





dynamics of the economy and society (Dobb’s structuralist 
commitments especially influenced the work of Rodney 
Hilton, Robert Benner, and their students). 
The Dobbian position and analysis of the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism underscored both Dobb’s 
institutionalist emphasis and his structural analysis.  
Dobb’s socioeconomic historical analysis is structuralist 
at its core.  More specifically, for Dobb, it was the 
relationship between the primary producers and their 
immediate supervisors which determined the dynamic or 
structural tendencies of society. However, a more concrete 
analysis always requires an articulation of the 
institutional physiology of society.  In other words, the 
structural tendencies always can remain inactive, 
counteractive, or active, depending on the institutional 
arrangement of a society. 
  Dobb’s Studies and the debate concerning the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism articulate the 
importance of an institutional analysis.  For Dobb, 
institutional analysis was indispensable for understanding 
the crises of feudalism and the transition to capitalism.  
In addition, Dobb’s notion of radical agency of the lower 
(financial, political, and social) classes is mediated by 





addition to the transition of feudalism to capitalism, 
Dobb’s analysis of the so-called ‘industrial revolution’ 
methodologically underscores and ontologically pivots on an 
indomitable historical reconstruction of institutional 
forms.  The section that follows outlines Dobb’s historical 
analysis of the so-called ‘industrial revolution’ and 
illustrates his strong institutional approach to history 
and theory.   
Theoretically arrayed with an acute institutional 
historical reconstruction of late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century England, Dobb is able to radically 
reinterpret the significance of the notorious era. Even 
before Rostow’s work and the ensuing debates, Dobb claimed 
that the ‘industrial revolution’ was a misnomer. Similar to 
Rostow, Dobb always would maintain that the period was not 
necessarily an industrial or technological revolution per 
se.  However, contrary to Rostow and many other political 
economic theorists and historians, Dobb maintained that the 
period was nonetheless a revolutionary era.   
The revolution was in the social relation of 
production which then formed to support institutional forms 
of capitalism.  The transformation in the institutional 
forms during this forty-year period was merely a “prelude” 





decades later, directly within the social relations of 
production. 
If Dobb’s analysis of the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism and of the period of the so-called ‘industrial 
revolution’ can be said to underscore his emphasis on 
institutionalism, it is Dobb’s analysis of the 
socioeconomic crisis that emphasizes his theoretical use of 
structuralist theory.  Socioeconomic crises constitute the 
basis of a Dobbian political economy.     
Structuralism would become the most influential social 
scientific paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s.  In social 
science the paradigm concept of structure has long held a 
pivotal position (Bottomore and Nisbet 1978, ch. 14).  Jean 
Piaget (1968) has demonstrated its force and influence in 
the fields of mathematics, biology, psychology, 
linguistics, anthropology, history, and economics and more 
generally within philosophy.  Structuralism has also had an 
important affinity with Marxism.  Structuralists have often 
considered Marx an important influence, even as a point of 
departure (Godelier, 1973; Levi-Strauss, 1963; Althusser, 
1965; Foucault, 1970).      
Within Marxism, it is often asserted that 
structuralism is necessarily opposed to a ‘history from the 





Marx himself theorized the connection between structure and 
agency (or in more Hegelian language, necessity of action 
versus freedom of action) in a complex ontological way.  As 
such, Marx’s theoretical work is liable to be a one-sided 
interpretation posing structure over and against agency (as 
exemplified in the work of Althusser, and specially Hindess 
and Hirst 1975).  Likewise, Marx also is liable to an 
equally one-sided interpretation that poses agency over and 
against structure (e.g., the rational choice Marxism of Jon 
Elster 1985, 1986).  Moreover, social reality, and 
consequently the study of social being itself, is subject 
to the parallel liability.  
Dobb’s theoretical work was always conscious of this 
liability.  Dobb’s historical and theoretical analyses 
demonstrate a rigorous effort to avoid the conflation of 
agency to structure (the ontological mistake of 
structuralism) and, likewise, the reduction of structure to 
agency (the ontological mistake of rational choice theory). 
Dobb would not reject the traditional definition of 
structure as an organized body of mutually connected parts.  
In social structure, the parts are relationships between 
persons or social agents.  The relationships should not be 
conflated with the persons themselves.  Thus what mediated 





between social agents and institutions.  This meditation 
resists conflation of agency to structure and the reduction 
of structure to agency.  Rather, for Dobb, both structure 
and agency are given ontological command, and in the study 
of history, methodological priority is placed on the 
constitution of human relations and institutional forms. 
The methodological priority on human relations and 
institutional forms is exemplified in Dobb’s historical 
analysis of the so-called industrial revolution.   Dobb’s 
methodological priority upon human relations and 
institutional forms is also exemplified in his more 
theoretical (and less historical) work on political economy 
proper. In the next section, Dobb’s historical analysis of 
the industrial revolution will be scrutinized.  Then in the 
subsequent section, Dobb’s more theoretical political 
economy will be outlined.  In both sections, the 
methodological priority of human relations and 
institutional forms will be underscored.  
 
3.2. A Prelude to the Industrial Revolution 
 
 In the traditional account of the industrial 
revolution, there are two interrelated tendencies in the 
analysis.  The first tendency is to focus on the economic 





output, trade patterns, investment ratio, employment level, 
size of industrial operations, etc.  Second, there is a 
tendency to abstract away from property relations and the 
variations in the wage-labor/capital nexus.  With these two 
tendencies taken together, the analysis of the traditional 
account of the industrial revolution suffers from a type of 
reductionism whereby the internal articulation of and 
historical processes responsible for this stage of 
historical development are reduced to mere statistical 
series.   Often, these quantifiable economic elements take 
on a life of their own, necessarily denying the importance 
and even the relevance of institutional modifications and 
changes within the social relations of production (Dobb 
1967:17-8).115  
 Dobb suggested that this reductionist tendency in the 
traditional account of the industrial revolution is a 
methodological error.  The process of abstraction is of an 
illicit type because essential elements of the historical 
process during this stage of economic development are 
neglected, hence (implicitly) ontologically denied. 
                                                 
115 The traditional account is a historical tendency, especially prior to 
the work of Rostow.  However, the more causal academic references to 
the industrial revolution continue today, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to evoke the traditional account.  In this sense, the 
“traditional account” is being used as Dobb himself employed the term, 






3.2.1. The ‘Qualitative’ Revolution 
 
 Alternatively, Dobb insists that the industrial 
revolution cannot be properly understood while neglecting 
the institutional milieu and the changes that occurred in 
the social relations of production.  Furthermore, to 
understand the significance of these changes and to place 
the industrial revolution itself into historical context, 
Dobb proposes that analysis should follow Marx’s lead 
(1976:876, 1981:442-55, also see 1976:1025-34).  Dobb later 
suggested that subsequent historical “research leaves 
little doubt” of the importance of a more qualitative 
analysis for understanding the significance of the 
industrial revolution. Moreover, a qualitative emphasis 
also “leaves little doubt” of the correctness of Marx’s 
initial dating of the formal emergence of capitalism in 
sixteenth-century England (Dobb 1967:19).  Nonetheless, it 
would be a mistake, as Dobb emphasizes in the transition 
debate, to characterize the sixteenth, seventeenth, or even 
the eighteenth century as capitalist. 
Without denying the significance of this stage of 
development on the industrial revolution, it must be 
emphasized that the socioeconomic events of the sixteenth 
century and the political revolution of the seventeenth 





transition to a new epoch.  Nevertheless, the events which 
preceded the actual “industrial revolution” created the 
institutional changes that laid the basis for the 
eighteenth-century (Rostowian) “take-off.”  In other words, 
the “revolution” did not consist of the quantifiable 
elements traditionally emphasized, but of the qualitative 
elements usually neglected by traditional and mainstream 
accounts.  Therefore, if historical analysis is to focus on 
the quantitative element, that analysis is liable to 
conclude that no revolution occurred.116  
 
3.2.2. The Monopoly Merchant and the Mercantile 
       Element 
 
 Dobb began his own qualitative analysis of the 
internal articulation of feudalism and its dissolution with 
the role played by the monopoly merchants.  To anticipate, 
the dissolution of feudal relations of production was the 
revolutionary moment and the basis for the industrial 
“take-off” of the eighteenth and nineteenth century.  Dobb 
maintained that in the sixteenth century, monopoly 
merchants were a dominant social class and an essential 
institutional element regarding factors that affected 
production (Dobb 1946:129ff).  Generally speaking, craft 
                                                 
116 For example, D.C. Coleman in an article in Economic History Review 
(1983, 36:435-448) concludes that the notion of an industrial 





guilds and town craftsmen were in subordination to this 
mercantile element.  Prices that craftsmen or craft guilds 
could demand were often strictly regulated, directly or 
indirectly, by rules that limited the persons to whom the 
craftsmen were able to sell their products (Dobb 1946:126).   
Monopoly merchants were jealous to protect their 
‘rights’ to secure “exploitation through trade” (Dobb 
1946:128).  Their chief means of securing this advantage 
was through (political) legislation and (sociopolitical) 
rules of trade that created excess supply in the market of 
wholesale purchase and excess demand in the market of 
retail sale, with the position of the monopoly merchant in 
the “bottleneck” in-between (Dobb 1946:127).   
It was also during the sixteenth century that there 
was an increase in the attempt of the politically enriched 
mercantile element to further subordinate the craftsmen and 
craft guilds to the (economic) will of the advantageously 
placed merchant.  The mercantile element had by now gained 
semicontrol of production itself.   
The control was of a limited character in that it was 
based on (phase one of) the “putting-out” system.117  
Although the control of production was limited, the 
                                                 
117 Engels makes comment on this first phase of the putting-out system in 





extensiveness of the organization of production on such a 
putting-out basis was significant (Dobb 1946:152).  As Eric 
Hobsbawm insisted in his 1954 article, “The Crisis of the 
Seventeenth Century,” it was during “the later sixteenth 
century” that “as a general rule the transformation of 
crafts into “putting-out industries began seriously” and by 
the seventeenth century “such systems established 
themselves decisively” (Hill 1965:40). 
  In phase one of the putting-out system, the monopoly 
merchant would furnish the guild and/or independent 
craftsmen with the particular raw materials needed for the 
production of their specific product.  A fee would then be 
paid by the merchant to the guild and/or craftsmen to work 
the raw material into the final product (Dobb 1946:138).   
Böhm-Bawark’s theory of the “degree of roundaboutness 
of production” captures the essence of the institutional 
structure of the sixteenth century putting-out system.  
Böhm-Bawark’s theory underscores the multiple intermediate 
stages in the production of commodities, as was, for 
example, the case in sixteenth century weaving (see Dobb 
1946:144).  During the sixteenth century, the intermediate 
stages were augmented by the proliferation of middlemen at 





important middleman was the monopoly mercantile element 
(Miskimin 1977:91-2). 
The mercantile element, by putting-out, accomplished 
more than becoming middlemen in the production process 
because they had “broke[n] through the traditional barriers 
of production” (Engels, in Marx 1981:142-3).  The 
mercantile element had gained partial control of the price 
they had to pay for the final product by means of 
negotiating the fee paid to the craftsmen or guild. 
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the mercantile 
element exercised very little control over the production 
process itself.  The mercantile element mediated but did 
not control the process of production.  Foremost, the 
mercantile element did not have property rights for the 
means of production on any sort of wide scale.  For this 
reason, in the first phase of the putting-out system and 
during the entirety of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century, the feudal system remained characteristically a 
“petty-mode of production.”   
 
3.2.3. The Petty-Mode of Production 
 
Petty-mode of production refers to the organization of 
production that is characteristically centered around and 





Even though the production sometimes could be characterized 
by large-scale manufactories, such as in weaving, mining, 
etc. (Dobb 1946:139-42), these cases were quite rare.  
Moreover, they were not run by “captains of industry,” or 
those solely motivated by minimization of costs, but 
“largely captained by aristocratic patentees, whose 
enterprise was fostered by special grants of privilege from 
the Crown” (Dobb 1946:142).  Thus, although the evidence is 
far from clear, it is likely that many of these 
manufactories were ruled by relationships characteristic of 
the “domestic system” or phase one of the putting-out 
system (Dobb 1946:146).  
When the mercantile element was not able to establish 
itself on a putting-out basis, the political alignments of 
the crafts guild and mercantile element were of an 
antagonistic nature.  The mercantile element would attempt 
to escape the restrictive powers of the crafts guild by 
means of putting-out raw material to (more rural) 
independent craftsmen.  These independent craftsmen were 
necessarily out of the jurisdiction of the township and 
guild.  This was a socioeconomic means of bypassing feudal 
restrictions; otherwise, the mercantile element as a class 





It is in this sense that the dynamic between the 
mercantile element and the craft guilds was antagonistic.  
The mercantile element would tend to favor political aims 
to fight against restrictive legislation on production, 
whereas the guild fought to (re)enforce productive 
restrictions.  For the most part, the historical evidence 
suggests that the mercantile element was relatively 
unsuccessful in penetrating the production process of the 
guild system.  When the mercantile element achieved a 
degree of success in penetrating the production process, 
that success did not necessarily manifest any sort of 
revolutionary change in the system or the social relations 
of production.  Rather, the merchant turned producer would 
exploit the advantages of controlling trade and prices, 
with little reform to the petty mode of production. 
 
3.2.4. Craftsmen as the “Really Revolutionary” 
       Force 
 
According to Dobb, the historical evidence suggested 
that the mercantile element was far from revolutionary 
toward the social relations of production.  In spite of the 
antagonistic sociopolitical aspect involved between 
merchants and guilds, the historical record of merchants is 





petty-mode of production.  The revolutionary force came 
from a different class.   
Dobb’s historical conclusion was that a section of the 
craftsmen class would sometimes become interested in 
augmenting the level of production.  This was even more 
likely when the craftsmen could penetrate the 
sociopolitical restriction by entering into merchant 
activity.  When the craftsmen were able to invade the arena 
of merchant activity, there was an increased incentive to 
evade the traditional guild restrictions that formed the 
legislative basis of the petty-mode of production.  
Politically, it was easier for the craftsmen or guild to 
attack or evade guild restrictions than it was for the 
merchant.  In England, this evasion occurred on a 
relatively significant scale “[b]y the middle of the 
seventeenth century […, and] a section of the crafts 
themselves had become interested in the extension of 
industry and in evasion of the traditional guild 
restrictions” (Dobb 1946:134).  
The political goals of this section of craftsmen took 
two main forms: (a) to challenge for the (semi-)governance 
of the mercantile element or (b) to secure independence 
from the mercantile element, with a new status as a 





the emergence of this new political force of craftsman, it 
was not long that the mercantile element favored 
enforcement of the “old regulations” of production, which 
they had formerly opposed (Dobb 1946:138). 
 
3.2.5. A Dobbian Paradox 
 
Before pursuing the important role that the 
independent section of craftsmen played in the Dobbian 
prelude to the transition to capitalism, mention must be 
made of a certain tension in Chapter 4 of Studies.  The 
tension is Dobb’s assertion that the mercantile-controlled 
putting-out system of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries 
was actually an immature capitalism.  Dobb’s final verdict 
is that this early capitalism is prevented from maturing 
until seventeenth century England.  Nonetheless, it is 
paradoxical, given Dobb’s definition of capitalism, that he 
is able to identify this definition with phase one of the 
putting-out system.  
In a ten-page section (1946:151-61), heavily 
influenced by Pirenne (who is cited no less than eight 
times), Dobb describes the struggle within townships for 
(a) town governance, (b) regulations of guilds, (c) control 
of domestic markets, and (d) control of exports.  Dobb 





fifteenth centuries, power had passed in many European 
townships “to a small bourgeois oligarchy” (Dobb 1946:153).  
The bourgeoisie typically was dominated by merchants and 
those who benefited from the political interests of that 
class. 
These small bourgeois oligarchies were generally 
composed of the mercantile element, “the name of ‘the 
patriciate’ came to be given” (Dobb 1946:152).  Having 
obtained power, the patriciate passed legislation in favor 
of itself as the town mercantile element.  During this 
stage of development, this mercantile bias in town 
governance was characteristic of various, although not all 
(see Dobb 1946:153), regions throughout Western Europe 
(Dobb 1946:151ff).   
The patriciate, once established, was quick to loosen 
the regulations of guild production to their advantage.  
Especially significant was the repealing of the strict 
restrictions on the number of apprentices a guild master 
could command.  It was this latter policy, according to 
Dobb, that allowed for “a fairly extensive capitalist-
controlled ‘putting-out’ system” in various industries “in 






However, in towns where the patriciate were able to 
establish power, rarely did it go unchallenged. The main 
challenge seems to have come from the craft guilds, where 
often the old guild privileges would be reasserted (Dobb 
1946:154, 155, 157, 159 for examples).  “But the growth of 
Capitalism, while it was retarded by this reassertion of 
guild privileges, was far from being completely smothered” 
(Dobb 1946:155). 
This identitification of the mercantile-controlled 
putting-out system with Dobb’s definition of capitalism as 
a mode of production is both remarkable and paradoxical.  
Dobb makes clear in the first chapter of Studies that 
capitalism, defined as a mode of production, refers “to the 
way in which the means of production were owned and to the 
social relations between men which resulted from their 
connections with the process of production” (Dobb 1946:7). 
It is highly ambiguous that phase one of the putting-
out system would meet the qualifications of being 
capitalist in this sense.  Moreover, Dobb insists that his 
definition of capitalism does not simply mean a system of 
production for the market, “but a system under which 
labour-power had ‘itself become a commodity’ and was bought 
and sold on the market like any other object of exchange” 





during the period of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries 
meet this latter criterion.  Even Dobb contends that rural 
and town serfs alike maintained attachment to the land 
(Dobb 1967:22).  Elsewhere, Dobb insisted that the stage of 
economic development in Europe throughout the fourteenth 
and sixteenth centuries remained feudalistic (Dobb 1946:19-
20).  It is precisely this latter point on which Dobb 
insists in his debate with Paul Sweezy (Hilton 1976:63, 
99).  Sweezy did not charge Dobb with this paradox, or as 
even being the basis of his own questioning of how to 
characterize the period between the thirteenth and 
fifteenth centuries.  However, it certainly could be 
suggested that this paradoxical characterization of the 
thirteenth to fifteenth centuries could have been the basis 
for Sweezy’s questioning of how to characterize the period. 
I have shown that in the transition debate Dobb (and 
Hilton both) steadfastly maintained that the period at hand 
was unquestionably feudalistic.  Hence, it is a curiosity 
that such a blatant paradox exists within Studies.  It is 
an indication of how difficult it is to avoid 
inappropriately importing categories from one society to 
the analysis of another society.    
This paradox seems to be an example of the complaint 





critical six-paragraph review of the book in the Journal of 
Economic History, 1948.  Polanyi asserts that Dobb’s view 
of the mechanisms of feudal exploitation illicitly imports 
a concept of a “labor market” into a nonmarket economy.  
“Such a thesis amounts to a reversal of the view that no 
supply-demand-price mechanism can be effective outside of a 
market system” (Polanyi 1948). 
It is not clear that the culprit in the paradox 
identified earlier is Dobb’s conception of feudal 
exploitation, but it certainly seems clear that Dobb 
illicitly imports a concept of labor markets when there is 
none.  Furthermore, these crucial pages seem to be an 
example of Dobb applying supply-demand-price analysis at 
the neglect of his own insistence on the importance of 
institutional analysis.  It may have been Dobb’s 
overreliance on Pirenne118 in those crucial pages that have 
him mistakenly identify the putting-out system with 
capitalism proper.   
Indeed, Pirenne defines capitalism as merely commodity 
production; hence Pirenne is consistent with his own 
definition.  Dobb, however, specifically rejects this 
definition as being too general and “insufficiently 
                                                 
118 There is no other passage in Studies in which Dobb relied as heavily 
on Pirenne’s historical analysis as he does in these crucial ten pages 





restrictive to confine the term to any one epoch of 
history” (Dobb 1946:8).  In his ensuing debate with Sweezy, 
Dobb reasserts his rejection of Pirenne’s definition 
(Hilton 1976:61).  Nevertheless, it had slipped into Dobb’s 
own historical analysis.  Although Sweezy does not cite 
this Dobbian paradox, it may have been these pages 
specifically that gave rise to Sweezy’s questions about how 
to define and characterize the period from the thirteenth 
century to the fifteenth century.   
 
3.2.6. Dissolution of Feudalism: The “Really  
   Revolutionary Way” 
 
Despite the presence of a supply-demand-price analysis 
in Dobb’s own historical analyses, his stronger line of 
argument regards the dissolution of the feudal mode of 
production in Western Europe.  It is this stronger line of 
argument that is the basis of Chapter 4 in Studies.  In 
this line of argument Dobb remains committed to the 
essentially parasite-like existence of the mercantile 
element on the feudal order and the generally conservative 
and change-resisting political attitudes of merchants 
toward feudalism as a mode of production (Dobb 1946:121-2). 
This stronger line of argument develops the historical 
picture of what Marx called the “really revolutionary way” 





section of craftsmen free themselves from feudal obligation 
with regard to production, emerging as independent 
craftsmen.  Next, or simultaneously, a number of these 
independent craftsmen take to trade activity or become 
merchants. 
The mercantile element that had control of phase one 
of the putting-out system played an important role in the 
historical process of these independent craftsmen becoming 
a revolutionary force.  It was not, however, that the 
putting-out system, upon which their activity depended, was 
capitalist.  Rather, it was the fact that they aided in the 
loosening of the hold guilds had on the feudal process of 
production.  Of special significance in the political 
activity of the mercantile element was the abatement of the 
number of apprentices that any one guild master could 
command.  This was a direct attack on the institutional 
arrangement that constituted the petty-mode production as 
characteristically small scale units of production.   
Even with this loosening of the guilds’ hold, the 
putting-out system allowed for merchants to remain 
parasitic on the feudal order and highly protective of the 
feudal privileges won during their struggle over the 
governance of townships. This point is in concert with 





the merchant may take direct control of production 
 himself.  But however frequently this occurs as a 
 historical transition […] it cannot bring about the 
 overthrow of the old mode of production by itself, but 
 rather preserves and retains it as its own 
 precondition.   
 
Historical evidence has more or less supported this 
claim by Marx; however, it should be recognized that the 
mercantile element was often an important political force 
in loosening the feudal regulations on production.  The 
qualification to this statement is that the mercantile 
element’s political activity was highly limited unless 
allied with a section of the craftsmen or guilds. 
 The monopoly merchants,119 allied with a section of 
craftsmen, were able to undermine the guild control over 
feudal regulations of production and, further, were able to 
break down the “urban colonialism” that ruled feudal Europe 
prior to fourteenth century (see Dobb 1946:95ff, 161, 128).  
This is the first essential step in the dissolution of the 
feudal mode of production.  However, since the mercantile 
element remained a highly conservative force,120 a second 
essential condition for the dissolution of feudalism was 
                                                 
119 Dobb adds that the mercantile element who fought to undermine guild 
restrictions were not the “grand merchants,” but a “newer generation of 
merchant[s]” (Dobb 1946:162).  This “newer generation” of merchants 
generally found themselves shut out from the feudal privileges and 
sought protection by means of loosening the restrictions of production.  
120 Dobb (1946:80) himself writes “the influence of commerce as a 
dissolvent of feudal relationships was considerable, merchant capital 
remained nevertheless in large measure parasite on the old order, and 
its conscious role, when it had passed its adolescence, was 





the emancipation of a section of independent craftsmen 
“from the monopolies in the sphere of trade in which 
merchant capital is already entrenched” (Dobb 1946:161). 
For the independent section of craftsmen, this was a long, 
slow battle that spanned several centuries.   
 The requirements for royal charters were beyond the 
financial means of the craftsman of “humble social 
origins.”  Furthermore, a royal charter required favorable 
approval from the court. Here again, the craftsman of 
“humble social origins" would find it too difficult to 
obtain favorable court approval (Dobb 1946:166).  It seems 
that the struggle of the craftsmen fighting against the 
ubiquitous presence and hegemonic economic power of the 
monopoly mercantile element and its Royal privileges proves 
decisive. 
 In this stage of development in the petty-mode of 
production, dominated by monopoly merchants, independent 
craftsmen and those from the guilds, along with independent 
small merchants, politically reacted against the economic 
hegemony of the royal privileges granted to the mercantile 
element (Dobb 1946:133).  Nonetheless, the success of the 
craftsmen’s political reactions was of a limited nature, 
and the antimonopoly legislation that was enacted in the 





pace of Royal privileges granted to the mercantile element 
(Dobb 1946:168).  In short and with emphasis, this would 
manifest into the retention of feudalism, not its 
dissolution. 
 
3.2.7. Social Differentiation as the Begetter 
       of Capitalism 
 
 The revolutionary effect of the craftsmen’s political 
activity was not necessarily their intended goal, but 
rather the unintended consequence of their activity.  The 
essential effect was that it gave rise to a particular and 
significant degree of social differentiation among the 
craftsmen themselves (Dobb 1946:133).  This social 
differentiation gave rise to the emergence of small, well-
to-do craftsmen oligarchies (Dobb 1946:124).  These small 
oligarchies would hire out their poorer brethren, resulting 
in the latter’s subordination to the former (Dobb 1946:149, 
125, 134-5).  
 As a result of this process of social differentiation, 
Dobb claimed there seemed to have been a shift in the 
center of gravity by the beginning of the seventeenth 
century when these small independent craftsmen-oligarchies 
rose to predominance (Dobb 1946:134).  This was also the 





of control of production process by all but the oligarchic, 
or well-to-do section of the craftsmen (Dobb 1946:143).  
 A third essential condition, “deserving to rank with 
the other two,” is the favorable presence and encouragement 
of investment of capital in agriculture (Dobb 1946:161).  
It was Dobb’s (p. 164) contention that both the mercantile 
element and the Crown obstructed, rather than encouraged, 
capital investment in agriculture. 
 However, there seems to have been an analogous process 
of social differentiation, which occurred in the case of 
the craftsmen as detailed above, within the ranks of rural 
farming (Dobb 1946:125-6).  It was the rise of a well-to-do 
independent section of yeomen that helped to encourage 
investment of capital in the agricultural sector (Dobb 
1946:161), and further it was by the yeomen farmers “that 
most of the improvements in methods of cultivation seem to 
have been pioneered” (Dobb 1946:125). 
 The rise of this kulak-like class of well-to-do yeomen 
further impoverished the poorer rural element and quickened 
the pace of enclosures (Dobb 1946:173).  “The victim of the 
enclosure was generally the smaller cultivator, who now 
dispossessed was doomed to swell the ranks of the rural 






3.2.8. Internal or Domestic Markets Emerge 
       in England 
 
 In addition to creating and swelling the ranks of the 
(semi)proletariat, these developments were “also a crucial 
factor in creating an internal market for the products of 
manufacture” (Dobb 1946:162).  This latter point was 
emphasized by Eric Hobsbawm as the differentia specifica of 
English capitalist development (see Hill 1967:50).  There 
had existed restricted luxury domestic markets in most 
regions of Europe, but at the time, there was no region 
that had any significant domestic market for staple goods.  
As Dobb points out, Hobsbawm attributed “the absence of the 
latter […] to the fact that peasant production in 
agriculture remained predominantly subsistence farming” 
(Dobb 1967:25).  What agricultural products were sold were 
mainly intended to generate money to pay rent, leaving very 
little margin, if any, for products of manufactory. 
 The developments within the agricultural sector 
generally, and in particular the historical process of 
class differentiation within agriculture, gave rise to a 
strong domestic market (see Hobsbawm, in Hill ed. 
1967:35ff; Dobb 1967:26).  For Dobb, this underscored the 
dual nature of transformation in the social relations that 





importance of this process viewed in one aspect appears as 
the growth of an internal market, in another aspect as the 
growth of supply of wage-labour” (Dobb 1967:26). 
 This further highlighted another of Dobb’s emphases on 
the notion of primitive accumulation as conceived by Marx.  
Dobb emphasized that it is an error to think of primitive 
accumulation in a Smithian sense as a mere piling up of 
commodities, means of production, or wealth.  In addition 
to the accumulation of wealth, there occurs a transfer of 
wealth, or the capitalist accumulation of the few implies 
the disposition of the many.  Hence, once again, the 
underscored emphasis for Dobb was placed upon the 
institutional transformation within the social relations of 
production. 
 The craftsmen, as the radical social element, were 
needed to bring about the bourgeois revolution.  Their 
intentions were not to bring forth capitalism nor 
necessarily to attack the economic institutions and social 
relations of feudalism as a mode of production.  Although 
the notion of “free trade” was invoked by the craftsmen 
revolutionaries, it was not any sort of general free trade 
movement.   
 The free trade that was sought was conditional and 
 limited free trade conceived, not as a general 





 century, but as ad hoc proposals to remove certain 
 specific restrictions that bore down upon the 
 complainants (Dobb 1946:164).   
 
 
3.2.9. Democratic Aims and Revolutionary  
       Social Results 
 
According to Dobb, the historical evidence suggests 
that the craftsmen’s intentions were less economic than 
political.  Namely, the craftsmen desired a more democratic 
decision-making process with respect to economic concerns.  
It was during the mid-seventeenth century in London and 
many other provincial cities that  
the working craftsmen, the apprentices, the journeymen 
 [… had] an extraordinary development of a democratic 
 temper.  […] We find a marked increase in the number 
 of democratic movements among the Yeomanry of the 
 Livery Companies, some of which, like the Feltmakers, 
 were successful in securing incorporation, thereby 
 freeing themselves from the dominance of the merchant 
 element (Dobb 1946:174). 
 
 Many of the democratic achievements of the seventeenth 
century disappeared with the Commonwealth, but the 
(necessarily unintentional) damage to the social relations 
of production had been done.  It would not have been known 
at the time, but the conditions had been created for 
capital to become king (Dobb 1946:176).  The disposition of 
the masses was far from complete, but the institutional 
conditions allowed for independent craftsmen to penetrate 





institutional conditions that constituted the revolutionary 
result of the epoch. 
 
3.2.10. Dobbian Conclusions: A Revolution of  
        Social Relations 
 
 The radicalization of the traditional account of the 
bourgeois revolution by the Dobbian perspective is twofold.  
First, the revolution was not created by the bourgeois or 
mercantile element itself.  Rather, the revolution was 
brought forth by the impetus of the more politically 
radical craftsmen.   
Thus we have displayed with remarkable clearness that 
contradictory feature that we find in every bourgeois 
revolution: while this revolution requires the impetus 
of its most radical elements to carry through its 
emancipating mission to the end, the movement is 
destined to shed large sections of the bourgeoisie as 
soon as these radical elements appear, precisely 
because the latter represent the small man or the 
dispossessed whose very claims call in question the 
rights of large-scale property (Dobb 1946:172). 
 
The bourgeois and mercantile elements were very politically 
active, but otherwise highly conservative with respect to 
feudalism.  The bourgeois and mercantile elements not only 
did not initiate the bourgeois revolution, but when the 
radical element had been recruited, the bourgeois and 
mercantile, remarkably, were opposed to it.   
 Second, the revolutionary aspect was the 





relations of production.  That is to say, the 
transformation in more qualitative elements is where the 
real revolutionary changes appear (Dobb 1946:128), which is 
to further suggest that focus on the quantifiable elements 
is liable to lead to the conclusion that no revolution 
occurred (Dobb 1967:17).   
 The importance of the revolutionary changes being 
manifest in the social relations of production in Dobbian 
perspective means that the industrial revolution is “a 
concept too many.” Industrially, there was something less 
than a revolution and something much more like a “take-
off.” Nonetheless, a type of revolution occurred, or 
perhaps more accurately, a realization of an earlier 
revolution in the social relations of production was 
obtained.   
Dobb’s position on these points corresponds to Marx’s 
distinction between the formal subsumption of labor to 
capital versus the real subsumption of labor to capital 
(see Marx 1976:1019-38).  This means that the industrial 
revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century cannot be understood apart from the bourgeois 
revolution of the seventeenth century. 
 Dobb charged Rostow with this type of neglect.  Rostow 





However, it was the intention of Rostow to demonstrate 
that, with respect to economic growth, “there is a 
universal sequence of stages in economic development quite 
independent of institutional differences and social 
structures” (Dobb 1967:18).  This absence of an account of 
the institutional arrangement is, according to Dobb, an 
illicit move by Rostow on both ontological and 
methodological grounds: ontologically illicit because it 
misrepresents the society in question and methodologically 
illicit in that stage-theory analysis is predisposed to 
reification when it is unconnected to institutional 
analysis and a sense of agency. 
 Dobb accepts that Rostow’s talk of an industrial 
“take-off,” as opposed to a “revolution,” is appropriate.  
However, Dobb did not deny, rather he insisted, that a 
revolutionary transformation had taken place in human 
history and social being.  Dobb’s analysis further 
illustrates that revolutionary transformation cannot be 
reduced to the (industrial) moments of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century.  
 The revolution took several decades, and arguably more 
than a century.  Nonetheless, the result, and what the so-
called “industrial take-off” realized, was that the social 





transformed in a revolutionary manner.  More specifically, 
given Dobb’s definition of a mode of production – the 
primary relationship between the direct producers and their 
immediate rulers – society had been transformed.  This 
meant that new institutions would be created to support the 
new structure.  The new institutions would be not only 
economic but also necessarily political, social, cultural, 
and ideological.  Moreover, the social actions of human 
beings, or human agency, would be, necessarily, radically 
revolutionized.  In others words, the ways in which the 
social structure both constrains and enables individual 
agents would be radically new, and social actions would 
have to be modified in order to navigate ‘successfully’ and 
survive within it.  
 Importantly, this meant that with the social structure 
revolutionized and the institutional arrangement (and with 
it human agency) radically transformed, stages of economic 
development, growth, and crisis would be transformed in a 
revolutionary magnitude.  Classical political economy had 
theoretically grasped the significance in the stages of 
development and growth.  However, it was Marx who 
understood best the nature of the transformation for the 






3.2.11. Dobb’s Real Intentions of Studies 
 
 In spite of the tremendous attention that the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism received following 
the publication of Studies, it was not Dobb’s primary 
concern for writing the book.  Without exaggeration, it was 
the main intention of Dobb’s Studies to understand the 
stages of economic development, growth, and crisis of 
capitalism.  To do so, Dobb believed that he first needed 
to understand the transition that took place.  First, in a 
contrastive (or scientific) sense, the structural dynamic 
of capitalism could be analyzed from and compared with the 
differences of the structural dynamic of feudalism.  
Second, Dobb believed that history is always present.  The 
idea of history always being present refers to the fact 
that social structure, modes of production, and 
institutions always evolve from those of the past.  
Contemporary institutions are always rooted in previous 
institutions and, in part, constitute them. 
 For Dobb, history is a necessary endeavor to 
understand contemporary social being.  Also, it was 
necessary to understand the institutions, the evolutionary 
development, and the contemporary forms of social being.  
Dobb’s approach to contemporary social being was not only 





stages (of development) and orientated around the concept 
of agency.  Dobb’s notion of social class includes all 
these methodological motifs.   
Social class is structural in that it is determined 
and defined by the mode of production.  Social class is 
institutional in that it is mediated by the institutional 
forms.  Stages of economic development (contingently) 
modify social class (and sociopolitical alliances).  
Finally, social class is the predominant aspect that 
determines political motives and social action.  It is in 
this sense, that for Dobb social class is the primary 
category for understanding the reproduction of any social 
arrangement or mode of production.  The social class of an 
individual determines the ways in which a person flourishes 
in (or is enabled by) and suffers in (or is constrained by) 
a society.         
Dobb not only turned to history to help understand 
contemporary social class and social being, but he also 
believed that a return to classical political economy, and 
especially the work of Karl Marx, was of the utmost 
importance.  The return to Marx was important for Dobb in 
that it was Marx who first emphasized both class-struggle 
analysis and socioeconomic crisis for understanding social 





and systematically theorize these aspects of social being, 
but he had theorized these aspects of social being further 
than Dobb’s own contemporaries.  
Dobb’s return to Marx pivots on the reproduction 
schemas constructed in volume II of Capital. Although these 
reproduction schemas are highly incomplete, they offer the 
basis for understanding the impossibility of crisis-free 
development in capitalist social relations.  It is in this 
sense that the reproduction schema is consistent with 
Dobb’s ‘primacy of the pathological.’   
The achievements of Dobb are multiple.  However, what 
is striking, and at this point needs emphasis, is that Dobb 
arrives at a methodological position that sustains a 
radical sense of agency and an ontological notion of 
structure, mediated by institutions and history.  This 
methodological position will be developed more formally in 
a later chapter.   
Currently, what is important is to recognize that 
Dobb’s methodological position allows him to develop a 
unique political economy.  It is a political economy that 
underscores four concepts: historical institutional 
totality, self-regulation, transformation, and radical 
agency.  Dobb’s particular focus is upon the moments of 





short.  That is to say, Dobb is interested in the moments 
of crisis.  Crises, however, do not explain transformation.  
Radical agency is the basis of all transformation.  Crises 
produce the opportunity for transformation, but only the 
actual historical agents can do the transforming.  Crises 
have an additional importance to social science, which Dobb 
was anxious to exploit. Methodologically, crises allow a 
theorist analytical access to the ways a system is either 
reproduced or transformed, by means of understanding the 
historical episodes a system fails to reproduce itself. 
It is indeed striking to discover that Dobb’s main aim 
in Studies was to develop a theory for the self-regulation 
and reproduction of a capitalist political economy.  For 
Dobb to understand the political economy of twentieth 
century capitalism, it was necessary to understand its 
institutions and history and historical emergence.  It was 
to this aim that the historical chapters of Studies 
concerning feudalism and precapitalism were intended.  What 
is remarkable is that these chapters contributed to the 
degree that they did for understanding feudalism and its 
mode of self-regulation, reproduction, and eventual 
transformation.   
Dobb applies his historical reflections on the roots 





construction of twentieth-century capitalism.  The section 
below outlines Dobb’s political economy, with continuing 
emphasis on the institutional structure.  Unlike the 
previous section, however, the interest in the 
institutional structure is not for its historical roots but 
its current mode of self-regulation, enlightened by 
historical insights.   
Dobb always insisted on making a distinction between 
stages of historical development and historical 
transformation.  In both cases, there is a failure for the 
system to successfully self-regulate and reproduce.  In the 
former case, modes of behavior and institutions may change 
and transform, but the main relationship between the direct 
producers and their immediate supervisors remains 
relatively stable.  In the case of historical 
transformation, modes, behavior, and institutions are 
transformed and so is the relationship between direct 
producers and their immediate supervisors. 
Dobb always was interested in the moments when self-
regulation is interrupted. In his political economy, Dobb 
emphasized the institutional arrangement or internal 
articulation of the particular stage of development.  The 
following section outlines Dobb’s political economy and its 





internal articulation and the necessary modes of agency.  
In the subsequent sections, Dobb’s reliance on Marx’s 
insights from his reproduction schemas is underscored; and 
finally, Dobb’s application of these insights or his theory 
of crisis is developed and scrutinized.      
 
3.3. Dobb’s Historical and Methodological 
 Achievement 
 
 Maurice Dobb is perhaps best known as a (Marxian) 
economic historian as especially exemplified in his Studies 
(1946) and Soviet Economic Development Since 1917 (1948).  
Virtually all the attention Studies received focused on the 
more historical sections, especially those concerning the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism and the Dobbian 
conception of the internal articulation of feudalism. As a 
theoretician of political economy, Dobb’s contributions are 
considerable and possibly may prove to be among his most 
substantial and enduring academic efforts.  
In this section, the theoretical contribution of 
Maurice Dobb toward political economy will be developed and 
scrutinized.  In Chapter 2 of this dissertation Dobb’s 
influence upon economic historians in particular and the 
study of economic history more generally was shown to be 
direct and considerable.  More specifically, Dobb’s 





historians posed to the past and, consequently, the facts 
that history reveals to the present.121  A Dobbian 
interpretation of Marx helped to facilitate the 
rejuvenation of historical materialism as a viable and 
fruitful orientation toward historical questions.  
Moreover, Dobbian insights were a movement away from and 
theoretical overcoming of two major tendencies in 
interpreting Marxian historical materialism.  On the one 
hand, Dobbian insights avoided the reductionist tendencies 
of technological determinist interpretations of Marxian 
                                                 
121 The idea being alluded to in this sentence is of great importance.  
(Historical social) facts have a dual existence.  On the one hand, 
(historical social) facts preexist their ‘discovery.’  In this sense, 
they are previously produced (historical social) phenomena; therefore 
facts have an ontological basis, or an intransitive dimension.  On the 
other hand, (historical social) “facts are social products” (Bhaskar 
1993:222).  That is to say, in their reproduction (and possible 
transformation or reinterpretation) facts as social products are 
‘discovered’ on an epistemological basis. Their ‘discovery’ pivots upon 
the conceptual schema or paradigms that govern our inquiries; so, too, 
do the interpretations of and significance given to (historical social) 
facts depend upon the conceptual schema or paradigm judging a 
‘discovered’ (historical social) fact.  In this sense, they are 
reproduced (historical social) phenomena; facts then also have a 
transitive dimension.   
 Therefore, it can be said that (historical social) facts are 
never created, since they were previously produced.  (Historical 
social) facts can be potentially revealed or reproduced by a conceptual 
schema or paradigm.  Thus, they are potentialities of particular 
conceptual schemes or paradigms (Bhaskar 1986:281).  Moreover, as a 
possibility, (historical social) facts can be transformed by cognitive 
structures or reinterpreted by alternative theories.  In this context, 
we can better understand Dobb’s historical achievements.  Armed with a 
Dobbian interpretation of Marxian historical materialism, Dobb’s 
historical probing revealed, or reproduced ‘new’ facts and in turn 
challenged, and helped to transform the interpretation of previously 
‘discovered’ facts.  Dobb’s ability to demonstrate the fruitfulness of 
a Dobbian version of Marxian historical materialism for revealing or 
reproducing new facts led to the formation of a new historical 
tradition (as discussed in the previous section of this dissertation).  
His ability to demonstrate the transformation or reinterpretation of 
reified facts had influence upon the entire discipline of socioeconomic 





historical materialism.  On the other hand, Dobbian 
insights avoided the conflationist interpretations of 
Marxian historical materialism, which in turn tend to reify 
Marxian categories and promote a strong form of dogmatism 
in Marxian accounts of history. 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the impact and 
influence Dobb had on the development of historical 
materialism.  Further, Dobb’s interpretation of Marx and 
Marxian historical materialism transformed Marxian 
historical analysis.  It is no exaggeration to state that 
Dobb and the historians he influenced helped transform the 
landscape of economic historical analysis.  In addition 
Dobb facilitated the strengthening and deepening of Marxian 
historical analysis.  These methodological and historical 
achievements of Dobb are the subject of Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation.  For the moment these achievements are 
highlighted, in part, to suggest that the magnitude of the 
Dobbian methodological and historical achievements should 
not distract attention from Dobbian theoretical 
achievements. 
In other words, the Dobb’s influence on the discipline 
of economic history has been (relatively) widely recognized 
and appreciated.  On the historical account alone, Studies 





historical development of capitalism.  The methodological 
achievement of Dobb’s has been recognized, if not yet fully 
scrutinized. 
 
3.3.1. Dobb’s Theoretical Achievement   
 
 Ironically, it was not the historical content or the 
methodological form that most interested Dobb.  Rather, 
Dobb’s intentions in Studies were actually driven by his 
aspirations to develop and construct a theory of modern 
capitalist development.  The irony is that these primary 
Dobbian aspirations have been underappreciated.  
Nonetheless three key aspects of Dobb’s theoretical work 
have been well recognized.  For example, Tony Lawson (1997) 
has praised Dobb for his theoretical efforts toward (social 
scientific) methodology in general and upon the process of 
abstraction in particular.  Second, many economic theorists 
have been influenced by Dobb’s theoretical work on (a) 
economic development and (b) economic planning.  Finally, 
Dobb’s critique of “modern trends” in economic theory, and 
within the neoclassicist tradition, has been widely 
celebrated and built upon. 
 A less recognized influence of Dobb upon economic 
theory is his analysis of contemporary capitalism and its 





capitalism appreciates and ontologically insists upon the 
changing nature of the capitalist mode of production and 
the institutions that support and constitute its dynamic 
development.   It is in this sense that a Dobbian political 
economy is reminiscent of the approach of David Gordon et 
al., or social structures of accumulation theory (SSAT). 
 The theoretical pedigree of SSAT is, in fact, very 
Dobbian.  The aim of Gordon et al., in their ground 
breaking work Segmented Work, Divided Workers: The 
Historical Transformation of Labour in the United States 
(1982) was to critique, develop, and synthesize three 
radical interpretations of U.S. labor history.  The three 
traditions were (1) J. R. Commons and the so-called 
Wisconsin school of labor history, (2) Harry Bravermen’s 
twentieth-century labor theory as expounded in his Labor 
and Monopoly Capital (1975), and (3) the new labor and 
social history of the United States as exemplified in the 
work of Herbert Gutman.122 
 Gutman, among other “new” labor historians of the 
United States, was highly influenced by, along with 
intellectually and methodologically developing directly 
from, the Dobbian-inspired economic historians (especially 
                                                 
122 For examples of Gutman’s work, see his Work, Culture & Society (1977) 
and The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom (1977).  Also for a 






E.P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm) underscored in Chapter 2 
above (see Gutman 1975:11, no. 8).  Thus, the intellectual 
pedigree from Dobb to SSAT is rather direct, with respect 
to a methodological approach to interpreting social 
history. 
 SSAT theorists initially set out to explain capitalist 
long-waves.  Although Dobb never stated that a theory of 
long-waves was his theoretical intention, he did insist on 
the changing institutional nature of the capitalist mode of 
production.  Moreover, Dobb maintained that as the 
institutional physiology of capitalism was transformed, the 
social alignments between individuals and classes also were 
potentially transformed.  Such a transformation could take 
place without necessarily transforming the essential 
defining relationship between the direct producers and 
their immediate supervisors.  In other words, institutions 
could be transformed such that the mode of production 
itself was not transformed but rather (at least 
temporarily) strengthened.  Thus, Dobb distinguished 
between the mode of production and its (changing) stages of 
historical development.  The latter refers to the 






 Thus, according to Dobb, capitalism has a malleable 
ontological existence, i.e., it has a nature to change; 
consequently, capitalism is ontologically very liable to 
institutional modification.  As a result, categories to 
interpret the capitalist mode of production must be 
malleable.  One of Dobb’s most important ontological 
insights is that the changing nature of capitalism, i.e., 
the modifications of the institutions that support the mode 
of production, not only transforms social alliances but has 
significant effects on individual agents and their motives.  
Thus, as shown in Dobb’s historical analysis, a particular 
class may be politically and economically progressive and 
revolutionary in their motive in one stage of development, 
whereas in the next stage of development, the same class 
becomes politically and economically conservative and 
reactionary in their motive.    
 Although Studies is certainly historical in its 
presentation, its aim is theoretically driven.  Dobb’s 
primary intention in Studies was to deepen and develop a 
theoretical understanding of contemporary capitalism.  
Namely, Dobb wanted to understand (1) the transformations 
between modes of production and (2) the (institutional) 
transformations within a mode of production.  Where (1) 





product-in-process formulation (see Bhaskar 1993:39, 220-
3).  
In spite of the overwhelming amount of attention on 
the conception of feudalism and subsequent transition 
(i.e., product-in-process), nearly one half of Studies is 
explicitly dedicated to the analysis of contemporary 
capitalism (i.e., process-in-product).  Moreover, it seems 
Dobb’s initial intention for the historical chapters in 
Studies concerning the internal articulation of feudalism 
and the transition from feudalism to capitalism was to 
construct a better theoretical conception of the role of 
institutions in historically determining and shaping 
contemporary circumstances, i.e., the presence of the past 
in the present and for the determination of the possible 
future. 
 
3.3.2. The Role of History in a System’s 
       Internal Articulation  
 
 With emphasis, Dobb would maintain that the lack of an 
historical understanding of social institutions contributed 
to the “mystification about the essential nature of 
capitalist society” (Dobb 1946:32).  In Dobb’s first two 
publications, Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress 
(1925) (hereafter CESP) and Wages (1928), the theoretical 





determining and shaping the motivations and beliefs of 
individuals, along with political struggles and the 
direction of economic development. 
 The overarching theme of CESP is that the dynamic of 
capitalism as a mode of production, i.e., its internal 
articulation, is a function of the specific institutional 
arrangement. More narrowly, Dobb was specifically 
interested in the institutional function of the 
entrepreneur.123   
According to Dobb the institutional function of the 
entrepreneur, though necessary, can vary in form.  Dobb 
(1925:42) argued the “Entrepreneur Function, which any 
differentiated society will need, could conceivably be 
fulfilled in a variety of ways” (Dobb 1925:42).  One way in 
which the entrepreneur’s function is fulfilled is an 
economic system controlled by “capitalist undertaking.”  A 
further area of theoretical interest in CESP is the 
specific institutional role of the capitalist undertaker in 






                                                 
123 Dobb uses the French term entrepreneur to refer to the function in 
the abstract, while the term “undertaker” is a particular concrete 
historical form of a capitalistic (i.e., individually profit motivated) 





3.3.3. The Role of the Capitalist Undertaker 
       as a Historical Agent 
 
 The conventional wisdom of entrepreneurship, as 
represented by Adam Smith (Dobb 1925:15-20) and A. P. Usher 
(Dobb 1925:9-12), is that the capitalist undertaker is 
naturally manifest and necessitated by both the increasing 
complexity of production and the widening of the division 
of labor. 
 In concert with this conventional wisdom, Dobb accepts 
that the rise of the capitalist undertaker is historically 
correlated with the increasing complexity of production and 
widening of the division of labor.  However, so is the rise 
of the capitalist undertaker correlated to and “essentially 
connected with” the economic historical dominance of 
various forms of monopolies and the formation of (new) 
social classes (Dobb 1925:13).  In this sense, Dobb 
maintains that the rise of the capitalist undertaker is not 
an inexplicable natural manifestation as suggested by 
conventional wisdom.  Rather, both the rise of and the 
contemporary ubiquitous presence and economic dominance of 
the capitalist undertaker are a function of complex social 
forces, “generated largely by businessmen themselves, who 





institutions; and institutions which man has made, man may 
also take away” (Dobb 1925:6).   
 The entrepreneur function is indeed fulfilled by the 
capitalist undertaker.  In this sense, the undertaker must 
be “credited with his virtues in fulfilling an 
indispensable economic function.” However, “the capitalist 
undertaker may have to be debited with some of the results 
of monopoly on which his existence is based” (Dobb 
1925:13).     
 Because the existence of the capitalist undertaker is 
based on forms of monopoly, the undertaker has an incentive 
to create and protect such monopoly privileges.  In short, 
the “possession of money and privileges makes easier the 
acquisition of more money and further privileges” (Dobb 
[1924]1955:10).  The significance of this otherwise very 
simple observation is that the mercantile system of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century was not necessarily the 
senseless and socially harmful imposition in its entirety. 
According to Dobb, “Mercantilism and its elaborate system 
of state-controlled monopoly played in its time a 
definitely constructive rôle” (Dobb 1925:268). 
Dobb concludes that mercantilism was a necessary 





undertaking institutions (Dobb 1955[1924]:10).  Without 
mercantilism,  
the preconditions for the revolutionary development of 
capitalist undertaking in the nineteenth century would 
scarcely have been prepared.  Without the careful 
protection of monopoly it is doubtful whether any but 
the abnormally courageous spirits could have borne the 
uncertainty of adventuring abroad.  Not only did the 
protected companies give the strength which comes from 
unity and combination; they were ensured by their 
monopoly of sufficient profits to make the large risks 
of foreign commerce worth while.  Without the 
differential gains of the upper class the large 
capitals would not have been available to finance the 
huge enterprises of two centuries later.  Without the 
new vision which was given of the possibilities of 
undertaking it is doubtful whether the spirit of 
enterprise would have been sufficiently matured to 
effect the sweeping changes of the industrial 
revolution.  Criticism of Mercantilism would, perhaps, 
be juster, if it were concentrated on the 
imperfections of senility and the untimely 
postponement of the system’s death (Dobb 1925:268-9).  
 
This conception of the “constructive” role of mercantilism 
underscores a primary theme within Dobb’s political economy 
of capitalism.  Namely, any mode of production develops in 
a series of stages.  Each stage is “characterized by 
different levels of maturity and each of them recognizable 
by fairly distinctive traits” and particular institutions 
(Dobb 1946:17). 
 
3.3.4. Undertaking and Stages of Historical 
       Development 
         
 A stage of historical development refers to a 





particular class can be progressive in one stage of 
historical development and conservative in another stage of 
historical development.  Briefly, the progressive or 
conservative (political) role of any particular class in a 
mode of production depends upon the stage of historical 
development and the particular institutional complex.   
In CESP, Dobb suggests that the capitalist undertaker 
may have been (politically) progressive in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century, whereas later in the twentieth 
century, capitalist undertakers as a class become a 
(politically) conservative force.  Dobb writes (1925:14),  
 the capitalist undertaker is the product of monopoly, 
 he can be regarded a priori neither as invariably 
 beneficent and necessary as the Liberals tend to 
 claim, nor as invariably maleficent and superfluous, 
 as the Socialists so often contend.  He may be a Jason 
 in youth and an Æetes in old age, or wild oats of 
 inexperience may give place to the mellow fruits of 
 later years.    
 
 As a mode of production develops, modifications in the 
institutional complex take place.  In turn, these 
modifications in the institutional complex change the 
position and political praxis of individuals and classes.  
Dobb maintained that the political (institutional) position 
and praxis of the capitalist undertaking class had been 
politically progressive during the seventeenth through the 





force by the latter half of the nineteenth century and into 
the twentieth century.  
 On the one hand, Dobb’s interpretation of this period 
developed and deepened from 1925 (CESP) to 1946 (Studies).  
On the other hand, Dobb’s focus on the (1) institutional 
modifications, (2) monopolization of social resources, and 
(3) the historical processes of class differentiation did 
not change from CESP to Studies.  With respect to what did 
change, Dobb prioritizes the central role of Marx’s “really 
revolutionary way” in both the emergence and development of 
capitalism (see Dobb 1946:134, 161; also Hilton 1976).  It 
is here that a distinction of crucial importance must be 
made.   For Dobb, there is great importance in the 
distinction between the mercantile feudal entrepreneur and 
the independent capitalistic entrepreneur.124  Also, in 
Marx’s really revolutionary way there is a specific 
distinction which is implicitly imported between the 
mercantile entrepreneur and the independent entrepreneur.   
                                                 
124 In CESP Dobb distinguishes between merchant undertaking, industrial 
undertaking, and finance undertaking.  This does not, however, 
underscore the point being made here.  The distinction in CESP refers 
to various forms of undertaking significant to the institutions in the 
stage of capitalist development characteristic of the early-twentieth-
century.  The distinction being made with respect to Marx’s “really 
revolutionary way” underscores the fact that the mercantile element was 
(politically) committed to and social embedded within feudal 
institutions, while the independent freeman was not.   In other words, 
while the various forms of undertaking in capitalism share particular 
political interests with respect to the mode of production, the 
mercantile and independent freeman did not necessarily share any 





 That is to say, the mercantile entrepreneur was 
socially entrenched in the feudal mode of production with 
monopoly privileges along with other feudal political 
prerogatives.  The independent freeman lacked any monopoly 
privileges and further had no ties to, hence did not 
necessarily benefit from, feudalism’s serf-labor.       
 Dobb is also more careful in Studies than he was in 
CESP to designate the period from the fourteenth century to 
the seventeenth century as feudal.  Once again, the 
influence of Marx seems here to be decisive.  In Studies, 
Dobb is much more at pains to focus his attention on the 
differentia specifica between modes of production, namely, 
the relationship between the most predominant direct 
producers and their relationship with their most immediate 
ruler. Dobb is here following the ontological and 
methodological hints of Marx, as suggested by comments in 
Capital volume III (see Marx 1981:927). 
 
3.3.5. Agency, Social Laws, and Internal Articulation 
 
 These Marxian ontological and methodological 
influences seem to have strengthened Dobb’s insistence that 
the internal articulation or institutional complex 
determines political praxis and class alliance.  





production and its specific stage of historical 
development.  In other words, an economic law is applicable 
only within the parameters of a specific institutional 
complex.  In this context, Dobb (1955[1924]:11) writes that  
an economic law stated in terms of a certain value 
relation can be either of two things: (a) it can be 
regarded as a law which exists in the realm of pure 
theory, but can only become a law of applied economics 
where there is economic equality; (b) it can be 
regarded as a law of the real world; but since it is a 
statement of a ‘subjective-price’ relation, it must be 
regarded as entirely relative to a certain 
distribution of wealth. 
 
 The distribution of social wealth depends on the 
particular institutional complex of society, i.e., the mode 
of production and the stage of historical economic 
development.  Moreover, of special importance is how and 
which members of society fulfill necessary economic 
functions (e.g., entrepreneurship). 
An illustration of the historical (institutional) 
relativity of economic laws may be informative here.  The 
law of supply may seem to be a universal (i.e., non-
relative) economic law.  The law of supply simply states 
that as the price of a commodity rises, the supply of that 
commodity will increase.  In a society where the capitalist 
undertaker predominates and fulfills the role of the 






However, the predominance of capitalist undertaking 
presupposes a particular relationship between the direct 
producers and their immediate superiors.  It presupposes 
the presence of a wage-system.  In turn, the wage-system 
presupposes ownership of social productive resources (or 
what Marx called the means of production).  A wage-system 
presupposes that one class of society legally possesses the 
social productive resources, while another class lacks 
legal access to the social productive resources.  In such a 
society (depending upon the stage historical economic 
development), the law of supply should be applicable.  Or 
in short, when the price of commodity rises, the supply of 
that commodity should be expected to increase. 
If the institutional complex is not presupposed, the 
law of supply is not necessarily applicable.  In feudalism, 
for example, the relationship between the direct producers 
and their immediate rulers is not wage-laborer/capitalist, 
but rather serf/overlord.  The ownership of the means of 
production in feudalism is not directly in the hands of a 
capitalist class but is directly in the hands of the serf 
class.  The predominant economic motive is not profit 
maximization but rent maximization.  That is to say, the 
overlord does not maximize profits but attempts to get the 





If it is further assumed that commutation takes the 
monetary form (as opposed to direct-labor service or 
payment in kind or product).  Then with rent fixed at a 
particular level, the serf-laborer will plan on a certain 
level of production to enable him to sell his commodity and 
pay rent to his overlord.  Now if the market conditions are 
more favorable than the serf had anticipated, i.e., the 
price he can command for his commodity is higher than 
initially expected, then in such a situation, the law of 
supply suggests that the supply of the commodity should 
increase in the next production period.  However, Dobb 
alternatively suggested that in feudalism it was not 
uncommon in such a situation for the supply of the 
commodity to actually fall in the next production period.  
The explanation for such a counter-intuitive result pivots 
on the recognition of the institutional arrangement. 
In feudalism, the overlord could raise rent; this 
constituted the form of exploitation in the feudal mode of 
production.  If the exchange of a commodity became more 
favorable and therefore the serf was able to command an 
increased amount of social wealth, the overlord could 
simply raise the amount of rent.  Anticipating this 
exploitation, the serf did not necessarily have an 





decrease production, hence decreasing his own personal toil 
in the next production period. 
In brief, it can then be said that when the profit 
motive predominates, this presupposes a particular 
institutional complex, i.e., a particular mode of 
production (namely capitalism) at a specific stage of 
historical economic development, whereby the law of supply 
is applicable.  However, when the rent motive predominates, 
this presupposes a different institutional complex and the 
law of supply is not necessarily applicable.  Likewise, it 
can be said that when the profit motive predominates (or in 
more Marxian language, the real subsumption of labor to 
capital), the market becomes a ubiquitous, coercive force 
on the motives of individuals within the institutional, or 
market, arrangement.  When the profit motive does not 
predominate (or there is only formal subsumption of labor 
to capital), the market does not become a ubiquitous, 
coercive force.   
 
3.3.6. Capitalistic Undertaking and the  
       Entrepreneurial Function 
 
What is decisive for the applicability of any 
socioeconomic law is the institutional arrangement.  





historical circumstances, capitalist undertakers emerged as 
a class to fulfill the role of the entrepreneur function. 
The (a) deepening of the division of labor and (b) the 
increased complexity of economic society necessitated (1) 
the entrepreneur function, while (various historical 
processes of) (c) class differentiation and (d) 
monopolization of particular social resources allowed for 
(2) the capitalist undertaker to fulfill the entrepreneur 
function for society. 
In this sense, it can be said that while the 
entrepreneur function is historically necessitated by (a) 
and (b) above, the capitalist undertaker fulfilling this 
function is not necessitated but rather socially and 
historically contingent.  In other words, the entrepreneur 
function can be fulfilled in a variety of ways (Dobb 
1925:42).   
Dobb (1925:48, 42ff) mentions four social systems of 
enterprise with four different ways of fulfilling the 
entrepreneur function:   
  1. Classless Individualism 
  2. Communism 
  3. Capitalist Undertaking 
  4. State Capitalism 
Private property exists in the first system, and the 





entrepreneur function is fulfilled by independent and 
individual craftsmen.  However, special institutions would 
have prevented class differentiation and prohibited the 
monopolization of social resources.  
In the second system, special institutions must also 
prevent class differentiation and prohibit monopolization 
of social resources.  However, control of the entrepreneur 
function is not in the hands of individual agents; rather 
it is performed by ‘agents of community.’  These communal 
agents would be public servants, of sorts, and part of a 
collective or semiautonomous (production) body reminiscent 
of mediaeval collective bodies.125  Perhaps such 
semiautonomous bodies could be described as the fiscal 
analogue to the Federal Reserve System or various 
contemporary monetary authorities.  
In the third system, much like the first system, 
private individuals would fulfill the role of the 
entrepreneur function.  However, unlike both the first and 
second systems, no special institutions would have 
prevented class differentiation nor necessarily prohibited 
the monopolization of social resources.  Hence, significant 
                                                 
125 Curiously this is how Keynes describes his notion of “semi-autonomous 






class divisions exist, and monopolization of (at least) 
some of the society’s resources has occurred. 
The class differentiation allows for the rise of a 
particular differential advantage of the richer to “claim a 
larger share of the income of the community than their 
fellows” (Dobb 1925:125).  The inequality of income 
disrupts the index of utility by which both undertaking and 
socioeconomic adjustments are regulated.  When there are 
competing demands for social resources to be directed 
toward either luxuries for the rich or necessities for the 
poor, while luxuries are at the same time more profitable, 
social resources will be directed toward the production of 
luxuries. 
Therefore, with the entrepreneurial function dominated 
by capitalist undertaking, there emerges a simultaneous 
falsification in the index of production.  The 
falsification is cumulative.  Every financial gain of an 
individual undertaker increases his or her differential 
advantage over his or her brethren.  At the same time, his 
or her financial gain lowers the marginal utility of money 
to him or her.  Hence, it becomes easier for him or her to 
face the risk and uncertainty that both accompany the 
entrepreneur function and discourage others with a higher 





uncertainty of entrepreneurship.  Therefore, “the rich tend 
to get richer, and the poor conversely to get poorer” (Dobb 
1955[1924]:13). 
Finally, in the fourth system of state capitalism, 
there is not necessarily any special institution to prevent 
class differentiation; hence this system has both class 
division and significant inequalities of income and 
distribution. With respect to the entrepreneurial function, 
in some industries, individual capitalist undertakers would 
dominate, and the profit motive would prevail as the 
regulator of production.  However, in state capitalism a 
large sphere of industry is operated “not by individual 
undertakers, but by the State” (Dobb 1925:49).  
 In that the state functions as a collective body for 
public service, there are certain affinities regarding 
socioeconomic management between state capitalism and 
communism (i.e., systems 2 and 4 above).  However, the 
social inequality present in state capitalism gives rise to 
“dangers” of economic management that are not necessarily 
present in communism.  One such danger emerges from “the 
inequality of income” which “may preclude the raising of 
prices in time of shortage for fear of throwing the major 





There is also an ideological “danger” in state 
capitalism with respect to what industries should be 
managed by the state and which industries should be 
regulated by individual capitalist undertakers.  Even with 
this ideological “danger” subdued, there is always the 
danger of the state management “crowding-out” private 
enterprise.  With consideration of these “dangers” and 
several others (Dobb 1925:372-374), “laissez-faire” 
advocates “decry all attempts by control or by subsidies to 
interfere with the unconscious operations of the market” 
(Dobb 1925:374-5).126 
 
3.3.7. Dobb’s Ideological Critique of the 
       Entrepreneur Myth 
 
Dobb does not necessarily advocate any one of these 
four (ideal) systems.  Rather, Dobb intends to attack what 
he calls the “Entrepreneur Myth” (Dobb 1925:400, 3-5, Dobb 
                                                 
126 Similar inequalities can exist in vulgar communism where class 
differentiation is not curtailed.  “There has been considerable 
confusion among economic writers over this whole matter, largely due to 
an incomplete theory of the undertaker. […] The confusion is most 
marked in the habitual usage of the terms Socialism and Communism.  
Socialism has been used to denote both systems 2 and 4 [i.e., Communism 
and State Capitalism].  Communism, however, has been made to refer, as 
a rule, to an economic system which does not use the device of money 
and price. […] This may describe the doctrines of Anarchist Communism, 
but it does not seem to correspond to anything that is or is likely to 
be a serious political reality.  The writer has accordingly reserved 
the word ‘Socialism’ to describe a general trend of political doctrine, 
and has used the term ‘Communism,’ as above, with the distinctive 





1955[1924]).  Dobb’s (1955[1924]:8) entrepreneur myth 
maintains that  
because the capitalist undertaker arose historically 
 as the co-ordinating force in a complex world, 
 therefore in some absolute sense this was the 
 ‘necessary’ and only possible method by which that 
 integration could have taken place [in a complex 
 society]. 
 
Dobb’s criticism of the entrepreneur myth is that the 
historical rise of the capitalist undertaker is not 
historically ‘necessary’.  Instead, it is historically 
contingent upon particular social institutions that allow 
for and facilitate differential advantages via class 
differentiation and the monopolization of (certain) social 
resources.  The latter social developments of differential 
advantages manifest social, income, and distribution 
inequalities.  Further, the continuation of capitalist 
undertaking not only reproduces but also tends to augment 
these inequalities, unless special institutions are 
constructed to prevent this augmentation of inequalities 
(e.g., redistributive tax system or subsides). 
Dobb insists that there has tended to be a general 
neglect of the entrepreneurial function within mainstream 
neoclassicist theory.  Moreover, the necessity of the 
capitalist undertaker to fulfill the social function of the 





tradition.  Neglect of rigorous analysis of the 
entrepreneurial function and the implicit assumption of the 
necessity for the capitalist undertaker to fulfill this 
function has tended to devalue the importance of 
differential advantages for the social predominant presence 
of capitalist undertakers in the (necessary) social role of 
the entrepreneurial function.   
 
3.3.8. The Analytical Neglect of the  
       Entrepreneurial Function  
 
According to Dobb, there are two main reasons for the 
general neglect of analyzing the entrepreneurial function.  
First, with respect to the historical interpretation, Dobb 
argued that there had been an overemphasis on the 
eighteenth-century (English) industrial revolution (with a 
simultaneous attack on mercantilism) as the genesis of 
capitalist undertaker.  At the same time, there was a 
neglect of the role of social differentiation and monopoly 
privileges during the period from the sixteenth century to 
the eighteenth century in making the social conditions for 
the possibility of the industrial revolution (Dobb 
1925:262ff, 306-8, Dobb 1955[1924]:10).        
Second, Dobb maintained that the “pure theory” of 
neoclassicism abstracts away from the institutional 





privileges of the actual world are not taken into account.  
Furthermore, when a divergence between pure theory and 
applied economics arise, the “exceptions” tend to be “swept 
aside under [the category of] ‘economic friction.’”  At the 
same time, “the ideal entrepreneur of pure theory” is 
“hedged and guarded with ceteris paribus” clauses.  
Consequently, “The extent of the divergence of the real 
from the ideal has not been sufficiently examined” but 
instead tacitly abstracted away from it by means of ceteris 
paribus; “nor has sufficient attention been given to the 
conditions which may tend to make this divergence so great 
that any identification of the two becomes, not only 
unprofitable, but absurd” (Dobb 1955[1924]:8).  
In short, Dobb complains of the neglect of 
institutional analysis and the specific role of 
institutions in the reproduction and (past and future) 
historical development of the socioeconomic conditions. 
This neglect of institutional analysis is further tacitly 
encouraged by the overly abstract theory of neoclassicism. 
Dobb aimed to fulfill this neglect in CESP by means of 
a critical attack on the entrepreneur myth and by carrying 
forth an historical institutional analysis of the 





results pivot on institutional insights into the 
entrepreneurial function of society.  
 
3.3.9. The Entrepreneurial Function: The  
       Immanence of Crisis  
 
These Dobbian results included the proposition that 
capitalist undertaking developed, is conditioned, and 
depends upon (1) (historical) differential socioeconomic 
advantages and (2) the inequality of income and 
distribution.   However, in a society where individual 
capitalist undertakers fulfill the role of the entrepreneur 
function, a third problem manifests, (a contingent) 
immanence for (3) socioeconomic miscalculation and 
maladjustment, or crisis.   
Understanding the immanence of crisis begins with the 
simple observation that each individual and independent 
capitalist undertaker must estimate the quantity of the 
supply that he or she is able to market.  The estimate in 
quantity supplied to the market by the individual 
capitalist undertaker depends on two main calculations.   
First, the state of consumer demand must be determined 
(the market price will offer the first estimation of 
consumer demand).  The second calculation is the quantity 
of supply likely to be marketed by competitors.  Although 





uncertainty, it is otherwise rarely much of a culprit in a 
major (or social-sized) miscalculation.  The same cannot be 
said for for the second calculation, however.  “Short of a 
system of espionage or the frank publication of business 
secrets and intentions, one can know [regarding the 
quantity supplied by one’s competitors] scarcely anything 
at all” (Dobb 1925:379).  Thus, uncertainty of the 
production of one’s competitors introduces risk to 
capitalist undertaking. 
Dobb maintained that due to the uncertainty of the 
second factor, the liability of miscalculation on the part 
of capitalist undertakers is highly probable.  Dobb writes, 
“There is abundant field for miscalculation; here, where 
basis for sound calculation is absent, emotional influences 
(business optimism, etc.) enter in” (Dobb 1955[1924]:14).  
Thus, more than a decade before Keynes’s notion of “animal 
spirits,” Dobb underscored the importance of emotional 
influences of the investing class for the determination of 
the level of employment, the level of national output, and 
the (mal)adjustment of society to miscalculations. 
When miscalculations are universal and in the same 
direction, Say’s law of markets can be said to hold.  
However, when the miscalculations are not universal nor in 





anticipations and the actual facts” arise (Dobb 1925:384).  
The sharp conflict will in turn manifest into “severe 
maladjustment and wastage will result--over-capitalisation 
and over-production in certain industries" (Dobb 
1955[1924]:14), “in a word, a crisis” (Dobb 1925:384).  
Hence, in society where the social entrepreneurial function 
is in the control of independent and individual capitalist 
undertakers, Say’s law of markets is not likely to hold, or 
crisis becomes immanent.   
 
3.3.10. The Cradle of Crisis 
 
 In CESP, the immanence of crisis is rooted in the fact 
that capitalism is characterized by anarchy of production.  
However, the anarchy of production is not necessarily the 
culprit of crisis.  Rather, the culprit that causes the 
immanence for socioeconomic crisis is the emotional 
response of individual and independent capitalist 
undertakers to (objective) uncertainty and the tendency 
toward (subjective) miscalculations. 
The effect of risk, uncertainty, and ignorance upon 
the class of capitalist undertakers becomes devastating to 
society.  The crisis will transform any previous optimism 
among undertakers “to pessimism and timidity. […] The 





capitalist spirit – destroy the undertaker’s self-
confidence and his incentive to brave uncertainty"(Dobb 
1925:384).   
Production will be curtailed and “undertakers will 
seek to turn away as many [productive] resources and as 
much labour as they can and ‘the bonds which unite 
different enterprises will become channels through which 
the depression will spread to other enterprises’” (Dobb 
1925:386).  The inside quotes of this passage is the voice 
of W. Mitchell, demonstrating anticipation of both Dobb and 
Mitchell for the theory of effective demand, and the 
multiplier effect that would be emphasized a decade later 
in Keynes’ General Theory. 
 
3.3.11. Oversupply: The Failure of Say’s Law 
 
Certainly, Dobb is here rejecting Say’s law of 
markets; even though “prima facie, it would seem that these 
several errors of miscalculation would approximately cancel 
out and that” various miscalculations “would not be a 
burden felt by the whole market” (Dobb 1925:379).  Dobb 
maintained that, in fact, it is probable that in an economy 
where the entrepreneurial function is dominated by 





manifest as a universal phenomena for the following 
reasons. 
First, socioeconomic events occur such that 
expectations of all competing undertakers are in the same 
directions; hence calculations will tend to be in the same 
direction.  A period of capitalist optimism “plays upon the 
existing uncertainty and tempts the undertaker to 
overestimate the chances of gain and to be a little blind 
to the chances of loss” (Dobb 1925:380). 
Second, although the individual undertaker cannot 
predict the output of his competitors, competition itself 
is expected.  The individual undertaker must aim to capture 
“some of the market from his rivals […] and to this extent 
his miscalculations are likely to err on the side of 
excessive supply” (Dobb 1925:380). 
Third, the individual undertaker does not have the 
luxury of refraining from oversupply.  Whether the 
individual undertaker follows or refrains from his or her 
rivals’ “ill-placed optimism,” he or she will suffer from 
the fall in the commodity price.  Best he or she errs on 
the side of excessive supply and hope to capture consumer 
demand by means of aggressive marketing and share in any 
prosperity while it might last, rather than leave a portion 





For these three reasons, according to Dobb, in a 
society where the entrepreneurial function is in the hands 
of independent and individual capitalist undertakers, there 
is a high probability of excessive miscalculation. Dobb, of 
course, attempts to explain the circumstances that both 
anticipate and describe the (Keynesian) multiplier effect.  
Of course, like the multiplier effect, the cumulative 
nature of the emotional response of individual undertakers 
functions similarly in a state of optimism as it does in a 
state of pessimism. 
That is to say, if the mood of optimism fades and “an 
opposite mood of pessimism” becomes manifest, the reaction 
will then be “in the reverse direction.”  “Optimism and 
pessimism alike will act as rapidly spreading epidemic” 
upon the mood and spirit of each individual undertaker 
(Dobb 1925:380-1).  Hence, boom and bust, in a word, crisis 
is immanent for society as a whole due to the nature and 
logic of the entrepreneurial function being in the hands of 
individual capitalist undertakers. 
 
3.3.12. Explanation of Crisis Deepened 
 
It would be a mistake, however, to understand the 
Dobbian explanation of the nature of capitalist crisis 





undertaker (or Keynesian ‘animal spirits’). Clearly 
informed by Marx, Dobb’s insistence on the immanence of 
crisis in a society where the entrepreneurial function is 
controlled by individual capitalist undertakers pivots on 
the relationship between “constructional goods” and non-
constructional, or consumable goods of society (see Dobb 
1925:382ff, Dobb 1955[1924]:14).  This distinction clearly 
draws from Marx’s division of respectively Department I and 
Department II commodities in volume II of Capital.127  
Dobb maintained that the demand for constructional 
goods especially will fluctuate.  Constructional goods are 
generally the more enduring products of industry, whereas 
the demand of constructional goods tends to be periodic.  
An increase in the production of consumable good will 
increase the demand of constructional goods.  The actual 
need for new constructional goods during, for example, an 
industrial expansion or trade boom will further tend to 
magnify even more greatly the actual production of 
constructional goods.  As A. C. Pigou pointed out,  
the new additions to plant are only a fraction of the 
 total stock of plant in use; and the need for a 10 per 
 cent increase in the latter [i.e., the need of an 
 industry for machinery] may involve an 80 per cent or 
                                                 
127 This is not to suggest that Dobb is necessarily exclusively drawing 
from Marxian ideas for his explanation of the immanence of crisis.  In 
Chapter 23 of CESP, Dobb is also informed by the Cambridge economists 
A. Pigou, J. M. Keynes, D. H. Robertson, and the Institutionalists W. 





 100 per cent increase in the former [i.e., the actual 
 new production of machinery] (Dobb 1925:283).  
 
 Thus, during an expansionary phase of industry the 
production of constructional goods will be especially 
magnified.  Production in machinery will tend to (over) 
expand in response to an increase in the demand for 
consumable goods.  As Dobb pointed out 
after the completion of this batch of boom orders, the 
demand will probably fall off considerably, and the 
constructional trades will find themselves heavily 
over-capitalised and over-producing.  The rise in 
price in this case will tend to be a deceptive index: 
it will not be a true index of the state of demand 
over the average of the ensuing years.  Undertakers, 
however, will tend, not only to respond automatically 
to this index, but to respond in a greater proportion. 
[…] It will be better for each undertaker to expand 
during the boom demand, and to swell the eventual 
over-production, rather than to have none of the 
profits of the boom and to suffer just the same the 
losses of the over-production produced by his rivals’ 
temerity.  But what is better for each will not be 
better for all (Dobb 1955[1924]:14). 
 
The conditions engendered by the particular dynamic of a 
society which is dominated by individual capitalist 
undertaking are of the nature of a socioeconomic anarchy of 
production.  The instability of these conditions of 
socioeconomic anarchy is periodically, otherwise 
continually, illustrated by the “recurring condition of 
general over-supply beyond the point where goods can be 
sold at prices which yield anticipated profits” (Dobb 





overproduction is that it is not relative to the capacity 
of the consumer demand, but rather relative to the profits 
of capitalist undertaking. 
 Second, the oversupply of commodities is uneven from 
industry to industry in that “prices and profits will rise 
unequally in different industries, and in response the 
fever of activity will rage at different temperatures” 
(Dobb 1925:385).  The temperature will be especially high 
during an industrial expansion in the constructional goods 
sector.  For this reason, the constructional goods sector 
will attract economic resources “to a point where their 
marginal usefulness is considerably below what it would be 
in other employments” (Dobb 1925:386).  
 The instability induced by the risk and uncertainty of 
individual capitalist undertaking will constitute a 
powerful impetus of encouragement for the individual 
undertakers to combine or collude, with the aim to gain 
some control of the conditions of economic anarchy.  
Moreover, it will provide an impulse for undertakers to 
expand their markets “so as to arrest the decline in prices 
and profits and capital values” (Dobb 1925:387).  For the 
reasons alluded to above, the need for new markets will be 






3.3.13. Imperialism  
 
 The latter point is of significance in that Dobb 
believed it to be the basis for the modern era of 
imperialism (see Dobb 1925:338-350, 387ff, also Dobb 1937).  
Imperialism is the first of three major institutional 
changes that provide reasons for the theorist to believe 
that there had been a politico-institutional shift away 
from both the political doctrine of laissez-faire and the 
economic doctrine of (old) liberalism. 
The emergence of imperialism crowns the state to 
fulfill an essential role of encouragement for both finance 
and extending trade and a return to mercantilist aims (Dobb 
1925:339).  Moreover, “the evils which attached to 
Mercantilism in the eighteenth century seem to have 
attached themselves already to the new Imperialism” (Dobb 
1925:349).  In this sense, the “resemblance of the new 
Imperialism to the old Mercantilism is not” merely a 
“superficial […] political doctrine of national trade,” but 
an economic desire to reduce risk and uncertainty and gain 
economic control (Dobb 1925:341). 
 
3.3.14. Additional Institutional Developments 
 
If Imperialism is an economic departure from the 





other institutional developments.  “First [of these 
institutional developments] is the fact that the democratic 
tendency of the nineteenth century towards the diffusion of 
political power has received a definite check” (Dobb 
1925:336).  No longer is it clear whether the state is “a 
reflection of popular will” or “a political department of 
the larger capitalist undertakings” (Dobb 1925:336).   
A second institutional development that emerges in the 
wake of the failures of both old liberalism and its 
laissez-faire policy is the “modern Labour movement” (Dobb 
1925:350-351).  The modern labor movement was the surrender 
of the Old Unionism (see Dobb 1928:162-5), which had 
tacitly accepted liberalism and merely sought to win a few 
privileges for a few privileged crafts.  In its place arose 
New Unionism (see Dobb 1928:165-8), which began “for the 
first time a collective class interest” (Dobb 1925:352).  
New Unionism was a movement of collectivism against 
laissez-faire, often in support of large corporate 
enterprise and sometimes found to be partial to the new 
imperialism.  The new labor movement was especially in 
favor of supplantation of individual undertaking “by State 
undertaking in all those cases where individual profit and 





The method of New Unionism was to rise above sectarian 
tendencies of Old Unionism and instead be “as all-embracing 
as possible” (Dobb 1928:167).  If some workers stood 
outside of the union “and were not included in collective 
bargaining,” then the negotiated “standard rate” (in effect 
a type of minimum wage [Dobb 1928:180]) would not apply to 
all workers.  Therefore, “the possibility still remained of 
the standard being undercut by the competition of other 
workers who offered their labour at a lower rate” (Dobb 
1928:166). 
It was not long before New Unionism became a political 
movement in its own right.  In early twentieth-century 
England, the Labour Party was formed.  Initially, the 
Labour Party was intent on securing the legislative 
“sanction for the right of collective bargaining” and for 
the legal right to “strike” (Dobb 1928:169).  However, with 
the newly won political battles and a significant political 
presence, “the New Unionism had come to adopt a definite 
social philosophy.”  This new social philosophy “involved 
the acceptance of the main characteristics and institutions 
of the wage-system,” and thus, it was a type of reformism 
(Dobb 1928:170). 
This reformism also attempted to extend the hand of 





sanction collective bargaining and to implement minimum 
wage legislation so as to raise the standard of livelihood 
of the working class.  Reformism, or New Unionism, is a 
movement away from revolutionary trade unionism.  The 
latter aimed to overthrow the wage-system; the former aims 
to function within it, as an institution of and for 
collective bargaining.  “The actual machinery of collective 
bargaining itself, as it develops, tends to merge by 
degrees into machinery which may be described as an 
elementary form of workers’ control over industrial policy” 
(Dobb 1928:195).  
The reformism of the New Unionism was “fertile soil 
for the Fabian seed.”  New Unionism or Labor Fabianism 
formed alliances with both the state and the middle class 
(Dobb 1925:352).  Actions of employers and trade unions 
alike tended to be purely strategic, with little 
consideration for the general efficiency of production.  
Hence, the development of strong (Fabian) state-sponsored 
unionism made industry less fluid and rendered it sluggish. 
Strong unionism tended to obstruct the very forces of 
rapid adjustment of resources upon which individual 
undertaking depends.  “For instance, resistance to wage-
reductions during a trade depression may hinder in certain 





occupations, where it is less superfluous” (Dobb 1925:356 
no. 1). 
It was in consideration of trade union ‘obstruction’ 
that the advocate of laissez-faire policy criticized any 
interference with the unconscious mechanisms of market 
adjustment (Dobb 1925:374-5).  It would be the marginal 
productivity theory128 of Jevons and Marshall that would 
offer a theoretical justification for the denunciation of 
trade union activity in permanently raising wages.  Dobb 
(1928:132) points out that in defending marginal 
productivity theory   
Jevons devoted a large part of his inaugural lecture 
 at Owens College, Manchester, to an attack on trade 
 unions, and in a popular primer declared that “there 
 is no reason whatever to think that trades unions have 
 had any permanent effect in raising wages in the 
 majority of trades.”  
  
Jevons was committed to a thesis of “natural laws” 
governing the distribution between profits and wages, hence 
the futility of the actions of trade unions, with the 
corollary that there is an essential harmony between 
capital and labor.  Jevons declared that the worker in a 
                                                 
128 The normative policy aims of the marginal productivity theory of 
distribution are nearly identical with the wage-fund doctrine of 
classical political economy.  The wage-fund doctrine “was principally 
used to demonstrate the unbending corollary that bargaining power or 
trade union action was impotent to alter the wage level as  a whole, 
and that any measures which hindered the accumulation of capital (e.g. 
taxation of the rich to subsidize the poor) were bound to lower wages 





laissez-faire market economy received “the due value of his 
produce,” in that the worker’s reward varied with his 
“productivity” (Dobb 1928:105). 
The extreme version of the marginal productivity 
theory of distribution was, according to Dobb, one of its 
original exponents, namely, J.B. Clark’s.  In the Clarkian 
form, each factor of production received the equivalent of 
its contribution to the production process: “‘the law 
itself’, said Clark, ‘is universal and hence natural’” 
(Dobb 1973:176).  In addition to being universal, the 
“natural law” of distribution was in the Clarkian view 
“held” to be “true independently of time and place” (Dobb 
1928:105).   
 
3.3.15. Illicit Abstractions: Marginal  
        Productivity Theory 
 
Therefore, in the extreme (Clarkian) version of 
marginal productivity theory of distribution, the 
institutional arrangement had no long-term effect on the 
level of wages (or upon the level of profits, interests, 
and rent).  This extreme (Clarkian) position reveals a less 
extreme, hence much more commonly employed, methodological 
corollary.  Namely, economic theory can justifiably be 
conducted at such a level that abstracts away from the 





society.  Stanley Jevons most rigorously argued for this 
methodological position.  The significance of this 
(Jevonian) methodological position is of the utmost 
importance, according to Dobb.  In fact, so much so that 
Dobb dubs the 1870s developments in economic theory the 
“Jevonian Revolution” (Dobb 1973:166ff).   
In addition to policy aims (see footnote 8), the 
marginal productivity theory of distribution has many 
similarities to the wage-fund doctrine of classical 
political economy.129  More or less superficially, both 
theories argue that wages (and distribution more generally) 
are predominantly determined by the factors that affect the 
demand of labor. However, they differ in what factors are 
deemed to be most important.  The wage-fund doctrine had 
emphasized the supply of capital as the main factor for the 
demand of labor (Dobb 1928:98), whereas marginal 
productivity theory underscores the productivity of labor 
as the chief factor in the demand for labor (Dobb 
1928:103).  
The more substantial similarity between these theories 
is the belief in a highly elastic (in the case of the wage-
                                                 
129 Dobb (1973:188, n.) notes that “Professor Stigler, rather 
surprisingly, thinks that ‘Jevons does not depart far from the 
classical theory.  His conception of capital and its rate is basically 
the same as that incorporated in the wages-fund doctrine’; the main 
difference being ‘that the classical doctrine assumes a fixed period of 





fund doctrine, sometimes perfectly elastic) demand for 
labor (Dobb 1955[1929]:24-5).  In this sense, the corollary 
of the futility of trade union action and state 
interference was strengthened with the marginal 
productivity theory of distribution.  That is to say, 
rather than being implicitly assumed, the elasticity of the 
demand for labor was made explicit in the theory of 
distribution of marginal productivity analysis.  Moreover, 
it was more consciously understood that the elasticity of 
labor demand was decisive for the results obtained.  
Dobb (1928:103) insists that according to the marginal 
productivity theory of distribution,  
if the demand for labour was elastic, interference to 
 raise wages above their ‘natural level’ (unless it was 
 coupled with increased productivity) would have the 
 more damaging result of causing an actual shrinkage in 
 the funds devoted to the employment of labour, instead 
 of merely leaving this fund unchanged. 
 
Given the supply of natural resources and the supply 
of capital, along with technology and productivity held 
constant, and in concrete with an elastic demand for labor, 
the level of wages at full-employment would be “rigidly 
determined.”  If the level of wages were to be 
“artificially” increased above this “natural” level, 
whether by ‘successful’ trade union activity or state 





abstraction was such that, as stated above, this doctrine 
was believed to be universal, hence independent of any 
particular politico-economic institutional arrangement.  
Dobb maintained that such a high level of abstraction 
imported illicit assumptions and misguided conclusions. 
Upon closer scrutiny, marginal productivity theory of 
distribution depends on three important assumptions: (1) 
The supply labor must be given or is necessarily 
deterministic and thus predictable.  (2) The supply of 
capital must also be given or is internally deterministic.  
(3) The factors that determine the supply of labor and the 
demand of labor must be independent of one another. 
 
3.3.16. Dobb’s Critique of Marginal  
        Productivity Theory 
 
Dobb maintained that the marginal productivity theory 
of distribution is incomplete and suffers from the “fallacy 
of an ambiguous state” (Dobb 1955:16).  First, the 
definition of the supply of labor is not entirely clear.  
It may refer to the number of workers, the number of hours 
worked, or the intensity of work (Dobb 1928:110).   
More importantly, marginal productivity theory relates 
the supply of labor to the disutility involved in work 
(Dobb 1955[1929]:24). Dobb suggested that this element of 





labor is itself institutionally determined.  Most 
generally, the higher the opportunity costs of not working, 
the lower the wage.  For example, if workers are in control 
of their means of production, then the less likely it is 
that they hire themselves out for wages (Dobb 1928:5-9).  
This was at issue during the feudal era with the 
predominance of serf labor and also a phenomenon 
characteristic of many developing nations, where there is 
free(r) access to social resources (e.g., in sixteenth 
century to eighteenth century North America). 
Moreover, whether or not there is a positive 
correlation between the wage-level and the amount of work 
performed depends on a number of factors and so cannot 
merely be assumed (Dobb 1928:54). Dobb is here referring to 
the cases in which a supply-curve of labor is backwards-
bending or negatively sloped.   
However, for Dobb, the backwards-bending supply-curve 
does not only apply to relative high levels of income or 
disagreeable work.  More generally, Dobb suggests that the 
“poorer is the wage-earning class, and the smaller any 
reserve that workers have to fall back upon, the cheaper 
the price at which they are willing to sell their labour-





The culprit in the presupposition of a deterministic 
supply of labor is a further assumption that the marginal 
utility of income for the seller is (relatively) constant 
(Dobb 1955[1929]:25).  However, the marginal utility of 
income is itself a function of the amount of income.  “The 
lower the income which people have, the higher the 
valuation they put on each additional shilling; or the more 
they are willing to do in order to obtain an extra 
shilling” (Dobb 1928:111). 
Since the laborer is otherwise propertyless, the sale 
of labor-power will be the sole source of income.  As such, 
the terms of the sale of a laborer’s labor-power will be 
the principal determinant in her valuation of her utility 
of income.  In this sense, the institutional complex and 
relative strength of organized labor (versus that of 
organized industry) will be a significant determinant in 
the valuation of a laborer’s subjective utility of income.  
Dobb argued that an actual change in the price of 
labor, whether it is an increase or decrease, will manifest 
in a change in the subjective supply-price of labor and 
therefore creates “a tendency for any fall in wages to 
become cumulative, as in the classic case of sweated 
trades.”  In the Post-Keynesian spirit that develops later, 





“equilibrium” at all, it is one characterized not by 
stability, but rather instability (Dobb 1955[1929]:25). 
 
3.3.17. The Instability of Labor Markets 
 
The main determinant in the relative instability of 
labor market equilibrium is the relative instability and 
enduring characteristics of the institutional physiology of 
society and the relative strength and bargaining position 
of organized labor versus organized industry. 
In short, the level of income received will itself 
determine the “marginal utility of income.”  It seems to be 
for a very similar reason that warrant is found for David 
Ricardo’s and classical political economy’s insistence on 
the determination of distribution prior to both a theory 
and production and theory exchange (see Dobb 1973:84-5, 
Dobb 1955[1929]:31, also see Dobb 1937:37ff). 
 For Dobb, the distribution of income is itself 
primarily a function of various socioeconomic institutions, 
the particularity of their arrangement, and political 
legislation.  The stability of institutions and legislation 
can offer the appearance of stability of the subjective 
“marginal utility of income” of workers.  The instability 
of institutions and legislation will suggest to the 





supply-curve or abandon (any rigidity in) the notion of 
(labor-market) equilibrium.  Dobb (1928:111 no.1) writes: 
It is a matter of convenience, rather than any 
principle, whether this [instability in the marginal 
utility of income] is expressed in the form of a 
single supply-curve which slopes back, or in a series 
of movements of the whole supply-curve to new 
positions as the marginal utility of income changes.  
For purposes of statistical study of concrete data the 
former is the more serviceable; but for purposes of 
analysing the separate causes of change, the latter is 
the more convenient, and the distinction implied by it 




3.3.18. The Indeterminacy of the Supply of 
        Capital  
 
Dobb further maintained the marginal production theory 
of distribution leaves many things ambiguous with respect 
to the determination of the supply of capital (Dobb 
1928:106).  Dobb’s concern here harks back to CESP and the 
relative risk and uncertainty involved in the process of 
entrepreneurship.   
An increase in the relative strength of labor will 
tend to have a positive effect on the relative level of 
risk and uncertainty involved in the entrepreneurial 
function of the capitalist undertaker (Dobb 1925:356).  
Marginal productivity theory predicts that an increase in 
the level of wages and a simultaneous fall in the level of 





undertakers in fulfilling their role of entrepreneurial 
function.  A failure to fulfill their social role 
necessarily leads to a decrease of investment, hence, a 
fall in the supply of capital and the level of employment. 
However, Dobb suggests that a decrease in the income 
of the capitalist undertaking class may actually stimulate 
investment (Dobb 1928:126ff).  For this argument, Veblen’s 
influence upon Dobb seems decisive (Dobb 1955[1929]:28).  
Dobb suggests that before one can understand the effect of 
a decrease in the incomes of the capitalist undertaking 
class, the consumption habits and the role of “conventional 
standards” upon the consumption patterns of the investing 
class must first be understood (Dobb 1955[1929]:27). 
Dobb considered the relation between the investing 
class’s income and their consumption patterns to be of 
great importance.  Dobb maintained that if the wage-level 
is increased and the investing class is not able to pass on 
this increase in their costs of production to the rentier 
class, then the capitalist undertaking class must decrease 
either (a) their personal consumption, (b) the amount of 
money dedicated to investment, or (c) both. 
Dobb suggested that even though the income of the 
undertaking class has fallen, whereby they have become 





decrease in investment of new capital.  Rather, since their 
present income has fallen and, further, it is probable that 
their future income will be adversely affected, it may be 
the case that individual capitalist undertakers become 
encouraged or induced to invest a larger proportion of 
their income (Dobb 1928:126-7).   
This means that in the short-run, their present 
consumption of goods would decrease; however, if their 
investments are successful, they can return to a ‘higher 
standard’ of consumption in the future.  Thus, an increase 
in the wage-level may actually manifest not in a decrease 
but rather an increase in capital investment. 
This result is rendered even more probable, according 
to Dobb, by the fact that the expenditures of the rich are 
largely conventional or Veblenian (Dobb 1955[1929]:28).   
Although the relationship between marginal utility of 
income is normally inversely related to the amount of 
income possessed, in the case of the wealthy capitalist 
undertaker, this is not necessarily the case.  For the 
wealthy, who are most often the investing class, habit and 
conventional standards rule the consumption of luxuries and 






Our need for afternoon tea is mainly because others 
drink it; our desire for a tailored suit is chiefly 
because it is customary and carries a certain social 
prestige; the zeal for filling bookshelves with first 
editions and sideboards with hall-marked silver would 
undoubtedly be much smaller if social prestige did not 
enter into the matter.  If we take all such 
conventional standards as given parameters in our 
equations, no formal difficulty arises, and to this 
extent the conception of an independent demand-curve 
for labour remains.  The question here is one not of 
logical consistency, but of consistency with practice.  
In the case of our previous and more fundamental 
difficulty it was a case of the logical inconsistency 
of treating the marginal utility of income to the 
worker as constant when the income of the worker was 
implied in any assumption as to what the marginal 
utility of that income was.  Here it is a practical 
question whether the assumption of conventional 
standards as independent of the income of the class in 
question is consistent or not with the actual facts. 
 If such an assumption is illegitimate, there is 
no warrant for concluding that the rise in the price 
of labour, decreasing the profits of the propertied 
class will necessarily cause a shrinkage in savings 
and hence in the wages fund.  It may merely cause a 
revision of conventional standards, diminishing the 
intensity of desire for present income on the part of 
those who have a surplus to invest. 
 
Dobb maintained the conventional aspect of the 
consumption patterns of the undertaking (leisure) class is 
likely to adjust according to any significant institutional 
(i.e., via trade union action or political legislation) 
rise in the wage-level, such that investment itself need 
not necessarily fall.  
It becomes especially probable when the national 
 income is expanding, and the effect of rising wages 
 may be to cause capitalists’ income, and hence their 





 expenditure, to grow more slowly than would otherwise 
 have been the case (Dobb 1928:127). 
 
 
3.3.19. Summary of Labor Supply and Capital 
        Supply Determination 
 
At this point, a summary may be useful to pull 
together the first two strands of the argument, before 
moving on to the third. Dobb argued that for the supply of 
labor ((1) above), the institutional physiology of society 
will be decisive for the subjective evaluation of the 
marginal utility of money, hence, the decision to work.  
That is to say, the supply of labor is a function of the 
institutional arrangement or internal articulation of 
society.  In this sense, Dobb’s analysis is antagonistic to 
both the wage-fund doctrine and marginal productivity 
theory.  Both these theories were, and are, pitched at a 
level of abstraction that has the determination of the 
wage-level independent of institutional forms. As such, 
they are theories that tend to illegitimately reduce wage-
level determination to the subjective valuations of 
individual workers.   
Since the subjective valuations are necessarily 
radically institutionally determined, marginal utility 
theory must first analyze the institutional complex.  The 





institutional forms that either enable or constrain 
individual action; how the institutional complex is both 
enabling and constraining individual action is a question 
that must be answered prior to the determination of 
marginal utility of individuals and their decision to 
supply their labor.  Hence, if realistic and practical 
theoretical results are desired, then abstraction from the 
institutional complex is methodologically illicit.   
Therefore, according to Dobb, wage-level determination 
cannot be reduced to mere subjective valuations of 
individual workers.  Second, consequently from a change in 
either institutional forms or political legislation or by 
means of trade union action, changes necessarily may change 
in the level of wages, even without a change in subjective 
valuations. 
The second part of Dobb’s argument concerns (2) the 
supply of capital, or the inducement to invest.  Here Dobb 
argued that the consumption patterns of the wealthy 
(normally the investing class) are conventionally 
determined.  As such, if the level of wages was to be 
increased via the means earlier suggested, the increase 
does not necessarily lead to a decrease in investment (or 





Pulling the arguments together, an increase in the 
wage-level could very well lead to an increase in the 
supply of capital if the wealthy class were to curtail 
their consumption of luxuries and increase their level of 
investment in an attempt to reclaim the “standard” of 
conventional or conspicuous consumption of luxuries. Dobb 
does not necessarily predict or suggest that this will be 
an inevitable occurrence.  Rather, it is merely a 
possibility.  Nonetheless, even the possibility of such a 
reaction by the investing class implies that the supply of 
capital is itself influenced by the institutional forms or 
the institutional physiology of society. Hence, once again, 
the supply of capital cannot be reduced entirely to the 
subjective valuation of the capitalist undertaking class’s 
propensity to invest. 
The Dobbian argument, in short, is that neither (1) 
the supply of labor nor (2) the supply of capital can 
necessarily be deterministically obtained based on the 
subjective marginal propensity of individual action.  
Rather, both (1) and (2) depend on the institutional 
physiology of society.  If the institutional physiology of 
society is itself stable, then it will manifest the 
illusion that both (1) and (2) are relatively stable.  In 





theorists that (1) and (2) are perhaps even independent of 
the institutional physiology of society.  However, this is 
either illusionary or a neglect of a longer institutional 
observation.  In other words, a neglect of institutional 
history allows for the development of impoverished and 
misleading analytical theory. 
  
3.3.20. The Interdependence of Supply and 
        Demand of Labor 
 
The third part of Dobb’s argument concerns the 
assumption of independence between the factors that 
determine the supply of labor and the factors that 
determine the supply of capital. This is of some 
importance; the supply of capital is what determines the 
demand of labor.  Thus, if the supply of labor is not 
independent from the supply of capital, then the 
determination of the supply and demand of labor are 
interdependent.  Interdependence of the supply and demand 
curve makes the notion of equilibrium inappropriate, if not 
nonsensical.   
According to Dobb, the independence of supply and 
demand of labor is merely an assumption, and an illicit 
assumption at that.  “If this crucial [illicit] assumption 





market ceases to be subject to a determinate equilibrium” 
(Dobb 1955[1929]:25). 
Dobb’s argument against this “assumed” independence is 
twofold.  The first part of the argument is that, similar 
to a barter economy which is dependent upon the ‘double 
coincidence of wants,’ the initial terms upon which 
exchange takes place will affect the marginal utility of 
the goods being bartered by the respective sellers.  As 
Marshall observed, only when goods are exchanged against 
money, increasing the alternative of objects, will this 
indeterminateness of barter be overcome.   “Similarly in 
our case of labour an equilibrium cannot be postulated 
because labour is not one among many alternative objects of 
sale and purchase, but is the sole object of exchange in 
this particular sphere” (Dobb 1955[1929]:26). 
The second and more substantial part of Dobb’s 
argument for the lack of independence between the supply 
and demand of labor pivots on the institutional and 
political influence on the determination of the supply of 
labor and supply of capital.   
As argued earlier, when labor is being sold, the 
marginal utility of income is not constant.  Rather, it is 
dependent upon the price of labor itself.  If the sale of 





income, “the terms of this sale will virtually affect his 
[or her] whole position, and will be the principal 
determinant of the labourer’s subjective valuation of his 
[or her] own labour in terms of the income which he secures 
in return” (Dobb 1955[1929]:25). 
Likewise, due to the Veblenistic consumption desires, 
the marginal utility of income for the employer also can 
not necessarily be taken as constant.  The marginal utility 
of income, for both the suppliers of labor and those who 
demand labor, has a prior dependence on the price of labor.  
In turn, the terms, conditions, and power-relations of 
exchange are partly determined by the price of labor.  That 
is to say, the institutional physiology of society and 
political legislation are determinants in both the supply 
and the demand for labor.  Hence, the independence of 
supply and demand does not hold, and equilibrium is 
therefore indeterminate as purely a function of subjective 
valuations (Dobb 1955[1929]:26).  
The indeterminacy of the supply and demand of labor is 
manifest from the inter-relatedness of the labor market, 
i.e., both the supply and demand conditions, upon the 
institutional physiology of society.  Here a central 
Dobbian observation can be enunciated.  Any notion of a 





physiological “form of society and the prevailing social 
institutions” (Dobb 1928:123).  Moreover, the conditions 
that manifest a “competitive” level of wages are highly 
unstable.  This is because a low level of wages will 
decrease the supply price of labor and tend to perpetually 
lower the level of wages “and conversely with a rise in the 
wages” (Dobb 1928:125). 
 
3.3.21. The Decisiveness of the Institutional 
        Physiology 
  
The institutional physiology of a market society is 
decisive in the determination of the system dynamic.  The 
wage-level of society is radically dependent on 
institutional, political, and power-relation factors.  A 
competitive laissez-faire society is no exception to the 
decisiveness of the institutional physiology.  The 
macroeconomic import of this result includes the Dobbian 
idea that trade union activity and political legislation 
(e.g., minimum wage) may very well increase the wage-level 
of society without necessarily decreasing the level of 
employment and output.  Even more stunning, an 
institutionally or politically motivated increase in the 
wage-level may actually increase the production and the 





It has already been argued that one of the reasons to 
expect an increase in the level of production and output 
following an increase in wages is a function of the 
consumption patterns of the investing class.  A second 
reason, however, is that with a higher (national) wage-
level, the physical and mental health of the working-class 
is improved; hence the ability to labor and produce is 
likewise improved (Dobb 1928:51-3).   
Therefore, according to Dobb, the “confident 
pessimism” of the marginal productivity theory advocates 
the possibility of an institutionally and/or politically 
influenced increase in the wage-level lies shattered.  
Thus, the question becomes, if wages can be increased by 
means of political legislation and trade union activity, 
then how far can wages be lowered or raised? The former 
case is more easily answered than the latter.  Regarding 
the lower limit, it is not likely that the wage-level can 
fall below the level of bare physical subsistence for any 
extended period of time130 (Dobb 1928:134).   
The upper limit of the wage-level proves to be 
extremely difficult to define.  Given Dobb’s arguments, he 
cannot simply suggest that the upper limit of the wage-
                                                 
130 Dobb (1928:44-9) suggests that it is not uncommon for the wage-level 
to be close to the lower limit when the strength of labor is weak, or 





level is that point at which the surplus produce of the 
capitalist undertaker is absorbed by wages because the 
surplus produce of the capitalist undertaking class goes 
into both investment spending and consumption spending.  On 
the one hand, the consumption spending of the leisure class 
is a function of conventional standards.  On the other 
hand, the investment spending is highly influenced by 
political and institutional factors.  Thus, any definition 
of an upper limit to the level of wages “is probably much 
more a matter of politics and social psychology than it is 
a matter for economic theory” (Dobb 1928:136). 
This is not to suggest that there is “no more pattern 
to the labour-market than a disordered tumble of warring 
forces” (Dobb 1928:134).  Rather, it is to suggest that the 
upper limit cannot be defined, aside from the particular 
stage of economic development.  It further depends on 
politics, power-relations, and the degree that 
institutional forms either antagonize or facilitate 
economic development.   
In light of these considerations, the upper limit of 
the wage-level is somewhat variable.  The most Dobb is 
willing to say of the upper limit to wages is that during a 
period of economic prosperity, when gross national output 





should be in a good position to increase both their 
relative and absolute share of the national product. 
However, during a static state, where gross national 
output is stationary or during an economic downturn when 
output is falling, the ability of wage-labor to raise the 
level of wages is much more limited, even if labor is 
strongly organized.  A strongly organized labor movement 
may nonetheless proceed with an attempt to increase wages 
during a stagnant state.  The result in such circumstances 
may very well be that “instead of pruning their standards 
of consumption,” the capitalist undertaking class may 
reduce investment.  Dobb argues otherwise “firms may try to 
economize on labour to the maximum possible extent by 
substituting labour-saving machinery” (Dobb 1928:136). 
This latter point is important, for this is the result 
of marginal productivity theory views on attempts of trade 
unions increasing wages.  However, there is an extremely 
significant point of difference.  For marginal productivity 
theory, this result is both inevitable and universal to 
‘successful’ trade union action to increase the wage level.  
However, for Dobb, this result is contingent on the 
macroeconomic conditions and the particular institutional 





Nevertheless, Dobb is conceding the point that trade 
unions can have a very counterproductive effect on the 
macroeconomy, and potentially result in no positive benefit 
for trade union members.  Rather, the “successful” action 
of the trade union may, in such circumstances, deepen and 
elongate a socioeconomic contraction.   
Furthermore, trade union action may be an inducement 
to substitute workers for machinery.  It is here that 
something should be said of Dobb’s analysis of the 
relationship between the demand of labor and industrial 
technique.  Marx heavily influenced Dobb’s analysis of this 
relationship.  In opposition to Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo, Dobb, following Marx, maintains that it is a 
mistake to assume that capital accumulation necessarily 
leads to an increase in the demand for labor. 
If labor is well-organized, capitalist undertakers may 
be encouraged to replace labor with machinery.  Moreover, 
when there is an invention that enables machinery to be 
produced more cheaply or increases capital productivity, 
the effect will be to make investment in machinery more 
profitable.  In a society with a predominance of individual 
capitalist undertakers fulfilling the entrepreneurial 
function, the result is clear.  The technical development 





proportion” of investment funds to go toward machinery and 
a smaller amount to employ labor (Dobb 1928:113). 
Therefore, in concert with Chapter 25 of Marx’s 
Capital volume I, the accumulation of capital corresponds 
to a less than proportionate increase in the demand for 
labor.  Of course, if accumulation of capital is expanding, 
the demand for labor also will increase, however, at “a 
constantly diminishing ratio as compared with the increase 
of capital” (Marx, quoted in Dobb 1928:113). 
Dobb does consider the possibility of “capital saving” 
technology but maintains the historical record is “that the 
influence of invention has been preponderantly in a ‘labour 
saving’ direction” (Dobb 1928:114-5).  Thus, the result of 
technical change on the wage-level will tend to be 
negative.  Moreover, technical change will be a devastating 
weapon for the capitalist undertaker against strong labor 
union activity. 
Although technical change will tend toward a relative, 
or proportionate, decrease in wages, whether they will 
reduce absolutely is of considerable dispute.  Dobb argued 
that the determination of distribution is not a function of 
any natural or universal law.  Thus, Dobb was insisting 





Dobb maintained that the high level of abstraction of 
the marginal productivity theory of distribution generates 
universal results; however, the high level of abstraction 
makes the theory highly suspect.  For Dobb, the 
institutional physiology of society and politics is 
decisive in the distribution of social wealth.  With the 
institutional physiology of society and political 
legislation in place (or taken as “given” data), it is 
possible to make predictions.  However, the Dobbian stage 
theory of economic development suggests that socioeconomic 
institutions and political legislation are never stable 
(nor can they necessarily be taken as “given” data).  
Further, Dobb’s historical Studies substantiate his stage 
theory of economic development in a more empirical way.  In 
addition, Dobb lodges a direct theoretical assault on the 
mainstream theory of the determination of wages.    
Mainstream economists have maintained that there are 
two effects of labor-saving technology that assure wages do 
not fall absolutely.  First is the compensation effect, the 
argument that new technique translates into cheaper goods.  
However, Dobb maintained that this implies that 
technological improvement is always related to the 





this is not true; hence, the effective extensiveness of 
this compensation can be seriously doubted (Dobb 1928:116).  
Second is the expansion effect.  In this case, the 
technological change is said to (necessarily) lead to an 
expansion in production and output (Dobb 1928:115).  Dobb 
questions the logic of the expansion effect.  Dobb points 
out “that the elasticity of demand for goods in general (as 
distinct from individual commodities) cannot be very large 
as long as the total income of the mass of the population 
is constant” (Dobb 1928:117).  Consequently, it is unlikely 
that the demand for goods will increase unless the income 
of the population first increases.  If demand does not 
increase, neither will output increase; hence, the 
expansion effect may be nil. 
Nonetheless, if an expansion takes place in the 
construction of new machinery, it will have a buoyant 
influence upon both output and employment.  However, unless 
it induces an increase in the demand of goods, the increase 
in machinery production will be of a temporary nature.  “In 
this sense it is a ‘once-for-all’ effect, and not 
necessarily a permanent effect.  Once it is over, the fact 
remains that less labour is required to produce a given 
quantity of output than before” (Dobb 1928:117).  Thus, 





technically improved capital equipment, the ultimate 
outcome may still very much tend toward a decrease in the 
level of employment and a fall in the aggregate level of 
wages. 
This last point harks back to Marx’s distinction 
between wage goods and capital goods in volume II. Marx’s 
reproduction schemas in volume II of Capital had an 
increasingly important influence on Dobb’s political 
economy.  In CESP, Dobb developed a theoretical grounding 
for the immanence of crisis. As shown above, Dobb 
anticipated J. M. Keynes and the Keynesian notion of the 
‘lack of animal spirits’ as the basis for the immanence of 
crisis within a capitalist system.  
Dobb was not as politically hopeful in circumventing 
the socioeconomic impact of capitalist crisis on the life 
of individuals living within the system.  It seems that 
Dobb anticipated that Keynesian economic policy would usher 
in state capitalism, along with its multitude paradoxes and 
contradictions.  Dobb predicted that the contradictions of 
state capitalism would be both economic and political.  In 
short, the political predicament was that state management 





legitimatization crisis.131 The question becomes: to whose 
advantage does the State manage the economy and market 
activity? 
More importantly, Dobb would argue that state 
management and macroeconomic policy more generally would 
not and cannot overcome the necessity and permanence of the 
socioeconomic crisis within capitalist social relations of 
production.  On the necessity and permanence of 
socioeconomic crises, Marx’s influence would once again 
prove decisive for Dobb’s theoretical work.  However, with 
respect to a theory of crisis, Marx was far from complete.  
Moreover, since the time of Marx’s own studies, the 
(Western) capitalist system had gone through significant 
socioeconomic metamorphoses or stages of economic 
development.  In this sense, Marx could be used only as a 
guide for understanding the theoretical underpinnings of 
contemporary socioeconomic crises.  
In spite of Marx’s incompleteness and the 
socioeconomic metamorphoses that occurred since 1870, by 
carefully studying, scrutinizing, and developing Marx’s 
schemas of reproduction as presented in volume II of 
                                                 
131 Jurgen Habermas rigorously develops the notion of a “legitimization 
crisis.”  The term is borrowed from Habermas and was not used by Dobb.  
Nonetheless, in a more or less rudimentary way Dobb anticipated the 
problems that would manifest from state management of industry, labor, 





Capital, Dobb is able to provide a theoretical foundation 
for and explanation of the necessity for crisis in a market 
society.  Moreover, Dobb would argue that in capitalist 
social relations of production, crisis is necessarily 
permanent as a phenomenon to reproduce to the system.  
In the section immediately following, Marx’s 
reproduction schemas will be rehearsed.  It bears repeating 
that these in Marx’s volume II of Capital the reproduction 
schemas are highly incomplete; nevertheless, Dobb’s 
interpretation of Marx is very consistent with the spirit 
of volume I of Capital.   
After rehearsing Marx’s schemas of reproduction, the 
ensuing section will develop Dobb’s position on the 
immanence of, necessity for, and permanence toward 
socioeconomic crisis in capitalist production.  It can be 
argued that the importance of the immanence, necessity, and 
permanence of crisis was Dobb’s primary aim in writing 
Studies.  Although the historical chapters of Studies and 
Dobb’s analysis of the transformation from feudalism to 
capitalism by far received the most attention and acclaim, 
what seems to be Dobb’s real thrust in Studies is to 







3.4. Paradigm of Reproduction 
 
 Marx’s schemas of reproduction must be understood in a 
twofold sense.  The schemas of reproduction were an effort 
to understand the (necessary) reproduction of social 
classes on one hand and the (necessary) reproduction of 
capital, goods, and services on the other hand.  Most 
importantly, the schemas of reproduction were designed to 
demonstrate the relationship between the reproduction of 
social classes and the reproduction of capital, goods, and 
services.  Dobb well understood the importance of this 
relationship of reproduction in his analysis of the 
capitalist undertaker as the social agent that fulfills the 
social act of the entrepreneurial function.  According to 
Dobb, the reproduction of capital, and the avoidance of a 
pathological socioeconomic state, or crisis, radically 
depends upon the reproduction of the conditions desirable 
for the capitalist undertaking, or capital social 
investment. 
To achieve the desired conditions for the capitalist 
undertakers, it is most important that the relationship 
between the working-class and their immediate supervisors 
be moderated to minimize various and numerous socioeconomic 





generated endogenously, and simultaneously, during the 
production process and distribution process.132 
The historical moderation of these conflicts has taken 
many political forms, from regulating (finance) capital to 
“defeating” labor, along with various compromises of 
collective-bargaining.  Dobb rejected interpretations of 
                                                 
132 For Dobb class remained a primary motivational moment for individuals 
living within the structure of capitalism.  As such, Dobb viewed class 
conflict as an essential characteristic of capitalism.  It is in this 
sense that for Dobb, like Marx before him, class conflict is to a large 
degree the chief determinant of socioeconomic development and change.   
According to Dobb “a class is to be defined in terms of a common source 
of income, which lays the basis of a common interest and probably also 
a common mode of life and common psychological traits” (Dobb 1955:95).  
Dobb pointed out that capitalist society is defined by private property 
rights, while the concentration of private capital is accumulated in 
relatively few hands.  In such a society a basis is laid for 
“significant differences in the source of income of different sections 
of society” and for “inequality of opportunity,” which together 
constitute the essential ingredients for class conflict (Dobb 1955:95-
96).  Dobb would emphasis that it would be remarkable in a society 
marked by differentiated sources of income and inequality of 
opportunity that class interest and class conflict did not play a 
pivotal role in the reproduction of the system. 
 Class, according to Dobb, helps to understand the motivation of 
human action.  First because individuals are often unaware of their 
true motivations of action, the concept of class can illuminate some of 
these unconscious motives of action.  Second, human will and action 
depend upon the relations between individuals, or between individual 
wills, and upon the total historical character of the objective 
situation that human actions aim to influence.  Class is essential to 
understand antagonistic wills, and the objective historical conditions 
that individuals confront.  Third “there is plenty of evidence that 
when one is dealing with large numbers – at the level of the group or 
class – there is much greater uniformity in the response of human 
beings to various situations and to various stimuli than can be noticed 
when one is observing individuals” (Dobb 1955:230-1).   This is 
“because so much in the mode of life of man in society – his nurture, 
his habits and conventions, his prejudices and sense of values, his 
cultural opportunities and pursuits, and his relations with other 
members of society – is dependent on the source and nature of his 
income” (Dobb 1955:232).  In short, the “more we study the world today, 
and the more we penetrate behind the reasons for which people say they 
act, or consciously think they are acting, to find the real motive 
forces which impel them, the less doubt, one might think, there could 
be about the importance of class conflict as a dominant feature of 





Marx that maintained class conflict would result from any 
sort of simple “revolutionary transformation into 
socialism.”   Likewise, Dobb emphasized in concert with 
Marx that the historical development of capitalism does not 
necessarily translate into “the So-Called ‘Law of 
Increasing Misery’”133 of the proletariat as a whole.  
Rather, for Dobb, the importance of the concepts of class 
and class conflict is that they offer a glimpse into the 
social motivation behind, and lay the basis for, “the 
famous schema of reproduction” (1967:536). Dobb emphasized 
that the reproduction schema of Volume II of Capital 
constitutes an essential moment for understanding 
socioeconomic crises (Dobb 1973:161-4).     
 
3.4.1. Distinguishing Between a Crisis and 
       the Trade-Cycle 
 
 For Dobb, periods of economic stagnation and the trade 
cycle are not necessarily crises.  Whereas stagnation and 
trade cycles are short-term problems, implying both a 
downturn and recovery symmetrically related in the normal 
process of reproduction, crisis is a long-term movement, 
invoking a “break” or transformation in the normal process 
of reproduction.  In this context, Dobb (1967:64-5) wrote:   
                                                 
133 See Dobb 1957 “Marx and the So-Called ‘Law of Increasing Misery’” 
Keizai Kenkyu (Tokyo), VIII, I.  And Dobb 1960 Teoria economica e 





I want […] to draw attention to the link between this 
essentially short-term problem [i.e., the trade cycle] 
and the long-term problem of development in two main 
respects.  Firstly, I want to suggest that the term 
‘crisis’ may be more appropriate than the term ‘cycle’ 
to describe this crucial phenomenon of capitalist 
society; since ‘crisis’ implies a break or 
interruption in some more long-run movement, whereas 
cycle seems to imply an oscillation in which both 
turning-points – the downturn and the upturn – are 
symmetrical and slump can be regarded as ‘producing’ 
or ‘leading to’ a subsequent recovery and boom, as 
much as the boom can be regarded as ‘leading to’ the 
slump.  On the other hand, if one views the short-term 
phenomenon of fluctuation against the background of 
the long-term movement, the crisis-phase, or break in 
the long-term movement, and the subsequent resumption 
of investment and activity do not appear as 
necessarily symmetrical, and each may have to be 
explained quite differently.  Secondly, I would 
suggest that there is much to support the view that 
the long-term development of capital accumulation 
continued up to the First World War (and in America up 
to 1929), despite the interruption of periodic crises, 
only because of the operation of special factors 
favourable to a shortening of the depression-phase and 
to a resumed momentum of investment activity once 
again – factors which were in their nature transitory, 
and in a sense external to the process of capital 
accumulation.  
 
 According to Dobb, a crisis can be defined as the 
failure of a mode of production to reproduce the main 
social relations that define it.  Trade cycles are the 
failure of the reproduction of capital, goods, and 
services.  Likewise, crises are the failure of the 
reproduction of capital, goods, and services but, 
additionally, are the failure to reproduce stable 





In this sense, trade cycles and crises are both 
characterized as economic downturns, but crises alone are 
further characterized as a period of social transformation, 
or structural shift. 
Dobb will conclude, like Marx before him, that in a 
capitalistic economy, there emerges a necessity for crisis.  
Dobb (1937:80) like  
Marx clearly regarded crises, not as incidental 
 departures from a predetermined equilibrium, not as 
 fickle wanderings from an established path of 
 development to which there would be a submissive 
 return, but rather as themselves a dominant form of 
 movement which forged and shaped the development of 
 capitalist society.   
 
A necessity for crisis emphasizes that crises are 
internally generated, without denying the possibility of 
external causation (i.e., natural disasters).  The 
necessity of crisis was, for Marx, a direct theoretical 
attack on Ricardo and later Ricardians who attempted to 
politically institute free trade.  The absence of free 
trade was the key element, according to liberal Ricardians, 
impeding capital accumulation and industrial growth.  
According to various liberal Ricardians, instituting 
liberal policies of free trade and the removal of the 
obstacles of capital accumulation would stable industrial 
growth and economic development would be assured.  Against 





characterized by unstable industrial growth and economic 
development, that “rested on certain contradictions, and 
that the very forces which operated to yield an equilibrium 
of its elements generated counter-forces which periodically 
disrupted that equilibrium” (as quoted in Dobb 1955:196). 
 
3.4.2. The Unstable Development of Capitalism 
 
Dobb (1937:79-126) illustrated the unstable 
development of capitalism by means of Marx’s reproduction 
schema in part three (Chapters 18-21), volume II of 
Capital.  Marx summarized much of part three of volume II 
in Chapter 23 of volume I of Capital.  Marx’s reproduction 
schemas concern the circulation of capital reminiscent of 
Quesnay’s tableau economique.134   
In Chapter 9 of volume I, Marx maintained that the 
total value of a commodity is a function of constant 
capital, plus variable capital, plus surplus value (or c + 
v + s).  In Chapter 20 of volume II, Marx maintained that 
all commodities (except labor-power) are either means of 
production or consumer goods (what Marx called “means of 
consumption”).  As such, Marx maintained that all 
production in an economy correspondingly can be divided 
into two departments: Department I, which produces the 
                                                 





means of production, and Department II, which produces the 
means for consumption or consumption goods. 
Hence, in the aggregate, the value of the means of 
production and the value of consumption goods can be 
summarized in the following schemas (see Marx 1978:473ff): 
 
Production of means of production:  
cI + vI + sI = value of means of production (w1) 
Production of consumption goods:  
cII + vII + sII = value of consumption goods (w2) 
Aggregate Production: 
C + V + S = W 
 
3.4.3. Simple Reproduction 
 
For the system to be reproduced without hindrance, a 
number of conditions must be fulfilled.  The most basic of 
these conditions are those of “Simple Reproduction” where 
everything, cI + vI + sI and cII + vII + sII, is merely 
replaced exactly on the same scale, i.e., where it is 
assumed that there is zero growth and distribution between 
agents is unchanged.  Simple reproduction requires not only 
that total supply must equal total demand, but that the 
output of the respective department is equal to the demand 
of the other department.  That is to say, the constant 
capital (c) used up in both departments equals the entire 






(1) cI + cII = cI + vI + sI   
 
Furthermore, the total or aggregate incomes of the 
economy135 (workers and capitalists in both departments) 
must be equal to the entire output of Department II, 
summarized as: 
 
 (2)  vI + sI + vII + sII = cII + vII + sII 
 
Both conditions reduce to the simple equation: 
 
 (3)  cII = vI + sI 
 
The basic condition for simple reproduction is the value of 
constant capital (used to produce consumer goods) used up 
in Department II, must be equal to the income of 
capitalists and workers (who produced the means of 
production) in Department I.  If this condition is 
satisfied, reproduction proceeds “hitchless”136 and the 
                                                 
135 Simple reproduction assumes by definition that all income is 
consumed, whereby the economy is merely reproduced, otherwise 
unchanged. 
136 This term comes from Joseph Schumpeter in a discussion of Say’s law 
and theories of crisis.  Schumpeter suggests that economic models of 
capitalism that are committed to the idea that there exists no 
“inherent tendency to develop hitches (merely by the working normally 
and according to design), which then make [the economic system] stall 
or stop working normally and according to design” can be termed 
hitchless.  Models that are committed to the existence of “inherent […] 
hitches” as part of the “normal” functioning of capitalism as an 
economic system are dubbed by Schumpeter (“With apologies”) as 





economy is assumed to be reproduced on the same scale 
indefinitely. 
By dividing equation (3) by vII, it can be rewritten as 
 
  (4) cII/vII = vI/vII + sI/vII 
 
The expression cII/vII is the organic composition of capital 
in Department II. Now, factoring out on the right-hand side 
of the equation: 
 
  (5) cII/vII = vI/vII (1 + sI/vI) 
 
where sI/vI is the rate of surplus-value or the rate of 
exploitation.  In simple reproduction, the rate of 
exploitation is equal in both departments by assumption.  
Rearranging, the equation is expressed as 
 
  (6) vI/vII = (cII/vII)/(1 + sI/vI) 
 
Hence, for simple reproduction to proceed hitchless, the 
ratio of variable capital employed in the two departments 
must be strictly determined as an increasing function of 
the organic composition of capital in Department II and as 
a decreasing function of the rate of surplus value.  To put 
it a bit differently, wages advanced in the respective 
departments must be of a specific ratio in correspondence 





and the rate of surplus value in Department I.  However, 
because capitalist production is initiated by the profit 
motive there exists a particular “anarchy of production,” 
whereby ex ante there is an absence of any production 
mechanism that ensures a balance.  More emphatically, in 
capitalist development, balance between departments occurs 
only by miraculous accident.  The price mechanism is 
formally capable of bringing about balanced reproduction ex 
post.  In volume II of Capital, Marx assumes that the price 
mechanism is successful in achieving balanced reproduction.  
 The numerical example offered by Marx assumed balanced 
reproduction by means of various assumptions. Marx’s 
numerical example of a balanced simple reproduction schema 
is as follows: 
 
4000cI + 1000vI + 1000sI = 6000w1 
2000cII + 500vII + 500sII = 3000w2 
Aggregate production: 
6000C + 1500V + 1500S = 9000W 
 
 
The balance condition of equation (3) is obtained:  
 2000cII = 1000vI + 1000sI 
Variable capital in the respective departments are of the 
“required” proportion as a function of the organic 
composition of capital and the rate of surplus value as 






 1000vI/500vII = (2000cII/500vII)/(1 + 1000sI/1000vI) 
  
 Marx (Chapter 20 of volume II) further divided the 
means of consumption, i.e., Department II, into necessary 
means of subsistence, Department IIa, and luxury goods 
Department IIb.  Hence, in summary  
 
Production of means of production:  
cI + vI + sI = value of means of production (w1) 
 
Production of necessary means of subsistence:  
cIIa + vIIa + sIIa = value of necessary means of 
        subsistence (w2) 
 
 
Production of luxury goods: 
cIIb + vIIb + sIIb = value of luxury goods (w3) 
 
Aggregate production: 
c + v + s = w 
 
 
The equilibrium condition(s) become 
 
 
 c= w1 
 v = w2 
 s = w3  
 
 
Incidentally, c corresponds to what Adam Smith called 
“productive” consumption, and w1 is the portion of social 
product “capitalized.” v is the amount of social revenue 





is the portion of social product consumed as necessary 
consumption by both workers and nonworkers.  Finally, s is 
the amount of social revenue of nonworkers, and w3 is the 
portion of social product consumed as (both necessary and) 
luxury goods, the latter of which include what Adam Smith 
called “unproductive” consumption.  It should be noted, if 
the balance conditions are satisfied, then for Marx, there 
exists no “unproductive” consumption in the sense that Adam 
Smith used the term; rather all consumption becomes 
necessary for (simple) reproduction to proceed in a 
hitchless manner. 
Moreover, as presented above (and as presented by 
Marx), if the conditions for balanced reproduction are not 
met there can indeed be sectoral overproduction.  However, 
any overproduction in one sector or department will be 
offset by a corresponding underproduction in some other 
sector, whereby the aggregate (c + v + s = w) condition 
will be obtained.  It is not at all clear that any general 
overproduction would manifest or, for that matter, even be 
a possibility. 
Marx’s numerical example of a three-department simple 
reproduction schema is as follows: 
 
4000cI + 1000vI + 1000sI = 6000w1 





400cIIb + 100vIIb + 100sIIb = 600w3 
 
 
Marx pointed out that workers producing luxury goods will 
only consume necessary goods, i.e., commodities from 
Department IIa.  The capitalists will spend a portion of 
their income on necessary goods from Department IIa and a 
portion on luxury goods from department IIb.  Marx 
arbitrarily assumed that capitalists spend 3/5 of their 
income on Department IIa commodities and 2/5 on Department 
IIb commodities.  Hence, the three departmental equations 
become  
 
4000cI(1) + 1000vI(2) + 600sI(2) + 400sI(3) = 6000w1 
1600cIIa(1) + 400vIIa(2) + 240sIIa(2) + 160sIIa(3) = 2400w2 
400cIIb(1) + 100vIIb(2) + 60sIIb(2) + 40sIIb(3) = 600w3 
 
 
where the numbers in the parentheses are the respective 
direction that circulation takes between departments.  More 
specifically, for example, cI(1) indicates the amount of 
constant capital used in the production process of 
Department I, and the exchanges necessary to reproduce this 
level of constant capital all take place within and between 
the capitalists of Department I (indicated by the subscript 
(1)).  Likewise, vIIb(2) indicates that workers producing 
luxury goods spend all of their income in Department IIa, 





respectively, indicate that the profit incomes (rent, 
interest, etc.) of capitalists producing and investing in 
luxury goods, Department Ilb, spend a portion of their 
revenue on necessary consumption goods, and also a portion 
on luxury goods. 
 Marx did not explain how the balance conditions are to 
be met; rather, he merely assumed it.  Likewise, Marx does 
not indicate whether he believed that his assumptions were 
realistic.  However, it can be imagined that the conditions 
for balanced reproduction could be met via centralized 
planning,137 or via a liberal price mechanism.138   
For Marx, the mechanism for balanced reproduction is 
incidental, given his high level of abstraction.  Rather 
his purpose may be interpreted as merely to obtain 
abstractly the conditions that formally allow the 
achievement of balanced reproduction.  Dobb steered away 
from interpretations of the simple reproduction schemas as 
an attempt to critique the possibility of the price 
mechanism as being capable of adjusting an economic system 
                                                 
137 In this sense, Marx’s schemas provided the basis for G. Feldman’s 
Soviet model of growth (see Domar 1957). 
138 If interpreted in this way Marx’s schemas anticipated the work of 
Leon Walras and provide the basis of balanced economic growth 






toward balanced reproduction.139  In fact, the schemas may 
offer a glimpse towards the sophistication of the price 
mechanism, and the advantage of the price mechanism as the 
organizational principle over centralized planning, simply 
on the grounds of the enormity of the task of centralized 
planning in coordinating the complexity of the system.  
With emphasis, throughout part three of volume II of 
Capital, Marx typically abstracted away from any hitchbound 
manifestations of capitalist reproduction. 
With the above qualification, it can be observed that 
although beyond doubt, Marx’s aim in Chapter 20 of volume 
II is to demonstrate the necessary conditions of balanced 
simple reproduction.  The third department, in which luxury 
goods are produced, seems to be introduced for the purpose 
of later developing arguments for the manifestation of 
imbalances and disproportionalities between departments.  
It should be made clear that Marx does not develop these 
arguments in part three of volume II of Capital with any 
sort of rigor.  However, he suggestively states that “Every 
crisis temporarily decreases luxury consumption; it delays 
and slows down the re-transformation of [variable capital 
                                                 
139 Tugan-Baranowski and Rosa Luxemburg interpreted the schemas in this 
sense.  For Tugan-Baranowski the schemas could then function as a basis 
for a theory of underconsumption crisis.  Luxemburg argued that the 






from Department IIb] into money capital” (1978:486).  Marx 
does not offer an explanation of why a partial imbalance 
would not immediately, or shortly thereafter, adjust via 
the price mechanism and avoid the manifestation of a 
general crisis.   
Nonetheless, in the passage quoted above, Marx assumes 
a general crisis to have manifested, whereby there is an 
imbalance between sectors, such that only a portion of the 
luxury goods produced are sold or exchanged at their 
expected prices.  With unexpected built-up inventories 
within the luxury sector, Marx (1978:486) maintains  
a section of the luxury workers are thrown onto the 
 streets: this leads in turn to a stagnation and 
 restriction in the sale of necessary means of 
 consumption [i.e., Department IIa commodities].  And 
 this quite apart from the unproductive workers who are 
 discharged at the same time, workers who receive for 
 their services a part of the luxury expenditure of 
 capitalists (they are themselves to this extent a 
 luxury item), and who also participate very 
 substantially in the consumption of necessary means of 
 subsistence, etc.  
 
 Although Marx does not explain anywhere in part three 
of volume II of Capital why a general crisis manifests, 
clearly he believed crisis to be potential (even perhaps 
immanent).  Further, in the quoted passage, Marx plainly 
demonstrates his knowledge and understanding of the 
multiplier effect when involuntary employment arises.  In 





phase, or a “phase of hyper-activity,” prices of 
commodities rise above their values, including the 
commodity labor-power.  In such a situation, the “working 
class also […] takes a temporary share in the consumption 
of luxury articles” (Marx 1978:486).   
 A “phase of hyper-activity” necessarily implies that 
equation (3) above becomes ex ante: 
 
  (7)  cII < vI + sI 
 
 
and prices begin to rise, i.e., adjusting, whereby Marx is 
assuming nothing impedes the price mechanism.   
 Likewise, during a crisis, prices would be generally 
falling and equation (3) becomes ex post: 
 
  (8) cII < vI + sI 
 
 
How either case arises, Marx does not elaborate in Chapter 
20 of Volume II.  Nevertheless, in case (7) Marx strikingly 
suggested that not only do wages rise during expanded 
reproduction, but workers also can share in the 
distribution of surplus value.  Consistent with volume I of 
Capital, accumulation of capital leads to “a rise in the 
price of labor” (Marx 1976:769).  This is not due to any 
rise in the value of labor, but instead is because workers 





Workers, therefore, “can extend the circle of their 
enjoyments [i.e., luxury goods from Department IIb], make 
additions to their consumption fund of clothes, furniture, 
etc., [i.e., necessary goods from Department IIa], and lay 
by a small reserve fund of money” [i.e., save] (Marx 
1976:769).  
 In that Marx’s intention throughout Chapter 20 has 
been merely to illuminate the necessary conditions of 
balanced simple reproduction, he does not elaborate on 
“circumstances” of “expanded reproduction,” or on 
“circumstances” resulting “in an incomplete – defective – 
reproduction” (Marx 1978:471).  Hence, it appears that he 
introduces the possibility of alternative circumstances to 
simple production to be able to make the point that 
“defective” reproduction (i.e., crisis) does not typically 
manifest directly from underconsumption, i.e., where “the 
working class receives too small a portion of its own 
product, and that the evil would be remedied if it received 
a bigger share, i.e. if its wages rose” (Marx 1978:486).      
Thus, the preliminary conclusion can be made from 
Marx’s comments in Chapter 20, Volume II, that for 
reproduction on an extended scale to take place, it is 
desirable, if not necessary, that an extensive 





language, this means that effective demand must be 
realized.  Tugan-Baranowsky assumed that this 
redistribution would not take place, and an 
underconsumption crisis would ensue.  Later writers, such 
as V. Lenin and R. Luxemburg, were to see the necessary 
growth of exports for sustaining capitalist growth.  The 
ensuing desire to augment exports would tend to manifest 
into imperialism and colonialism.   
 The only thing that can be said with certainty is that 
Marx’s notion of simple reproduction is, of course, an 
abstraction.  Marx’s simple reproduction is an analytical 
device to understand reproduction of a “hitchless” 
capitalist economy where all incomes are consumed. Most 
immediately, this fiction abstracts away from the ability 
of both workers and capitalists to save a portion of their 
incomes and from the necessity of capitalists to 
accumulate.140  The “absence of any accumulation or 
reproduction on an expanded scale is an assumption foreign 
to the capitalist basis” (Marx 1978:470).  After all, 
                                                 
140 Marx puts it as follows: “Simple reproduction on the same scale seems 
to be an abstraction, both in the sense that the absence of any 
accumulation or reproduction of expanded scale is an assumption foreign 
to the capitalist basis. […] But since, when accumulation takes place, 
simple reproduction still remains a part of this, and is a real factor 






“Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets” of 
the capitalist mode of production (Marx 1976:742). 
 
3.4.4. Expanded Reproduction  
 
 Expanded reproduction is essentially the same as 
simple reproduction; in fact, simple reproduction is a 
necessary moment within expanded reproduction.   The main 
difference between simple and expanded reproduction is that 
capitalists save a portion of their incomes and reinvest in 
additional variable and constant capital.  Essentially it 
is an abstract model of a “hitchless” economy that exhibits 
growth, in which “Money is withdrawn from circulation and 
stored up as a hoard by the sale of commodities without 
subsequent purchase” (Marx 1978:567).  Accumulation and 
hoard formation occur in both departments.   Now, in 
extended reproduction, capitalists are not consuming all 
their income, but instead save (or hoard) to reinvest on an 
extended scale.  In Marx’s simplified example in volume II 
Chapter 21, he assumes that the rate of surplus value (S/V) 
in the economy does not change (in Marx’s example, S/V = 
100%).  Also unchanged are the respective organic 
compositions of capital (ci/vi) in each department; in 
short, there is no technological improvement, but merely a 





assumes that capitalists in Department I save exactly one-
half of all their income and re-invest it in constant (and 
variable) capital (see Howard and King 1985:183). 
 In the case of expanded reproduction, the abstract 
condition for simple reproduction: cII = vI + sI no longer 
holds.  With expanded reproduction, the values of the 
incomes in Department I are greater than the aggregate 
constant capital of the economy, or formally: cII < vI + sI.  
This happens ex ante, before production; hoarding takes 
place whereby sI begins to swell.  In short, after capital 
replacement, income is greater in value than total value of 
consumer goods.  This hoarded income is reinvested in 
productive capital, both constant (cI) and variable capital 
(vI), on an extended scale.  To avoid excess supply or over-
production, the capitalists in Department II simply would 
absorb the excess capital goods so as to clear the capital 
markets in Department II, automatically expanding the 
production of consumer goods and clearing the consumer 
goods markets. 
 In the case of expanded reproduction, the balance 
condition (ex post) becomes 
 
 (9) cI + cII + cI + cII = cI + vI + sI 
 
 






 (10) cII + cI + cII =  vI + sI 
 
Subtracting sI from both sides, and rearranging 
 
 (11) vI = cII + cI + cII  – sI 
 
 
dividing through by vII, and multiplying cI/vII by vIcI/vIcI, 
multiplying cII/vII by vIcII/vIcII, and multiplying sI/vII by 
vI/vI, then rearranging: 
  
 (12) vI/vII = cII/vII+(cI/cI)(cI/vI)(vI/vII)+   





 (13) vI/vII =  
       [(cII/vII)(1+(cII/cII))]/[1+(sI/vI)–(cI/cI)(cI/vI)] 
 
 
The expression demonstrates that balanced growth requires 
that the ratio of variable capital or wages to be advanced 
must be of a particular ratio.  This ratio is itself 
determined by, and for balanced growth must correspond 
specifically to, five particular economic elements: (1) the 
organic composition of capital in Department II, (2) the 
organic composition of capital in Department I, (3) the 





the rate of growth of constant capital in Department I, and 
(5) the rate of surplus value in Department I.   
  
3.4.5. Marx’s Numerical Example of Expanded 
       Reproduction 
 
 With the above preliminary remarks, Marx’s numerical 
example from Chapter 21 of volume II can be developed.  
Before proceeding, mention should be made of the fact that 
all of volume II is composed of various manuscripts by Marx 
that were compiled and edited by Engels after Marx’s death 
in 1883.  Chapter 21 is from manuscript VIII, written in 
1878 (see Engels’s preface to the second edition of volume 
II, written in 1893, printed in Marx 1978:104).  Marx had 
written a preliminary sketch as early as 1870 (manuscript 
II), published as Chapter 17 of volume II.  The 
articulation of expanded reproduction in this manuscript is 
important, especially in the direct context of the later 
1878 manuscript.  It must be kept in mind that manuscript 
II (1870) and manuscript VII (1878) are both merely “a 
provisional treatment of the subject” (Engels’ preface to 
the first edition of volume II, written in 1884, printed in 
Marx 1978:86).  Nowhere in all of volume II is the warrant 
of Engels’ comment more obvious than Chapter 21 where the 





 Marx makes a first attempt at sketching a “schematic 
presentation of accumulation,” or a schema of extended 
reproduction, which he labels (a) for the initial scheme 
where the ex ante condition cII < vI + sI is in place, i.e., 
money has been hoarded.  Then he presents a second schema 
(b) where the ex ante hoarded money condition is not yet in 
place.  Marx makes a few preliminary remarks concerning the 
formation of money hoards for extended accumulation.    In 
short, he suggests that hoard formation does not result 
from swindling.  That is to say, in the aggregate, 
capitalists cannot swindle workers to form money hoards, 
nor in the aggregate can capitalists swindle one another to 
form money hoards.    
Marx, however, stops short of explaining the source of 
money hoard formation: “How this [formation of money 
hoards] happens will be investigated at the close of the 
present chapter (section 4)” (Marx 1978:585).  In section 
4, “the close” of Chapter 21, Marx offers an obtuse eight-
sentence paragraph which gestures toward the production of 
gold in Department I as a main source of the initial money 
hoard.  Therefore, the matter of the formation of money 
hoards is, in part three of volume II, both unsatisfactory 
and misleading.  The source of the hoard is to be found in 





the reason that money capital is hoarded rather than 
accumulated is the real question here, which Marx does not 
adequately address.  Nonetheless, his schema of expanded 
reproduction has capitalists in both Departments I and II 
capable of forming money hoards and then investing these 
hoards toward accumulating additional capital. 
Marx’s numerical example of expanded reproduction 
schema assumes that the rate of surplus value is 100 
percent throughout the entire economy.  He further assumes 
a ratio of constant capital (c) to variable (v) to differ 
in Department I (cI/vI = 4) from Department II (cII/vII = 2), 
so that respectively cI/(cI+vI)= 4/5; and cII/(cII+vII)= 2/3. 
Table 1 has Marx’s expanded reproduction.  The total 
output of Department 1 is 6000; however total capital is 
5500.  Moreover, total value added V + S (= 3500) is 
greater than total output of Department II (wII = 3000).  
Hence, in both cases cII < vI + sI, whereby the system is not 
in the mode or schema of simple reproduction.  In this case 
of revenue generated in production, capitalists are able to 
hoard a portion of their incomes.  When these hoards are 
advanced toward more capital, then the system will exhibit 
growth, or extended reproduction.   
In Marx’s schema of extended reproduction, as 





Table 1 (amended from Desai 1974:79-80). 
Department         
        CI 
 
        Vi     
 
        SI 
 





      4000 
      1500 
     1000 
       750 
      1000 
        750 
  6000 





Social Product       5500       1750       1750   9000 
Department I 
Department II 
      4400 
      1600 
      1100 
        800 
        500 
        600 
  6000 





Social Product       6000       1900                 1100   9000 
      
Department I 
Department II 
      4400 
      1600 
      1100             
        800 
    1100 
        800 
  6600 




Period 2 Social Product       6000       1900       1900   9800 
Department I 
Department II 
      4840 
      1760 
      1210 
        880 
        550 
        560 
  6600 





Social Product       6600       2090       1110   9800 
      
Department I 
Department II 
      4840 
      1760 
      1210 
        880 
      1210 
        880 
  7260 





Social Product       6600       2090       2090 10780 
Department I 
Department II 
      5324 
      1936 
      1331 
        968 
        605 
        616 
  7260 




Period 3 Social Product       7260       2299       1221 10780 
      
Department I 
Department II 
      5324 
      1936 
      1331 
        968 
      1331 
        968 
  7986 





Social Product       7260       2299       2299 11858 
Department I 
Department II 
      5856 
      2129 
      1464 
      1065 
        666 
        677 
  7986 





Social Product       7985       2529       1344 11858 
      
Department I 
Department II 
      5856 
      2129 
      1464 
      1065 
      1464 
      1065 
  8784 





Social Product       7985       2529       2529 13043 
Department I 
Department II 
      6442 
      2342 
      1610 
      1172 
        732 
        745 
  8784 





Social Product       8784       2782       1477 13043 
      
Department I 
Department II 
      6442 
      2342 
      1610 
      1172 
      1610 
      1172 
  9662 










hoarding money, but they advance these hoards toward the 
accumulation of more capital.  Capitalists in Department I 
accumulate according to the simple rule that one half their 
income (or surplus value) is reinvested.  Because Marx 
assumed no technological progress, the simple rule of 
Department I accumulation will leave the ratio between 
constant and variable capital unchanged.  
Given the arbitrary rule of Department I capitalists 
extending their capital accumulation by one half of their 
surplus value, a number of important features of the system 
are illuminated.  First, the very presence of the initial 
hoards implies the dynamic potential toward internally 
generated growth. Second, the ex ante disequilibrium or 
disproportionality between departments will necessarily 
close ex post. 
 If capitalists in Department I hoard one half of their 
surplus value, there are three broad possibilities with 
respect to the direction these hoards will take to close 
the disproportionality.  (1) Capitalists can expand their 
consumption pleasures, i.e., increase their demand for 
various consumption goods, simultaneously expanding old, 
and creating new markets for luxury goods, potentially 
leading to enormous growth in a third department, and 





(2) Capitalists can extend their accumulation of (constant) 
capital (and with c/v constant by assumption, consequently 
increase their demand for variable capital).  Once again, 
the consequence is the growth of the system as a whole.  
(3) Capitalists may leave the hoards idle, which is to say 
they may leave the hoard in monetary form.  As long as this 
increase in monetary form is merely surplus value above and 
beyond that which is necessary for simple reproduction, the 
hoard formation can occur without any hitches, necessarily 
forming in the normal reproduction of the system. 
Marx assumes that the capitalists of Department I 
accumulating constant and variable capital on an extended 
scale reabsorb all hoard formation into the system,  
whereby the ex ante disproportionality between C < wI and S 
+ V > wII as shown in Table 1, Period 1, will be brought 
back to proportionality ex post, with the capitalists of 
Department I accumulating more capital.  This is an 
arbitrary assumption: extended reproduction could proceed 
forward by increasing consumption, and simple reproduction 
could proceed by hoard formation, i.e., merely keeping the 
excess surplus value in monetary form.  Or a combination of 
the three could achieve extended reproduction.  For 
simplicity, Marx assumes that the propensity to hoard 





unchanged, then one can denote the ratio of constant 
capital to total capital [c/(c + v)] by  and the ratio of 
variable capital to total capital by .  Thus, I = 4/5 and 
I = .  Finally, denoting the ex ante categories by 
keeping them in brackets [ ], then the simple arbitrary 
rules of capitalists accumulation within Department I for 
both constant and variable are given by the respective ex 
post formulas: 
 
(14) cI = [cI ]+ I I [sI] 
 
(15) vI = [vI] + I I [sI] 
 
 
In other words, ex ante the system exhibits cII < vI + 
sI; however, ex post cII = vI + sI. How does this come about?  
Ex ante the planned investment of capitalists in Department 
II produced wII = 3000.  Workers in both departments and 
capitalists within Department II spend all of their income 
on consuming commodities from Department II, leaving a 
total product of 500 for Department I capitalists.  Hence, 
Department I capitalists spend 500S of their 1000S on 
Department II commodities, leaving them with excess 
surplus-value.  Marx’s arbitrary rule then is that 






 The ex post increase in labor (vI) will tend to 
increase demand for the means of consumption or Department 
II commodities, whereby prices for Department II 
commodities will increase, inducing capital accumulation 
within Department II.  Department II accumulation of 
capital further increases the demand for the means of 
consumption, first, by means of an increase in vII, and 
second, by means of the realization process, from the sale 
of capital equipment from Department I to Department II, or 
the realization of surplus value within Department I, given 
the propensity to consume half of the surplus value 
realized will be spent on commodities in Department I.  
When all these price adjustments take place, 
proportionality between departments is established ex post. 
The increase of prices will induce capital 
accumulation; capitalists in Department II temporarily 
curtail consumption by approximately one third, or II = , 
and by the assumption of no technological change.  The 
ratio between constant and variable in Department II 
remains unchanged at cII/vII = 2, whereby II =  and ii = .  
Given the arbitrary rule of Department I capitalists, 
Department II capitalists will be induced to accumulate 






(16) cII = [cII ]+ II II [sII] 
(17) vII = [vII] + II II [sII] 
 
 
 The accumulation of constant and variable capital 
takes on a life of its own after the production process 
disproportionality emerges once again.  For example, in 
Period 2, capitalists in Department I advance 4400cI and 
1100vI, a constant rate of exploitation of 100 percent; 
1100vI will generate 1100sI, for a total product of 6600wI.  
Likewise, at the beginning of period 2, capitalists in 
Department II advance 1600cII and 800vII, generating 800sII.  
Hence, although the ex post actions of the economic agents 
resulted in ex post proportionality, after the production 
process has taken place, period 2 once again is ex ante, 
characterized by an imbalance between departments, or cII < 
vI + sI.  As long as capitalists in Department I continue to 
follow the arbitrary rule of accumulating or capitalizing 
one half of their surplus value, then the process of 
extended reproduction can formally proceed unhindered. 
 In the six periods illustrated in Marx’s example, 
total social product w increases from 9000 in the first 
period to 14,348 in the sixth period; this corresponds to a 
10 percent growth rate in total output each period, except 





percent.  With no technological improvement, the organic 
composition of capital is constant; hence the accumulation 
of constant capital is 10 percent.  With the rate of 
exploitation unchanged, the change in investment of 
variable capital also is 10 percent.  The expenditures of 
Department I capitalist on consumption and luxury 
commodities increase by 10 percent; however, expenditures 
of Department II capitalists on consumption and luxury 
commodities changes by –6 percent between the first and 
second period, and then increases by 10 percent each 
period.  Finally, the value rate of profit () is given by 
  
 (18)   S .        
      c + v 
 
 
The value rate of profit for each department differs; 
this is due to the different organic compositions of 
capital.  The value rate of profit for Department I I = 20 
percent, for Department II II = 33 percent, and the average 
value rate of profit is constant in each period at  = 24 
percent.  This is an ad hoc assumption; it is not entirely 
clear why an equalization of the profit rate should not 






In volume II, Chapter 21, Marx succeeded in 
demonstrating, by means of an analytical or numerical 
fiction, that balanced expanded reproduction was, in fact, 
possible in capitalism.  However, as Dobb never tired of 
pointing out, there is no “actual tendency in capitalist 
society for these abstract conditions to be fulfilled – on 
the contrary, they were only observed ‘by an accident’” 
(Dobb 1955:196, 1937:102, 1973:163).141   As this comment 
stands, it is not at all clear what significance Dobb has 
in mind.  Nor is it clear why the efficacy of the price 
mechanism is not capable of establishing proportionality 
between departments.  This is especially perplexing in that 
Marx has demonstrated an example whereby it is possible. 
The virtue of capitalism is an internal impetus for 
growth and expansion.  This impetus is the combination of 
the spirit of free enterprise (i.e., private property) and 
competition.  Profit as an award of entrepreneurship based 
on the amount of capital an entrepreneur has in the 
circulation process is the very basis of the dynamic of a 
                                                 
141 Dobb writes elsewhere (1967:56) “the dynamic impetus in a capitalist 
economy, where the decisions affecting development are in the hands of 
autonomous entrepreneurs, or firms, motivated by considerations of 
individual profit.  I need hardly remind you that in such an economy 
development does not occur as the result of any thought-out and 
coordinated plan; it just happens – accidentally as it were – as the 
result of a large number of autonomous individual decisions each of 
them taken in ignorance of other and parallel decisions, on the basis 
of market data plus guesswork or ‘expectations’ as to future movements 





capitalist system.  It is to Marx’s credit that he 
recognized extended reproduction always involves simple 
reproduction.  However, simple reproduction is not the 
driving aim of the individuals within such a system.  In 
fact, Marx argued, “Accumulation of capital, i.e. genuine 
capitalist production, would be impossible in this way.  
The existence of capitalist accumulation accordingly 
excludes the possibility that cII may be equal to vI + sI” 
(Marx 1978:596).  The disproportionality between 
departments, expressed as cII < vI + sI, is characteristic of 
the system at nearly all moments of reproduction.  It would 
be miraculous for a balance to be achieved without price 
changes also having significant influence on the migration 
of both constant and variable capital.  Such movements tend 
to cause uncertainty in future investment and entrepreneur 
projects.  Competition between capitalists (along with 
other institutional forms) generates often enormous risk.  
The anarchic beginning of the production process is the 
source of ignorance. 
These circumstances of capitalist undertakers create 
serious constraints upon their ability to fulfill the 
entrepreneurial function for society.  J.M. Keynes would 





undertakers or the investment class.  In concert with Dobb, 
Keynes (1963:317-8) wrote: 
Many of the greatest economic evils of our time are 
 fruits of risk, uncertainty, and ignorance.  It is 
 because particular individuals, fortunate in situation 
 or in abilities, are able to take advantage of 
 uncertainty and ignorance, and also because for the 
 same reason big business is often a lottery, that 
 great inequalities of wealth come about; and these 
 same factors are also the cause of the Unemployment of 
 Labour, or the disappointment of reasonable business 
 expectations, and of the impairment of efficiency and 
 production.  Yet the cure lies outside the operations 
 of individuals; it may even be to the interest of 
 individuals to aggravate the disease.  
 
Money, via the price mechanism, is needed to achieve 
proportionality between departments.  However, social 
attributes of money also behold the potential to deepen the 
disproportionality.  Each of these issues requires further 
investigation into the motives of individuals in a 
capitalist mode of production, or what Keynes called a 
“monetary economy of production.” 
It must be recognized that in volume II of Capital, 
Marx does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the 
immanent, necessary, and permanent contradictions involved 
in the capitalist mode of production.  It is to this aim 
that Dobb developed a political economy of crisis.  Marx’s 
schemas of reproduction are the foundation of Dobb’s 
theory.  Dobb argued that various institutional forms 





ignorance with respect to the fulfillment of the 
entrepreneurial function in a capitalist society.  The 
basis of capitalist crisis is the failure to fulfill the 
entrepreneurial function of society.   
According to Dobb, Marx’s schemas of reproduction were 
aimed at demonstrating the high improbability of balanced 
economic growth.  It is in this sense that Dobb understood 
the schemas of reproduction as a basis for developing a 
general theory of capitalist crisis and theory of 
imperialism. 
 
3.5. Crisis: Overproduction and 
Disproportionalities 
 
 Dobb contended that “Undoubtedly for Marx the 
important application of his theory was in the analysis of 
the character of economic crises”142 (Dobb 1937:79).  Dobb 
pointed out (1937:89-90), and it is clear from Marx’s 
                                                 
142 Simon Clarke (1994:5, no. 4) contends that “It is difficult to see 
how Dobb could substantiate [t]his bold assertion.”   Clarke claims 
that Marx did not develop a clear, coherent theory of crisis (Clarke 
1994:274).  Rather, Marx, at various moments, associates “crises with 
the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, with tendencies to 
overproduction, underconsumption, disproportionality, and over-
accumulation with respect to labour, without ever clearly championing 
one or the other theory” (Clarke 1994:5).  Nonetheless, it can be said 
that two social phenomena preoccupied Marx in his studies of political 
economy.  First, the periodic crises that plagued Western European 
capitalist nations, and second, the disparity in the distribution of 
social wealth in an age when social wealth had increased immensely, 
while at the same time, for the vast majority of human beings living in 
capitalist social relations of production, their distribution of this 
social wealth had done little more than stay constant, and in some 
instances, even decreased (Dobb 1946; Mandel 1962:145ff).  In this 
sense, Dobb’s “bold” assertion is correct; however, this should not 





reproduction schemas, that crises are not necessarily 
manifest from wages being too low, or in other words, 
underconsumption based on a Ricardian-driven “Iron Law of 
Wages.”  Marx himself wrote: 
It is purely a tautology to say that crises are caused 
by the scarcity of solvent customers or of paying 
consumption. […] If any commodities are unsaleable it 
means that no solvent purchasers have been found for 
them, in other words, consumers (whether commodities 
are bought in the last instance for productive or 
individual consumption).  But if one were to attempt 
to clothe this tautology with a semblance of a 
profounder justification by saying that the working 
class receive too small a portion of their own 
product, and the evil would be remedied by giving them 
a larger share of it, or raising their wages, we 
should reply that crises are precisely always preceded 
by a period in which wages rise generally and the 
working class actually get a larger share of the 
annual product intended for consumption (Marx 
1978:486; also Dobb 1937:90 no. 3). 
 
As I have shown, according to Marx in volume II of 
Capital, it is not at all clear what may cause a crisis.  
It is Dobb’s aim both to interpret the implicit meaning of 
Marx in these unfinished manuscripts and to further develop 
a theory for capitalist economic crises. 
 For Dobb, a leading characteristic of capitalism is 
that the entrepreneurial function is in the hands of 
individual capitalist undertakers.  The significance of 
this observation is that there is, first by definition and 
second by institutional design, “anarchy of production.”  





‘atomistically’ and are coordinated by the mechanism of the 
market and its price-movements (Dobb 1962:30).  For 
(neo)classical economists, capitalist commodity production 
and exchange operate without collective regulation as long 
as there is sufficient competition among producers (Dobb 
1937:37). 
 The special virtue of the competitive market system is 
that the regulation of the system is maintained by the 
“rule of rationality” and by “automatic adjustment” of 
prices.  The production decisions of individual capitalist 
undertakers are normally made in blindness of one another; 
hence the basis of the joint outcome that produces the 
“automatic adjustment” is the aggregation of individual 
guesses (Dobb 1937:275).   The allocation-pattern of 
investment in a capitalist mode of production is “a product 
in the first instance of the guesses and expectations of a 
large number of independent decision-takers 
(entrepreneurs), in the long run revised by ex post 
movements of market prices” (Dobb 1960:5). 
 In addition, the production decisions or investment 
“guesses” must “be made some distance ahead of the market-
events into which they mature.”   This necessarily implies 
that the corrective “price-movements may not occur for some 





guesses have to serve for knowledge, and mistaken decisions 
continue to be made and embodied in action” (Dobb 
1937:275).   
 The “correctness” of investment “guesses” depends on 
four facts that individual undertakers in the anarchy of 
capitalist production are either partly or fully ignorant 
of.  These are (1) parallel and rival acts of investment;  
(2) acts of investment that will or will not be made in 
complementary processes, for example, complementary 
products, transport or power facilities, etc.;  (3) the 
aggregate amount that will be saved and/or invested 
throughout the economy as a whole; and (4) the course of 
capital investment in the future, which will in part 
determine the rate of interest on the economic life of the 
individual undertaker’s current fixed capital investment 
(Dobb 1937:278). 
 The boom and bust phenomenon of capitalism, or the so-
called business cycle, is very much a function of the 
relative ignorance of these four facts on behalf of the 
individual capitalist undertakers, who are, in turn, 
responsible for the fulfillment of the entrepreneurial 
function of society, i.e., investment decisions.  In the 
capitalist mode of production, these independent and 





particular characteristics and dynamic of the system.  It 
is here that “there is abundant field for miscalculation” 
(Dobb 1955[1924]:14).  The basic ignorance of these facts, 
coupled with the competitive nature of capitalism, produces 
a tendency towards overinvestment in certain industries, 
and consequently, overproduction. 
 As I have shown, the overproduction tendencies of 
capitalist production are “fairly familiar.”  
Examples consist in the chaotic duplication of railway 
facilities, the frequent overlapping of public utility 
services, the mushroom growth of shopping and 
entertainment facilities in new urban districts where 
(in respect to shops at least) the rate of mortality 
of business seems to be extraordinarily high (Dobb 
1937:279). 
 
An example of the familiarity of overproduction is provided 
by the Final Report of the Royal Commission in their 
analysis of the crisis of the late nineteenth century:  
We think that […] over-production has been one of the 
most prominent features of the course of trade during 
recent years; and that the depression under which we 
are now suffering may be partially explained by this 
fact.  […] The remarkable feature of the present 
situation, and that which in our opinion distinguishes 
it from all previous periods of depression, is the 
length of time during which this over-production has 
continued (quoted in Dobb 1946:307). 
 
 
3.5.1. Underinvestment Tendency of Capitalist  
  Social Relations  
 
 Although overproduction is a prominent feature of 





recognized result of the individual undertakers’ ignorance 
is, ironically, underinvestment (Dobb 1937:279).  Dobb 
maintained that if such ignorance is sufficiently great, 
“it may so inhibit investment decisions as to arrest 
[economic] growth entirely” (Dobb 1960:8).  Dobb suggests 
that it is especially the “complementary” investments that 
facilitate the manifestation of underinvestment.  
Examples of underinvestment “are doubtless more 
important than we are generally aware since they are not 
brought to our notice as are the results of overinvestment, 
which force our attention” (Dobb 1937:279).  In 
underdeveloped nations where the political commitment is 
toward laissez-faire, hence industry is ruled by ‘anarchy 
of production,’ underinvestment becomes especially 
significant.  In economically underdeveloped nations, the 
ignorance and risk that face individual capitalist 
undertakers (both foreign and domestic entrepreneurs alike) 
may inhibit development of industries that require 
coordination of a large number of individual decisions 
(Dobb 1962:65).    
 
3.5.2. Unstable Development: A Problem of 
       Economic Organization 
 
 Dobb argues that investment may not take place when it 





 investment at one point on the economic front is 
 dependent upon a simultaneous act of investment at 
 other points may prevent that investment from being 
 made at all, however economically justified it might 
 prove to be if the whole series of related moves could 
 be made in unison (Dobb 1967:86). 
 
However, as Dobb never tired of pointing out, “where [the] 
basis of sound calculation is absent, emotional influences 
(business optimism, etc.) enter in” (Dobb 1955[1924]:14).  
Even if investment could get underway, for example, by 
means of an impulse of unanimous optimism on the part of 
individual capitalist undertakers, development is by no 
means necessarily stable.   
 Unstable development may very well be what best 
characterizes the process of economic growth.  Unstable 
development may manifest in that  
the several parts of the pattern of development will 
 lack co-ordination and will accordingly tend to be 
 such as to involve subsequent maladjustments, 
 frustrations and distortions, probably of a serious 
 and costly character (Dobb 1955[1953]:76). 
 
Such maladjustments and distortions “can only be 
subsequently corrected by jerks in development, and 
probably by jerks [which are in themselves] productive of 
fluctuations” (Dobb 1937:285).   
It is in this sense that Dobb believed that the 
uncertainty of individual capitalistic undertaking may 





more cautious investment against potentially more ambitious 
paths of development (Dobb 1967:86).  “In other words, the 
type of mechanism whereby economic decisions are taken may 
be the crucial factor in determining the form and direction 
of development” (Dobb 1955[1953]:76).  Consequently, Dobb 
argued that the real dilemma upon “industrialisation is 
essentially not a financial one, but a problem of economic 
organisation” (Dobb 1967:73).  
When the organization of an economy is capitalistic, 
development, guided by the partial blindness of individual 
undertakers, will be characterized particularly by ‘jerky’ 
or unstable economic development.  For Dobb, especially 
significant here is a simple historical observation that 
begs for an explanation.  Dobb (1962:64-5) observes that, 
at least since the industrial revolution,  
capitalism has shown striking unevenness of 
 development, not only in the sense that different 
 sectors and regions have grown at different rates, but 
 in the sense that the system as a whole has shown a 
 marked rhythm of fluctuation between alternating 
 periods of expansion and retardation and contraction. 
  
 
3.5.3. Capitalistic Contradictions: A Historical    
   Materialist Interpretation   
 
It was the Dobb’s contention that the “marked rhythm 
of fluctuation” in the historical development of capitalism 





forces of production and the social relations of 
production.  It is the relationship between these two 
fundamental elements of society that most influences the 
expected profitability of a long-term investment. 
There are two key concepts to the forces of 
production.  First is Marx’s separation of capital into 
“constant” and “variable” capital.  The second is the 
Marxian emphasis on the concept of an “increase of relative 
surplus-value” (Dobb 1937:94).   
Likewise, there are two key points to be emphasized 
with respect to the social relations of production.  First, 
the very notion of social relations of production is meant 
to underscore “the way in which the means of production 
were owned and to the social relations between men which 
resulted from their connections with the process of 
production” (Dobb 1946:7).  Namely, (a) capital is 
possessed individually, and the individual undertaker who 
is the possessor of (social) capital is expected to fulfill 
the entrepreneurial function for society as a whole; (b) 
another class of individuals possess no capital, save for 
their own labor-power.  Hence this second class must sell 
their labor-power to a capitalist undertaker.  Second, the 
monopolization of social resources and the inequality of 





class antagonism between these two classes with respect to 
the distribution of wealth (Dobb 1955[1937]:95ff). 
To further understand the contradictions that arise 
between the forces of production and social relations of 
production, Dobb followed Marx in his distinction between 
two main departments of industry (Dobb 1937:99, Dobb 
1962:68).  For Marx, industries of Department I produce 
capital goods, and industries of Department II produce 
consumer goods.  Also in the “incomplete” and “fragmentary” 
manuscripts of volume II of Capital, Marx does not provide 
any explicit explanation for causes of economic crises.  
Moreover, Marx’s schemas of reproduction are presented as 
being hitchless.  At best, Marx’s schemas only establish 
the potential of crisis.  As such, a vulgar interpretation 
can maintain that Marx’s schemas are a theoretical 
demonstration of even development and growth.  With 
emphasis, Dobb rejects this interpretation.  However, Marx 
indeed developed the conditions necessary for the 
successful (simple) reproduction of a capitalist society.  
He demonstrated the abstract possibility of production of 
an “expanded” scale of economic development.  To extend 
Marx’s schemas of production, it must be recognized that 
capitalism not only expands but expands on an intensified 





of exploitation, or rate of relative surplus value, is not 
at all characteristic of capitalist production.  Capitalist 
production continuously increases relative surplus value by 
means of technological innovations. Marx does not provide 
in volume II of Capital an example of an intensified scale 
of expanded reproduction.   
 
3.5.4. Intensified Capitalistic Production: 
       The Feverish Scale 
 
It is Dobb’s intention to outline some tendencies of 
capital accumulation on an intensified scale.  That is to 
say, whereas Marx abstracted away from any “increases in 
relative surplus-value” (hence technology is held 
constant), and thus the ratio of “constant capital” and 
“variable capital” (C/V) remained fixed, Dobb instead drops 
this assumption.  To anticipate, with the increases in 
relative surplus-value, crisis becomes immanent to the 
system of production.  Moreover, with intensified capital 
accumulation, the ratio between constant capital and 
variable capital tends to increase, and ceteris paribus the 
rate of profit tends to fall.   
In this sense, increases in relative surplus value 
modify, and potentially revolutionize, the forces of 
production.  In turn, the constant modifications, and 





to (1) heighten the uncertainty of investment, while the 
constant possibility of a fall in the rate of profit (2) 
augments the risk of investment.  Increases in relative 
surplus value further tend to displace workers and create 
unemployment.  Thus, a disruption is likely to occur in 
capital/labor nexus, in turn (3) aggravating class 
antagonisms. 
Furthermore, if the rate of profit also falls, it 
seems more likely that the capitalist undertaking class 
fails to fulfill the entrepreneurial function for society.  
The failure to fulfill the social role and function of the 
entrepreneur is due to the decrease of reward and the 
increase of risk.  However, the tendency for the rate of 
profit to fall is not necessarily the cause of crisis. 
 
3.5.5. Disproportionality and the Drop in the 
       Rate of Profit 
  
The issues of central importance in Dobb’s conception 
of capitalist crisis are the contradictions that manifest 
between the forces of production and social relations of 
production.  The “crux of the matter” concerns the 
relationship between the growing productive powers of 
society, on the one hand, and the relative (falling) 
profitability, on the other.  However, Dobb is quick to 





the (concrete) manifestation of a socioeconomic crisis 
(Dobb 1937:108-10). 
Of greater importance than whether the rate of profit 
is falling is the structural relationship and 
(dis)proportionality between the industries that produce 
capital goods (Department I) and those that produce 
consumer goods (Department II) (Dobb 1973:161-2, Dobb 
1937:111, Dobb 1962:69).  According to Dobb, a proportional 
balance between Department I and Department II (reminiscent 
of Marx’s presentation of the reproduction schemas in 
volume II of Capital) are “unlikely to be achieved in 
reality save by ‘an accident’” (Dobb 1973:163).  
The emphasis upon the disproportionalities between 
Department I and Department II translates into a de-
emphasis of underconsumptionist theories of crisis (Dobb 
1937:87ff).  Rather, for Dobb, underconsumption, or the 
“realization” difficulties underscored by Rosa Luxemburg,143 
are indeed “an important incident” in the total physiology 
of a crisis, but remain merely an incident.  Likewise the 
conflict that arises between increases in productivity and 
(lack of) consumer demand is “one facet of crises and one 
element of the contradiction which found expression in a 
                                                 
143 Dobb reviewed a new addition of Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of 
Capital, with an introduction by J. Robinson in 1952, and reprinted it 





periodic breakdown of the system.” However, continues Dobb, 
it remains “only a facet” (Dobb 1937:121). 
 
3.5.6. Structural Contradictions: Immanent, 
       Necessary, Permanent 
 
Of more fundamental importance than the relationship 
between productivity and consumption are the contradictions 
within the sphere of production itself.  Thus, for Dobb, 
the hierarchical importance of various structural 
relationships between entities for the understanding of 
socioeconomic crises can be listed as follows: 
(a) Institutional physiology of society 
(b) Productive forces and social relations of  
    production     
 
(c) Growing productive powers and falling  
    profitability 
 
(d) Industries of Department I and Department II 
(e) Capital & Wage-Labor Class 
(f) Sphere of production and sphere of consumption 
What distinguishes a Marxian/Dobbian theory of crisis from 
other more mainstream theories of crisis is the necessity 
for, immanence of, and permanent structural tendencies 
toward crisis to stabilize and balance the sets of 
relationships between the various entities listed above. 
 For Dobb, the crisis tendencies of capitalism could 





addressing market exchange and/or (re)distribution.  If 
this latter point would prove to distinguish Dobb from 
(later) Keynesian developments, Dobb further distinguished 
his interpretation of Marx and theories of crisis from 
subsequent Marxists.  What first distinguished Dobb from 
other Marxists was his rejection of underconsumptionism as 
the culprit of capitalist crisis.  Second, Dobb’s de-
emphasis on the fall in the rate of profit in general, and 
rejection of the fall in the rate of profit as the cause of 
crisis further distinguished Dobb from other Marxists. 
 
3.5.7. A Dobbian Theory of Crisis 
 
 These distinctions in Dobb’s interpretation of Marx 
and a Dobbian theory of crisis from other Marxian theories 
are of some significance.  First, Dobb’s rejection of 
underconsumptionism was in direct opposition to what (could 
be argued) had become Marxian orthodoxy during the first 
half of the twentieth century.  Second, Dobb’s rejection of 
the fall in the rate of profit anticipated (and rejected) 
the later reactionary response of various Marxists to 
defend underconsumption as the primary cause of crises.  
Namely, in the 1970s, several Marxian theories emerged 
which had promoted the tendency for a fall in the rate of 





 For Dobb, the fall in the rate of profit is of itself 
of great importance but cannot in itself explain the 
immanence of, necessity for, and permanence of structural 
tendencies toward a socioeconomic crisis.  In this sense, 
the historical demonstration (e.g., Dumenil, Glick, and 
Rangel 1987a, 1987b) of the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall, although of some importance, is otherwise beside 
the point.  For Dobb, the issue of importance is the nexus 
between the rate of profit and the disproportionality of 
Department I and II, along with the effect on various 
sectors and industries of the economy. 
 According to Dobb, as long as the rate of profit is 
positive, regardless of whether it is falling, constant, or 
rising, capitalist accumulation will necessarily proceed 
forward.  However, a falling rate of profit may intensify 
competition between capitalist undertakers and sharpen 
class antagonisms with respect to issues of distribution.  
Nonetheless, a falling rate of profit is not necessary for 
the manifestation of a crisis. 
 Rather, crisis, according to Dobb, is immanent because 
the capitalist undertaker will attempt to avoid a fall in 
the rate of profit (often successfully) by mechanisms that 
increase relative surplus value, which in turn tend to 





the degree of centralization).  Crisis is necessary, not 
because of a low or falling rate profit, but because of the 
disproportionalities that manifest.  The disproportionality 
is directly related to the increases in surplus value 
(which tend to counteract a fall in the rate of profit) and 
the simultaneous displacement of workers and rise of 
unemployment.   
 The increase in relative surplus value may lower the 
value of labor-power but may be offset by a decrease in the 
price of commodities, or the real wage may not fall.  
However, if the increase in productivity is not in an 
industry that produces goods included in the basic 
consumption bundle of the working-class, the rise in 
unemployment itself may affect circumstances so as to 
diminish the value of labor-power.  Thus, 
disproportionality emerges in that the proceeds of the 
increase in productivity go to the capitalist undertaking 
class, and the tendency for this class is to produce 
without regard to the limitation of the market.   
It is examples of such disproportionalities in 
distribution that offer a degree of warrant to 
underconsumption theories of crisis.  However, for Dobb, 





that may manifest in the contradictory dynamic of 
capitalist development. 
 Most broadly, it is the tendency of the productive 
forces in capitalism to develop beyond the limits of the 
market that is the basis for the immanence of and necessity 
for crisis.  Overproduction, then, is the basis of 
capitalist crisis.  Overproduction, however, is not 
necessarily the basis toward underconsumption, or 
respectively, the “opposite sides of the same coin” (Sweezy 
1946:183).  The basis of underconsumption is not dynamic 
and structural as much as it is static and institutional.  
That is to say, although they can, it is not always the 
‘laws of capitalist motion’ that necessarily produce 
underconsumption.  Rather, the legislative (e.g., property 
rights, regulation of capital mobility, labor regulations, 
etc.) and institutional factors (e.g., organization and 
relative strength of labor, etc.) are the main culprits in 
the manifestation of underconsumption.   
Overproduction, unlike underconsumption, is dynamic 
and structural.  Although overproduction is not necessarily 
the basis of underconsumption, it is the basis for the 
various forms and conditions of disproportionalities.  
Moreover, for Dobb, the incessant drive for surplus value 





overaccumulation and overproduction are the causes and the 
central factors in the permanence of the structural 
tendencies toward socioeconomic crises (Dobb 1937:123-5, 
Dobb 1962:68-70). 
Thus, in counter distinction to many mainstream 
theories, crisis for Dobb is not an abnormal occurrence to 
the normal functioning of capitalism.  Instead, crisis is a 
necessary equilibrating force of the mode of production 
when the entrepreneurial function is in the control of 
independent and individual capitalist undertakers.  Crisis 
tends to equilibrate the disproportionalities between 
departments and sectors.144 
 
3.5.8. The Role and Influence of Tugan-Baranowsky 
 
By subscribing to a disproportionality theory of 
crisis, Dobb was in a precarious position as a Marxist 
(especially in 1937).  The main source of disproportional-
ity theory of crisis was a non-Marxist, Tugan-Baranowsky.   
In 1893, drawing directly from Marx’s ‘reproduction 
schemes’ of volume II of Capital, Tugan-Baranowsky 
critically developed an attack upon both the 
underconsumptionist theories of crisis and explaining 
crisis on the basis of the tendency for the rate of profit 
                                                 
144 Howard and King (1989:175) have also observed that “Dobb regarded 
overaccumulation as the principal element in Marxian crisis theory 





to fall (Sweezy 1946:159).  At the same time, Tugan-
Baranowsky constructively developed a disproportionality 
theory of crisis (Clarke 1994:33-9; Howard and King 
1989:168-71; Sweezy 1946:158-62).   
 Tugan-Baranowsky was the first to understand the deep 
significance of Marx’s ‘reproduction schemas’ (Howard and 
King 1989:168).  Like Dobb, Tugan-Baranowsky insisted on 
the importance of two observations.  First, increases in 
the relative surplus value were the norm for capital 
accumulation in capitalist relations.  Second, production 
in capitalism is not necessarily socially motivated, but 
rather production is for profit (Dobb 1937:112 no. 1; 
Howard and King 1989:169-70). 
 With respect to underconsumptionism, Tugan-Baranowsky 
conceded that if industries producing the means of 
consumption expanded beyond the consumption demand of 
society, a crisis could arise.  However, wages being too 
low or the limited consumption of the working class was not 
necessarily the cause of such a crisis.  Rather, an 
overproduction of consumption goods was the culprit, giving 
rise to disproportionality between branches of production 
(Clarke 1994:34).  
With emphasis, two observations are of great 





norm in capitalism, and (2) in capitalistic society 
production is strictly carried forth for profit.  It was 
the fact that capital accumulation tended to expand on an 
intensified scale, i.e., increases in relative surplus 
value as the norm in capitalism that tended to push the 
production of the means of consumption beyond the societal 
consumer demand.  The fact that production was for profit 
meant for Tugan-Baranowsky that a regime characterized by 
an anarchy of production would be the economic basis, while 
overproduction and disproportionality would be the manifest 
result.  Nonetheless, Tugan-Baranowsky believed: 
If social production were organized in accordance with 
a plan, if the directors of production had complete 
knowledge of demand and the power to direct labor and 
capital from one branch of production to another, 
then, however low social consumption might be, the 
supply of commodities could never outstrip the demand 
(quoted in Sweezy 1946:166). 
 
Tugan-Baranowsky then is interpreting Marx’s 
presentation of the reproduction schemas quite literally.  
More specifically, regardless of the how restrictive the 
market for consumption goods may be, capital expansion can 
proceed indefinitely as long as the means of production 
expand proportional to the means of consumption (Clarke 
1994:35). However, Marx’s manuscripts are highly 





abstraction; therefore, this literal interpretation may be 
very misleading, i.e., a vulgar interpretation. 
Marx’s assumption of no increase in relative surplus-
value meant that the organic composition of capital would 
remain constant, along with the rate of profit.  Thus, when 
Tugan-Baranowsky drops this assumption, he must deal with 
the effect on the rate of profit.  Tugan-Baranowsky argued 
that a rising organic composition of capital, far from 
leading to a decrease in the rate of profit, would lead to 
an increase.  However, Tugan-Baranowsky’s notion “that a 
raised organic composition must result in a rise in the 
rate of profit rests on a special assumption: namely, that 
the rate of surplus-value (in the example cited) is doubled 
as a result of the change” (Dobb 1937:112 no. 1).  This is 
a purely arbitrary assumption that has often been regarded 
as invalid (see Sweezy 1946:159; Dobb 1937:113). 
 
3.5.9. Dobb Supersedes Tugan-Baronowsky  
 
Dobb, in an attempt to defend a disproportionality 
theory of crisis, agrees with Tugan-Baranowsky that co-
ordination by means of economic organization of 
entrepreneurial planning would help to avoid the 
manifestation of disproportionalities (Dobb 1967:86; Dobb 





Baranowsky, this type of planning and economic organization 
cannot be on a profit motive basis because accumulation 
necessarily tends to decrease the rate of profit unless the 
rate of exploitation is increased.  Here then is a simple, 
but crucial contradiction.  If the rate of profit falls, 
there is likely to be a disruption in the social 
entrepreneurial function; if the rate of profit does not 
fall, this implies an increase in the rate of exploitation 
and, likely, an augmentation in class conflict.  
For Dobb, the capitalist mode of production was 
necessarily embedded and entangled in a basic class 
antagonism. If the rate of profit was to rise, this 
necessarily implies an increase in the rate of 
exploitation, and a decrease in the rate of exploitation 
most often implies a decrease in the rate of profit.  Thus, 
according to Dobb, an economic organization based on 
(investment) planning must be on a social motive basis and 
not a profit motive basis. 
As indicated above, the main problem of individual and 
independent capitalist undertakers controlling the 
entrepreneurial function is that there are too many 
uncertainties, including the incalculable element of the 
amount of supply of one’s competitors.  The implication of 





a tendency towards overproduction; hence there arises the 
“possibility of serious maladjustment of resources and 
consequent damage both to business men and to the 
community” (Dobb 1925:379). 
In Dobb’s early writings, the tendencies toward 
overproduction and maladjustment of social resources were 
mainly due to irrational spirits of individual capitalist 
undertakers (e.g., Dobb 1925:380).   Where there is an 
absence of a sound basis of calculation, an emotional 
element (e.g., business optimism or pessimism, etc.) must 
enter in (Dobb 1955[1924]:14) and “will act as a rapidly 
spreading epidemic” (Dobb 1925:381). 
Dobb’s early focus on the subjectivity of the 
individual capitalist undertaker tends to suggest that the 
undertaker’s lust for profit is irrational and merely 
emotional.  Dobb is not careful to establish an objective 
foundation for the tendency towards overproduction.  Dobb’s 
Marshallian145 hangovers left key elements of the motion of 
capitalism un(der)analyzed.  Although his early writings 
established the immanence of crisis, Dobb failed to 
establish the necessity for and permanence towards 
structural socioeconomic crisis.         
                                                 
145 Dobb himself says of CESP, that it was “an unsuccessful and jejune 
attempt to combine the notion of surplus-value and exploitation with 





3.5.10. The Immanence, Necessity and  
        Permanence of “Frictions” 
 
In this sense, Dobb’s early Marshallian-informed 
writings shared some affinity with bourgeois economics.  As 
Simon Clarke has stated: 
The whole sophisticated edifice of bourgeois economics 
rests on the fragile foundations of its assumption 
that capitalist production tends to adjust itself to 
the limits of the market, the failure of such an 
adjustment being treated as a superficial 
imperfection, resulting from the subjective ignorance, 
uncertainty or misjudgement of individual capitalists 
(Clarke 1994:88). 
 
Although mainstream or bourgeois economists do not deny the 
possibility of crisis, if a crisis arises, it is 
necessarily due to the existence of barriers (e.g., 
especially social impediments to greater competition) to 
the proper functioning of the market. 
 These barriers to the proper functioning of the market 
were “usually referred to as ‘frictions’” (Dobb 1937:186).  
In mainstream (or bourgeois) theory, “imperfections” which 
caused the market  
to depart from the abstract ideal of competition were 
treated simply as frictions which either delayed the 
attainment of the equilibrium-position, without 
altering the nature of the position which would 
eventually be reached, or else introduced definite 
spatial differences in price – differences which were 
themselves a simple and direct function of the 






By 1937, Dobb was not merely acknowledging the presence of 
these frictions.  He was arguing for the permanence of the 
presence of these frictions.  In other words, neoliberal 
reforms to remove the rigidity of prices, monopoly powers, 
social institutions that protect privileges of imperfect 
competition (e.g., patents, licensing, etc.), easing 
capital mobility, restricting labor union activity, etc. 
would not completely absent the tendency toward 
socioeconomic crisis. Rather within capitalist social 
relations of production there is a permanence of 
“frictions.”  
The permanence of economic frictions allowed Dobb to 
theoretically establish that in capitalistic social 
relations of production, there is an immanence of, 
necessity for, and permanence toward structural crisis. 
Moreover, Dobb maintained that some frictions “were more 
than a friction” (Dobb 1937:187).  Some “disturbing 
influences” are capable of causing not merely a more or 
less calculable quantitative change but a qualitative 
shift.  The introduction of some “friction” or “new 
element” may have an emergent quality, or “chemical” 
effect.   The mere presence of some friction or new element 
may alter “the very character and action of other elements 





Thus, for Dobb, revolutionary transformation is an 
unremitting potential.  Revolutionary transformation 
remains merely an unremitting potential, contingent upon 
the institutional arrangement and modes of a constraining 
and enabling agency.  It can be argued that legislative and 
political action can limit the unremitting potential and 
constrain revolutionary agency.  Nevertheless, the 
unremitting potential of revolutionary transformation 
remains. 
 
3.5.11. The Underanalyzed Role of Capitalist 
        Competition 
   
The immanence of, necessity for, permanence toward 
structural crisis and unremitting potential of radical 
transformation had gone theoretically underappreciated 
because of a particular neglect of analysis.  What had been 
un(der)analyzed is the nature of capitalist competition 
itself.  With a deepened analysis of the competitive 
process, “the presence in the market of frictions, such as 
ignorance, inertia, or cost of movement, even in a small 
degree,” can cause a shift of qualitative character.   The 
presence of such frictions may not only cause the “normal 
price” level to diverge “by an amount equivalent to the 





‘normal price’ throughout the market to be different from 
what it would otherwise be” (Dobb 1937:191). 
Simon Clarke has succinctly captured the problem of 
the un(der)analyzed nature of competition within mainstream 
theory.  In concert with Dobb’s critique of mainstream 
economics, Clarke (1990:451) writes: 
The bourgeois analysis of competition is formal, 
idealist, circular, and internally contradictory.  For 
the bourgeois economist the capitalist is a pure 
arbitrageur, moving capital instantly between branches 
of production in order to secure the uniformity of 
prices and of conditions of production within branches 
of production, and the uniformity of the rate of 
profit between branches of production, required to 
establish an equilibrium.  The analysis is formal 
because it abstracts entirely from the social 
relations within which competition takes place.  It is 
idealist because competition is an intellectual 
process of rational decision making.  It is circular 
because it presupposes knowledge (“expectations”) 
which anticipates the outcome of the process whose 
course it determines.  It is contradictory because 
opportunities for profit only arise to the extent that 
the market fails to establish an equilibrium, so that 
the presumed tendency to equilibrium extinguishes the 
agents whose entrepreneurial activity underpins that 
tendency.   
 
Dobb himself heeded the warning of the formalization of 
economic theory (Dobb 1937:128ff, 171ff, Dobb 1973:11-3).  
With respect to idealism, Dobb had insisted upon the 
importance of the historical social relations in the 
context of the (concrete) stage of economic development, 
while simultaneously, he critiqued the idealist tendency to 





1946:5ff; Dobb 1955[1937]:93-103).  Furthermore, because 
neoclassical theory of competition is idealist, Dobb 
questioned its practical relevance and theoretical accuracy 
(Dobb 1969:9-26, Dobb 1937:181-4).  
Dobb was quite anxious to critique both the 
circularity and contradictoriness of the neoclassical 
theory of competition.  Dobb concedes that the expectations 
of any single individual capitalist undertaker have 
“negligible influence on the total market situation”; hence 
the expectation of any individual is irrelevant to the 
final market outcome. However, when several individual 
capitalist undertakers are influenced by similar 
expectations, “the combined expectation of a collection of 
individuals” can significantly affect the total market 
outcome (Dobb 1937:204).  Dobb reasoned that a “combined 
expectation of a collection of individual[s …] will exert 
an influence in producing fluctuations – fluctuations which 
will be greater and their effects more lasting the more 
durable the form in which the decisions are embodied”  
(Dobb 1937:221). 
Thus, in opposition to bourgeois economics, 
fluctuations are generated internally within the mode of 
production.  Regarding intersectoral adjustments and the 





market economy […] is subject to great macro-instability” 
(Dobb 1969:141).  Accordingly, fluctuations and crisis are 
“part of the essential nature of an individual economy, not 
an accidental derivative” (Dobb 1937:221). 
Dobb insists that risk, uncertainty, and ignorance are 
factors within, and in part constitute, the competitive 
process.  As such, expectations will “affect the process of 
adjustment and may indeed thwart it so far as attainment of 
any particular equilibrium is concerned” (Dobb 1969:122).   
Therefore, Dobb believed that viewing risk, ignorance, 
and uncertainty as subjective factors is reductionist and 
should be avoided.  Rather, risk, ignorance, and 
uncertainty are (at least in part) objective factors (Dobb 
1962:8).  If any one of these objective factors of 
competition is “sufficiently great, it may so inhibit 
investment decisions as to arrest growth entirely” (Dobb 
1960:8).  Thus, the presence of these objective factors 
implies that there is no necessary uniqueness in the market 
outcome of the competitive process.  In this context, Dobb 
maintained that “no optimal quality attaches to the 
solutions achieved by a decentralised market system, 
however competitive it may be” (Dobb 1969:123). 
Moreover, the constant shifting of these objective 





capitalism “highly unstable; […] so-called adjustment 
processes may involve fluctuations which can even be 
cumulative, or at least self-perpetuating” (Dobb 1969:123).  
Dobb contended “We are confronted with [… a] paradox” in 
the neoclassical theory of competition:   
If the entrepreneur could foresee the actions of his 
 rivals, he would not act in the manner in which the 
 theory of competition assumes him to act, and the laws 
 of Political Economy in their traditional form would 
 cease to hold true (Dobb 1937:221).   
 
It is only in virtue of the ignorance and the uncertainty  
 
of each as to the actions of all do the traditional 
laws of market rule; only by the appearance of freedom 
does economic necessity and automatism prevail; only 
by reason of the essential ignorance of each 
entrepreneur does the economist’s power of forecasting 
the total situation emerge (Dobb 1937:222).    
 
However, the ignorance and uncertainty of each as to 
the intentions of others is what gives rise to the 
influence and importance of collective expectations.  At 
the same time, the influence of collective expectations is 
the basis for the immanence and “inevitability of economic 
fluctuations: fluctuations which generate an important 
modifying influence, as well as a potent motive force, 
shaping the future of the economic system” (Dobb 1937:222).   
 
3.5.12. The Deficiencies of Neoliberal Policy 
 
According to Dobb, the neoclassical theory of 





irrelevance (Dobb 1955[1953]:86-7).  The practical 
significance of Dobb’s view of competition is quite 
contrary to neoliberal policy.  The neoliberal economic 
policy is to absent various market “frictions” and increase 
competition.  In Dobb’s view, neoliberal policy fails to 
remove such “frictions.” More than that, if neoliberal 
policy were to be successful, it may cause fluctuations to 
sharpen (Dobb 1955[1924]:13-4, Dobb 1955[1949]:105).  
Crises were not merely a transitional dislocation of 
the market schema of the capitalist mode of production, 
According to Dobb, they play a progressive role “in shaping 
the long-term trend of the system” (Dobb 1937:121-2).  
Collective expectations of profitability are the central 
element in the decision to invest in new capital equipment.  
Hence, it is “not the abstract limits to exchange, but the 
limits to investment and production at a certain rate of 
profit” (Dobb 1937:115).  
 
3.5.13. The Rejection of Say’s Law of Markets: 
        Marx’s Influence  
 
The key Marxian insight is the rejection of ‘Say’s law 
of markets’ (Dobb 1973:164; Keynes 1979:81).  According to 
Marx, it was a mistake to depict the circulation process 





as did David Ricardo (Dobb 1937:43).146 Ricardo’s main 
argument was as follows: 
No man produces, but with a view to consume or sell, 
and he never sells but with an intention to purchase 
some other commodity, which may be immediately useful 
to him, or which may contribute to future production.  
By producing, then, he necessarily becomes either the 
consumer of his own goods, or the purchaser and 
consumer of the goods of some other person.  It is not 
to be supposed that he should, for any length of time 
be ill-informed of the commodities which he can most 
advantageously produce, to attain the object which he 
has in view, namely, the possession of other goods; 
and therefore, it is not probable that he will 
continuously produce a commodity for which there is no 
demand (Ricardo 1973:290; also quoted in Dobb 
1973:92ff). 
 
Marx’s critique of the Ricardian pronouncement of 
Say’s law of markets and the impossibility of a general 
crisis is threefold. First, Marx claimed that Ricardo had a 
tendency to overlook that fact that commodity production is 
not for the direct satisfaction of the producer.   
To deny crisis they [the Ricardian economists] speak 
of unity where there is contrast and opposition. […] 
All the objections made by Ricardo, etc., to over-
production have the same basis: they regard bourgeois 
production as a mode of production wherein there is no 
distinction between purchase or sale (direct 
exchange), or they see social production, in which 
society divides its means of production and its 
productive resources according to a plan, in the 
                                                 
146 Marx’s three circuits of social capital, which will be discussed, 
have often been interpreted as a formal rejection of Say’s Law of 
Market (e.g., Dobb 1973:164; Foley 1986:146-8; Sweezy 1946:138ff).   
Robinson (1942:86) has suggested that Marx’s presentation of the 
reproduction schemas is “Part of the time […] accepting Say’s Law and 
part rejecting it.”   Nonetheless, others have further argued that 
Marx’s reproduction schemas clearly were intended to reject Say’s law 






proportions in which they are necessary to the 
satisfaction of different needs (Marx quoted in Dobb 
1937:116). 
 
 In commodity production, when exchange-value is the 
aim, sale is separated from purchase and crisis becomes a 
possibility (Marx 1969:502).  Elsewhere, Marx adds that in 
precapitalist commodity production, crisis is certainly a 
possibility but  
 no more than a possibility.  For the development of 
 this possibility into a reality a whole series of 
 conditions is required, which do not yet even exist 
 from the standpoint of simple circulation of 
 commodities (Marx 1976:209).   
 
Second, Marx says, due to the anarchy of capitalist 
production, sellers may be forced to sell at a loss, or be 
unable to sell at all: 
A man who has produced does not have the choice of 
selling or not selling.  He must sell.  In the crisis 
there arises the very situation in which he cannot 
sell or can only sell below the cost price or must 
even sell at a positive loss.  What difference does it 
make to him or us that he has produced in order to 
sell?  The very question we want to solve is what has 
thwarted that good intention of his? (Marx 1969:503). 
 
 Marx elsewhere adds that “Nothing could be more 
foolish than the dogma that because every sale is a 
purchase, and every purchase a sale, the circulation of 
commodities necessarily implies an equilibrium between 
sales and purchases” (Marx 1976:208).  It is true that “No 





directly needs to purchase because he has just sold” (Marx 
1976:208-9).  Marx concluded that there is internal 
dependence between sale and purchase; however, there is 
external independence.   
 [T]hese two processes lack internal independence 
 because they complement each other.  Hence, if the 
 assertion of their external independence proceeds to a 
 certain critical point, their unity violently makes 
 itself felt by producing – a crisis” (Marx 1976:209). 
 
Finally, Marx clearly does not accept Ricardo’s dictum 
that “no man sells but with an intention to purchase.”  
Rather, Marx argued that it is especially during a crisis 
that the capitalist must sell in order to pay his 
creditors.  “During the crisis, a man may be very pleased 
if he has sold his commodities without immediately thinking 
of a purchase. […] The immediate purpose of capitalist 
production is not ‘possession of other goods’ but the 
appropriation of money, of abstract wealth” (Marx 
1969:503).  It is because money functions as a “means of 
payment” that a monetary crisis becomes a potential (Marx 
1976:236).   
 Where chains of payments and an artificial system for 
 adjusting them have been developed, any upheaval that 
 forcibly interrupts the flow of payments and upsets 
 the mechanism for balancing them against one another. 
 […]  This particular phase of world market crises is 






 Money then, is both an integral part of circulation 
(as a means of exchange) and indeed “stands independent of 
circulation” (as a means of payment) (Marx 1973:217).  
“Money, then, has an independent existence outside 
circulation; it has stepped outside of it. […] as money, it 
can be accumulated to form a treasure” (Marx 1973:216).  
Money can be an “end-in-itself, and hence steps outside 
circulation just like a particular commodity which ceases 
to circulate for the time being and changes from 
marchandise to denrée” (Marx 1973:215). 
The conversion of products into money in the sphere of 
circulation appears originally simply as an individual 
necessity for the commodity-owner when his own product 
does not constitute use-value for himself, but has 
still to become a use-value through alienation.  In 
order to make payment on the contractual settlement 
day, however, he must already have sold commodities.  
The evolution of the circulation process thus turns 
selling into a social necessity for, quite 
irrespective of his individual needs.  As a former 
buyer of commodities he is forced to become a seller 
of other commodities so as to obtain money, not as a 
means of purchase, but as a means of payment, as the 
absolute form of exchange-value.  The conversion of 
commodities into money as a final act, or the first 
metamorphosis of commodities as the ultimate goal, 
which in hoarding appeared to be the whim of the 
commodity-owner, has now become an economic function.  
The motive and the content of selling for the sake of 
payment constitute the content of the circulation 
process, a content arising from its very form (Marx 
1970:141-2).   
 
 Thus, not only is “hoarding” an irrational act of the 





The warrant of truth of Say’s law of markets is that when 
the abstraction is the depiction of circulation as C-M-C, 
overproduction is not possible and would be quite 
irrational, if not illogical.  However, despite implicit 
denial of Say’s law of markets, overproduction and general 
crisis becomes quite possible when excess demand prevails 
for the general commodity, i.e., money. 
Clearly for Marx, the presence of money is of central 
importance for the circulation of commodities (and 
capital).  “Circulation sweats money from every pore” (Marx 
1976:208).  In capitalism, money takes on a life of its 
own.   In contrast to the Ricardians, Marx makes the simple 
observation that capitalist production is aimed for the 
realization of profits (as opposed to production merely for 
use-values); hence the circulation process is more 
accurately depicted as M-C-M’ (Money-Capital  Means-of-
Productions  Money-Capital plus profits).  It is the money 
circuit of production (M-C-M’) that is meant to suggest 
that the circulation process is not necessarily a 
continuous process as implied by Say’s law of markets; 
rather the circuit was always liable to disruption, by 
either the emergence of a monetary crisis or by means of 
“hoarding” of M instead of reinvesting it as C (Dobb 





 “Hoarding” may manifest when expected profitability is 
too low or collective expectations become pessimistic.  The 
effect of this type of hoarding is likely to become 
cumulative (Dobb 1925:381).  I also have shown that Marx 
further maintained that hoarding not only occurs during 
moments of social pessimism, but it becomes an economic 
function. On the one hand, some capitalist undertakers must 
sell without buying, i.e., those capitalists who need to 
collect a hoard for replacement of capital or for new 
investment.  On the other hand, some capitalist undertakers 
must buy without selling, i.e., those capitalists spending 
their hoard on new expansionary investment or replacement 
of depreciated capital equipment.  Marx (1978:567) writes:   
Money is withdrawn from circulation and stored up as a 
hoard by the sale of commodities without subsequent 
purchase.  If this operation is conceived as taking 
place on all sides, it seems impossible to explain 
where the buyers are to come from, since in this 
process – and it must be conceived as a general one, 
in as much as every individual capital may be 
simultaneously engaged in the act of accumulation – 
everyone wants to sell in order to hoard, and no one 
wants to buy.  
 
This dilemma underscores the pivotal role of money.  Money 
demand must not be too excessive.  In this sense, money 
plays the crucial role: 
money plays a role, not just as means of circulation, 
but also as money capital within the circulation 
sphere, and gives rise to certain conditions for 





mode of production, i.e. conditions for the normal 
course of reproduction, whether simple or on an 
expanded scale, which turn into an equal number of 
conditions for an abnormal course, possibilities of 
crisis, since, on the basis of the spontaneous pattern 




3.5.14. Marx’s Anticipation of Keynes 
 
 Dobb suggested that Marx resolved the dilemma in a way 
that anticipated Keynes.  First, Marx acknowledged the 
Keynesian identity that total social income must be equal 
to social output (Dobb 1937:101).  Second, drawing from 
Kalecki, Dobb suggested that with respect to the particular 
relationship and balance “which would need to hold between 
the capital-goods industries and consumption-goods 
industries" (Dobb 1937:101), Marx was “saying virtually the 
same thing as certain recent propositions about the 
identity of ‘saving’ and ‘investment’ ex post” (Dobb 
1937:102 no. 2).  In Marx’s (Marx 1978:570) own words: 
In as much as one-sided conversions take place, a 
number of mere purchases on the one hand, and isolated 
sales on the other – and as we have seen, the normal 
exchange of the annual product on the capitalist basis 
requires these one-sided metamorphoses – this balance 
exists only on the assumption that the values of the 
one-sided purchases and the one-sided sales cover each 
other.  
 
 Given the ‘anarchy of production’ and the ignorance of 
the independent and individual capitalist undertaker, 





miraculous if “the replacement-demand of industries for 
equipment and raw materials and the division of income of 
workers and capitalists between consumption and investment” 
were to be balanced (Dobb 1937:101-2).  Luckily, the 
capitalistic ‘laws of motion’ leave room for the 
construction of various institutional buffers.  With 
emphasis, the presence of well-constructed institutional 
buffers allows for periods of sustained growth.  However, 
the objective conditions of competition strain these 
institutional buffers to their practical limit.  Beyond the 
practical limit, the contradictions of capitalistic ‘laws 
of motion’ burst further into a crisis.   Ironically, the 
crisis itself must necessarily manifest to help resolve the 
dilemma or ease the strain of the forces of production 
developing without regards to the ‘limits of the market.’   
Subsequently, it is an important Dobbian insight that the 
Marxian circuit of social capital is heavily institutional 
in its emphasis.   
 
3.5.15. The Circuits of Social Capital: An   
    Institutional Emphasis 
 
Marx presented three basic circuits of social capital. 
The main point of these circuits is that the (simple) 
reproduction of social capital radically depends upon the 





important is the circuit of money-capital.  The circuit of 
money-capital can be said to have four “movements.”  The 
basic formula for the circuit of money capital is: 
 
Mr  
M – C{MP, LP} … P … C’ – M’ 
 
There are four movements: (1) M – C, where money (M) is 
used to purchase or is transformed into commodities (C) in 
the form of means of production (MP) and labor-power (LP); 
in phase (2) the sphere of production (… P …), the 
commodities purchased in phase one, are combined such that 
a new commodity is (or commodities are) produced, and  
surplus value is created (analyzed as the phase of 
valorization in volume I of Capital); and (3) C’ – M’, 
during the production process the means of production and 
labor-power have combined such that a new commodity (C’) 
has been produced.  If the production effort constitutes 
socially necessary labor-time, along with the right market 
conditions, then a greater sum of money (M’) can be 
realized during the process of exchange (Marx’s realization 
phase).  The difference between M’ and M is surplus value.  
Although surplus value is realized in exchange, it is 
valorized in production, while its possibility radically 





institutional arrangement that historically “frees” human 
beings in Marx’s double sense). In phase (4) money is 
reinvested (Mr) to start the circuit anew, whereby 
accumulation continues.  From a macrosocial perspective, if 
the money reinvested, (Mr) is equal to the initial amount of 
money (M) present at the inception of the circuit (or Mr = 
M); this constitutes simple reproduction; if Mr > M, this 
constitutes expanded reproduction; and if Mr < M, this 
constitutes (socioeconomic) crisis or what can be said to 
be a failure in the reproduction of society on its former 
scale. 
 The following questions can be posed in the context of 
circuits of capital: what determines (1) the level of 
reinvestment, (2) the rate of accumulation, and whence (3) 
the conditions for reproduction?  To commence such inquiry 
requires, for (Marx and) Dobb, institutional analysis.  
Accumulate, accumulate, accumulate may become the 
capitalist’s Moses and prophet – additionally, however, 
accumulation necessitates institutional reproduction. 
 Therefore, it is to such institutional analysis that 
Marx turns in part seven of volume I of Capital.  It is not 
enough to understand that capitalists have an incessant 
drive for surplus value, which pivots on the 





conditions necessary for capitalistic exploitation. One 
must further understand how the institutions, rules, and 
modes of life that support such (social) forms are 
continually reproduced.  The Dobbian concern then becomes 
one of institutional analysis.  It is in this sense that 
(Marxian) crisis theory should not become, or be 
interpreted as being, “too mechanical” (Dobb 
1955[1942]:106).   
General social forms and structural tendencies can 
only offer the most general outline of the basic (but 
otherwise deep) contradictions of the capitalist mode of 
production. Dobb’s chief interest is the (en)durable 
continuation of, connection between, and reproduction or 
transformation of the institutions within an extended 
circuit as a whole.  The form and process of exploitation, 
the general tendencies of the rate of profit to fall, the 
reserve army to swell, the entrepreneurial class to 
overaccumulate and overproduce, and the 
disproportionalities that rise between departments and 
sectors are the basic contradictions which may manifest in 
a variety of forms in the shape of a crisis.   
“The actual outcome of this interaction of conflicting 
elements might be different in one concrete situation from 





1937:110).  The cause of a crisis and the actual form a 
crisis takes depend upon the stage of economic development 
and institutional physiology of society (Dobb 1962:74).   
In a Dobbian analysis, attention is paid to institutional 
forms which promote or inhibit such processes from 
manifesting in a variety of forms from the activity of 
economic agents. 
What matters in a Dobbian analysis is less the precise 
ways in which the capitalist ‘laws of motion’ and general 
structural tendencies strain the institutional physiology 
of society in any particular set of circumstances and more 
the way the capitalist ‘laws of motion’ and general 
structural tendencies cradle and generate the various 
contradictions, and hence, social conflicts (Dobb 1962:59). 
 
3.5.16. The Relational Ontology of a Crisis 
 
A Dobbian conception of crisis is relational to its 
core.  At a concrete level, the institutional physiology of 
society will determine the crisis forms that manifest when 
there is a failure of social reproduction.  At a more 
abstract level, Dobb argued that the particular 
institutional physiology of society was much more 





With the entrepreneurial function in the control of 
independent and individual capitalist undertakers, there is 
an immanence of, necessity for, and permanence of 
structural tendencies toward socioeconomic crises.  In 
short, the normal state of capitalist (re)production is 
periodic crises. 
From both a neoliberal and neoclassical perspective, 
it can be said that one of the, if not the, greatest 
virtues of capitalism is its ability to automatically 
expand, develop, and grow the factors of production.  From 
Adam Smith, through Stanley Jevons, to Milton Friedman, 
nothing puts more commodities in the refrigerators of 
individual human beings than increases in (economic) 
productivity.  Without denying the warrant of truth 
embedded in this liberal postulate, in a Dobbian/Marxian 
analysis, it is only a partial truth.  Moreover, according 
to Dobb, the increases in productivity that automatically 
occur in capitalist social relations prove to be its 
Achilles Heel. 
 While the incessant drive for the accumulation of 
capital extends or widens the field of investment, the 
increase in productivity is an intensification, or 
deepening, of the field of investment (Dobb 1967:52).  The 





crucial importance, not only for the light it throws 
on the history of crises themselves, the circumstances 
out of which they develop, and the new developments 
which they create, but also in relation to Marx’s 
theory of wages and hence to the changing form which 
the proletarian struggle assumes at different stages 
of development (Dobb 1937:123).  
 
Dobb further suggested “that new investment, if it is 
to occur, must generally take the form of ‘deepening’ 
capital – finding new ways of ‘putting more power behind 
the human elbow’, as Americans would say” (Dobb 1967:52).  
The system’s greatest virtue is this automatic deepening of 
capital, i.e., the automatic ability (via competition and 
the profit motive) to induce increases in productivity (or 
what Marx called an increase in relative surplus value).  
The greatest of capitalist virtues, its tendency to 
manifest increases in productivity, also however occasions 
a number of contradictions. 
First among these contradictions, or social dilemmas, 
is the tendency for an increase in productivity to manifest 
“‘technological unemployment’ as a leading peculiarity of 
the modern age” (Dobb 1946:338, Dobb 1967:39).  Further, 
the incidence of productive improvement is necessarily 
unevenly distributed between industries and even between 
different branches of the same industry, giving rise to 
disproportionality between departments, and hence 





(Dobb 1960:86ff, Dobb 1946:338).  In an environment where 
competition has become imperfect, an increase in 
productivity may cause chronic undercapacity (Dobb 
1946:338).  Where competition remains sharp, a fall in 
profitability tends to develop (Dobb 1962:57ff, Dobb 
1946:287-8).  
Thus, an increase in productivity generates various 
instabilities and creates forms of unemployment.  If the 
institutional physiology of society supports significant 
competition between capitalists, profitability tends to 
fall, increasing the risk facing the individuals expected 
to fulfill the entrepreneurial function for society.  If 
individual capitalist undertakers fail to fulfill their 
societal role in the entrepreneurial function, this will 
necessarily force the state to step forward to fulfill this 
function (Dobb 1967:38 & 40-1, Dobb 1946:383ff).   
In the alternative circumstance that the institutional 
physiology of society supports dull or imperfect forms of 
competition, not only does undercapacity become chronic, 
but political power struggles emerge and class war may 
become intensified.  For example, unionism may become more 
important against large corporations; in fact, this could 
be argued to be what happened with the rise of new unionism 





Even if there could be a mechanism devised to absent 
the tendency of increases in productivity to create 
technological unemployment, another paradox emerges.  
Namely, positions at, or near, full-employment in 
capitalism have proven to be highly  
unstable in the sense that a small pressure in either 
 direction is likely to give rise to a rapid cumulative 
 movement, uphill (into inflationary conditions and 
 subsequent collapse) or downhill into falling 
 production and falling demand (Dobb 1955[1950]:222). 
 
Once it is understood that capitalist production 
relations are riddled with contradiction, a Dobbian 
analysis places emphasis on the institutional physiology of 
society.  To put it another way, Dobb’s abstract 
theoretical analysis establishes the view that crisis is an 
immanent, necessary, and permanent element of the 
capitalist mode of production.  Dobb’s concrete analysis 
attempted to detail the institutional circumstances that 
lead to boom, bust, and recovery.  In Dobb’s (1962:74) own 
words: 
I believe that the right way of looking at economic 
crises is to regard them, not as the inevitable 
product of any one particular form (or aspect) in 
which the essential contradiction of capitalism 
appears (that between the developing forces of 
production and profitability for capital), but rather 
as an expression of this basic contradiction which may 
manifest itself in a variety of particular forms.  It 
is accordingly possible that different booms may 
break, not for the same, but for different reasons (so 





and what this particular reason is can only be 
discovered by studying the concrete circumstances and 
sequence of events of the boom in question.   
 
 
3.5.17. Stages of Capitalist Development 
 
 A Dobbian theory of crisis has already been described 
as relational.  Similarly, a Dobbian analysis of the actual 
concrete manifestation of crisis can be described as 
eclectic.  Since no crisis has exactly the same particular 
forms, or causes, capitalism and its development are best 
understood to fall into a series of stages (Dobb 1946:17, 
Dobb 1937).  Each stage of capitalism remains embedded in 
the wage-labor/capital relationship, while the 
institutional forms themselves will necessarily vary, often 
significantly. 
 Dobb’s more abstract theory integrates Marx’s analysis 
from Chapter 25 of volume I of Capital with Marx’s comments 
on the tendency of the fall in the rate of profit from 
volume III of Capital.  There are two main mechanisms in 
capitalist production that warrant “the law of the 
tendential fall in the rate of profit,” namely, (1) 
accumulation of capital147 and (2) competition between 
capitalist undertakers.   
                                                 
147 To capture Marx’s ideas on the necessity of accumulation in a 






At a relatively highly abstract level, in capitalist 
production, Dobb accepted that there exist mechanisms that 
tend to lower the rate of profit.148  However, at a more 
concrete level, it is contingent on whether or not there 
manifests an empirical fall in the rate of profit.  More 
specifically, according to Dobb, the empirical 
manifestation of a fall in the rate of profit is contingent 
on the state of the labor market and the reserve army of 
labor.  
In this context, Dobb is drawing heavily from Chapter 
25 of volume I of Capital.  Broadly, Dobb distinguishes 
between two cases.  Dobb employs each case as a type of 
thought experiment.  In thought experiment one, Dobb 
assumed “a condition of affairs where large ‘relative over-
population’ [i.e., unemployment] exists” (Dobb 1937:110).   
Such conditions could be caused by, for example, (a) a 
population explosion; (b) “labour was being displaced by 
machinery faster than investment in new industries was 
absorbing it”; or (c) the proletariatization of the masses 
was occurring in a relatively rapid fashion (Dobb 
1937:111).   
                                                 
148 According to Marx (1981:338): “The capitalist who employs improved 
but not yet universally used methods of production sells below the 
market price, but above his individual price of production; his profit 





This last example of proletariatization can refer to 
two separate processes or a combination of them.  First, it 
can refer to the deskilling of an industry or industries’ 
work force, whereby formerly skilled workers are no longer 
needed because of the introduction of particular 
innovation(s) or machinery.  In this case, the labor-power 
is forced into a (more) competitive labor market as 
relatively unskilled labor (e.g., see Marx 1976:788).  
Second, proletariatization can refer to the historical 
deterioration or political dismantling of certain 
institutional forms that buffer individuals from having to 
sell their labor-power on labor markets for a livelihood. 
The classical case of the second form of 
proletariatization is one aspect of Marx’s so-called 
‘primitive accumulation’ as illustrated in section five of 
Chapter 25 of Capital volume I and the entirety of part 
eight.  Of course, the process was further developed and 
illustrated by Dobb in Chapter 6 of Studies.   It should be 
mentioned that this second process does not end with the 
completion of the historical process of primitive 
accumulation.  A more contemporary illustration of the 
process of proletariatization is in Harry Braverman’s Labor 
and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the 





 Regardless of the cause, the issue, or assumption, is 
the existence of a relative overpopulation.  In such 
conditions, “the field of exploitation could extend pari 
passu with capital accumulation.  Consequently, no fall in 
the rate of profit need occur” (Dobb 1937:111).  However, 
the political struggles may sharpen, and the class 
antagonisms may become explosive.  This latter possibility 
is contingent, in that “such an antagonism must be of 
sufficient order of importance for it to unite the various 
individuals and groups which are tied by this common 
interest” (Dobb 1955[1937]:95).  Historically, social and 
economic degradation and deskilling of many individuals 
have often proven to be of “sufficient order” (see, for 
example, Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982). 
 Aside from contingent political reactions to social 
degradation and economic deskilling, production could 
proceed forward more or less hitchless.  The only 
impediment on expanded reproduction, under circumstances of 
relative overpopulation, would be a disproportionality 
between (Marxian) Departments I and II, i.e., between 
(Keynesian) investment and saving.  In Dobb’s (1937:112) 





hitchless given (or assuming) circumstances of relative 
overpopulation,149 provided  
 the proportion in which industry was divided between 
 making means of production and means of consumption 
 continued to correspond to the proportion in which the 
 money-income of society was devoted to investment 
 (including repair and replacement) and to expenditure 
 on consumption goods. 
 
 Dobb further suggested that given such circumstances, 
the rate of profit need not necessarily fall.  If labor was 
poorly organized, or relatively weak compared to industry, 
the political struggles may not be of “sufficient order” to 
secure labor’s share in the increases in productivity.  
This latter point means that either exploitation has been 
intensified or wages are below the value of labor-power or 
both.   
In other words, the counteracting tendencies towards 
an increase of ‘relative surplus-value’ and to a 
‘cheapening of the elements of constant capital’ may 
overbear the tendency to a decline in the rate of 
profit latent in the initial change in the ratio of 
constant to variable capital.  Moreover, the tendency 
of labour-saving innovations to increase the state of 
‘relative over-population’ may exert a still further 
effect in depressing wages below the level at they 
previously were (Dobb 1937:113). 
 
                                                 
149 This notion of a hitchless economy with circumstances of relative 
overpopulation anticipates the neoliberal or Monetarist view of Milton 
Friedman (1969) by more than 30 years.  Of course, Friedman’s 
terminology for a relative overpopulation (or Marx’s reserve army of 
labor metaphor) is changed to “the natural rate of unemployment.”  Also 
Friedman is not concerned with the notion of disproportionalities 
between departments.  Nor does Friedman necessarily believe that a 
disparity between investment and saving would be problematic, provided 
that the monetary authority has the power and knowledge to manipulate 





 In the second thought experiment, Dobb reverses the 
assumption of a relative overpopulation to a situation 
where the labor force is being exhausted by the expansion 
of industry.  The concrete actualization of such 
circumstances can manifest from (a) accumulation process 
that exhausts the reserve army of labor; (b) labor is 
strongly organized such that (i) deskilling and/or (ii) 
wage reductions are successfully resisted; and/or (c) the 
historical processes of proletariatization are 
(institutionally) arrested.   
 Both situation (b) and (c) are, of course, 
institutional elements.  Especially in case (c), political 
legislation can protect against proletariatization.  For 
example, legislation for centuries slowed the enclosures 
movement in England and throughout Western Europe (see Dobb 
1946:226ff; and Marx 1976:877ff).   
However, other examples that impede the historical 
processes of proletariatization include various types of 
licensing and other political privileges that allow 
individuals to demand and receive an “institutional rent.”  
Any legislation or institutional form that has the effect 
of controlling or restricting the supply of a resource or 
competition will then receive a reward above the 





(Dobb 1937:120, Dobb 1955[1924]:12).  Even in the case of 
(b), the aim of organized labor is often to secure an 
institutional rent for a section of the working-class or 
union members (Dobb 1928:170-1). 
In such a case where the pace of “capital accumulation 
is tending to outrun any possible extension of the field of 
exploitation, […] the rate of profit per unit of capital 
must fall” (Dobb 1937:114).  The significance of this 
tendency for the rate profit to fall, according to Dobb, 
has been misunderstood (Dobb 1962:58-9).  Moreover, Marx’s 
understanding of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall 
is not at all clear, “nor is there any statement [by Marx] 
about the anticipated relative strength of ‘tendency’ and 
‘counter-tendencies’”150 (Dobb 1973:157). 
Central for Marx’s notion of the tendency for the fall 
in the rate of profit is that its existence is not 
dependent on diminishing marginal returns of agricultural 
production, as was the case for Ricardo.  Rather, capital 
accumulation, the institutional complex, and capitalist 
competition could generate a general fall in the rate of 
                                                 
150 Several Marxian economists have argued that the countertendencies can 
never fully offset the main tendency of the fall in the rate of profit 
(e.g., H. Grossman, P. Mattick and D. Yaffee).  More recently, Anwar 
Shaikh (1989) advances the position that each of the countertendencies 





profit, regardless of the diminishing marginal returns of 
land (or capital).   
Crucial, then, is that social ends do not motivate 
production in capitalism; rather the pursuit and the 
realization of profits motivate production in a capitalist 
system.  Hence, crises were not necessarily expression of 
any particular barriers to exchange or any “iron law of 
wages.”  Since there are necessarily no limits to exchange, 
Dobb may appear to provide a defense to Say’s law of 
markets.  In fact, the limitless nature of the realm of 
exchange is the warrant and thrust of Say’s law of markets.  
However, as stated, Dobb, following Marx, rejected Say’s 
law of markets, not because of limits in exchange but 
rather because of “the limits to investment and production 
at a certain rate of profit” (Dobb 1937:115).   These 
production limits tend to fetter both capitalist production 
and reproduction.  
For Dobb, like Marx before him, the barriers of 
capital are the very conditions of capital accumulation 
itself.  There is periodically  
too much produced in the way of means of labour and 
 means of subsistence, too much to function as means 
 for exploiting the workers at a given rate of profit. 
 […] It is not that too much wealth is produced.  But 
 from time to time, too much wealth is produced in its 






The capitalist mode of production is fettered at a scale of 
production, which would not necessarily exist under 
different relations of production.  The fetters are 
specifically manifest from the institutional fact that 
independent and individual capitalist undertakers are in 
control of the entrepreneurial function of society.  Hence, 
socioeconomic crisis becomes immanent, necessary, and 
permanent only when the “real subsumption of labour under 
capital” has become a reality (Marx 1976:1037).   
Socioeconomic crisis arises, and “Production comes to 
a standstill not at the point where needs are satisfied, 
but rather where the production and realization of profit 
impose this” (Marx 1981:367).  Thus, on the one hand, 
economic expansion and the extension of markets become one 
result of capital accumulation, while, on the other hand, 
overproduction and crisis are yet another result.  
“Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the 
prophets!” (Marx 1976:743).  Moreover, accumulate, 
accumulate  
becomes a law, independent of the will of the 
 individual capitalist.  And this law only becomes 
 reality because instead of the scale of production 
 being controlled by existing needs, the quantity of 
 products made is determined by the constantly 
 increasing scale of production dictated by the mode of 






It is in this sense that Dobb called the conditions of 
risk, uncertainty, and ignorance, more objective than they 
are subjective.  These conditions are part of the 
institutional design and constitutional dynamic of the 
capitalist mode of production, in which crisis becomes 
immanent, necessary, and permanent.  
 
3.5.18. Dobb’s Political Economy Summarized  
 
Contradictions riddle the reality of capitalism.  
Experience has demonstrated dogmatically that anything 
approaching pure liberalism, or laissez-faire policy, is 
fated for severe crisis.  Thus, liberalism has given way to 
neoliberalism where some (state) management is accepted as 
necessary.                 
 From a reproduction of institutions perspective, 
Marxian exploitation can be understood to rest on a 
particular arrangement of the institutions of production, 
rather than the logical extension of (a misinterpreted) 
value theory (Dobb 1967:252, Dobb 1973:146).  As such, 
capitalist exploitation is not overcome by means of 
intensifying competition (as Adam Smith and many 
contemporary neoclassicals would have it).  As earlier 
explained, the intensification of competition actually may 





exploitation would require the transformation of the 
institutions of production that constitute it. 
 A summary of Dobb’s political economy can now be 
enunciated.  In the capitalist mode of production, 
socioeconomic crisis becomes immanent, necessary, and 
permanent.  Crises do not occur necessarily because of the 
empirical manifestation of a falling rate of profit (nor 
from a falling level of wages). Rather, the particular 
cause of capitalist crisis is contingent, while the general 
phenomenon of capitalist crisis is necessary, as a process 
of adjustment from the general tendency towards 
overproduction.  The general tendency towards 
overproduction manifests from the ignorance, uncertainty, 
and risk of the capital undertakers that fulfill, or fail 
to fulfill, the social entrepreneurial function.  The 
overproduction generates disproportionalities between 
sectors, necessitating a process of adjustment. 
 Since capitalism develops in a number of stages, 
theories of capitalism will likewise change and develop to 
comprehend these developments.  According to Dobb, it then 
follows, any theory (e.g., neoclassical) that attempts to 
focus only on the universal elements that each stage of 
development shares will be especially impoverished in its 





Further, Dobb applies this conception of the development of 
the transitive dimension of economics to the interpretation 
of the history of economics. 
 Dobb had maintained that methodology was especially 
important for the proper understanding of the dynamic 
process of capitalist development.  Necessarily, a system 
that is in constant flux and institutional transition 
cannot be studied by employing empiricist ontology.  It is 
to Dobb’s methodological approach and his underlying 













4. THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF MAURICE DOBB 
 
 
4.1. Dobb’s Methodology: A Methodological  
Approach to an Institutional Ontology  
of Social Being 
 
 The emergence of the ‘Jevonian Revolution’ brought an 
important methodological shift in the science of economics 
(Dobb 1973:167).  This shift was the result of change in 
(theoretical) emphasis from the economic costs incurred 
during the process of production (the emphasis of the 
classical school) to the desires and preferences of 
individual consumers.  This gave the discipline of 
economics an atomistic bias and a “preoccupation with 
micro-analysis of individual market-behavior and action and 
the rooting of economic generalisation in such micro-
phenomena” (Dobb 1973:168, emphasis added; Dobb 1969:5). 
Consequentially, there was a narrowing of the boundaries of 
economic analysis to the sphere of exchange and market 
behavior of the individual (Dobb 1973:33, 169).  With this 
narrowing of the science of economics’ boundary-lines, 
there emerges a theoretical disinterest in, if not a denial 





interdependence between individual desires, through the 
play of social convention, emulation and other Veblenesque 
factors” (Dobb 1969:6). 
The significance of this otherwise unremarkable shift 
was that distribution of income was no longer prior to, but 
seemingly the mere result of, unbiased market activity of 
individual (utility) maximizers (Dobb 1937:178-84, Dobb 
1973:169, Dobb 1955:110, Dobb 1969:23-6).         
 It was Dobb’s contention that this result was 
engendered by the specific methodological generalizations 
upon which marginal economic analysis was (or is) based.  
According to Dobb, the methodological generalizations upon 
which neoclassical welfare economics was based were not 
normatively neutral as many theorists contended, but rather 
the result of the normative point of entry (i.e., 
individual preferences on the side of consumption and 
technological conditions with respect to production).  In 
more Marxian language, the methodological issues involved 
concern about the process of abstraction. 
 
4.2. The Process of Abstraction: Dobb’s  
Methodological Paradigm 
 
 In its most simple and traditional formulation, the 
process of abstraction is the emphasis on certain aspects 





aspects (Lawson 1997:227).  This process of abstraction is 
central to all science.  When a science attempts to achieve 
a more precise refinement and comprehensiveness, 
“abstraction is required” (Dobb 1937:4).  For example, “in 
chemistry,” such a refinement was achieved by means of 
abstraction, with “the concept of atomic weight of chemical 
elements, and in physics by the Newtonian law of 
gravitation” (Dobb 1937:5).  In fact, in everyday activity, 
every individual must employ the process of abstraction to 
make sense of any moment of reality.  “Our minds can no 
more swallow the world whole at one sitting than can our 
stomachs” (Ollman 1993:24). However, in social reality the 
process of abstraction takes on special significance.  Marx 
recognized the special significance of the process of 
abstraction for economic science in the Preface of the 
first edition of Capital, when he wrote: “in the analysis 
of economic forms neither microscopes nor chemical reagents 
are of assistance.  The power of abstraction must replace 
both” (Marx 1976:90). 
Nevertheless, in spite of the obvious necessity of the 
process of abstraction to all scientific endeavors, or 
perhaps because of the obvious necessity, the procedure 
itself has suffered from a neglect of rigorous scrutiny and 





abstraction is especially surprising when one realizes the 
power of this scientific tool.  The process of abstraction 
not only aids in the production of knowledge and 
consequently, the generation of beliefs, but also can 
produce illusions and false beliefs (Sayer 1984:86).   
 It is to the credit of Maurice Dobb that he 
unambiguously recognized the importance of the process of 
abstraction.  He understood the power of abstraction to 
produce knowledge and the power of abstraction for 
solidifying ideology, or illusions of the epoch.  As such, 
abstraction becomes Dobb’s methodological paradigm for both 
scientific and historical analysis and the basis for his 
critique of mainstream economic theory.    
Dobb’s most important pronouncements on methodology 
are to be found in the pages of his Political Economy and 
Capitalism (1937).  Dobb’s most explicit application of his 
method of abstraction is twofold: his historical analysis 
found in Studies (1946) and his various critiques of 
mainstream economic theory (Dobb 1969, Dobb 1937, Dobb 
1973, Dobb 1955:104-17).   
 It is within the pages of Political Economy and 
Capitalism (1937) where Dobb first develops his Marxian-
driven beliefs on the process of abstraction.  Most 





abstractions in the construction of economic theory: (1) 
abstraction within a particular institutional complex and 
(2) universal generalizations (Dobb 1937:127ff).  There is 
a third type of abstraction which Dobb does not mention 
here but gestures towards elsewhere (1955:20), namely, (3) 
abstractions of traditional empiricism.    
 In this third case of abstraction, the empiricist 
tends to abstract away from commonality.  Any attempts to 
“generalize” are seen as illicit.   Hence, what is 
abstracted from in this case is the abstract itself.  In 
this particular process of abstraction there is the 
concern, indeed the obsession, with what is and a disregard 
for how it became.  
In the case of (2) universal generalizations, the 
process of abstraction is independent of any particular 
concrete historical “evidence of fact.”  Universal 
generalizations are unconcerned “as to what features in a 
situation are essential and what are inessential, but 
simply on the formal procedure of combining the properties 
common to a heterogeneous assortment of situations and 
building abstraction out of analogy” (Dobb 1937:128). 
 In this process of abstraction, a universal element or 
characteristic is, at least implicitly, primary, while any 





institutional complex is secondary” (1973:25).  Socio-
theorists who adopt this process of abstraction tend to 
necessarily “deny any validity to frontier-lines between 
historical epochs” (Dobb 1946:1).  More specifically, for 
economists within this “neo-Kantian” tradition,  
economic laws have the force of ‘synthetic a priori 
propositions,’ as Professor Hayek has declared, they 
are built up from, ‘not physical facts, but wholes 
‘constituted’ out of ‘familiar categories of our 
minds,’ which apply to all economic experience.  They 
are not contingent on historically relative, 
institutional factors: on the contrary, they embody 
certain ‘necessities’ which are alleged to constrain 
the working of any type of economic system (Dobb 
1955:107).   
 
     Institutions and other historically relative elements 
are introduced only as secondary elements that play a 
strictly subordinate role as changes in “data” to the 
generalizations.  Otherwise, these institutional data, or 
secondary elements, do not alter the universal abstractions 
and/or main equations (Dobb 1946:27-8, Dobb 1955:107).  
In brief, with this type of abstraction there is such 
an obsession with generalizing what is universal or common 
to any system (or thing) that the generalization 
necessarily abstracts away from any peculiar institutional 
complex and specific characteristics of a particular system 
(Dobb 1973:25).  The apparent ‘virtue’ of such a “high-





historical; hence, in principle, it is applicable to all 
human history (Dobb 1973:24-5, Dobb 1946:12, Dobb 
1955:232). 
With an institutionally based process of abstraction, 
or case (1), there is an attempt to demarcate the most 
essential elements or mechanisms from the inessential (Dobb 
1937:127).  As such, emphasis is often placed on the 
specifics of the institutional complex and the particular 
characteristics of economic relations, “even at the expense 
of a wider, but perhaps more barren, generality” (Dobb 
1937:131).  In fact, “prominence” is given “to 
‘institutional’ factors” and economic problems displayed 
and economic inquiry made within a particular institutional 
complex (Dobb 1973:26). 
 
4.3. Dobb’s Process of Abstraction: The  
Methodological Underscoring of  
Historical Institutions 
 
In the first chapter of Studies, Dobb makes clear that 
his process of abstraction will be the institutionally  
based type, or type (1) above (Dobb 1946:8).  Dobb’s 
concern in the opening pages of Studies is with his entry 
point to economic analysis in a historical context.  Thus 
Dobb is anxious to provide a (working) definition of 





Dobb is quick to dismiss those historians whose 
definition of capitalism relies on an empiricist 
methodology and process of abstraction (i.e., type (3) 
above).  The empiricist process of abstraction tends to 
place emphasis upon “the variety and complexity of 
historical events […] and […] deny any validity to 
frontier-lines between historical epochs” (Dobb 1946:1).  
The result of an empiricist process of abstraction is that 
it tends to deny any “historical” meaningfulness to the 
very term “capitalism.” 
It is the voice of authority that Dobb employed to 
dismiss the empiricist process of abstraction.  More 
specifically, to dismiss the empiricist’s process of 
abstraction as methodologically illicit, Dobb approvingly 
quotes Richard Tawney’s well-known passage:   
After more than half a century of work on the subject 
by scholars of half a dozen different nationalities 
and of every variety of political opinion, to deny 
that the phenomenon exists, or to suggest that if it 
does exist, it is unique among human institutions in 
having, like Melchizedek, existed from eternity, or to 
imply that, if it has a history, propriety forbids 
that history to be disinterred, is to run willfully in 
blinkers. … An author … is unlikely to make much of 
the history of Europe during the last three centuries 
if, in addition to eschewing the word [capitalism], he 
ignores the fact (quoted in Dobb 1946:2).  
 
Two other definitions of capitalism Dobb takes more 





economic system in the spirit of the epoch: in the case of 
capitalism, the spirit of enterprise, or “‘bourgeois 
spirit’ of calculation and rationality,” a position well 
represented by Werner Sombart and Max Weber (Dobb 1946:5).   
The second position “identifies capitalism with the 
organization of production for a distant market” (Dobb 
1946:6).  Although Dobb (1946:5) suggested that this 
position is most often implicitly applied to historical 
analysis, rather than explicitly formulated, it was the 
position defended by Paul Sweezy as outlined above in the 
“transition debate.” Sweezy’s own position, as I have 
shown, was based mainly on the historical work of Henry 
Pirenne. 
Dobb’s main complaint aimed at both of these 
conceptions of capitalism is that they are abstractions of 
such a high level of generalization “that they are 
insufficiently restrictive to confine the term to any one 
epoch of history” (Dobb 1946:8). Hence capitalism is 
present, at least to some degree, in all periods of 
history.  Therefore, whereas the empiricist definition 
denies the meaningfulness of the term capitalism, the 
Sobart/Weberian definition is much too historically 
permissive.  The historical question then becomes why do 





all?  For the theorists of the Sobart/Weberian perspective, 
the distinction is more epistemological, whereas for Dobb 
it is pivotally ontological.  It can be argued that Dobb 
rejects the Sobart/Weberian definition on the grounds of 
its lack of ontological boldness, and the lack of sense it 
makes of the presence of particular historical phenomena, 
events, and episodes.  With its overly permissive tendency, 
the Sombart/Weberian definition of capitalism is 
ontologically overly problematic, hence methodologically 
illicit.    
The Sombart/Weberian definition has a further 
difficulty.  Namely, if capitalism as an economic form is a 
function of the capitalist spirit, an account for the 
origin of the capitalist spirit itself must be given.  Or 
in Dobb’s own words: “If this capitalist spirit is itself 
an historical product, what caused its appearance on the 
historical stage?” (Dobb 1946:9).  
At first glance, Dobb’s choice of definition, hence 
the type of process of abstraction employed, along with its 
“justification,” seems somewhat arbitrary, if not perhaps 
ideological.  Dobb explicitly stated that it is not his 
purpose to debate the merits of any of these definitions, 
but merely to make clear the position that guides his 





definition [along with its process of abstraction] must 
ultimately rest on its successful employment illuminating 
the actual process of historical development” (Dobb 
1946:8).  Based on Dobb’s methodological comments on the 
process of abstraction, his chosen definition of capitalism 
can be argued to be much less arbitrary and ideological 
than it appears at first glance.   
 
4.4. Five Methodological/Ontological Theses  
of Dobb’s Process of Abstraction 
 
Dobb’s process of abstraction rests on five basic 
theses, one of which is more methodological and the other 
four more ontological.  First is the ‘theory thesis’: 
Theory is necessary to both scientific activity and 
historical analysis alike.  The second is the ‘material 
thesis’: Ideas of human beings are conditioned by their 
practical or material experience.  The third is the 
‘internal articulation thesis’: Societies are structured 
and differentiated sets of social relations.  Fourth is the 
‘historical thesis’: Social relations are transitory; hence 
so, too, is theory.  Finally, the fifth is the ‘agency 
thesis’: All human action potentially has epoch-making 
effects. 
 The ‘theory thesis’ has two sides: (a) a rejection of 





events” speak for themselves and (b) a rejection of the 
notion that weaving or constructing theory can be 
independent from the institutional milieu.  With respect to 
(a) Dobb asserts that “facts never speak for themselves” 
(Dobb 1947-48:9).  Rather “facts” and “events” must be 
interpreted, and interpretation requires theory or a 
“conceptual web” or “framework” (Dobb 1973:18).  For 
example, Dobb’s intention in Chapter 4 of his handbook on 
Wages was to contrast various historical theories on wages 
to demonstrate that different theories have diverse 
interpretations of the same or similar empirical evidence.  
Thus, all science requires a “conceptual framework” to 
interpret reality.  “Far from being superfluous, some 
general framework of this kind, it would seem, can scarcely 
be dispensed with by the most thorough-going empiricist,” 
especially in the social sciences (Dobb 1973:19, also see 
Dobb 1955:235).  
 This is not meant to imply that “facts” and “empirical 
events” are not important.  Rather, as indicated by (b) 
above, Dobb underscored the paramount importance of 
empirical elements.  The empirical elements are important 
not only for the construction of theory but also for the 
maintenance and vindication of theoretical frameworks.  In 





of various theoretical “conceptual webs” and their implied 
or explicit interpretation of various historical events. 
 In Studies, Dobb often demonstrated that a particular 
“conceptual web” is out of phase with the collected 
historical evidence.  For example, the “traditional” or 
commercialization view of capitalist development was shown 
to be out of phase with historical evidence in various 
regions of Europe (Dobb 1946:38ff).  For Dobb, there is no 
simple mechanistic formula by which a theorist can decide 
whether the historical evidence or a “conceptual web” (or a 
complex combination of both) lies in error.  There are 
simply no “absolute standards” by which to judge (Dobb 
1973:19). 
 Dobb would seem then to be in full agreement with 
Michael Polanyi (1964:14) when he writes, “there are rules 
which give valuable guidance to scientific discovery, but 
they are merely rules of art.”  In this context, when a 
contradiction between historical evidence and a ‘conceptual 
web’ arises, the theorist must employ personal judgment 
when assessing the contention.   
 With no absolute standards, Dobb contended that theory 
must be judged based on its “degree of realism, historical 





of the theorist’s own subjective] vision” (Dobb 1973:36).151  
Thus, even though there are no “absolute standards” from 
which to judge the full warrant of a ‘conceptual web,’ 
there are grounds for which a ‘conceptual web’ can be 
“rationally debated” (Dobb 1973:19). 
 Since “a conceptual framework is not easily verified 
or disproved,” Dobb rejected the (logical positivist) 
criterion of “verification” and likewise “the Popper-
criterion” that theory must be constructed in “falsifiable” 
form.  When the process of abstraction is of the universal 
generalization type, the verification and falsification 
criteria are powerless to access the validity of the 
conceptual web.  The reason for this is that the universal 
generalization renders itself “remote from the actual 
possibility of empirical disproof” (Dobb 1973:19).  
The ‘material thesis’ of Dobb would seem to be strictly 
‘Marxian.’  However, it is here that Dobb begins to 
distinguish himself from his contemporary Marxists.  Dobb 
rejects any strict deterministic relationship between the 
                                                 
151 For M. Polanyi, this is not to fall into the charge of theory being 
completely subjective in that a theorist’s personal knowledge is a 
function of the practices and skills obtained in his or her training.  
It is this institutional training and “intellectual commitment” that 
“saves personal knowledge from being merely subjective.  Intellectual 
commitment is a responsible decision, in submission to the compelling 
claims of what in good conscience I conceive to be true” (Polanyi 
1958:65).  Polanyi goes on to argue that his conception of personal 






material social basis (or the economic conditions of life) 
and the consciousness or ideas of human beings (Dobb 
1955:229).  In a similar vein, Dobb rejected technological 
determinism, where productive forces are dominant and 
determine socioeconomic development (Dobb 1973:144).  
Rather, Dobb maintained that there is “reciprocal 
interaction between ideas and economic conditions” (Dobb 
1955:228) and the historical stages of economic development 
within any mode of production (Dobb 1946:17ff). 
Nevertheless, Dobb approvingly accepted Marx’s 
statement from the opening pages of Chapter 7 of volume I 
of Capital that  
 “In production men not only act on nature but also one 
 another.  They produce only by cooperating in a 
 certain way and mutually exchanging their activities.”  
 And again: “By thus acting on the external world and 
 changing it, he at the same time changes his own 
 nature” (quoted in Dobb 1973:144, also Dobb 1955:229).   
 
It is in this sense that the material basis or social 
relations between human beings in the course of production, 
along with the productive forces, constitute the 
ontological primacy of social being. 
 As Dobb aimed to show in Studies, there is an 
historical genealogy to the ‘conditions of life,’ or the 
material base of social being.  “Ideas,” however, cannot be 





and “the influence” which ideas exert “upon events” is 
nothing “more than a conditional one.”  In other words, the 
“two-way influence” between ideas and economic conditions 
upon each other is asymmetrical (Dobb 1955:228). 
 For Dobb, the material base (constituted in the 
traditional Marxian sense, i.e., social relations and 
forces of production) exercises “a strongly selective and 
formative influence over the ideas which” are “dominant at 
a particular period.”  According to Dobb the influence of 
“ideas” upon conditions of life could only occur in 
“certain ways and subject to definite limitations” (Dobb 
1955:228).152  
 Dobb’s material thesis is therefore both less than and 
more than a strict ontological statement about social 
being.  It is less than a strict ontological statement in 
that as it is formulated; it informs us very little about 
the constitution of social reality.  For example, it does 
not inform us of the degree of asymmetry between 
‘conditions of life’ and ‘ideas,’ nor necessarily anything 
specific about the reciprocal interaction between them. 
                                                 
152 In this context Dobb approvingly quotes the authority of Herbert 
Spencer: “Ideas wholly foreign to this social state cannot be evolved, 
and if introduced from without, cannot get accepted, or if accepted die 
out.  Hence the advanced ideas when once established act upon society: 
yet the establishment of such ideas depends on the fitness of society 
for receiving them.  Practically the popular character and social state 





 It is more than an ontological statement in that it is 
meant to be a methodological guide or ontological clue to 
theoretical and historical analysis.  It informs a theorist 
about which elements to look for and in what direction.   
 For example, Rodney Hilton was shown to argue for the 
ubiquitousness of peasant revolts during the feudal epoch.  
Armed with the methodological guide of the material thesis, 
the (Marxian/Dobbian) theorist would look for an 
explanation of such omnipresent activity within the 
constitution of the social relations of production, as 
opposed to reducing the explanation to the beliefs and 
ideas held by the peasantry.  Beliefs and ideas are 
themselves historical products, the historical appearance 
of which requires (a material) explanation.153   
 As an example of this latter point, Dobb sought to 
explain the (politico-economic) conservative bias of feudal 
monopoly merchants not by means of the ideas and beliefs 
held by members of the class, but by the relationship of 
monopoly merchants to other members of feudal or manorial 
society.  It is in this sense that the material thesis 
orientates the theorist in a particular ontological 
direction toward social being.  More specifically, the 
                                                 
153 This is the essence of Dobb’s complaint of the Sombart/Weber notion 





ontological orientation is toward an analysis of the 
institutions and social relations which are historically 
present during the respective period in question.    
 The ‘internal articulation thesis’ is what drives the 
early chapters of Dobb’s Studies.  In fact, his main 
complaint of the “commercialization view” concerning the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism was its absence of 
any “analysis of the internal relationships of the Feudal 
mode of production” (Dobb 1946:42).  Dobb (1946:11) further 
suggested that  
 each historical period is moulded under the 
 preponderating influence of a single, more or less 
 homogenous, economic form, and is to be characterized 
 according to the nature of this predominant type of 
 socio-economic relationship. 
 
Here again Dobb finds his lead from comments made by Marx.  
In several places Dobb approvingly quotes the celebrated 
passage from volume III of Capital:  
 The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus 
 labour is pumped out of the direct producers 
 determines the relations of rulers and ruled. […] It 
 is always the direct relations of the owners of the 
 conditions of production to the direct producers which 
 reveals the innermost secret, the hidden foundation of 
 the entire social construction, and […] of the 
 corresponding form of the state (quoted in Dobb 
 1946:36, no. 2, also see Dobb 1955:234; Hilton 
 1976:58, no. 2).   
  
From this pregnant ontological statement of Marx, Dobb 





analysis.  The metaphor to capture the essence of this 
methodological paradigm became history from the bottom, up.     
 Methodologically, the meaning of this metaphor can be 
unpacked by recalling that, for Dobb, societies are 
complexly structured and differentiated sets of social 
relations.  The structuration154 of society refers to the 
(historical) tendency for social relations to be 
(relatively) enduring.  Especially enduring is the social 
relation between the direct producers and their immediate 
rulers during any particular epoch.  This enduring quality 
of social relations is an additional ontological clue to 
the study of social phenomena.   
 The notion of societies being differentiated refers to 
the various classes and hybrid classes that constitute any 
particular society, along with the relations between these 
classes.  Echoing Marx and Engels, Dobb asserts that 
“history has been to-date the history of class societies” 
(Dobb 1946:13).  
 What constitutes a class and its consciousness is a 
highly complex set of historical circumstances.  If one is 
to accept Thompson’s maxim, then “consciousness of class” 
                                                 
154 The term structuration is nowhere used by Dobb.  The term is borrowed 
from Anthony Giddens, who employs the term specifically in reference to 
the complexity of social structures and their differentiation.  It is 
purposely borrowed and placed here to suggest certain similarities with 





arises in similar ways “in different times and places, but 
never in just the same way” (Thompson 1966:10).  What is 
gained in historical accuracy with this definition however 
may cost the theoretical usefulness of the category of 
class.   Dobb writes, in a similar vein, that the common 
elements of a particular class depend “less on formal 
precision of definition than on practical judgment applied 
to particular [historical] cases” (Dobb 1955:96). 
 In this context, Dobb insisted that an essential 
element in the formation of a class grouping is the source 
of income upon which any individuals predominantly rely 
that “will usually determine their social alignment” (Dobb 
1955:95, no. 1).  However, a more important element is the 
historical evolution of a particular group or class in a 
particular society (Dobb 1946:15).   
 The source of income and the specific historical 
process of formation, in conjunction with Marx’s pregnant 
ontological comment on the importance of the direct 
producers and their relationship with their immediate 
superiors, suggested to Dobb that the differentiation of 
society into various class groupings becomes the paramount 
ontological hint for understanding the dynamics and 
internal articulation of a society.  Class, in its various 





the actions and motivations of individual human beings and, 
in turn, the historical development of any particular 
society. 
 It was only after the turn of the nineteenth century 
that it became widely recognized “the extent to which 
individuals are unaware of the true motivation of their 
actions, so that the influences which move them are largely 
different from the reasons which they would consciously 
formulate” (Dobb 1955:230).   
 For this reason Dobb (1955:97) maintained:  
 The more we study the world today, and the more we 
 penetrate behind the reasons for which people say, 
 they act, or consciously think they are acting, to 
 find the real motive forces which impel them, the 
 less doubt, one might think, there could be about the 
 importance of class conflict as a dominant feature of 
 contemporary history.    
 
This does not mean, however, that individuals are 
necessarily aware of any “membership” to a particular 
class.  In others words, individuals are not necessarily 
aware of the common, real interests they share with other 
individuals.  The complex structure of society and the high 
degree of differentiation that occurs make common interests 
between individuals relatively opaque. 
 Nevertheless, in historical events “the product of 
[individual] human will and actions [which in turn] depends 





to the wills of others [… e.g., class], and upon the total 
character of the objective situation which human action 
seeks to influence” (Dobb 1955:231).  
 When individual wills form into a class grouping, with 
their collective actions directed in an appropriate 
direction, and given the historical situation of a certain 
kind, human collective action can have “an epoch-making [or 
breaking] effect” (Dobb 1955:230).  Collective actions can 
be such that “a change of balance” within the “constituent 
elements” of a society, result “in the appearance of novel 
compositions and more or less abrupt changes in the texture 
of society.  To use a topical analogy: it is as though at 
certain levels of development something like a chain-
reaction is set in motion” (Dobb 1946:13). 
 The recognition of the importance of class in the 
constitution of society makes class conflict a key element 
for understanding the dynamics of any epoch.  More 
specifically, there is a necessity for the historical 
analysis of the direct producers, historically the lower of 
classes.  The action and beliefs of the direct producers, 
along with their relationship to their immediate superiors, 
will determine the enduring quality and stability of the 





 In this sense, an analysis of history from the bottom, 
up is initiated.  That is to say, historical analysis must 
begin with the direct producers, and then by means of a 
process of abstraction a theorist aims to reconstruct the 
relationships of various individuals, groups, and social 
elements to the direct producers.  Hence, “the progression 
of economic forms,” i.e., economic development, “is a 
function not only of the division of labour, but also of 
class differentiation” (Dobb 1955:8). 
 Although social relations are relatively enduring, the 
‘historical thesis’ maintains that all modes of production, 
and the social relations that constitute them, are 
transitory in nature.  This transitory nature is itself a 
function of the internal articulation of society.  Dobb 
argued that the internal articulation or institutional 
complex of any society facilitates or impedes the 
inequalities among its members to the access of social 
resources (Dobb 1946:253-4, Dobb 1925:14).  Strict 
inequality to social resources, and/or the monopolization, 
manifests into significant class differentiation. 
 With such inequalities to the access of social 
resources manifest, along with the class differentiation it 
generates, there is at the same time a divergence of 





in personal interests between individuals is mainly a 
function of opposing sources of income.  Thus, it is the 
inequality of opportunity to social resources and the 
specific historical processes of class differentiation 
generated that provide the social circumstances for the 
conditions necessary for class conflict and internal 
(institutional) contradictions within a society (Dobb 
1955:96). 
 Hence, although the ‘internal articulation thesis’ 
maintains that social relations are relatively enduring, at 
the same time, the ‘historical thesis’ suggests that social 
relations are by no means static.  There is no “pure form” 
of any social relation ensemble (Dobb 1946:11).  Although 
the structuration process is relatively stable, in absence 
of particular institutional forms, the differentiation 
process is not. 
 Social relations are, in part, enduring in that human 
beings are socialized with, and within, the behavior and 
routines that constitute them.  In this sense, human beings 
do not create social relations, because social relations 
preexist individuals and are the necessary conditions for 
individual activity.  Rather, social relations are an 





individuals reproduce or transform and which would not 
exist unless they did so (Bhaskar 1989:36). 
 The enduring tendency of social relations in 
conjunction with their nonstatic or dynamic nature 
(respectively what here has been termed the ‘internal 
articulation thesis’ and ‘historical thesis’) has, for 
Dobb, both ontological and methodological import. 
 Ontologically, the stability of social relations 
suggested by the ‘internal articulation thesis,’ in 
conjunction with the transitory nature of institutional 
forms suggested by the ‘historical thesis,’ suggested to 
Dobb that socioeconomic analysis must recognize that 
socioeconomic development occurs in stages. 
 Stages can be contrasted with the notion of an epoch.  
An epoch refers to a period of time whereby there is a 
certain stable and enduring presence of a specific 
predominant relationship between the direct producers and 
their immediate superiors.  Upon this relationship, the 
institutional structure, or what Marx called the 
superstructure of society, can take a number of forms.   
 A particular stage of historical development then 
refers to a specific ensemble of institutions and the 
routine-like patterns of individual behaviors that the 





Studies, Dobb attempted to demonstrate that the development 
of feudalism, like the “development of capitalism, falls 
into a number of stages, characterized by different levels 
of maturity and each of them recognizable by fairly 
distinctive traits” (Dobb 1946:17, emphasis added).   
 This latter point of “distinctive traits” of any 
particular stage further informed Dobb methodologically 
that the elements that make a stage of historical 
development unique are at least as important, and often 
more important, than the elements that different stages of 
economic development share in common. 
  Thus, the methodological import suggests that a 
successful process of abstraction must discriminate between 
the more essential and inessential elements of historical 
development.  This process further requires a contrastive 
method of analysis to determine what makes one stage of 
historical development different to others stages.  It is 
in this sense that Dobb’s point of entry is not some 
universal generalization of human nature, but rather an 
historical analysis of the routine-like patterns of 
behavior during any particular stage or epoch of historical 
development and the reconstruction of the institutional 






 The ‘agency thesis,’ as alluded to above, suggests 
that “when the objective situation is of a certain kind, 
and action has an appropriate direction, such action can 
have a large, even an epoch-making effect” (Dobb 1955:230).  
This statement, as it stands, offers very little 
information indeed about the formation of “epoch-making” or 
epoch-breaking actions of individuals. 
 It is an historical-empirical observation that 
provides the ‘agency thesis’ with its analytical potency.  
This analytical potency has two moments in the work of the 
British Marxian economic historians.  First, epoch-breaking 
collective action has historically manifested from 
individuals resisting the inequalities of access to, and 
monopolization of, social resources.  Once again, this 
observation underscores the presence and effect of class 
conflict in historical socioeconomic development. 
 Second, it is historically observed that sometimes a 
grouping of individuals or social class tends to have a 
conservative or change-resisting attitude toward the stage 
or institutional complex, whereas another group of 
individuals or class has a revolutionary or change-seeking 
attitude toward the particular stage of history.  
Whether a group has a change-resisting or change-seeking 





part, on the source of the class’s income and their access 
to social resources.  In Dobb’s (1946:15) own words,  
 the relationship from which in one case a common 
 interest in preserving and extending a particular 
 economic system and in the other case an antagonism of 
 interest on this issue can alone derive must be a 
 relationship with a particular mode of extracting and 
 distributing the fruits of surplus labour, over and 
 above the labour which goes to supply the consumption 
 of the actual producer. 
 
 More specifically, the ‘agency thesis’ suggests that 
those individuals and classes that have adequate access to 
the social resources tend to be conservative or change-
resisting in attitude, while those that are barred from 
access to essential social resources have historically been 
the individuals and classes that, over time, develop a 
change-seeking attitude.  It has been those who are barred 
from access to social resources who have historically 
become, when objective conditions are of a certain kind, a 
revolutionary force with stage-breaking and epoch-making 
(potential) effect (Dobb 1955:230). 
 However, this is not to say that those barred from 
access to the social resources are automatically 
radicalized.  In fact, Dobb had very little to say about 
the process of change-seeking attitudes coming into 
consciousness.  Rather, for Dobb, it is merely a historical 





have tended to emerge within the groups of individuals who 
have been barred from access to social resources.   
 The class that is socially and politically dominant 
during any particular stage in historical development “will 
naturally use its power to preserve and to extend that 
particular mode of production - that particular form of 
relationship between classes, - on which its income 
depends” (Dobb 1946:13).  Individuals and classes with 
change-resisting attitudes have the power to affect not 
only the political and legislative institutional complex 
with their conservative intentions, but also the entirety 
of the institutional complex of the stage of historical 
development.  As I have shown in the work of the British 
Marxian economic historians, the institutional forms the 
change-resisting attitudes will attempt to affect include 
religion, culture (e.g., sports, leisure activity, etc.), 
media, and education. 
 Thus the conservative bias and change-resisting 
attitude of the ruling classes, in institutional form, 
become a process of socialization of the populace or of the 
totality of social members of society.  Thus, the process 
of socialization internalizes the social relations of 
production within the beliefs and very identities of 





to produce a conservative or change-resisting bias in the 
consciousness, beliefs, and actions of individuals. 
 The internalization of institutional forms, by means 
of socialization, tends to make remote any motivation 
toward change-seeking activity.  However, when inequalities 
of access to the resources of society are of a particular 
magnitude or when the social injustices are of a particular 
sort, the process of socialization will not be enough to 
suppress the development of change-seeking attitudes.  
Thus, inequalities and injustices tend to spontaneously 
radicalize an individual’s consciousness, beliefs, and 
actions.  Therefore, the process of socialization gives way 
to the manifestation of various modes of social resistance. 
 Dobb does not explain the process by which modes of 
social resistance manifest.  Rather, Dobb merely invokes 
historical episodes of resistance.  Peasant revolts are a 
paradigm example, along with labor and union history.  
These episodes that exhibit modes of social resistance have 
become a research agenda for historians practicing history 
from the bottom, up.    
These modes of social resistance are various and 
complex. The British Marxian economic historians have 
demonstrated (in their history from the bottom, up), the 





peasant revolts, tool-breaking, machine-wrecking, political 
protest, strikes and other union activities, criminal and 
terrorist activity, along with ideas of the “lunatic” 
fringe. 
 With the ‘agency thesis,’ the significance of these 
modes of resistance no longer can be ignored by historians.  
Likewise, no longer can the daily activity and social 
beliefs of the lower classes be underestimated as had 
become customary in social sciences.155 
 The above five theses are the minimum ontological 
clues that a (Marxian/Dobbian) theorist needs as an entry 
point into the study of historical and social phenomena.  
Moreover, these theses function as a methodological guide 
for the process of abstraction.   
 Armed with the ‘internal articulation thesis’ Dobb’s 
first abstraction is to identify the epoch.  This requires 
the identification and definition of the predominant 
relationship of production between the direct producers and 
their immediate superiors.  This is the first abstraction 
which Dobb makes when identifying his ontological 
orientation toward his Studies of Capitalism (1946:7ff).   
                                                 
155 Even Marx himself falls into this underestimation when he suggests, 
in his essay “Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” that the French 
peasantry constituted “the great mass of the French nation […] by the 
simple addition of isomorphous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack 





Likewise, when defining feudalism, Dobb again attempts to 
first abstract away from all but the predominant class 
relationship between the direct producers (i.e., serfs) and 
their immediate overlords (i.e., the landed aristocracy). 
 Dobb’s second mode of abstraction is to attempt an 
identification of the stage of historical development.  
This implies a reconstruction of the predominant 
institutional forms of society at the particular historical 
time and place under analysis.  For the British Marxian 
economic historians, these institutional forms were shown 
to include various routine-like patterns of behavior, modes 
of economic exchange, politics, religion, education, family 
life, personal and cultural beliefs, etc. 
 The third step in Dobb’s process of abstraction is the 
interaction between these various institutional forms.  In 
the second step the intention was merely to identify the 
existence (or perhaps absence) of various institutional 
forms.  In the third step, the intention is to understand 
the dynamic of society by means of reconstructing the 
degree of conformity and harmony and the degree of 
contradiction and antagonism between institutional forms. 
 The fourth step is to attempt an explanation of the 
routine-like pattern of behavior, beliefs, actions, and 





stage of development.  Of course, the success of the 
attempted explanations will radically depend upon the 
available historical evidence and the appropriateness of 
the abstractions made in steps one, two, and three. 
 Finally, the fifth step is to apply the theoretical 
and/or historical knowledge to inform contemporary 
political and practical activity, i.e., to inform the 
personal actions of individuals. 
 In the end, Dobb develops a unique approach to 
understanding social being.  His ontology allows for a 
structural approach to the reproduction of social 
relations, without denying the role of “agency.”  It is an 
approach that emphasizes the role of institutions in the 
reproduction of, or failure to reproduce, social relations.  
Dobb’s ontological and methodological position underscores 
the role of individual and collective human agency.  The 
notion of agency suggests that the underclass can determine 
the direction of history as much as the ruling class.   
 Dobb’s ontology is important for the construction of 
theory and for understanding contemporary society.  At the 
same time, it is also paramount for reconstructing the 
past, or practicing history.  It is an ontological paradigm 
that continues in the tradition of a relation conception of 





rediscovered and reestablished each generation.  This 
dissertation has been an attempt not only to rediscover the 
importance of the work of Maurice Dobb but also to better 
model a relationship approach to social being and the 




















 A main intent of this dissertation is to make a 
contribution toward the relative neglect of the political 
economy of Maurice Dobb.  A further result has been that 
the political economy of Maurice Dobb offers insights into 
the current global socioeconomic breakdown.   
Of special interest was that Dobb underscored the 
importance of an historical orientation for the development 
of economic theory in particular and social science in 
general.  In other words, the construction of social 
scientific theory necessarily pivots upon accurate 
historical analysis.  At the same time, Dobb demonstrated 
that historical analysis itself radically depends upon the 
specific theoretical orientation of the theorist.  
Methodologically, the implication of this history/theory 
dialectic is that historians and social theorists must 
consistently engage for the development of their respective 
disciplines.  If historians neglect theoretical challenges, 





social theorists neglect historical analysis, there emerges 
a poverty of theory. 
 Perhaps Dobb was perceptive of the history/theory 
dialectic because of his sympathy toward a social 
scientific orientation that had become significantly 
neglected in the Western academic arena due to political 
agitations it caused.  Namely, Dobb was highly sympathetic 
to a Marxian orientation toward social scientific theory.  
Dobb aptly demonstrated that a Marxist political economy 
does not belong on the shelves of the history of economic 
thought.  Quite the contrary, Marxist political economy is 
a real alternative theoretical orientation to both the 
then-emerging Keynesian and the then-dominant neoclassical 
economic theories.  Dobb was especially anxious to reveal 
that Marxist political economy had much to offer in 
interpreting and understanding the socioeconomic 
development of the Western world throughout the twentieth 
century (and potentially into the twenty-first century).   
 The relative neglect of Maurice Dobb’s contribution to 
political economy is surprising in that Dobb was a premier, 
if not the premier, Marxian political economist of his 
time.  Dobb also was a member of the faculty of the 
foremost political economic institution of the era, namely, 





political economy is especially disturbing in light of his 
considerable and multitude contributions to the development 
and practice of political economy.   
 Dobb’s Studies in the Development of Capitalism (1946) 
made a number of contributions to the study of economic 
history.  His Studies had a primary role in establishing 
the understanding that markets had an important role in the 
economies of feudalism.  Studies helped to initiate a 
historical reassessment of the place and function of 
townships in a feudal economy.  Dobb was able to decisively 
argue bourgeois merchants were a highly conservative force 
in the feudal order.  Bourgeois merchants resisted the 
transformation of feudalism and tended to impede the 
emancipation of serfs and, hence, inhibited the development 
of capitalism.  Dobb’s Studies demonstrated that far from 
functioning as a fetter, monopoly capital was essential for 
the emergence of a capitalist economy.  However, once 
capitalism had emerged, the monopoly capital element tended 
to transform its revolutionary forces toward highly 
conservative forces.   
 Dobb’s Studies were a type of fountainhead for the 
notion that feudal societies, far from being a static, 
“natural economy,” were highly complex human social 





reproduction of the social system.  Dobb emphasized the 
pivotal role the institutional physiology had for the 
success or failure of a system to reproduce another 
generation of the same social composition.  Dobb emphasized 
the importance of the institutional physiology for the 
stability of feudalism and capitalism alike. 
 Dobb’s emphasis on the pivotal role of the 
institutional physiology necessitated a re-
conceptualization of the notion of human agency.  The 
argument is that human agents or individuals make history.  
However, these human agents are constrained by and 
necessarily depend upon an institutional physiology for any 
action.  In this sense, ultimately individuals, or groups 
of individuals, are the real revolutionary force in 
history.  It is Dobb’s notion of human agency that 
especially differentiated his approach to political economy 
from those of other prominent Marxists (i.e., the 
Leninist/Stalinist notion that individuals do not matter in 
history and Plekhanov’s technological determinism).  
Dobb’s emphasis on the importance of the institutional 
physiology for understanding a society and constructing 
social theory reveals his sympathy toward structuralism as 
a valid methodological approach to social science.  At the 





legitimating a critical methodological individualism.  Dobb 
did not take sides in the ongoing debate between 
structuralism and methodological individualism but, in 
practice, transformed the grounds of the debate itself. 
In the practice of political economy and historical 
analysis, Dobb married a structuralism and methodological 
individualism which would inspire and initiate a historical 
tradition.  The British Marxist economic historians were 
provoked by Dobb’s unique methodological approach.  To 
understand history, the British Marxian economic historians 
would stress the study of the institutional physiology of a 
society in history and, simultaneously, the study of the 
beliefs, ideas, culture, and (political) desires of the 
“common people” of that society.  Rodney Hilton and Eric 
Hobsbawm would tend to underscore the importance of 
analyzing the institutional physiology, whereas E.P. 
Thompson and Christopher Hill would highlight the value of 
scrutinizing the beliefs, ideas, cultures, and political 
desires of individuals. 
 These historians would not be immediately recognized 
as constituting a new emerging consensus, or tradition. 
However, debate continues today about whether these 
historians constitute an identifiable tradition.  





would prove to have an enormous impact on the actual 
practice of history.  In the late 1960s, and throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, their practice of history would constitute 
an alternative interpretation to historical materialism.  
Their interpretation of historical materialism challenged 
both the technological determinism of Gerry Cohen and the 
“over-determination” structuralism of Louis Althusser. 
 The British Marxian economic historians were 
especially interested in the moments of socioeconomic 
crisis.  They called attention to the degrees of relative 
stability and instability present in a society.  They were 
anxious to explain why a society stable for decades could 
(seemingly) suddenly become unstable.  Further, they were 
interested in analyzing why instability would sometimes 
lead to a transformation in the mode of production, versus 
the greater probability that the instability would merely 
lead to a modification in institutional physiology of 
society.  The approach, of course, was radically Marxian 
and can be summarized as a motif: all societies develop 
with relative instability in their reproduction; this 
instability is continually liable to radical social 
transformation or socio-political revolution.  The 
relatively unstable reproduction necessitates an analysis 





transformation requires a conception of individuals’ agency 
within any society.  Although agency of individuals is 
always socially constrained, it is the potent force of 
potential revolution. 
 The British Marxian economic historians’ practice of 
history would far surpass Dobb’s historical flirtations.  
However, Dobb’s own interest in socioeconomic history was 
to construct a theory to understand contemporary society.  
The challenges Dobb lodged against historians concerned the 
epistemological status of historical explanation, the 
structure of historical consciousness, and the ontology of 
historical social being; in short, Dobb was engaging in 
meta-history.  It was this engagement with meta-history 
that Dobb used to transform political economy and the 
practice of economics.  
The meta-historical investigations informed Dobb’s 
practice of political economy for twentieth-century 
capitalism.  For Dobb, society, and social being more 
specifically, is radically determined by history.  The 
actions of the past cannot be undone.  In fact, the social 
results of past actions are even difficult to transform.  
In this sense, history matters, for the actions of our 
ancestors are present in the construction and constitution 





matters.  Dobb attempted to demonstrate that comprehensive 
historical analyses always reveal particular circumstances, 
actions, and structures occupying historical events.  A 
general economic or social theory is always circumscribed. 
  That general theories of socioeconomic structures 
are always circumscribed necessarily implies that 
explanations offered by means of a general theory are 
always partial and historically misleading. Hence, the 
practice of history is necessary for the full understanding 
of the particular circumstances, structures, and agency of 
any event.  If a general theory of socioeconomic structures 
and activities could be successfully employed, historical 
analysis would be redundant, hence unnecessary.  General 
theorizing is seductive and has characterized the approach 
of most mainstream neoclassical and Keynesian economists, 
along with many Marxian economists.  The seduction of a 
general theory is the explanation of everything.  More 
humbly, the more general a theory, the more unified the 
explanation.  The more unified the explanation, the less 
necessary the historical analysis. Dobb desired to 
challenge the predominance of socio-economic general 
theorizing, and reestablish the necessity of historical 





demonstrate the inadequacy of general theories for 
explaining the events and circumstances in history. 
The inadequacy of general theorizing did not 
constitute, for Dobb, an abandonment of theorizing 
generally.  Quite the contrary, understanding the 
inadequacy of general theories constituted the Dobbian 
approach to theorizing generally.  For Dobb, the concepts 
and categories employed by socioeconomic science are always 
particular to more or less specific institutional 
arrangements.  Hence, a theorist must always engage in a 
thorough analysis of the institutional arrangement before 
employing any particular theory, concept, or category to 
interpret the events. 
The particular institutional arrangement, or what Dobb 
called the institutional physiology, constituted a 
society’s stage of development.  In this sense, Dobb 
treated societies as evolving complex organisms.  If a 
particular evolving complex organism, or society, was 
relatively stable, then particular concepts, categories, 
and theories could be employed to understand it.  For 
example, the concepts of factors of production, labor, 
capital, land, entrepreneurship, wages, interest, rent, and 
profits can be employed if the institutional physiology is 





theories will be highly inappropriate when the 
institutional physiology is of a different kind.  In this 
sense, for Dobb, ontological presuppositions are of 
fundamental importance.  General principles cannot be 
presumed but must be demonstrated historically in the 
particulars of an event. 
It was the ontological presuppositions of neoclassical 
economics which Dobb demonstrated to be inadequate for 
normative, or welfare, economics.  More specifically, Dobb 
argued that an ontological presupposition of utility 
maximization resulting in general social welfare has 
“individual [human] beings regarded as independent units 
with respect to the influences affecting demand” (Dobb 
1969:5).  This ontological presupposition ignores “the 
interdependence between individuals’ desires, through the 
play of social convention, emulation, and other Veblenesque 
factors, as well as their dependence on a producer’s 
initiative, […] propaganda, and presentation” (Dobb 
1969:6).  For Dobb, the logical conclusions from such 
ontological presupposition are simply assumed when the 
institutional physiology and complex social influences are 
ignored.  In brief, ontological ignorance allows the simple 





Dobb likewise demonstrated the ontological 
presupposition of Marxian theorists, especially regarding 
crisis theory.  Crisis theory held a special place in 
Marxian economics, in that it was assumed crisis would 
automatically lead to socialism.  Dobb is able to 
demonstrate the fallacy of this assumption.  Crisis, far 
from transforming society, may lead merely to an 
institutional adjustment and a new stage of economic 
development.  For Dobb, understanding how a society 
generally, and a capitalist society particularly, evolves 
helps to explain how it endures.  The endurance of 
capitalism is especially curious given its liability toward 
change, or its relatively high degree of instability.  
For Dobb, capitalist crises are part of the 
constitution, or adjustment mechanism, of the system. 
Ontologically, crises, according to Dobb, are immanent, 
necessary, and permanent to the capitalist mode of 
production. Dobb’s broad conclusions are that capitalism 
has been successfully, but unevenly, reproduced for more 
than two centuries.  Thus, capitalism is highly unstable 
given its ontological constitution but can be relatively 
stable with the correct institutional arrangement.  The 





institutional arrangement must itself adjust to provide 
continued stability and successful reproduction. 
Currently, the domestic Western capitalist economies 
have once again become relatively unstable.  The global 
economy is arguably on the brink of a socioeconomic 
breakdown.  Many social theorists acknowledge that, for 
most of the world’s citizens, socioeconomic life is 
becoming increasingly difficult and precarious. 
The general theorizing of both orthodox and heterodox 
economics has been incapable of producing the theory 
necessary to construct stabilizing policy.  It is now 
recognized that an institutional approach to socioeconomic 
theory is necessary to inform successful public policy. 
Dobb long ago recognized the impoverishment of general 
theorizing and the strength of a historically informed 
institutional approach.  This dissertation on the political 
economy of Maurice Dobb and the historical tradition he 
inspired is intended as a contribution to both understand 
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